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FOREWORD 
These proceedings from t h e  IIASA Task Force Meeting held  i n  He ls ink i  
from 9-14 October, 1983 r e f l e c t  t h e  wide spectrum of i n t e r e s t s  and exper i -  
ences  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The main topic-Human Fac to rs  i n  Innovat ion 
Management-was s ing led  ou t  a s  a p o t e n t i a l  focus  e a r l y  i n  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  
Innovat ion Management P r o j e c t .  P re l iminary  meetings had a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d  
how i n t e r n a l l y  s t r u c t u r e d  t h i s  t o p i c  could be. In ten t io .na l ly ,  no a t t empts  
were made t o  l i m i t  t h e  scope of t h e  meeting,  a s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  was t o  re-  
a l i s t i c a l l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s ,  exper iences  and r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s  of our  
c o l l a b o r a t o r s  and cons t i tuency  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  
The papers  and s t u d i e s  generated f o r  t h e  meeting have t o  s e r v e  a s  a 
b a s i s  f o r  f u r t h e r  work i n  t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  There a r e  few, i f  any p u b l i c a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  f i e l d  which, on a working l e v e l ,  r e f l e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s  of Eas t  and West 
r e s e a r c h  and i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Th i s  a l s o  b r i n g s  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  
c e r t a i n  c a u t i o n  when read ing  t h e  proceedings because i n  s p i t e  of c e r t a i n  
e d i t i n g ,  we d i d  n o t  want t o  produce a "monolithic" p u b l i c a t i o n  e l i m i n a t i n g  
some i n t e r e s t i n g  p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s .  This  may be v a l i d  f o r  vocabulary and 
semantics of a few terms. P a r t i c i p a n t s  from s o c i a l i s t s  c o u n t r i e s  guided by 
t r a n s l a t i o n  from S l a v i c  languages a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  eng ineer ing  and 
technology by " technics"  and understand under "technology" t h e  product ion 
process .  
Severa l  au thors  t r e a t i n g  t h e  sub jec t  have h i n t e d  a t  t h e  vagueness of 
r e l a t e d  terms such a s  s t r a t e g i c  planning (Wolf, P a t z ) ,  innovat ion and i t s  
i n g r e d i e n t s  (Benjamin, Langrish,  Prakke, Riegel)  , o r  c r e a t i v i t y  (Kivikko, 
Langrish,  Pa tz ) .  I n  t h e  paper by Bachvarov e t  a l . ,  examples a r e  given how 
i n c e n t i v e  and p a r t i c i p a t i v e  behavior a r e  enhanced. The human f a c t o r  i s  re -  
l a t e d  t o  t h e  wider problem of s o c i a l  impacts of new technolog ies ,  a s  pointed 
out  by Langr ish  and Patz  and h i n t e d  a t  by s e v e r a l  o t h e r  au thors .  
The interesting ideas, experiences and research results on the problems 
of team building and work are reported by several authors (Andersin, Bachvarov 
et al., Hanes, Moss, Rysina et al., Wolf). One tends to express the impres- 
sion that in many companies in different countries the problems seem to be 
structured following similar patterns. At the first IIASA meeting on the 
problems of innovation the following question was posed: "To what extent is 
management of innovat ion the innovat ion of management?" Several authors 
stressed the need to educate managers to think and act creatively and in an 
innovative way and reported on the programs their own companies have insti- 
tuted (Cervenka, Hempel, Smrcka, Virkkala) . This only proves the relevance 
of the question posed above. 
From several papers one can also feel the "in-house" practices that com- 
panies use when contemplating innovations (for example, Karttunen and Wolf). 
These proceedings with selected papers, present examples ofthe most im- 
portant problems managers face when managing innovation in the contemporary 
world. 
Tibor Vasko 
Leader 
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OPENING ADDRESS 
Pekka Jauho 
Director General, 
Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), 
Espoo, Finland 
It i s  my p l e a s u r e  and honor t o  open t h i s  meeting,  t o  welcome you t o  
t h e  Technical  Research Centre  of F in land ,  and a l s o  t o  Finland.  I have a 
double f u n c t i o n  h e r e :  I am D i r e c t o r  General of t h i s  o rgan iza t ion ,  which i s  
hos t ing  your meeting,  and I am a member of t h e  F i n n i s h  Nat ional  Member 
Organizat ion group of IIASA. When looking a t  t h e  program and a t  t h e  names 
of t h e  people  who a r e  t a k i n g  p a r t  i n  t h i s  meeting,  we can n o t e  w i t h  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t  group that i s  meeting h e r e  i n  Finland i s  of a 
v e r y  h igh  s tandard .  We a r e  v e r y  happy t o  once aga in  welcome you t o  our 
country .  
Since  t h e  beginning,  F i n l a n d ' s  p o s i t i o n  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  IIASA has  been 
very  p o s i t i v e ,  w i t h  a g r e a t  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  deep-growing work a t  IIASA, 
where s o  many nati 'ons from a l l  co rners  of t h e  world a r e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g .  We 
e s p e c i a l l y  recognize  t h e  importance of t h e  cooperat ion between East  and 
West in sc5ence; and,  a s  every s c i e n t i s t  knows, i t  i s  of t e n  much e a s i e r  t o  
f i n d  a common language between s c i e n t i s t s  than between p o l i t i c i a n s .  We 
a l s o  in tend  t o  cont inue t o  support  t h e  work of IIASA i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  i n  
s p i t e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  o p e r a t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which a r e  w e l l  known t o  t h i s  
group. 
I promised t o  open t h i s  meeting wi th  a v e r y  informal  t a l k .  I prepared 
i t  on t h e  a i r p l a n e  from Tokyo t o  Finland l a s t  n i g h t ,  s o  I am s t i l l  a b i t  
d i z z y .  I do, however, in tend  t o  i l l u m i n a t e  some of my own views w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  human f a c t o r  i n  innovat ion management. To s t a r t  wi th ,  I 
thought t h a t  i t  might be  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  look a t  some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  where 
t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  and t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  can 
be compared. A s  everybody knows, t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Revolution s t a r t e d  wi th  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  steam engine;  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  is  based on 
t h e  computer. The b a s i c  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  was, of course ,  
t h e  replacement of p h y s i c a l  l abor  by machines. I n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y ,  
it i s  t h e  replacement and a m p l i f i c a t i o n  of mental  l abor  wi th  t h e  a i d  of 
mic roe lec t ron ics .  Informat ion s o c i e t y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a n a t u r a l  con t inua t ion  
of t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Revolution i n  t h e  sphere  of g rey  substance i n s i d e  our  b r a i n s .  
The product ive  power i n  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s  i s  based on m a t e r i a l s  and 
products ,  and i n  informat ion s o c i e t i e s ,  on informat ion.  The d i f f e r e n c e  
might be  expressed by saying t h a t  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  m a t e r i a l s  determine 
t h e  l i m i t s ,  i n  informat ion s o c i e t y  t h e r e  a r e , . i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  no l i m i t s .  
You can produce a s  much informat ion a s  you want, b u t ,  of course ,  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  informat ion which can be  grasped by a human being i s  l i m i t e d .  
I f  one s t a r t s  t o  compare socioeconomic s t r u c t u r e s  i n  t h e s e  two cases ,  
you see  that i n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  t h e  main product i s  knowledge. I n  
and i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  product ion t akes  p l a c e  i n  t h e  f a c t o r i e s ;  t h e  product ion 
of informat ion can t ake  p l a c e  anywhere, and cover v a s t  d i s t a n c e s .  
Market a r e a s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  have been most ly  consumers, new 
c o u n t r i e s  and c o l o n i e s .  I n  informat ion s o c i e t y ,  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  i s  t h e  
b o r d e r l i n e  between t h e  known and t h e  unknown. Leading i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  
manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s  and informat ion i n d u s t r i e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n d u s t r i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  can be  d iv ided  i n t o  t h r e e ,  primary, secondary and t e r t i a r y ,  phases 
2n t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y ,  whereas i n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  you have an 
i n t e g r a t e d  network. I n  economic s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  d e a l  wi th  
commodities and i n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  you can speak about a s y n e r g e t i c  
economy. I n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  p r i c e s  determine t h e  equ i l ib r ium of 
supply and demand, and i n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  you have t o  d e f i n e  t h e  
g o a l s  i n  o rder  t o  f i n d  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  change. I n  socioeconomic terms 
you have t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  on t h e  one hand, whi le  i n  t h e  in format ion  s o c i e t y ,  
you can form l o t s  of coopera t ive  u n i t s  which produce informat ion.  I n  an 
i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  whether based on c e n t r a l i z e d  economies o r  p r i v a t e  
ownership, t h e  innovat ion i s  c a p i t a l ,  wi th  compet i t ion i n  t h i s  compet i t ive  
s o c i e t y ,  and v e r y  o f t e n  t h e  p r o f i t  motive i s  t h e  determining f a c t o r .  I n  
t h e  i'nformat5on s o c i e t y ,  perhaps t h e  s o c i a l  k i n e t i c s  have more weight i n  
decis5on making. 
The advent of t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  may mean t h a t  socioeconomic 
s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  changing. I n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  n a t i o n a l  goa l s  a r e  
t h e  maximization of n a t i o n a l  w e l f a r e  i n  terms of product supply.  Maybe 
i n  t h e  f u t u r e  you can speak about g ross  n a t i o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  a s  a g o a l ,  
r a t h e r  than  i n c r e a s e  of g r o s s  n a t l o n a l  product .  The i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s  
a r e  based on high consumption r a t e s  and t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  i s  based 
on high knowledge c r e a t i o n  r a t e s .  I n  many c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  form of government 
has been par l iamentary  democracy. Perhaps you can speak about p a r t i c i p a t o r y  
democracy i n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  phase. The f o r c e s  producing innovat ions  
and changes i'n s o c i e t y  have o f t e n  been l a b o r  movements, and i n  t h e  informat ion 
soci'ety t h e r e  a r e  more vo lun ta ry  fo rmula t ions  of d e c i s i o n s  which changes 
cont inuously .  
These two s o c i e t i e s  a l s o  have d i f f e r e n t  v a l u e  systems, a s  d i scussed  i n  
t h e  book by Professor  Masuda The Information Society as a Post-IndustriuZ 
Soci'ety. Values i n  an i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  a r e  most ly  m a t e r i a l  v a l u e s .  I n  
an informat ion s o c i e t y  t h e r e  a r e  higher  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  of s a t i s f a c t i o n  
of i .n te l l ec tua1  needs. I n  an i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  t h e  main problems a r e  human 
r i g h t s  a s  you have a system based on i n d i v i d u a l s  and most ly  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e .  
You cannot h p o s e  a c t i o n s  on i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  an informat ion s o c i e t y  i f  they 
a r e  n o t  i n  agreement wi th  t h e i r  own goa l s .  I n  t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y ,  
g lobal ism w i l l  be  a ve ry  r e l e v a n t  p roper ty  because t h e  whole globe w i l l  be  
comb5ned i'n in terconnected informat ion networks. I t h i n k  t h e  most important  
p o l n t  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  informat ion s o c i e t y  w i l l  be individual 
creativity. I f  it  i s  going t o  work a t  a l l ,  and I a m  p r e t t y  pessimist ic  
about t h a t ,  i t  might be based on individuals  and on the c r e a t i v i t y  of 
s ing le  persons, and then on the p o s s i b i l i t y  of forming broader groups by 
using information networks, then communities, then countr ies ,  and then the 
whole globe. I am not  qu i t e  sure whether a l l  human beings a re  capable of 
or  wi l l ing  t o  become bra in  c e l l s  i n  a global  network. I n  many cases,  the 
values which must e x i s t  i n  the  f u t u r e  information society a r e  very much 
d i f f e ren t  from the  values which we have i n  t h i s  concrete world of today. 
The acceptance of these new values w i l l  be a d i f f i c u l t  process and it w i l l  
requi re  a long period of accl imatizat ion.  
What i s  ce r t a in ly  t r u e  i s  t h a t  the c r e a t i v i t y  of a man i s  the  most 
tender flower of a l l  the  flowers of human a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  the  information 
soc ie ty  there  a r e  many dangers tha t  might l i m i t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  use 
individual  s k i l l s .  Mostly I am a f r a i d  of the  spread of bureaucracy which 
very eas i ly  follows, f o r  example, the  unwise appl ica t ion  of computer methods. 
Everyone of you knows t h a t  it  r e q u i ~ e s  s tandardizat ion;  it  requi res  many 
r u l e s  which must be obeyed and which very o f t en  a r e  i n  conf l i c t  with the  
requirements of c r e a t i v i t y  i n  an individual  person. The only way t o  
a l l e v i a t e  t h i s  very ser ious problem i s  t o  develop managerial s k i l l s ,  t o  
t r y  t o  f ind  out ways where t h i s  most important property i n  man can under 
a l l  phases of the  development of mankind be preserved and improved. I n  
t h a t  respect  your team i s  most up t o  date .  I f  one makes a guess about a 
time schedule concerning the introduct ion of an information soc ie ty ,  i t  
might be ten years--wh?ch i s  a very shor t  time, maybe 20 years i s  more 
r e a l i s t i c  i n  most advanced countr ies .  But jus t  now i s  the  r i g h t  time t o  
s t a r t  thinking about these problems. 

OPENING ADDRESS 
Boris  Segers tah l  
Chairman of the Research CowzciZ, the Finnish Committee for IIASA 
I am going t o  t r y  i n  a few words t o  e x p l a i n  t o  you how what we a r e  
going t o  do t h i s  week f i t s  i n t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  s t r u c t u r e  of what IIASA wants 
t o  do. I assume t h a t  I have some minimal amount of knowledge i n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t  a s  Chairman of IIASA1s Research C m i t t e e  which t akes  c a r e  of some 
of t h e  r o u t i n e  planning a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  shor t -  and long-range planning of 
ILASA1s resea rch .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y  t h e  work being done a t  IIASA i s  i n  s e v e r a l  
competing a r e a s  of most ly  app l ied  sc ience .  This means t h a t  we never s e e  
any one a r e a  d m i n a t i n g  everything t h a t  i s  going on a t  t h e  I n s t i t u t e .  We 
have s e v e r a l  r e a l l y  s t r o n g  r e s e a r c h  a r e a s  such a s ,  f o r  example, energy,  
food and a g r i c u l t u r e ,  economic s t r u c t u r a l  change and s o  on. Innovat ion 
management f i t s  i n t o  one a r e a  which was f a i r l y  s t r o n g  f o r  a few y e a r s ,  
i . e . ,  Management and Technology. This  a r e a  l i v e d  a good l i f e ,  b u t  f e l l  
i n t o  t h e  background when o t h e r  r e s e a r c h  a r e a s  became more important  f o r  
IIASA. Management and Technology d i d  n o t  completely d i sappear  however. 
I n  d i f f e r e n t  ways some people  managed t o  keep t h e  r e s e a r c h  going on a ve ry  
smal l  s c a l e ,  mainly concerning problems d i r e c t l y  involving product ion systems, 
i n d u s t r y ,  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  bus iness  and s o  on. Now IIASA i s  going t o  
g i v e  more p r i o r i t y  t o  r e s e a r c h  Which has  re levance  f o r  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  
f o r  indus t ry ,  and f o r  producing e n t e r p r i s e s .  
You w i l l  no t  s e e  t h e  Management and Technology Area aga in  a t  IIASA, b u t  
we a r e  going t o  s e e  something which is named Science and Technology. This 
i s  a smal l  r e s e a r c h  program which w i l l  s t a r t  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  1984. I n  
my opinion,  work being done on c r e a t i v i t y  innovat ion management, and r e l a t e d  
s u b j e c t s  could f i t  ve ry  wel l  i n t o  t h e  Science and Technology program a t  
I LASA . 
The work which has  been done under t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  of Vadim Goncharov 
has been done wi th  f a i r l y  smal l  i n t e r n a l  ILASA resources .  It has  mainly 
been based on v e r y  s t r o n g  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  work w i t h  a l o t  of i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  opera t ing  a s  a network. 
This  seminar i s  n o t  j u s t  a one-off seminar i n  Hels ink i ,  it  i s  p a r t  of 
a long process .  Some of you have taken p a r t  i n  t h i s  process ,  some of you 
may only be involved i n  t h i s  ga ther ing  here .  Unfor tunately ,  those  of you 
who only take p a r t  i n  t h i s  meeting without  being p a r t  of t h e  whole process  
w i l l  n o t  g e t  a f e e l i n g  f o r  w h a t  i t  i s  r e a l l y  a l l  about.  Those of you who 
a r e  s t i l l  here  on Thursday may g e t  an i dea  of t h e  process  when you take 
p a r t  i n  t he  planning d i s cus s ions  f o r  t h e  next  two t a sk  f o r c e  meetings.  I n  
any ca se ,  innovat ion management a s  a r e s ea r ch  process ,  a s  a networking 
a c t i v i t y ,  w i l l  be phased ou t  when t he  time comes. But, i f  we can f i n d  t h e  
support  needed and a l l  t he  i n t e l l e c t u a l  resources  needed, and i f  we p l an  
wel l  enough f o r  t he  f u t u r e ,  t he se  a c t i v i t i e s  could cont inue,  perhaps focused 
on o ther  ques t ions ,  bu t  t h e  main ideas  w i l l  surv ive  and could be p a r t  of t h e  
f u t u r e  Science and Technology Area a t  TLASA. One such idea ,  and it  i s  only 
an i d e a ,  i s  f o r  a p r o j e c t  on "Computers and Children".  Here a t  t h i s  
meeting we have Evka Razvigorova from Bulgar ia  who i s  involved i n  t r y i n g  
t o  plan f o r  t h i s  i dea  t o  be included i n  t h e  f u t u r e  IIASA r e sea r ch  p lan .  
IIASA i s  very  consumer o r i en t ed ,  and we t r y  t o  avoid doing t h ings  j u s t  
because i t  g ives  u s  a tremendous f e e l i n g  of p leasure .  We g e t  our p leasure  
ou t  of keeping our consumers happy. 
I s a id  e a r l i e r  t h a t  we t r y  t o  do work which has some re levance  f o r  
indus t ry  and product ion systems i n  d i f f e r e n t  coun t r i e s .  There a r e  some 
d i f  f l c u l t i e s  . IIASA i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  an academic environment. We have 
a l o t  of s c i e n t i s t s  from u n i v e r s i t i e s  and r e sea r ch  i n s t i t u t e s ,  which means 
t h a t  we ve ry  e a s i l y  f a l l  i n t o  na ive  academic percep t ions  of what i s  r e l evan t ,  
i n t e r e s t i n g  and r e a l l y  needed by indus t ry ,  and what they a r e  prepared t o  
support .  Somehow it  i s  ve ry  easy i n  an academic environment t o  c r e a t e  a l l  
k inds  of n i c e  and wonderful i dea s  which should be supported by i ndus t ry ,  
but  when we t u r n  t o  i ndus t ry  they a r e  no t  i n t e r e s t e d .  
Never thless ,  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  we w i l l  t r y  t o  f i n d  ou t  what i ndus t ry  needs 
and wants, a l though we can never g e t  a complete answer because i n  many cases  
t h e  people i n  i ndus t ry  do no t  know themselves. They do no t  know how t o  
formulate  t h e i r  problems, they do not  even always know where t h e i r  problems 
a r e .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  t h e ~ e f o r e  always be complicated.  IIASA has  
l imi ted  resources ,  we cannot and shall no t ,  c r e a t e  b ig  r e s ea r ch  groups. 
We a l s o  have t o  u se  those  components of IIASA's s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  a r e  r e a l l y  
s t rong  and, I would say,  unique,  i . e . ,  that IIASA i s  m u l t i c u l t u r a l  and 
mul t id2sc ip l inary .  We have responded t o  r eques t s  f o r  research  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
a r e a s  and, a s  Professor  Jauho mentioned e a r l i e r ,  one unique aspec t  i s  t h a t  
we have good working r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between r e sea r ch  groups from E a s t  and 
West. This i s  something which we have t o  remember a l l  t h e  time and take 
ca r e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we r e a l l y  a r e  a b l e  t o  work openly and hones t ly  
toge ther .  
It i s  ve ry  app rop r i a t e  t h a t  we have t h i s  t a s k  f o r c e  meeting here  a t  
t h e  Technical  Research Center.  Here i n  t h i s  environment, where t h e  Technical  
Research Center and t he  Hels ink i  Univers i ty  of Technology a r e  loca ted ,  we 
a c t u a l l y  have t h e  b igges t  concen t ra t ion  of innovat ion p o t e n t i a l  i n  t h e  
whole of Finland.  A l o t  of what is being done and c r ea t ed  i n  t h e  manufacturing 
environment o r  indus t ry  has i t s  r o o t s  somewhere he r e  i n  Otaniemi. Of course ,  
we have some o ther  s t rong  c e n t e r s  which a r e  q u i t e  capable  of t ak ing  c a r e  of 
t h e i r  own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  f o r  example, we have some ve ry  s t rong  groups i n  
Northern Finland,  however, we a r e  a l l  i n  one way o r  another dependent on t h e  
tremendous c l u s t e r  of resources  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  c apac i t y  here  i n  Otaniemi. 
Therefore ,  i n  my op in ion ,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  and c r u c i a l  f o r  every o rgan iza t ion ,  
every country ,  t o  know that somewhere t h e r e  i s  a concen t ra t ion  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  
power. 
One o t h e r  t h i n g  t h a t  we have t o  t ake  c a r e  of i n  our networking 
a c t i v i t i e s  i s  t o  con t inue  good communication w i t h  s o  many people  t h a t  we 
enab le  t h e  group t o  r e a l l y  s t a y  a l i v e  and c r e a t e  new ideas .  I ts  very  good 
t h a t  we s e e ,  a seminar l i k e  t h i s  i n  Finland wi th  no pass ive  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
I suppose almost a l l  of you a r e  going t o  do some kind of work dur ing  t h i s  
week, which means that we can probably achieve something. A l l  of u s  a r e  
ready t o  do work and I hope t h a t  you w i l l  enjoy t h e  environment around you. 
Th is  t a s k  f o r c e  meeting would have been impossible  wi thout  t h e  support  
of t h e  F i n n i s h  i n d u s t r y .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r e s e a r c h ,  connnunication 
and i n d u s t r y  i s  always s l i g h t l y  d i f f i c u l t .  We cannot  completely understand 
each o t h e r .  We do,  however, have some marvel lous  people  he re ,  f o r  ins tance ,  
one of t h e  nex t  speakers  Professor  Wolf, who has  been working i n  r e s e a r c h  a s  
a p rofessor  a t  t h e  Technical  Univers2ty and i s  now working a t  t h e  top 
management l e v e l  of i n d u s t r y .  He t h e r e f o r e ,  knows both  s i d e s .  It i s  v e r y  
unusual i n  Finland and some o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t o  f i n d  people who a r e  w i l l i n g  
and a b l e  t o  move back and f o r t h  between academic and i n d u s t r i a l  environments. 
Th i s  can be a problem i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  This  i s  a l s o  one reason why it  i s  n o t  
always easy t o  persuade i n d u s t r y  t h a t  we can g ive  them anything by doing 
r e s e a r c h  on innova t ion  management. 
I r e a l l y  hope t h a t  you w i l l  enjoy your week here .  We a r e  going t o  
spend a l o t  of t i b e  t o g e t h e r  he re  and T s i n c e r e l y  hope t h a t  we can  have 
your support  when we t r y  t o  f i n i s h  this p r o j e c t .  

OPENING ADDRESS 
Hans Andersin 
Corporate Vice President, VaZmet Automation Oy, 
He Zsinki, Fin Zand 
M r .  Chairman, Lad ies  and Gentlemen. It was a  p l e a s a n t  s u r p r i s e  f o r  me 
t h a t  I was given t h e  honor t o  make t h e  opening remarks. I was t o l d  t h a t  I 
have about f i v e  minutes .  I am going t o  squeeze i n  a  l o t  of  my f e e l i n g s  and 
some of my t hough t s  i n t o  t h i s  f i v e  minutes.  
It i s  my p l e a s u r e  t o  t a l k  t o  you a s  a  person working i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  a s  
a  c o u n t e r p a r t  t o  P r o f e s s o r  S e g e r s t a h l  who works i n  a n o t h e r  environment.  We 
i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  c o n s i d e r  o u r s e l v e s  t o  be  ve ry  p r a c t i c a l ,  aga in  i n  c o n t r a s t  
t o  people  working i n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and r e s e a r c h  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  W e  stress prac- 
t i c a l i t y  a  l o t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, we a l s o  r e q u i r e  an i n c r e a s i n g  amount of  
c r e a t i v i t y  from our  peop le .  A s  you know, c r e a t i v e  people  a r e  n o t  always t h e  
most p r a c t i c a l ,  and of course ,  p r a c t i c a l  people  are n o t  always t h e  most cre-  
a t i v e .  There fo re ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  ach ieve  what we c a l l  i nnova t ion ,  t h a t  i s ,  
c r e a t i n g  something new t o  be used f o r  something p r a c t i c a l ,  we need team work. 
I t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  w e l l  unders tood i n  i n d u s t r y  today.  We have t o  develop 
teams of people  who a r e  c r e a t i v e  w i t h  people  who a r e  p r a c t i c a l .  Of course ,  
t h e  t h i r d  element t h a t  i s  needed i s  t h e  management of t h e s e  p r a c t i c a l  and 
c r e a t i v e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  b e i n g  o r d e r  and f i n a n c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n t o  t h i s  work. 
I t h i n k  everybody i n  i n d u s t r y  w i l l  s h a r e  my op in ion  t h a t  a  seminar of  
t h i s  k ind i s  very  impor tan t ,  because  it i s  concerned w i t h  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t e d  
t o  innova t ion .  Th i s  i s  one of t h e  r easons  why we a r e  happy t o  sponsor t h i s  
seminar.  We a r e  g l a d  t h a t  IIASA has  taken up a  s u b j e c t  l i k e  t h i s  i n  t h e i r  
program, a  s e r i e s  of  seminars  concerned w i t h  innova t ion  management. We a l s o  
know very w e l l  t h a t  t h e  human f a c t o r  i s  t h e  s i n g l e  most impor tant  t h i n g  
where innova t ion  is  concerned.  Innova t ion  cannot b e  automated. Computers 
may be a  good t o o l  f o r  t h e  innova to r ,  b u t  it i s  human beings  t h a t  have t o  do 
t h e  c r e a t i v e  work, more t h a n  i n  any o t h e r  a s p e c t  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  p rocess .  
Th i s  seminar i n  a  very  good way combines p r a c t i c a l ,  c r e a t i v e  and manage- 
ment a s p e c t s .  We have people  h e r e  from i n d u s t r y ,  from u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  from 
r e s e a r c h  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  from government, e t c .  We a l s o  have people  of d i f f e r -  
e n t  c u l t u r e s  and i d e o l o g i e s .  Innovat ion i s  a  u n i v e r s a l  s u b j e c t  t o  t a l k  about ,  
r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  i d e o l o g i e s  he ld .  This seminar t h e r e f o r e  should be a  suc- 
cess  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  b u t  i t s  success  a l s o  depends on a l l  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
how a c t i v e  we a r e ,  how c r e a t i v e  and p r a c t i c a l  we a r e ,  and how much we can 
manage ourse lves  and t h e  people  s i t t i n g  nex t  t o  us .  
A s  a  person who works i n  i n d u s t r y  I hope t h a t  t h i s  seminar w i l l  be a  
success  and I wish t h i s  group and IIASA a l l  good luck.  
HUMAN FACTORS IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT-THEMES, 
CONTRADICTIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR OUR MEETING 
Thomas Moss 
Case Western Reserve University, CZeveZand, 
Ohio, USA 
INTRODUCTION: RISKS AND CHALLENGES OF OUR CONFERENCE 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to deliver this opening report. 
I will use the time to identify some important themes which I found in my 
reading of the papers submitted, to point out some questions which I saw 
raised or left unanswered by them, and to highlight some contradictions which 
struck me in the various points of view. I do this at some risk of misrepre- 
senting the authors, or exposing my own slowness to understand, since I have 
only read their words and in most cases have not had the opportunity for dis- 
cussion with them. I will .apologize in advance to those to whom my brief 
synopsis does injustice. 
I take the risk, however, for a simple reason. I think none of us likes a 
boring meeting in which reports are mechanically accepted without reaching for 
new synthesis and growth. If I can succeed in raising my own misunderstandings 
in a manner which stimulates discussion and clarification among us, and cata- 
lyzes refinement and creation of new concepts, I will have succeeded in my 
purpose. 
Let me just point out an organizational issue which in many interesting 
ways raises a typical problem of management for innovation. You will note that 
your papers have been placed in an organizational framework which may or may 
not appear natural to you: We quickly found that within the core planning group 
there were completely different views of how the papers of this conference could 
be organized, and that this situation was like many others in creating a team 
effort for problem-solving.' A group is typically brought together, apparently 
with a single purpose, and suddenly it appears that the diversity of assumptions 
and expectations is so great that synthesis and coherent purpose will be un- 
reachable. 
I imagine that in this full plenary session there is an even wider spectrum 
of views than in the planning group on the shape and organization of the problem 
of human f a c t o r s  i n  i n n o v a t i o n  management. We a r e  indeed a  d i v e r s e  group from 
widely  v a r y i n g  s o c i a l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  backgrounds.  I sugges t  o n l y  
t h a t  we avoid  r e t r e a t  i n t o  discouragement and confus ion ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  t a k e  t h i s  
d i v e r s i t y  a s  a  c h a l l e n g e .  We can  c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  next  days a s  an  a c t u a l  e x p e r i -  
ment i n  human f a c t o r s  i n n o v a t i o n  management, and no t  s imply a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
s i t  back and ana lyze  t h e  i s s u e .  We a r e  t h e  expe r imen ta l  group,  and our  t a s k  i s  
t o  overcome t h e  gu l f  of d i f f e r e n t  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  of d i f f e r e n t  concep tua l  frameworks, 
and of d i f f e r e n t  v o c a b u l a r i e s  t o  r e a c h  a  h i g h e r  s y n t h e s i s  of  comnon p r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  human f a c t o r  management f o r  innovation-a s y n t h e s i s ,  I shou ld  add,  t h a t  must 
b e  i n  a  form which can  b e  drawn on and a p p l i e d  i n  p r a c t i c a l  c i r cums tances  by 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s  such a s  t h o s e  i n  t h e  f i r m s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  
The r i s k  i n  t h e  nex t  days i s  t h a t  we w i l l  u s e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  v i ewpo in t s  
a s  a n  excuse  t o  " t a l k  by" each o t h e r .  That  i s ,  t o  t a l k  f rom o u r  own frame of  
r e f e r e n c e  wi thou t  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  r e l a t e  i t  by q u e s t i o n  and exchange t o  t h o s e  of  
o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The conver se  of t h i s  i s  an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  l e a r n i n g  oppor- 
t u n i t y :  t o  be  a b l e ,  through t h e  eyes  of o u r  meet ing  c o l l e a g u e s ,  t o  s e e  f a m i l i a r  
problems viewed i n  ve ry  new frames of r e f e r e n c e .  T h i s  new i n s i g h t  can  b r i n g  
g r e a t  b e n e f i t s  i n  under s t and ing  o u r  own weaknesses,  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  a p p r e c i a t i n g  
our  s t r e n g t h s .  I t r u s t  t h a t  we a r e  wi se  enough t o  use  o u r  p r e c i o u s  t ime  f o r  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  s i d e  of t h i s  dua l - f ace ted  r e a l i t y  of d i v e r s e  v i ewpo in t s .  
The c h a l l e n g e  s t a r t s  w i t h  t h e  vocabu la ry  i t s e l f .  There a r e  words i n  t h e  
program and papers  such a s  " p o l i t i c s " ,  " e f f i c i e n c y " ,  and even " innovat ion"  which 
are used i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  d i f f e r e n t  languages  and c u l t u r e s .  T ry ing  t o  b u i l d  
a  common under s t and ing  o f  t h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s  may be  an impor tant  l e a r n i n g  p rocess  
f o r  ou r  group. 
THEMES AND QUESTIONS FROM THE REPORTS 
I. INNOVATION POL ICY 
Le t  me b e g i n  now t o  h i g h l i g h t  key p o i n t s  I saw i n  t h e  pape r s ,  h o p e f u l l y  
w i t h  enough r e c k l e s s n e s s  t o  d i s t u r b  and draw i n t o  a c t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n  even t h e  
  no st r e s e r v e d  of us i n  t h i s  assembly.  I n  t h e  f i r s t  c a t e g o r y ,  c a l l e d  "pol icy"  
and i n c l u d i n g  t h e  b r o a d e s t  concep t s  and g o a l s ,  P r o f e s s o r  Lundstedt of  t h e  U.S. 
b r i n g s  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  o v e r - a l l  concept  t h a t  s o c i a l  i n n o v a t i o n  i s  a n  i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  of s u c c e s s f u l  t e c h n i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  n o t  a n  u n f a m i l i a r  i d e a ,  b u t  
by  drawing a n  analogy between a  management s t r u c t u r e  and an  e c o l o g i c a l  sys tem 
he  a l e r t s  u s  t o  t h e  need f o r  b u i l d i n g  concep t s  of  a d a p t a t i o n  and change i n t o  
management p r a c t i c e .  As t h e  e c o l o g i c a l  sys tem i s  based on  p r o v i s i o n  of needed 
r e s o u r c e s ,  Lundstedt  proposes  t h a t  management b e  grounded i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of 
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  b a s i c  human psycho log ica l  needs :  se l f -esreem,  a f f e c t i o n ,  and 
o t h e r  forms of emot ional  s u p p o r t .  With t h i s  concept ,  h e  becomes t h e  f i r s t  of 
s e v e r a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  weave Maslow's i d e a  of  how t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  f u l l  c r e a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  of i n d i v i d u a l s  i n t o  a n a l y s i s  of what i s  a t  t h e  c o r e  of e f f e c t i v e  
human f a c t o r  management. 
P r o f e s s o r  Benjamin prov ides  a n  example of how such s o c i a l  i n n o v a t i o n s ,  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  GDR i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and l e g a l  framework p r o t e c t i n g  workers from 
d i s l o c a t i o n  of t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change,  can  f a c i l i t a t e  innova t ion  by removing t h e  
t h r e a t  of pe r sona l  l o s s  s o  o f t e n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t .  However, conf i rming  t h e  
Lundstedt  e c o l o g i c a l  v iewpoint  of  need f o r  cont inuous  a d a p t a t i o n ,  h e  g i v e s  u s  
t h e  i n t r i g u i n g  s t a t emen t  t h a t  " . . . such  s t r i c t  l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  produce s p e c i a l  
problems . . ." I hope t h a t  he  w i l l  e n l a r g e  on t h i s  a s  a  c l u e  f o r  i d e a s  f o r  f u t u r e  
p a t h s  f o r  development once some of t h e  o r i g i n a l  s t r e s s  has  been removed. 
D r .  Zacher,  from Poland,  D r .  S m c k a  from Czechoslovakia ,  and P r o f .  PJikoZov 
of B u l g a r i a  each p rov ide  papers  echoing t h i s  need f o r  a d a p t i o n  t o  new condi-  
t i o n s .  Each i n  a d i s t i n c t i v e  manner p o i n t s  o u t  t h e  c i r cums tances  o f  unbalanced 
supply  and demand t h a t  l e d  t o  s t r o n g l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i a l  management systems 
i n  t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s ,  which a r e  now g i v i n g  way t o  exper iments  i n  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  
Each b r i n g s  a n  a p p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  exper iments  have enormous 
human f a c t o r  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  Changes of t r a i n i n g  and a t t i t u d e s  w i l l  be  needed t o  
c r e a t e  "self-management" s k i l l s  a b l e  t o  suppor t  t h e  new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
Cur ious ly ,  t h e s e  concerns  f e l t  i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of  c e n t r a l l y  planned econ- 
omies a r e  n o t  f a r  from ve ry  s i m i l a r  i s s u e s  f e l t  i n  l a r g e  U.S. f i r m s .  Lewis 
Hanes of  Westinghouse U.S.  w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of Q u a l i t y  C i r c l e s  i n t o  
Westinghouse o p e r a t i o n s ,  where a c l e a r  impact and purpose i s  t o  c r e a t e  decen t ra -  
l i z e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i s s u e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  management. Many o t h e r  l a r g e  U.S. 
f i r m s ,  a f t e r  a n  e r a  i n  which conce rn  f o r  s t r i c t  f i n a n c i a l  management drove  ten-  
d e n c i e s  t o  c e n t r a l i z e  a l l  forms of d e c i s i o n  making, a r e  now f a c i n g  t h e  r e a l i t y  
of  l o s t  i n i t i a t i v e  and c r e a t i v i t y  i n  t h e  working and lower management l e v e l .  
They a r e  expe r imen t ing  w i t h  s i m i l a r  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i d e a s .  E a s t  and West c a n  
l e a r n  much i n  t h i s  a r e a  by combining t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e i r  d i v e r s e  expe r imen ta l  
approaches .  
G o t t f r i e d  WoZf develops  a c o r e  human f a c t o r s  concept  t h a t  can  b e  used a s  a 
framework f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  of many of t h e  fo l lowing  p a p e r s .  It i s  a n o t h e r  b a s i c  
Maslow no t ion :  t h a t  o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  i n n o v a t i o n  by c r e a t i n g  a management sys tem 
i n  which t h e r e  i s  a c l e a r  synergy between t h e  g o a l s  of  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
and t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  u n i t  i n  t h e  f i rm,  and between t h e  g o a l s  of t h e  s u b u n i t s  
w i t h i n  t h e  l a r g e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  It  i s  a s imple  concept  and a l lows  a s t r a i g h t -  
forward and ve ry  broad d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  t a s k  of  e f f e c t i v e  i n n o v a t i o n  management: 
c r e a t i n g  o r  a d j u s t i n g  t h e  sys tem so  t h a t  t h e  needed s y n e r g i e s  a r e  n a t u r a l l y  
p r e s e n t  and d e t a i l e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and d i r e c t i o n  a r e  n o t  needed.  
I myself f i n d  t h i s  synergy-bui ld ing  frame of mind a  ve ry  h e l p f u l  one,  espe- 
c i a l l y  i n  avo id ing  manager ia l  b l i n d - a l l e y s  and i n  t r y i n g  new approaches  t o  
s tubborn  problems.  However, i f  l i f e  were a s  s imple  a s  t h e  concept  we would have 
no "human f a c t o r "  problems and l i t t l e  cause  t o  meet h e r e .  A s  e n t h u s i a s t s  f o r  
human f a c t o r s  management I thoughtwe would be  wel l -served by f a c i n g  t o  some de- 
g r e e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  why i n  r e a l i t y  we s o  f r e q u e n t l y  f a i l  t o  c r e a t e  t h e s e  syner-  
g i e s  i n  ou r  f a c t o r i e s  and o f f i c e s .  Thus my own paper  i s  aimed a t  i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e  p o i n t s  i n  which we o f t e n  f a l t e r ,  i n  hopes t h a t  t h a t  w i l l  b e  as i n s t r u c t i v e  
as d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  t h e o r i e s  f o r  s u c c e s s .  
A s  a u n i f y i n g  theme t o  t h i s  f i r s t  group of pape r s  I can c e r t a i n l y  sugges t  
t h e  Maslow n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  goa l  of  human f a c t o r  management f o r  i n n o v a t i o n  i s  t o  
b u i l d  t h e  synergy of  i n d i v i d u a l  and f i r m  o b j e c t i v e s .  Viewpoints  from b o t h  p lan-  
ned and unplanned,  s o c i a l i s t  and c a p i t a l i s t  e x p e r i e n c e  s t r e s s e d  b r i n g i n g  satis- 
f a c t i o n ,  rewards and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  from who h igh  
performance was d e s i r e d .  
Th i s  thought ,  however, l e a v e s  impor tan t  q u e s t i o n s  unanswered and I l i s t  them 
as a  c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h o s e  a u t h o r s  and t h e  d i s c u s s a n t s :  
1. The s y n e r g i s t i c  management sys tem may remove b a r r i e r s  t o  i n n o v a t i v e  
change-but n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s t i m u l a t e  i t .  Is t h i s  p a s s i v e  s t r a t e g y  
of a l l o w i n g  i n n o v a t i o n  r e a l l y  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b r i n g  i t  abou t?  Why i s  
i t  t h a t  e x t e r n a l  s t r e s s  i s  s o  o f t e n  l i n k e d  t o  r a p i d  innova t ion?  
What i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between s imple  good human f a c t o r s  management 
and management f o r  innova t ion?  How do we t e l l  when innova t ion  i s  
r e a l l y  needed, a s  opposed t o  s t a b i l i t y ?  How do we choose t h e  
b e n e f i c i a l  innova t ions  from t h e  unproductive ones which r e p r e s e n t  
on1 y  nove l ty  ? 
2. A r e l a t e d  q u e s t i o n  t r i g g e r e d  by t h e  rosy  p i c t u r e  of s y n e r g i s t i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  is  t h e  t r u e  r o l e  of compet i t ion i n  s t i m u l a t i n g  inno- 
v a t i o n .  C e r t a i n l y  compet i t ive  i n s t i n c t s  have been accepted a s  a  
powerful mot iva t ing  f o r c e  a t  l e a s t  s i n c e  p r i m i t i v e  human began t o  
c o n s t r u c t  games. How can t h e  p o s i t i v e  a s p e c t  of compet i t ion  be 
r e c o n c i l e d  wi th  t h e  concept of b u i l d i n g  s y n e r g i e s  a s  a  management 
s t r a t e g y ?  
3 .  A d e c e n t r a l i z e d  management system b u i l t  on c r e a t i n g  s y n e r g i e s  and 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  innova t ion  i s  based on an assumption t h a t  people 
w i l l  be c o n s t r u c t i v e  and c r e a t i v e  i f  u n r e s t r i c t e d .  Yet many d i s -  
empowering and r e p r e s s i v e  c e n t r a l i z e d  management systems were 
c r e a t e d  t o  guard a g a i n s t  t h e  r e a l i t y  of t h e  few i n d i v i d u a l s  who 
might abuse such a  system. Can we prevent  t h e  measures needed t o  
manage t h e  Least t r u s t w o r t h y  and c r e a t i v e  from d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  sys- 
tem aimed a t  drawing o u t  t h e  b e s t  from t h e  be ,s t?  
4 .  Many management systems and p r a c t i c e s  of t h e  p a s t  have j u s t i f i a b l y  
bred cynic ism and d i s t r u s t  on t h e  p a r t  of t h o s e  managed. New, more 
empowering and n u r t u r i n g  sys tems ,wi l l  n o t  r each  t h e i r  f u l l  p o t e n t i a l  
u n t i l  t h e  s c a r s  of  t h e  o l d  system a r e  hea led .  W i l l  we have t h e  
p a t i e n c e  t o  unders tand i n i t i a l  cau t ious  r e a c t i o n s  t o  new approaches 
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t o f  h i s t o r i c a l  exper ience ,  and s e e  t h e  v a r i o u s  exper i -  
ments through t o  completion? 
11. INNOVATION STRATEGY 
Professor  Wakke  from Holland makes a  b road ly  u s e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  h i s  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  by a l e r t i n g  u s  once a g a i n  t o  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  of t h e  problem we a r e  
examining. Rapid and n e a r l y  complete p e n e t r a t i o n  of once s t a b l e  markets has 
been made by t h e  Japanese  i n  Europe and t h e  U.S. o f t e n  through s u c c e s s f u l  human 
f a c t o r  management f o r  product o r  process  innovat ion.  No n a t i o n ,  no t  even t h e  
Japanese ,  can ignore  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  and exper imenta t ion i n  t h i s  f i e l d  i f  i t  
expec t s  t o  remain economically s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a  compet i t ive  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a rena .  
Prakke d e s c r i b e s  one n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y :  t h a t  of providing by government p o l i c y  
a  s t r o n g  boost  t o  innova t ion  s k i l l s  through a n  " innovat ion c o n s u l t a n t "  program 
t o  i n d u s t r y .   his i s  c l e a r l y  a n  example of  a  s t r a t e g y  based on p rov id ing  re-  
sources  f o r  innovat ion.  
P ro fessor  Patz i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  impacts of m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c  in fo rmat ion  
systems p o i n t s  t o  a  new.role  f o r  g e n e r a l  management: t h a t  of simply assembling 
and main ta in ing  c o a l i t i o n s  whi le  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  u n i t s  make s t r a t e g y  and o p e r a t i n g  
d e c i s i o n s .  D r .  2iegeL makes a  ve ry  important  c o n t r i b u t i o n  by providing us  a  
l e a r n i n g  exper ience  of a  s t r a t e g y  i n  which many t h i n g s  went wrong: a  "technology 
pusht'approach i n  which a l l  t h e  c l a s s i c  r e s i s t a n c e  and misunderstanding of innova- 
L ~ u n  was mani fes t .  
These t h r e e  papers  can  be  seen  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h r e e  of t h e  many s t r a t e g i e s  
f o r  innova t ion  management t h a t  can be found i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  and our  c o l l e c t i v e  
exper ience .  P r a k k e l s  r e p r e s e n t s  r e source  p rov i s ion ,  Patz  "need pu l l " ,  and 
R i e g e l l s  d i s c u s s e s  "technology push". Though only  a  microcosym of a  v a s t  a r r a y ,  
they  do t r i g g e r  f u r t h e r  ques t ions :  
1. It has become fash ionab le  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  "technology push" s t r a t e g i e s  
can never be e f f e c t i v e  and R i e g e l ' s  paper shows t h e  r i s k s .  But a r e  
t h e r e  no t  a  few, bu t  very important,  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  where technology 
push may lead  t o  enormous breakthroughs? I consider  t h e  sus ta ined  
e f f o r t  by Control  Data Corporation i n  t h e  U.S. t o  c r e a t e  a  market f o r  
computer-based educat ion a s  an example; many of you may know o t h e r s .  
2 .  Conversely, can t h e r e  n o t  be  hidden r i s k s  i n  "need p u l l "  approaches? 
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a r e  t h e r e  no innovat ions  where t h e  need i t s e l f  i s  only  
i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  innovat ion? I s  it perhaps too  e a r l y ,  f o r  ins tance ,  
t o  consider  a s  i s  o f t e n  done, t h a t  t h e  Concorde i s  an  example of mis- 
managed innovat ion? From a  human f a c t o r s  po in t  of view, w i l l  a  man- 
agement system o r i e n t e d  pure ly  t o  "needs p u l l "  miss key o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  breakthrough innovat ions?  
3 .  A management s t r a t e g y  of resource  p rov i s ion ,  o r  "bu i ld ing  c o a l i t i o n s "  
must answerthe  same ques t ion  we posed about t h e  e a r l i e r  papers which 
saw innova t ion  management a s  a  ques t ion  of b u i l d i n g  synerg ies .  These 
a l low innovat ion,  and f a c i l i t a t e  i t-but where i s  t h e  spark? Where 
i s  t h e  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  f o r  r i sk - tak ing ,  u p s e t t i n g  comfortable equ i l ib r ium? 
I s  i t  inheren t  i n  unencumbered management o r  workers? And, i f  no t ,  
what s t r a t e g i e s  of s t r e s s ,  encouragement, compet i t ion,  rewards,  e t c . ,  
w i l l  be s u c c e s s f u l ?  
111. METHODS 
D r .  Ryssina provides a  well-documented paper on a  c r u c i a l  ques t ion  i n  methods 
f o r  human f a c t o r s  management: team b u i l d i n g .    he d a t a  concern t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s -  
t i c s  needed f o r  e f f e c t i v e  resea rch  teams, and she r a i s e s  t h e  ques t ion  a s  t o  
whether t h e  c r u c i a l  r o l e s  she observes a s  e s s e n t i a l  can be  i n f e r r e d  a s  necessary  
f o r  management d i r e c t e d  t o  o t h e r  c r e a t i v e  t a s k s .  I c e r t a i n l y  see  t h e  re levance ,  
and those  of us f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h e  language of management s t y l e ,  o r  general  ca te -  
g o r i e s  of people i n t e r a c t i n g  i n  groups, w i l l  s e e  c l e a r l y  t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  of t h e  
r o l e  d e f i n i t i o n s  she  has showed. 
D r .  Hempel d e s c r i b e s a  t r a i n i n g  approach aimed i n  p a r t  a t  b u i l d i n g  team and 
decision-making s k i l l s .  Though he d e s c r i b e s  i t  g e n e r a l l y 1  understand t h a t  i t  i s  
a  ve ry  powerful exper ience f o r  Siemens managers and I hope he w i l l  provide  us  with 
concre te  exemplary d e t a i l s  t o  be compared wi th  o t h e r  approaches used i n  our par- 
t i c i p a t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  D r .  Andersin provides a  c r u c i a l  paper which once a g a i n  . 
b r i n g s  Maslow's t h i n k i n g  t o  t h e  f o r e f r o n t  of our d i s c u s s i o n s .  He focuses  on an  
a c t u a l  case  h i s t o r y  of an  innova t ive  b u r s t  of a c t i v i t y  i n  h i s  f i rm,  fue led  by 
f u l f i l l m e n t  of one of t h e  b a s i c  Maslowian human needs: mot iva t ion .  I t h i n k  we 
must d i s c u s s  t h i s  case  c l o s e l y  because I can imagine, from t h e  speed and p ressure  
of compet i t ive  developments he r e p o r t s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  t ime f o r  management 
t o  t h e o r i z e  and c a r e f u l l y  c o n s t r u c t  a  balanced "human f a c t o r  management" system. 
Yet many of t h e  goa l s  of synergy, inven t iveness ,  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and o t h e r s  seem 
t o  have come t o g e t h e r .  I n  e a r l i e r  papers t h e r e  a r e  s t r o n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  of how t o  
allow o r  facilitate innova t ive  behavior ,  but  very  l i t t l e  on how t o  c r e a t e  i t  o r  
how t o  " l i g h t  the  f i r e " .  This  paper and d i s c u s s i o n  may provide some answers. 
I n  a  more comparative view, Professor  John Langrish a l s o  provides  some im- 
p o r t a n t  i n s i g h t s .  By looking a t  s e v e r a l  case  h i s t o r i e s  he no tes  t h a t  key e le -  
ments i n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  managing f o r  innovat ion may no t  be i n  n u r t u r i n g  inven t ion  
i t s e l f ,  bu t  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  c r e a t i v i t y  i n  t h e  choice ,  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and t iming of 
development of inven t ions ,  a l l  post-discovery f u n c t i o n s .  These ideas  c l e a r l y  
must be l inked  t o  those  d i scussed  i n  t h e  previous s e c t i o n s  on t h e  b a s i c  goals  and 
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  innovat ion.  
From t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  of t he  papers of t h i s  methods s ec t i on  I can once 
aga in  e x t r a c t  a  thene of us ing management methods t o  bu i ld  s y n e r g i s t i c  r e l a t i on -  
sh ips  among i nd iv idua l s  and between them and t h e i r  f i rm.  The t r a i n i n g  and team 
bui ld ing  discussed,  along with  t h e  a c t u a l  case  h i s t o r y  of success fu l  p ro j ec t  
management,all po in t  t o  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  The l a s t  paper,  however, r a i s e s  t he  
ques t ion  of need t o  search f o r  a  broader synergy: t h a t  of synergy between tech- 
n i c a l ,  resource,  and managerial  c a p a b i l i t i e s  on t he  one hand, and t he  t r u e  needs 
of s o c i e t y  on t h e  o the r .  This must include matching development of those  capa- 
b i l i t i e s  t o  t h e  t iming of those  needs. Without a t t e n t i o n  t o  c r e a t i n g  t h i s  
add i t i ona l  s y n e r g i s t i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  we may be faced with  expending scarce  re-  
sources  and c r e a t i v i t y  on innovat ion wt th  no t r u e  u t i l i t y .  
My own ques t ions  on read ing  t h e  papers on t h i s  s e c t i o n  come back once more 
t o  t h e  paradox t h a t  our methods seem o r i en t ed ,  a s  do our s t r a t e g i e s  and p o l i c i e s ,  
t o  aZZowing innovat ion,  not s t imula t ing  i t .  Only Andersin 's  paper r e a l l y  focuses 
on s t imula t ion ,  and t h e r e  t h e  innovat ive  behavior is t r i gge red  by an ex t e rna l  
f a c t o r  of compet i t ion and aurv iva l  threat-not a  management a c t i v i t y .  Hence I 
ask:  
1. What methodsdowe have t o  s t imula te  r i sk - tak ing  i n  a  non-threatening 
environment? I s  t h e r e  a  f i xed  c l a s s  of n a t u r a l  r i sk - takers  q u i t e  
independent of ex t e rna l  s t imula t ion ,  o r  can and should we seek t o  
expand t h i s  group? 
2 .  Andersin 's  p i c t u r e  of a  c r e a t i v e  group enjoying i t s  i s o l a t i o n  from 
a l a r g e r  e n t i t y  brought up t he  r o l e  of s c a l e  i n  human f a c t o r s  i n  
innovat ion management. Must e f f e c t i v e  methods e i t h e r  i n  r e a l i t y  o r  
appearance r educe the  apparent s c a l e  of an o rgan iza t ion  t o  s t imu la t e  
. innovat ion? Why has  innovat ion i n  U.S. f i rms  o f t e n  seemed t o  have 
been coupled t o  a  p a t t e r n  of f ragmentat ion of smal ler  u n i t s  from 
l a r g e r  ones,  even a t  a  l o s s  of c a p i t a l  and o the r  resources?  
I V .  ACTIVITIES 
I n  t h i s  l a s t  s e c t i o n  we have some concrete  examples of innovat ion management 
a c t i v i t y  which pu ts  i n t o  perspec t ive  many of the  more t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts we 
have been d i s cus s ing  e a r l i e r .  Professor  Kar t tunm d iscusses  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  chang- 
ing  needs f o r  personnel types  and management s t y l e  over the  course of mot ivat ion 
of product development p r o j e c t s .  I n  t h i s  point  of view he echoes from p r a c t i c a l  
exper ience the  ideas  of Ryssina and Langrish which both s t r e s s e d  t h e  need f o r  
d i f f e r e n t  c r e a t i v i t y  r o l e s  w i t h i n  a  working group o r  a t  d i f f e r e n t  po in t s  i n  a  
dec i s i on  process .  D r .  WahZstrom s t r e s s e s  t h e  o rgan iza t iona l  needs t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
innovat ion,  and a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e s  t he  importance of l i nk ing  our work here  i n  
human f a c t o r  management t o  t h a t  of t h e  "organizat ional"  group i n  Prague. 
This  was brought home t o  me through h i s  point  on the  c r u c i a l  r o l e  played by in- 
formal o rgan iza t ions  bur ied w i th in  l a r g e  formal s t r u c t u r e s .  Nurturing and using 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of these  i s  one of t h e  complex demands on human f a c t o r  s p e c i a l i s t s .  
M r .  VirkkaZa, of Kone Corporation,  provides an example of a  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n -  
ing course  f o r  c r e a t i v i t y  development, and I hope we w i l l  be a b l e  t o  draw some 
use fu l  comparisons with  t he  t r a i n i n g  methods discussed by D r .  Hempel. 
The s i n g l e  theme I s e e  i n  t h i s  " a c t i v i t i e s "  s e c t i o n  i s  a dominant a t t i t u d e  
of pragmatism. As p a r t i c i p a n t s  have noted i n  our informal meal-tine d i scuss ions ,  
we understand so  l i t t l e  abou t t he  underlying causes of human c r e a t i v i t y  t h a t  i t  
would be foo l i sh  t o  base  a c t i o n s  on any s i n g l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  approach. Perhaps 
t he r e  i s  one key ques t ion  t o  ask those who b r i ng  innovat ion a c t i v i t y  d i scuss ions  
t o  t h i s  meeting: 
1. Of a l l  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  approaches  t h a t  you have heard  i n  t h i s  
meet ing  and. e l sewhere ,  a r e  t h e r e  any o v e r - a l l  concep t s  t h a t  have 
se rved  w e l l  i n  pragmat ic  d e c i s i o n  making? O r  do t h e  e x c e p t i o n s  
over-run t h e  g e n e r a l i t i e s ?  I ' m  n o t  s u r e  I r e a l l y  want t o  h e a r  
t h e  answer, b u t  f e e l  compelled t o  a sk  it i n  any c a s e .  
A s  I reached t h e  end of  t h e  papers  and grasped f o r  my own s y n t h e s i s ,  t h e  
image of  t h e  o l d  t a l e  of t h e  b l i n d  men t r y i n g  t o  under s t and  and d e s c r i b e  an  
e l e p h a n t  pushed i t s e l f  i n t o  my mind. Most of you remember t h a t  as each touched 
and exper ienced t h e  p a r t  of t h e  e l e p h a n t  n e a r e s t  t o  him he  reached a  c o n c l u s i o n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  t u s k ,  t h e  t r u n k ,  t h e  f l a n k ,  o r  t h e  t a i l ,  e t c .  
A l l  of  t h e  p o i n t s  of  view were t r u e ,  though ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  and even i n  appa ren t  
c o n f l i c t .  When i t  comes t o  n u r t u r i n g  c r e a t i v i t y  and e f f e c t i v e  i n n o v a t i o n  by 
human f a c t o r s  management, we a r e  indeed b l i n d  men and women w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
having a  complete p i c t u r e .  Our o n l y  hope i s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  example of  t h e  b l i n d  
men: t a l k  t o  each o t h e r .  Our e x p e r i e n c e s  may make l i t t l e  s e n s e  t a k e n  ind iv idu-  
a l l y ,  b u t  w i t h  e f f o r t  and t r u l y  open exchange of  i d e a s  we may b e  a b l e  t o  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  b e a s t .  I t r u s t  t h a t  we w i l l  b e  wi se  enough t o  u s e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  of  t h i s  
IIASA-convened assembly of  b l i n d  men and women t o  b e s t  advantage  b e f o r e  we go 
back t o  working b l i n d l y  w i t h  o u r  i n d i v i d u a l  p i e c e  of t h e  e l e p h a n t .  

SOME METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES FOR ANALYZING THE ROLE 
OF HUMAN FACTORS IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT (HFIM) 
Gottfried Wolf 
Siemens AG Austria, Vienna, Austria 
In the 1980s we face tough and increasingly complex challenges in managing 
innovation projects. Many of these projects assume a size and technical com- 
plexity that is unparalleled in the history of innovation management. In recent 
years, several factors have had a pronounced impact on innovation management and 
major complications can be expected to continue in the next decade: 
1. Innovation projects are more constrained by external factors such 
as the ecological-societal environment; new basic innovations . 
such as biotechnics, microelectronics~ etc.; state: local, and 
federal regulatory considerations; and the multiple needs and in- 
terests of different customers everywhere in the world. 
2. Cost overruns force the need for greater assurance that innovation 
projects will be completed on schedule. 
3. Advanced technology and unproved methods are introducing signifi- 
cant new unknowns and risks in many innovation projects, etc. 
This overview of some trends in innovation management alone makes it clear 
that managing innovation projects in the 1980s is already extremely difficult, 
and is expected to become even more demanding. In close connection with these 
trends we must be able to define for each organization and company: 
1. An adequate innovation policy, i.e., goal-oriented, skillful 
behavior as a whole, and 
2. a strategic plan and methodical execution for complex innovation 
projects within the scope, schedule, and cost objectives . This 
will require broader, more advanced innovation management skills 
than ever before and more attention to s<rategic and external 
factors during the project life. 
Innovation management is only now becoming a specif ic-and more and more 
important-management discipline. It's methods are related to the appropri- 
ateness of project-management methods in all sizes of projects and in a wide 
range of situations in a variety of organizations. But these are not the same. 
A quick look at the definitions of innovation shows that different ones exist 
(see Figure 1). Therefore, I think one of the aims of this IIASA project is to 
also develop a new innovation definition as well as a formal set of principles 
and practices that can be taught in an educational format and thus be passed on 
as a vital element of practical innovation management theory. 
Planning complex innovation projects cannot be simple and must include a 
strategic phase followed by a tactical base. The strategical planning of complex 
innovation projects--mainly based on a goal-oriented innovation policy-is anal- 
ogous to the strategic planning of a corporation. The innovation project group 
must basically decide: 
1. why, for what purpose (policy) an innovation is necessary, and 
2. what strategies are necessary to achieve its goals. 
Innovation time phasing in this context is shown in Figure 2. 
In the new innovation environment of the 1980s, one must avoid the manage- 
ment approach of the 1970s of getting fancier and fancier-always looking for a 
control system to provide automatic management. 
o Innovative corporations do not look for automatic management, they 
look for any tool they can use, because innovation is critical for 
survival. 
o In innovation projects and other areas, e.g., the innovation man- 
agement of software development, presents a formidable challenge. 
Many of the management techniques used for innovation hardware 
projects are inadequate, and sophisticated techniques for software 
innovation management have not yet evolved. 
o Innovation management has to be fluid in its thinking, and not 
allow organization charts to rule the project. It must be able to 
regroup large numbers of people and define authority and respon- 
sibility to meet new situations as well as to integrate new social, 
political, and environmental factors into their strategic innova- 
t ion planning. 
I would now like to make a suggestion. As you can see from the agenda, 32 
papers for the Task Force Meeting on Human Factors in Innovation Management have 
been prepared and 20 papers will be presented in four sessions.(Figure 3): 
A1, ..., A10 
B1, . . . ,B6 
Cl,. ..,C6 
Dl,. . .,D6 
with nine discussions denoted by 
AI, AII, A111 
BI, BII 
CI, CII 
DI, DII 
focussing on the following (see Table 1). 
If possible, we should also try to find the best possible definition of 
"innovation" in connection with the "human factor". The expression innovation 
has several meanings : 
J 1  A process (P = Input) that aims at bringing about a strategically and ac- 
cording to plan change with new qualities, where success is not yet assured. 
J2 A first accomplishment and realization of an idea for solving a problem (R = Output) (invention), i.e., changes in design, manufacture, sales and 
system formation for, e.g., the manufacture of a new product. 
J3 The innovation process itself as well as the realization of a problem solu- tion in a new mode. 
J4 An absolutely successful innovation with regard to its strategically plan- 
ned implementation, as well as its successful introduction onto the market. 
Figure 1. Different definitions of the world "innovation". 
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Table 1. Task Force Meeting on Human Factors in Innovation Management (HFIM), Helsinki, 10-14 October, 1983. 
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D5 Lassr Kivikko 
D6 Vilkko Vlrkkalm 
DII nl~rusrinn, Hain P o i n t s ~  
I 
INNOVATION POLICY 
Discussions AI, AII, AIII, based on papers A1, ..., A10 
Answers the questions: WHY INNOVATE? FOR WHAT PURPOSE? 
AIM: To find main ideas on recommended innovation policies based on 
human factors. 
INNOVATION STRATEGY 
Discussions BI, BII based on papers B1, ..., B6 (but also A1, ..., A10 and 
AI, AII, and AII). 
Answersthe question: INNOVATE WHAT? 
AIM: To find main elements and criteria of future-oriented innovation 
strategies based on human factors. 
INNOVATION METHODS (- PROCEDURES, - TACTICS.. .) 
Discussion CI, CII based on papers C1, ... C6 (but also on all previous 
activities) 
Answers the question: INNOVATE BY WHAT MEANS? 
AIM: Tofind priorities of recommended analytical and creativity techniques 
and innovation methods based on human factors. 
For example, creativity techniques (see Table 2) and synergetic use 
of analytical thinking in combination with an integral-thinking 
process (see Figure 4). 
INNOVATION APPLICATIONS (- OPERATIVE MEASURES) 
Discussion DI, DII based on papers Dl, ..., D6 (but also on all previous 
activities) 
Answers the questions : INNOVATE HOW? (WHO-WHERE-WHEN-HOW MUCH. . . ?) 
AIM: To find measures, new innovation activities and innovation tools based 
on human factors. 
W e  are already on a good path to finding new answers to the old and new 
questions raised in innovation management; Some of the questions in connection 
with this are, e.g., 
A. INNOVATION POLICIES 
What demands are pulled (made) by: a) the individual and society; 
b) the customer ; 
c) enterprises and other organiza- 
tions, etc.? 
B . INNOVATION STRATEGY 
What should innovation be 
focussed on: 
a) resources and cooperation; 
b) market demand pull; 
c) technologic, technology push, etc.? 
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Figure 4 .  Integral  innovative thinking! 
C . INNOVATION METHODS 
In an innovation process, how 
important are: 
D . INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
How important are : 
a) qualification and effectiveness; 
b) synergy effects; 
c) systemic thinking, etc . ? 
a) task orientation; 
b) relationship orientation; 
c) productive partnership, etc.? 
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AS A MANAGEMENT OF UNKNOWN PHENOMENA 
As shown in Figure 5 there are key differences in responsibility, informa- 
tion, planning, estimation, integration, forecasting, etc., between innovation 
(project) management and institutional (corporational) management. Innovation 
management and institutional management can be characterized as "nonlinear man- 
agement" and "linear management". There are many nonlinearities in an innova- 
tion project, whereas in an institutional setting, once the institution is 
established, phenomena are generally linear. 
In strategic planning and management, and innovation manager is not really 
achieving equilibrium but disequilibrium. He is trying to plan and manage a 
situation that, by definition, is never in equilibrium, never settles down, and 
is different every day. As soon as an innovation project gets to the top of the 
rate curve, it has to come down again. 
Because innovation managers-and their teams-are trying to do themselves 
out of jobs by careful innovation project planning, psychological problems are 
involved. The faster they get a job done, the faster they are out of a job. 
Thus, they do not have the same incentives as they do in longer-range, stable 
situations. 
These few comparisons show that innovation managers must meet specific 
qualification requirement profiles. 
Some Criteria of the Requirement Profiles in Innovation Management 
Responsibility 
o Withmore complex innovation projects, the innovation manager and his 
staffwho have always been the key figures, acquire much more respon- 
sibility, they must be: 
- creative and innovative themselves; 
- entrepreneurial; 
- task and relationship oriented and effective; 
- situation oriented and flexible as leaders, promotors, 
systemizers and integrators in an effective way, etc. 
Information 
o Information and good communication are highly important to successful 
innovation. The innovation manager and his team must determine for 
themselves those variables that are different for innovative projects. 
An experienced innovation manager will probably have two or three ways 
of getting information, with different cross-checks. He will not 
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Figure 5. Complexity-volatility diagram for innovation projects and 
corporations. 
depend entirely on a mechanized system but will have inputs from his 
own communication network, whether it be formal or informal. 
Planning for Uncertainty 
o The more complex an innovation project is, the greater the need for 
better planning early, when the information on which the innovation 
plan must be based is less certain. 
For most corporations it is difficult enough to maintain a position 
in existing businesses by innovation in processing and products, but 
even more difficult in determining what new products and businesses 
should be developed. 
The innovation manager who is charged with planning and implementing 
an innovation project will benefit from planning for such uncertain- 
ties (potential problems) and take advantage of the means available 
to him to deal logically and efficiently with such planning. Methods 
to cope with the uncertainties can be identified and characterized. 
o The major objective of planning for uncertainty is to decide which 
policy (answers the question "why innovatidn?") 
and strategy (answers the quest ion "what innovation?") 
This decision requires: 
1. determining which strategies are available for implementation 
of a specific innovation project. 
2. characterizing the uncertainties that must be considered, and 
3. projecting the implications of implementing each of the avail- 
able strategies and the relevant outcomes expected. 
These analyses can (should) be undertaken at several levels of thorough- 
ness, given the resources available to the innovation manager, the 
innovation manager's inclination and situation-oriented effective style, 
andthe time available to develop the information necessary for-the 
decision. 
o The second objective of planning for uncertainty is to develop innova- 
tion contingency plans (potential changes). As the implications of 
implementing different innovation strategies are analyzed and studied, 
innovation management will obtain insights into the merits of implement- 
ing different innovation strategies. 
The objective is to identify robust innovation strategies that permit 
modification of the project to counter changing future conditions and 
give the best performance according to the organization's goals over 
as broad a range of future conditions as possible. 
o Finally, innovation management has to select the strategy that will 
perform best and be to the organization's greatest advantage under the 
variety of conditions that may be encountered. 
The success of Japanese companies is due to a large extent to their 
mastery of planning methods and their steadfast pursuance of planning 
innovation results' 
SOCIAL INVENTION AND INNOVATION 
Sven B. Lundstedt 
Schoo Z of Pub Zic Administration, The Ohio State University, 
CoZwnbus, Ohio, USA 
An important lesson in technology management is provided by the recent 
accident at the "Three Mile Island'' nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsyl- 
vania in the United States. This apparent technological failure is an 
unusual opportunity to learn about the paractical importance of human factors 
in large scale electrotechnology and to advance the state of the art. The 
special commission appointed by the Carter Administration concluded that the 
technical failures at "Three Mile Island" were a result of human failure and 
not due alone to mechanical breakdown. The offical conmission report said: 
We are convinced that if the only problems were equipment problems, 
this Presidential commission would never have been created. The 
equipment was sufficiently good that, except for human failures, 
the major accident at Three Mile Island would have been a minor 
incident. But, wherever we looked, we found problems with human 
beings who operate the plants, with management that runs the key 
operation and with the agency that is charged with assuring the 
safety of nuclear power plants. (Report on the President's Com- 
mission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 1979.) 
As this and previous conferences on innovation management in electrotech- 
nology held by IIASA emphasize, special attention is being given to a better 
understanding of how operational technology is influenced by social systems 
and by people. William Fielding Ogburn's warning in 1932 seems now to be 
heeded more widely in the second half of the twentieth century. Ogburn said 
"Unless there is a speeding up of social invention or a.slowing down of 
mechanical invention, grave maladjustments are certain to result'' (Ogburn 
1932). 
THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL CONTINUUM* 
Modern technology is usually a combination of artifacts and procedures 
which together form a complex system. People and machines have always been 
*The term socio-technical originated with the Tavistock group in England. 
interdependent. People may, however, become servants of, as well as served 
by, machines. By its very nature such an interdependent relationship is a 
socio-technical continuum of people, techniques and machines. This is hardly 
a new insight in the history of science and technology. Yet for some reason 
its practical application in this century has been slow until very recently. 
A common mistake is that machines, with all their seductive powers as exten- 
sions of human control over the natural environment, have often become sym- 
bolic metaphors for man in which people are viewed as extensions of machines. 
The term socio-technical denotes a correction of this imbalance and a rever- 
sal in priority whereby machines as tools are viewed as useful extensions of 
people rather than conversely. Electrotechnology is no exception to this 
principle. 
A recent example in the automobile industry is the Volvo management sys- 
tem which has now become a routine policy in thier Kalmar plant in Sweden. 
Pehr Gyllenhammer, chief executive of Volvo, describes the socio-technical 
point of view this way: 
The modern working man needs a sense of purpose and satisfaction in 
his daily work. He feels the need of belonging to a team, of being 
able to feel at home in his surroundings, of being able to identify 
himself with the goods he produces and not least-of feeling that 
he is appreciated for the work he perfor ms... Factory work must be 
adapted to people, and not people to machines. This calls for in- 
novation both in the field of human relations and as regards tech- 
nical aspects ... I believe the humanization of work and efficiency 
can be compatible. Indeed, I believe that in today's society, they 
are inseperable. (Gyllenhannner, 1980. ) 
In an earlier time John Stuart Mill's statement that "It is questionable 
if all the mechanical inventions yet made have enlightened the day's toil of 
any human being1' is still partly true today unfortunately (Mill, 1952). And, 
of course, Karl Marx was a foremost critic of the way in which work was organ- 
ized in the 19th century, an example of which is his interesting critique of 
the relationship of people to machinery and the industry of his day. Charles 
Dickens in his novel Hard Times also draws our attention to adverse relation- 
ships between people, machines and work. As the remark by Mill shows, how- 
ever, Marx and Dickens were not the first to experience this important in- 
sight. 
A realistic, and eminently practical, viewpoint is that both technical 
and social invention and innovation are necessary in order to create, and to 
operate effectively, complex technological systems including electrotechnol- 
ogy. My impression overall is that the American electrotechnology industry, 
for example, is losing its traditional engineering bias towards purely tech- 
nological solutions and is becoming more socio-technical in outlook. 
There is naturally more than one way to approach the subject of social 
invention and innovation. For example, one can see them as expressions of 
*A distinction is usually made between invention and innovation in the stan- 
dard literature on the subject. Innovations are usually considered to be 
entire series of events including inventions and full prouduct development. 
The two terms are often confused and wrongly used interchangeably. 
basic social phenomena and as the necessary preconditions for social change. 
We might call this a generic view because it involves conscious application 
of the social and behavioral sciences. These disciplines seek to understand 
people as individuals, within small groups, within organizations, within 
larger societies and cultures, and as creators and users of social institu- 
tions. Social invention and innovation can be found at any one or a combi- 
nation of these levels of analysis (Lundstedt, 1982). 
William F. Whyte, a sociologist, illustrates: 
I define a social invention as a new and apparently promising 
strategy designed to solve some persistent and serious human 
problems. It may take the form of a new organizational struc- 
ture or a new set of interorganizational relations. It may 
involve a new set of procedures for shaping human interactions 
and activities and the relations of humans to the natural and 
human environment... The potential transferability of a social 
invention depends upon discovering the theoretical principles 
underlying its operation and the characteristics of the social 
and material environment into which it must be fitted in order 
to solve human problems. (Whyte, 1980.) 
Karl Deutsch provides some generic examples in an article in Science 
in which social inventions occurring over a period of years are illustrated. 
They include : Max Weber' s sociology of bureaucracy, culture and values ; 
Gini and Pareto's theory and measurement of social inequalities; Freud and 
Jung's contributions to the understanding of human behavior; the role of 
innovations in socioeconomic change according to Schumpeter, Ogburn, and 
others; Lenin's theory of one party organization and revolution; and Gandhi's 
form of large scale nonviolent political action (Deutsch et al., 1980). A 
recent article in the American PsychoZogist examines the contributions of 
social science to innovation and productivity. The authors say that: 
The current debate on national productivity and innovation has 
largely ignored the contributions of social science. This 
article discusses three trends and developments : social science 
as a decision aid, social science as a source of social tech- 
nology, and social science as a tool for understanding innovation 
and productivity. Despite these contributions, however, there is 
little utilization of social science pertaining to innovation and 
productivity issues. Major inhibiting factors include the non- 
proprietary nature of social science, the disaggregation of social 
science support, and the isolation of social science from decision 
making. The continued de-emphasis of social science research is 
seen as harmful for the nation's knowledge base and for its .efforts 
to achieve economic and technological revitalization. (Tornatzky 
and Solomon, 1982.) 
The final selection of this discussion will describe one particular kind of 
social invention and innovation and a contribution of empirical social and 
behavioral science to innovation and productivity. 
Another perspective is provided by Harvey Brooks using other functional 
categories. They are market, managerial, political, and institutional social 
inventions and innovations (Brooks, 1982). 
Brooks explains that market inventions and innovations are new ways of 
distributing products and services allowing greater market expansion for 
existing technologies or market penetration of a new technology. Managerial 
inventions and innovations include changes in work organization which improve 
organizational functioning. Equally important are political inventions and 
innovations such as new government policies or legislation. Institutional 
inventions and innovations are characterized by social and legal procedures 
and norms including legislation. 
In yet another sense Peter Drucker has said that social innovation 
means : 
... the creation of new value and new satisfaction for the customer. 
Organizations therefore measure innovations not by their scientific 
or technological importance, but by what they contribute to market 
and customer. They consider social innovation as important as 
technological innovation. Installment selling may have hadagreater 
impact on economics and markets than most of the great advances in 
technology in this century. (Drucker, 1982. ) 
It has been said that periods of economic difficulty are often an occa- 
sion, and an opportunity, for creative social and technological invention 
and innovation. One example is the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United 
States which was created as a federal corporation in 1933. Among its wider 
efforts to develop the resources of the Tennessee Valley were electrotechno- 
logical innovations made possible by this social innovation involving both 
public and private cooperation. The prive sector in the United States has 
been equally responsive to social change over the years. For example, early 
managerial and organizational innovations contributed to the formation of 
the present electrical grid system. 
ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Social inventiveness is a creative form of adaptation. Its underlying 
purpose is to alter the natural process of ecological succession which is 
always present. In this process access to, and control over, scarce resources 
and competition for them is changed by appropriate management behavior. In 
this sense human communities are analogous to other natural ecosystems. They 
contain finite resources in a limited space within which competition for such 
resources and space occur. Maintenance of a "resource web" to assure a con- 
stant resource supply to meet physiological and psychological needs for sur- 
vival and growth is often expressed in the form of creative new modes of 
human cooperation, competition and individual behavior which usually include 
social inventions and innovations. Examples of such inventiveness are very 
common, one early form being the limited liability stock company, precursor 
of the modern corporation. Socio-technical management is another form. 
But, ecological succession takes the form of constant change towards a 
stable state and is always a rule rather than an exception. As a population 
decreases or increases, and changes in its mix of individuals, more movement 
towards a "climax", or stable, community always occurs. Not all such climax 
communities that involve people are, however, conducive to human survival 
and prosperity as some modern bureaucracies demonstrate with their various 
forms of self-defeating behavior and their inability to reach their goals 
efficiently and effectively. Hence the need always exists in management for 
an assiduous amount of social inventiveness and innovativeness and this is a 
necessary condition for continuing survival and growth of an organization. 
Otherwise the system may well run down and cease to function effectively. 
The successful struggle for adequate satisfaction of human needs in 
earlier factories and offices has led to the present day "ecological" prior- 
ities and to new spatial boundaries and resource webs. An important example 
is the trend in management to eliminate the authoritarian forms of management 
and to increase the humane socio-technical kinds. The latter has simply 
proved to be more efficient and cost effective. To this extent, the tradi- 
tional resource web has become enlarged in order to meet a wider variety of 
human physiological and psychological needs. 
Modern management and organizational planning is taking the foniof crea- 
tive intervention in such human "ecosystems" (often called organizational 
development and management of change). In the conscious management of crea- 
tive change that takes place to alter positively the direction of ecological 
succession, a much more congenial environment for human work and productivity 
has begun to emerge. 
The virtue of an ecological perspective in management is that it recog- 
nizes the reality of constant systemic interaction between resources and 
people in human communities , as well with surrounding physical environments. 
We have spent more time in the past as a rule worrying about how machines 
deteriorate than we have about people deteriorating in the workplace. The 
conditions for optimal and successful balance in human ecological communities 
are being identified through research and the direction of succession can be 
changed in beneficial ways. There are many forms of "maintenance" not only 
the physical kinds. Taking good care of machinery is well understood by 
application of the physical sciences and their engineering derivatives. The 
same degree of management attention is now being given to human resources. 
Personal, and organizational renewal, are a constant requirement, or else 
organizations will deteriorate. 
AN EXAMPLE OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT 
There are a number of variations on the socio-technical theme and several 
such approaches to the management of organizations. The one with which I am 
most familiar and wish to describe briefly was developed by Rensis Likert with 
whom I have collaborated for over two decades. It is an example of applied 
social and behavioral science based on over three decades of empirical studies 
at The University of Michigan and elsewhere. This particular kind of social 
invention and innovation has as its basis five kinds of managerial leadership 
behavior. 
Effectively performing managers and executives in organizations that are 
highly productive appear to be able to provide to subordinates 1) appropriate 
technical and learning support when required; 2) to encourage participation 
and thus personal commitment and identification with the work organization; 
3) are supportive and friendly toward others in positive ways; 4) can effec- 
tively build work teams; and 5) insist upon high work standards from everyone 
including themselves. The gist of this kind of executive leadership is ex- 
plained in the following interpretive remarks. 
In my view, supportive behavior toward other people can be seen as a form 
of "psychological nourishment" in the ecological resource web. It recongize's 
basic human needs for affection and a healthy self esteem, and emphasizes the 
relative positive value of reward over punishment as an incentive. There 
are, of course, many ways to be positive and supportive which reflect the 
individuality of management and executive styles. But they all have in com- 
mon caring, respect, knowledge about others and a sense of responsibility 
toward them. Such support does not rule out challenge or even competition. 
If does connnunicate an assurance, however, that the individual who has power 
over one has good will and one's personal survival at heart. Supportive be- 
havior is more than mere manipulation of behavioral reinforcement. Such 
behavior increases the conscious development of self esteem, one's self image 
and identity and is based on genuine concern for others and in a recognition 
of their individuality (Fromm, 1956). 
Managers who know how to provide effective technical assistance and job 
related technological knowledge to subordinates demonstrate in a practical 
way how management and executive responsibility is also at times an educa- 
tional responsibility. To this extent executives are teachers as well. 
Obviously, well informed and trained employees will make fewer errors, enjoy 
their work and perform more effectively overall as a rule. Lack of such con- 
tinuing guidance and stimulus for self learning may alter an individual's 
space-time orientation sufficiently to cause personal disorientation, confu- 
sion and anxiety. Work environments are learning environments in which ef- 
fective communication of technical information between people is essential. 
Performance appraisal, for example, should be a continuing effort and not 
onlylimited to certain days during the year. There should be a continuing 
emphasis upon individual self control over the work flow which can be highly 
motivating. 
Encouraging participation on the part of subordinates serves to enlarge 
their overall commitment and identification with the organization's goals by 
deepening the sense of personal ownership of the work situation. Partici- 
pation in important work-related decision making in the work place is a posi- 
tive way to increase personal commitment and loyalty. Simply put, one is 
less likely to abuse what one owns, and toward which one has a greater sense 
of responsibility. Besides, participation encourages ideas and inventiveness 
by the very people who know the product or service the best, and thus better 
problem solving. 
Effective team building can help to improve the cohesiveness, interper- 
sonal communication, overall coordination and dispute resolving skills of 
the work group. As a rule the problem solving ability of an effective group 
is usually better than that of an indivudal especially where there are com- 
plex problems to be solved. The effective group is essentially a "non-zero 
sum game." 
Finally, expectation of high standards of work is obviously important 
not only for quality control, but also for the enhancement of self esteem, 
pride in work and greater work satisfaction. However, there are upper and 
lower limits to human performance and standard setting has to be governed 
by the realistic capacities of people. It is as foolish to expect too much 
as too little of people. 
This is the core of what is called the "participative-group" approach 
to leadership behavior. The five characteristics are interdependent and 
synergistic. Examples of publications containing both theory and applica- 
tions of this approach are Likert (1966, 1977) and Lundstedt et al. (1982). 
The following adapted table summarizes participative-group management 
(System 4) with reference to some typical management procedures while 
Table 1. Some essentials of System 4. 
Systems 1,2 and 3 System 4 
1. Selection By staff and/or 
superior 
By staff, superior and with 
peer involvement 
2. Training 
3. Setting goals 
Usually to individuals Usually to teams 
Generally by orders from 
higher levels 
With the involvement of those 
who are to achieve the goals 
4. Job evaluation By personnel staff By personnel staff but with 
involvement of those affected 
Reward individuals 5. Incentives and 
profit 
Reward groups as well as 
individuals 
Uses group objectives set by 
manager and work group and 
with each work group member 
knowing what his particular 
objectives are 
6. Management by 
objectives 
Person-to-person 
interaction between 
superior and subordi- 
nates 
7. Positive 
reinforcement 
By superior only By superior and work group 
members 
8. Problem solving Focused on problems at 
subordinate's level 
Focused on problems at the 
superior's level 
Organization chart 
shows solid and dotted 
lines 
Organization chart consists of 
linked multiple overlapping 
groups both horizontally and 
vertically, solid lines in 
both directions 
9. Structure 
Organization chart 
shows solid lines for 
line and dotted for 
staff 
Matrix organizationwithhori- 
zontal and vertical linking 
pins and solid lines in both 
directions 
11. Matrix form of 
management 
Workswell quite consistently Works well sometimes 
but more often poorly 
Works well quite consistently 12. Project 
management 
Works well sometimes 
but of ten poorly 
13. Cross-f unctional 
management 
Spotty results; some 
managers use them 
successfully 
Works well throughout organ- 
ization and survives any 
change in managers 
Source: Adapted from Likert (1977) pp. 70-71. 
contrasting it with the less effective exploitive-authoritative, benevolent- 
authoritative, and consultative approaches (Systems 1, 2 and 3). 
We conclude that social invention and innovation are unique human man- 
agement abilities. Yet they are far from being a new means of human problem- 
solving or a new kind of creativity. In the last years of this century there 
seems to be an encouraging increase in this creative activity in the manage- 
ment of complex technological systems. Unless there is an untimely reversal 
of this trend, we may expect to continue to see improvements in the quality 
of working life and in the way modern organizations are designed and admin- 
istered. To a great extent, the former concept of the executive role is also 
undergoing a change. The new executive is a decidedly different individual 
with different values and leadership abilities. 
We also now understand better the synergistic aspects of complex human 
and technical systems that are functionally interdependent with one another. 
An ecological perspective recognizes the natural interdependence of human 
communities with the physical world out of which technology in general, and 
electrotechnology in particular, arise. That is a different perspective 
from an earlier one in which artificial boundaries and separations between 
human comunities, other living systems and the physical world were a rule. 
We are not entirely at the mercy of all natural forces and there are reason- 
able grounds for optimism in the future. 
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INNOVATION MANAGEMENT: SOME SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
Michael Benjamin and Karel Riegel 
International Research Ins t i tu te  of Management Sciences (IRIMS) 
Moscow, USSR 
1. THE PHENOMONOLOGY 
The terminology related to innovation processes is not uniform and at 
present under rather controversal discussion; in the context of this.paper, 
however, we understand "innovation" to mean any relatively deep-reaching 
process of change in technics, technology or the organization of production 
or management in an enterprise. Innovation, in connection with technologi- 
cal or scientific progress, is only one kind of innovation-possibly the 
most important-but not the only one. This broad understanding of innovation 
is justified because from the socio-psychological point of view, innovations 
due to scientific progress do not differ principally from innovations based 
on other process, e.g., structural changes in the economy. 
Specific features of innovation processes include, in our understanding, 
the following aspects: 
- innovation processes do not involve particular, punctual changes, 
but moreor less comprehensive changes in the production and/or 
management processes; 
- in a much deeper way they concern personal, individual interests 
rather than customary problems in the production process; 
- innovation problems concern not only the activities and develop- 
ment of the enterprise and changes in its structure and organiza- 
tion but also imply deep changes in their social environment, 
especially in the cornunities where they are located. 
The fact that innovation is proceeding in socialist countries within a plan- 
ned economy, based on a conception of full employment'and balanced development, 
does not make these aspects disappear, although in some ways it alters the 
forms of their appearance and the methods for dealing with them. 
Introducing something new (be it technics, technology, or labor organiza- 
tion) into the organism of an industrial enterprise generally results in a 
chain reaction of activities that change the quality of the system within a 
c e r t a i n  per iod ( t h e  adap t a t i on  per iod) .  It i s  a p e c u l i a r i t y  of o rgan iza t ions  
t h a t  man appears i n  them i n  two ro l e s :  he i s  t h e  subject bu t ,  a t  t h e  same 
time, he  i s  a l s o  t h e  object  of t h e  o rgan i za t i on t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  Generally,  t h e  
members of an o r gan i za t i on  do n o t  r e a l i z e  t h i s  f a c t  and consequently do no t  
d i s t i n g u i s h  c l e a r l y  enough between t h e  system p r o p e r t i e s  and t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  
of t h e i r  pa r t ne r s  on d i v i s i o n  of labor  i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  For t h i s  reason 
n e a r l y  a l l  t h e  con t r ad i c t i ons  t h a t  emerge o b j e c t i v e l y  w i th in  any organ iza t ion  
( e s p e c i a l l y  those  i n  connection with  innovat ion processes)  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
a s  a  r e s u l t  of i nd i v i dua l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o r  even a s  cha r ac t e r  f a u l t s  of t h e  
people p a r t i c i p a t i n g  and cooperat ing i n  t h e  innovat ion process .  The case  
study presented by D r .  Riegel de sc r i be s  more d e t a i l e d  empi r ica l  f a c t s  from 
the  f i e l d  of innovat ion po l i cy  which v e r i f y  t h i s  phenomenon. 
2 .  THE SUBJECTIVE BACKGROUND 
The essence of t h e  problem seems t o  be t h e  fol lowing.  Under normal, 
s t a b l e  condi t ions  any o r gan i za t i on  ( the  o rgan iza t ion  as a whole a s  wel l  a s  
i t s  members) t o  a  c e r t a i n  degree performs i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
s t a b l e  a n t i c i p a t i o n  and feed-back c i r c u i t s .  Those s te reo types ,  which a r e  i n  
deep-reaching analogy t o  t h e  func t ion ing  of a  computer, form t h e  b a s i s  on 
which, l i k e  t h e  top of an  i ceberg ,  the  v i s i b l e  behavior of people appears  
( i n  our case  with r e s p e c t  t o  innovat ion) .  
Innovations produce f u r t h e r  (secondary) consequences, which appear a s  
s t r u c t u r a l  changes i n  t h e  socia2 subsystem of t h e  socio-economic-technic 
system. Innovation e l imina tes  automated p a t t e r n s  of o rgan i za t i ona l  behavior 
and because automation i s  a l s o  i n  human behavior (genera l ly  a  u se fu l  adapta- 
t i o n  and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of. behavior) t h i s  means a  s t rong  i nc r ea s e  i n  t h e  
imponderabi l i ty  of t h e  members of t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  The e l im ina t i on  of a  
cons iderab le  number of automated feed-backs and a n t i c i p a t i o n s  may d e s t a b i l i z e  
t h e  o r g a n i za t i ona l  system o r ,  what i n  many ca se s  means t h e  same, make i t  im- 
p o s s i b l e  t o  a c t  r a t i o n a l l y .  I n  a  genera l i zed  way what happens t o  t h e  organ- 
i z a t i o n  can be descr ibed a s  t h e  following: 
- t h e  degree of con t r o l  i n  t h e  system i s  temporar i ly  diminished; 
- memorary t r a c e s  of former a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  a c tua l i z ed ;  
- t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  of c a u s a l i t y  s t r u c t u r e s  of former a c t i v i t y  i s  
a c t ua l i z ed ;  
- new s t r a t a  of a n t i c i p a t i o n  a r e  developed; 
- t h e  t ransparency and r i g i d i t y  of system borders  changes; 
- c on t r ad i c t i ons  i n  s epa r a t e  p a r t s  of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  a r e  a c tua l i z ed ,  
and whereas t h e i r  s o l u t i o n  has a  s t a b i l i z i n g  e f f e c t ,  no t  so lv ing  
them can have unspec i f i ed  e f f e c t s ;  
- r e c i p r oca l  changes of p r o p e r t i e s ,  a c t i v i t i e s  and opera t ions  emerge 
i n  t h e  o r gan i za t i ona l  s t r u c t u r e ,  r e l a t i n g  t o  goaZs and t h e  means 
of achieving t h e  goa l s ,  e .  g . ,  
r e l i a b i l i t y  - e f f e c t i v i t y  
goal  - means 
s ub j ec t i ve  - ob j ec t i ve  
d ec i s i on  making - problem so lv ing  
I f  o r g a n i za t i ona l  processes ,  adequate t o  t h e  innovat ion processes ,a re  blocked 
t h e  system genera tes  fictitious feed-backs and motion. The r e s u l t  of t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s  can be descr ibed by t h e  fol lowing p a t t e r n  of 
r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  sub j ec t  and i t s  environment: 
subject (properties) 
stereotypes 
rigidity 
habits 
adaptation to 
causal relations 
environment (state) 
not continuous 
not defined 
unreliable 
instable 
discontent 
uneffectiveness 
This somewhat sad picture reflects the subjective side of the situation, 
.ts reflection in the mind of the personnel. It is not necessarily tr.ue but 
.t describes one very essential component of the innovation problem. In 
other words, innovation does not only mean the change of technics, technology, 
and the organization of labor; and the human aspects do not only involve the 
necessity of training people to enable them to use a new technology. Of 
course, these changes are the starting point and the well-defined goal of the 
innovation process; so, in a certain sense they form the axis around which 
the whole socio-economic and technical system moves, and which determines the 
direction of the movement. On the other hand, innovation processes cannot be 
managed, nor can they be understood and dealt with as processes of change of 
men and men's relations. 
3. WAYS OF SOLUTION 
The principal pattern for solving the contradictions described above 
evolves from their essence. Fromthesocio-psychological point of view (which 
evidently only regards one side of the whole problem) the main question and 
first step to solving the problem is to become aware of the problem, to make 
each involved member of the organization and the organization as a whole con- 
scious of the problem. The second step is the actual problem solving and, 
as a result, decision making in full awareness of the problem, its scientific 
and technical, as well as social and individual circumstances and properties. 
The experience of socialist countries is that the general mechanism of 
socialist democracy in enterprises and firms (as determined by the economic 
and labor legislation) also proves to be effective in the case of innovation 
policy. This means the participation of the workers' collectives and of their 
organizations (first of all the trade unions) in decision making on innovative 
processes, including their organizational and social aspects, as well as in 
finding adequate and optimal technical and organizational solutions. Neces- 
sarily this participation has to be based on detailed, exact and broad infor- 
mation. Experience shows that even large scale innovation and restructuring 
process (such as the closure of a coal-mine or organization of entirely new 
jobs for the workers) could be performed with high efficiency and a minimum 
of friction by way of early, broad and exact information and discussion. This 
includes the use of mass media as well as detailed and exact information 
within the enterprise and with the trade unions, and information and discus- 
sion in the basic units with the management. From this point of view there 
is no difference between innovation processes and any other questions that 
need to be discussed in an enterprise, such as regular planning discussions. 
The same refers to making and carrying out decisions. Realization of the in- 
novation process implies an awareness of its problems and conscious coopera- 
tion by all involved, including the staff of workers. 
One o t h e r  a spec t  of broadening the  b a s i s  of informat ion and dec i s i on  
making i n  innovat ion processes  a l s o  has t o  be pointed ou t .  A s  we have seen,  
o r g a n i z a t i ona l  changes r e l a t e d  t o  innovat ion processes  a l s o  b r i ng  s t r e s s  
s i t u a t i o n s  wi th  them. A t  t h e  same time they genera te  i nd iv idua l  and group 
approaches t o  implement them and t o  promote, i f  pos s ib l e ,  i nd iv idua l  and 
group i n t e r e s t  i n t h e  process.  Publ ic  informat ion and d i s cus s ion  i s  an ef-  
f e c t i v e  means of e l abo r a t i ng  a common approach, syn thes i s ing  and, a t  t h e  same 
time, l i m i t i n g  ind iv idua l  and group i n t e r e s t s ;  t h e  process  i t s e l f  becoming 
maximally t ransparen t  and convincing f o r  t h e  publ ic .  
The above mentioned p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of t h e  innovat ion process  determine 
t h e  s p e c i f i c  f i e l d  of informat ion and dec i s i on  making, which inc ludes  t h e  re -  
moval and s o l u t i o n  of any psychological  discomfort  caused by t h e  innovation.  
Firstly, informat ion about innovat ion processes  has proved t o  be e f f e c t i v e  
i f  it  i s  given i n  good time (which may mean months o r  even years  before)  and 
i f  i t  provides  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  pub l ic  ( i n  var ious  forms) d i s cus s ion  on 
t h e  d e c i s i on  making process .  One such method t h a t  has  proved success fu l  i s  
f o r  t h e  management t o  organize  a s e rv i ce  t o  c o l l e c t  a l l  ideas  and proposi-  
t ions-posi t ive  o r  negative--made wi th in  t h e  d i scuss ion .  There should a l s o  
be f r a n k  answers t o  and p r e c i s e  informat ion about problems no t  y e t  solved. 
Secondly, t h e  innovat ion pol i c y  should from t h e  very beginning inc lude  solu- 
t i o n s  t o  t h e  numerous personal  and ind iv idua l  problems involved. This  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  management s t a f f  a s  wel l  a s  t h e  workers. 
A s  s t a t e d  above, from our  p o i n t  of view innovat ion i s  mainly a process  
of changing and developing human r e l a t i o n s .  I n  t h i s  context  one of t h e  main 
condi t ions  f o r  avoiding t en s i on  and f r i c t i o n  i s  t o  make each member aware of 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he w i l l  have a job,  according t o  h i s  knowledge and capab i l i -  
t i e s ,  a f t e r  implementation of t h e  innovat ion process .  This  awareness i s  t h e  
b a s i s  f o r  a system of t r a i n i n g  and r e t r a i n i n g  measures based on t h e  var ious  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of t he  p a r t i c u l a r  innovat ion process .  A s  
i s  wel l  known, many i nd i v i dua l  problems emerge from o rgan i za t i ona l  changes. 
I n  many cases ,  innovati0.n l e ads  t o  changes i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of l abo r ,  such 
a s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  t h r ee - sh i f t  work arid changes i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of working 
groups. These ques t ions  a l s o  deserve s e r i ous  d i s cus s ion  and, i n  some cases ,  
ind iv idua l  so l u t i ons .  
I n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  of s o c i a l i s t  coun t r i e s  t h e r e  a r econs ide r ab ly  s t r i c t  
condi t ions  regarding t h i s .  The GDR Labor Code s t a t e s  t h a t  a change i n  t h e  
condi t ions  of work, a s  wel l  a s  any t r a i n i n g  o r  r e t r a i n i n g  measures, a r e  sub- 
j e c t  t o  s p e c i a l  c o n t r a c t s  being agreed between t h e  worker and t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  
n o t  l e s s  than t h r e e  months before  such a change t ake s  p l ace  (Labor Conditions 
Change Contract ,  No. 4 9 ) .  I n  t h i s  connection t h e  ques t ion  of wages a l s o  has  
t o  be solved. Without going i n t o  too much d e t a i l  we would l i k e  t o  po in t  o u t  
t h a t  t h e  experience of s o c i a l i s t  coun t r i e s  confirms t h a t  t h e  economic e f f e c t s  
of innovat ions  a r e  no t  based mainly on saving money on wages, but  on t h e  
higher  p r oduc t i v i t y  of t h e  t echnolog ica l  process .  For example, i n  t h e  GDR 
(according t o  t h e  law but  a l s o  i n  p r ac t i c e )  innovat ion processes  gene ra l l y  
mean higher  wages f o r  t h e  worker-after t r a i n i n g  i f  necessary.  I f ,  i n  excep- 
t i o n a l  cases  (about 1-2 percen t  of t h e  people involved) t h e  former wages can- 
n o t  be earned by t h e  worker w i t h in  an appropr ia te  t ime, he w i l l  then  be paid 
a y e a r ' s  amount of t h e  f o r e seeab l e  diminuation of income. A f u l l  employment 
conception i s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  l abor  l e g i s l a t i o n  of t he  GDR. According 
t o  No. 53 of t h e  Labor Code, any e n t e r p r i s e  dismiss ing a worker i s  obliged 
t o  f i n d  him another  adequate job i f  t h e  worker demands t h i s .  Dismissal  i s  
s u b j e c t  t o  a t r i p a r t i t e  " t r a n s i t i o n  con t rac t" ,  which c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  new job 
l e g a l l y .  A t r a n s i t i o n  c o n t r a c t  caused by innovat ion processes  a l s o  has  t o  be 
concluded no t  l e s s  than t h r e e  months before  d i smi s sa l .  
4. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
It need not be pointed out that such strict legal obligations produce 
special problems and complications for the management of innovation proces- 
ses. On the other hand, it has been proven by experience that they create 
a climate of social security that helps to avoid many social tensions. Under 
such conditions innovations are not only not opposed by the workers but 
there is an increased interest in the understanding of necessities, coopera- 
tion and creativitiy in performing the necessary changes. At the same time 
as stressing the aspects of publicity and participation we also have to point 
out the organizational framework for it. It is different in different soci- 
alist countries, but the main features coincide. 
First of all, the workers' collective should be mentioned; its status 
and competence being subject to detailed legal regulations (cf. the Law on 
Rights and Obligations of Workers' Collectives of the Soviet Union, also the 
individual Labor Codes of socialist countries). All of them provide for 
broad participation of the collectives in discussing principal items of work 
and its organization, including innovation processes. An important role is 
played by the trade unions, who not only organize discussion and deliberation 
but particularly take care that the proper solutions to all questions con- 
cerning living and working conditions during the innovation process and its 
results are found. Questions of this character can only be decided in ac- 
cordance with the trade unions. 
Another, sometimes underestimated, level of social activities in inno- 
vation processes is connected with the social environment, especially the 
immediate surrounding territory. There exist many deep-reaching interdepen- 
dencies and interactions between them. Innovation processes induce several 
kinds of territorial activities. They can induce far-reaching demographic 
changes concerning migration, new education and training profiles and changes 
in the employment of women. They may require changes in the development 
planning of a town, long-range (and in some cases short-range) changes in 
the social infrastructure (education, professional training, transport, etc.). 
Changes in employment (e.g., employing more women, the introduction of night 
shifts, etc.) also means changes in the activities of kindergartens, shops, 
urban traffic, etc. There are examples in industrial towns in the GDR where 
flats were built and allocated taking into account the special requirements 
of night-shift workers who need peace and quiet during the day. Innovation 
processes therefore are in many cases not only subject to discussion and de- 
liberation in the enterprises and firms but also in the local parliaments, 
their commissions and in local administration. It is especially necessary to 
point out the great function performed by the Communist Party organizations 
in the enterprises and their districts, and the territorial committees in 
organizing and leading discussion and decision making in innovation processes. 
This therefore is the background and context within which socialist en- 
terprise management acts in performing innovation processes. An essential 
conclusion therefore is that the management of innovation processes not only 
requires experts in technology but to no less degree also the efforts of 
qualified experts in social and behavioral sciences, which leads us to our 
next point. That is, it is not only sometimes necessary to train and retrain 
the staff of workers in the innovation process but also the management to 
enable it to perform innovation in the most effective way with respect to 
social relations. Personnel management should not be understood as mere 
"administration" but as the work of experts who should be entitled to partici- 
pate (and really in dealing with production problems. On the 
other hand, technicians, technologists and organizers should understand that 
any man-machine system is an open system, the liability and effectiveness of 
which depends mainly on the social subsystem. The peculiar task of person- 
nel management is to deal with the personnel as the subject of innovation. 
An additional important task appears therefore in addition to the "classical" 
tasks of personnel management (such as the selection of personnel), that is, 
the organization of direct feed-back links from the "bottom" level to the 
managerial level. 
STRES s ING "HUMAN FACTORS~~ IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT- 
WILL IT WORK? 
Thomas H. Moss 
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This paper on human factors in innovation is not meant to be theoreti- 
cal. It is based on observing or participating in the management of a 
variety of organizations: the International Business Machine Corporation 
(IBM), two universities, the U.S. Congress and federal government, and re- 
cently a start-up technology development corporation designed to create and 
foster new business ventures based on university technology. The ideas pre- 
sented spring directly from experience in these organizations, all but the 
last of which have a fundamental similarity to the heavy electrical industry 
which is the focus of this task force meeting: they are large and "mature" 
organizations with relatively stable characteristics and directions. 
The paper is also not intended to discuss the desirability or benefits 
of applying human factor thinking to innovation management. There is an, 
enormous outburst of literature on this subject, and the achievements which 
can be stimulated by mobilizing the full creative potential of management 
and workers are well recognized. Given the current enthusiasm for the ap- 
plication of human factor concepts, an important priority now is to take a 
realistic look at the barriers which we will have to overcome as we begin to 
direct management strategy in this new direction. What is likely to prevent 
us from successful use of these ideas in our management systems? What re- 
alistic constraints of history, organization, human nature, or other influ- 
ences must be confronted if we expect to plunge successfully into a manage- 
ment style in which human factors play a major role? 
Human factors in management approaches are, of course, not new. As- 
sumptions and hypotheses about human behavior have always been at least 
implicitly part of traditional management styles and methodologies. The 
issue is whether the implicit or explicit approaches to the human factor 
have been positive or negative in effect. There is a growing current con- 
sciousness that most notions of management have not been optimized for the 
human aspect of the innovation process. Typical management strategies, for 
instance, have focused on: 
1. Maximizing f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l ;  
2 .  St reng then ing  c e n t r a l  management in fo rmat ion  and c o n t r o l  of a l l  
o p e r a t i o n s ;  
3 .  Providing back-up s t r a t e g i e s  and systems t o  minimize r i s k ;  
4. Maximizing " p o l i t i c a l "  v i a b i l i t y  of a  u n i t ,  e . g . ,  v i s i b i l i t y ,  
conformity t o  f ash ionab le  t r e n d s ,  e t c .  ; 
5. F o s t e r i n g  compet i t ion between i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  s u b u n i t s  t o  achieve 
goa l s .  
A l l  of t h e s e  s t r a t e g y  emphases c l e a r l y  have human f a c t o r  assumptions and 
impacts,  b u t  whatever t h e i r  o t h e r  v i r t u e s ,  they  o f t e n  have n e g a t i v e  implica- 
t i o n s  i n  terms of f u l l y  mobi l i z ing  human p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c r e a t i v e  innovat ion.  
To o rgan ize  my remarks, I w i l l  look a t  a  few examples of key o b j e c t i v e s  
u s u a l l y  c i t e d  f o r  contemporary human f a c t o r  innova t ion  management: 
1. F o s t e r i n g  c r e a t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and i d e a s ;  
2. F a c i l i t a t i n g  convers ion of new i d e a s  t o  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ;  
3.  Building i d e n t i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l s  and s u b u n i t s  wi th  t h e  o v e r a l l  
goa l s  of an o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  
4. Team b u i l d i n g ;  
5.  F o s t e r i n g  goa l s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and awareness a t  a l l  l e v e l s  of 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  
6. F o s t e r i n g  communication a long t h e  management cha in  and among 
subun i t s .  
The i s s u e  I would l i k e  t o  b r i n g  t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  of t h i s  meeting 
does n o t  concern t h e  m e r i t s  o r  b e n e f i t s  of t h e s e  commonly expressed goa l s .  
I n s t e a d ,  I sugges t  t h a t  we look,  i n  each of our  exper iences ,  a t  what p reven t s  
p rogress  i n  ach iev ing  them. Bui ld ing  a  r e a l i s t i c  s e n s e  of o b s t a c l e s  t o  be 
encountered may be t h e  b e s t  way f o r  us a l l  t o  s e e  pathways t o  overcoming them 
i n  our  r e s p e c t i v e  management program. 
Many of t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  a r e  f a m i l i a r  a s p e c t s  of human n a t u r e ,  b u t  ones 
a l l  t o o  o f t e n  f o r g o t t e n  i n  t h e  enthusiasm f o r  new management s t r a t e g i e s .  A s  
a  reminder,  Table  1 l i s t s  some of t h e s e  common s tumbl ing b locks  under t h e  
s i x  human f a c t o r  o b j e c t i v e s  where t h e i r  impact i s  most f e l t .  However, r a t h e r  
than  con t inue  wi th  s y s t e m a t i c  l i s t s ,  I t h i n k  it i s  most important  f o r  our  
purpose t o  look a t  t h e  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  framework of a c t u a l  case  h i s t o r i e s .  I 
w i l l  review wi th  you some i l l u s t r a t i v e  examples from my own exper ience  and 
hope t o  h e a r  how they compare w i t h  yours .  These a r e  r e a l  even t s ,  and provide  
a  p r e d i c t i v e  framework f o r  human behavior  which i s  probably s u p e r i o r  t o  most 
t h e o r i e s ,  i f  we can e x t r a c t  t h e  common under ly ing  determinants  t h a t  shape 
bo th  success  and f a i l u r e .  Rela ted  c a s e  h i s t o r i e s  i n  any of our  c o u n t r i e s ,  
o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  most c e r t a i n l y  can a l s o  be analyzed f o r  common themes. I 
w i l l  look forward t o  h e a r i n g  t h e  exper iences  of o t h e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  which nay 
be  more r e v e a l i n g  than  my own. We may be  s u r p r i s e d  a t  how u n i v e r s a l  t h e  
themes a r e ,  t r anscend ing  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  our  va r ious  economic, c u l t u r a l ,  
and p o l i t i c a l  systems.  
Table 1. 
OBJECTIVE: Fostering creative Conversion of Building identity 
individual and new ideas to with organiza- 
ideas applications tional goals 
OBSTACLES: inertialsize inertialsize distrust 
disorder/equilibrium historical practice statuslhierarchy 
statuslhierarchy disorder1 rivalrylgreed 
disequilibrium 
rivalrylgreed lack of rewards/ 
short term horizon immobility lack of rewards1 
immobility disincentives 
poor measures of fear 
creativity 
poor measures of 
creativity 
fear 
fear 
OBJECTIVE : Team Goal responsibility Fostering 
building and awareness communication 
OBSTACLES: ambition/rivalry ambitionlrivalry ambition/rivalry 
distrust inertialsize inertialsize 
disorder1 distrust distrust 
disequilibrium 
s tatuslhierarchy disorder1 
statuslhierarchy disequilibrium lack of rewards1 
short term horizon immobility status /hierarchy 
disincentives poor measures of short term horizon 
fear creativity disincentives 
fear 
The first human factor goal I would like to examine is that of nurturing 
an innovative idea to fruition. I will present this in the framework of an 
unusual "case": the creation of the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program*. This is a radical new approach in U.S. government research 
support, in which a fraction of all government research funding will be chan- 
neled to small businesses, as opposed to the traditional university and 
government laboratory system. The program is based on the idea that small 
businesses are the source of many innovative research ideas. Moreover, these 
are usually ideas with practical applications in mind. Unfortunately, many 
of them are never developed because of inadequate research funds available to 
these small organizations. The SBIR program is designed to provide funds for 
the best of these small business research initiatives. 
*The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, U.S. Public Law 97-219. 
I do no t  c i t e  t h i s  program a s  an  example of a success :  it  i s  much too  
e a r l y  t o  t e l l  i f  it w i l l  t r u l y  advance t h e  t echno log ica l  compet i t iveness  of 
U.S. i n d u s t r y .  There a r e  many American e x p e r t s  who f e e l  t h a t  it w i l l  be a 
was te fu l  and und i rec ted  d i v e r s i o n  of funds from t h e  prime sources  of our  
s c i e n c e  and technology development. Nonetheless,  whether evo lv ing  a s  a suc- 
c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e ,  it is a genuine innovat ion i n  r e s e a r c h  management i n  my 
country ,  and i l l u s t r a t e s  some key examples of b a r r i e r s  t o  implementing inno- 
v a t i o n  management s t r a t e g i e s .  
The system i n  which t h a t  i d e a  emerged i s  a l a r g e  and complex one: t h e  
e n t i r e  U;S. Na t iona l  r e s e a r c h  program. I n  some senses  it i s  n o t  managed a t  
a l l ;  i n  ano the r  s e n s e  it i s  managed through a complex i n t e r p l a y  of p o l i t i c a l ,  
f i n a n c i a l  and h i s t o r i c a l  f o r c e s  which a r e  d i f f e r e n t  only  i n  s c a l e  from s i m i -  
l a r  f o r c e s  i n  more def ined o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The system has  many s u b u n i t s .  It 
inc ludes  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e ,  l a r g e  and s m a l l ,  l a b o r a t o r i e s .  These range from 
t h e  U.S. n a t i o n a l  l a b o r a t o r i e s  such a s  those  run  by t h e  Space Agency, Depart- 
ment of Defense, o r  Department of Energy, t o  t h e  l a b o r a t o r i e s  run  by p r i v a t e  
i n d u s t r y  such a s  B e l l  Labora to r i es  and IBM a s  w e l l  a s  many s i m i l a r  corpora- 
t i o n s .  The management of t h e  s u b u n i t s  i s  independent t o  va ry ing  degrees ,  
though u l t i m a t e l y  t h e  U.S. Congress ho lds  a u t h o r i t y  over  t h e  g r o s s  s t r u c t u r e  
and budget p r i o r i t i e s  of t h e  government l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  and t h e  economic c l i -  
mate i n  which t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  opera tes .  
It i s  important  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  t o  p rov ide  s p e c i a l  suppor t  t o  small 
bus inesses  i n  t h i s  system emerged i n  t h e  unique form of a s p e c i f i e d  s e t - a s i d e  
of a l l  r e s e a r c h  funds due t o  f r u s t r a t i o n .  The smal l  b u s i n e s s  community was 
thoroughly f r u s t r a t e d  and convinced t h a t  t h e  convent ional  r e s e a r c h  suppor t  
system would never respond t o  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  s m a l l  business-sponsored re-  
s e a r c h  could  be f r u i t f u l .  The smal l  bus iness  s e t - a s i d e  i d e a  emerged because 
a few people  who t r u l y  b e l i e v e d  i n  it pushed it  cont inuously  and a g g r e s s i v e l y ,  
d e s p i t e  r epea ted  f a i l u r e  t o  g e t  it implemented beyond token measures i n  con- 
v e n t i o n a l  p lanning and budget p rocesses .  This  e n e r g e t i c  e f f o r t  cont inued 
d e s p i t e  w e l l  organized o p p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i n i t i a l l y  appeared v e r y  i n t i m i d a t i n g .  
It was opposed on t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  p rocedura l  grounds,  f o r  example, t h a t  t h e  
f i x e d  percentage s e t - a s i d e  v i o l a t e d  convent ional  management c o n t r o l  over 
budget p rocesses .  It was f u r t h e r  opposed on s u b s t a n t i v e  grounds,  t h a t  it  
would no t  work due t o  t h e  l a c k  of exper ience ,  smal l  s i z e ,  and s h o r t  time 
hor izon of smal l  bus inesses .  L a s t , i t  was opposed on cons t i tuency  grounds: 
t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  b i t t e r l y  r e s i s t e d  t h e  smal l  b u s i n e s s  s e t - a s i d e  a s  r epresen t -  
i n g  a l o s s  t o  them of what they  perceived as a l r e a d y  very  s c a r c e  f e d e r a l  r e -  
s e a r c h  suppor t .  
Yet d e s p i t e  t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s ,  t h i s  innova t ive  approach came t o  f r u i t i o n  
f o r  s e v e r a l  powerful  r easons .  One was a s u r v i v a l  i n s t i n c t  on t h e  p a r t  of 
"top management" ( t h e  Congress) .  It was t h e i r  sense  t h a t  new and dramat ic  
measures were needed t o  main ta in  U.S. technology i n  a prominent p o s i t i o n  
a g a i n s t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e f f e c t i v e  world compet i t ion.  Another f a c t o r  pushing 
t h e  i d e a  was t h e  s e c u r i t y  of unchallenged a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  Congress, which 
allowed a w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  r i s k  and gamble. That gambling s p i r i t  overcame t h e  
l ack  of a complete s e t  of f a c t s  and r e l i a b l y  p r e d i c t e d  r e s u l t s  which a r e  
normally demanded i n  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  decision-making p rocess .  A t h i r d  
d r i v i n g  f o r c e  was t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  a " p o l i t i c a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e "  p o s i t i o n .  The 
groundwork f o r  t h i s  was l a i d  by t h e  proponents who v igorous ly  pub l i c ized  t h e  
i d e a ,  and organized suppor t  f o r  i t ,  i n  a manner which minimized p o l i t i c a l  
r i s k  i n  suppor t ing  it d e s p i t e  i t s  unknown s u b s t a n t i v e  impact.  
A last and crucial element allowingtheimplementationofthis innovative 
idea was the ability of the Congress and political leaders of the executive 
branch to maintain a dual consciousness or "split personality" concerning 
strategies to manage for innovation. That is, at the time of discussion of 
the SBIR program, there were also many systematically designed conventional 
innovation management approaches which moved through all the standard plan- 
ning, budgeting and analysis bodies in and out of government. However, quite 
independently, this idea emerged, with its birth and development outside of 
the normal channels, never integrated into conventional strategy. "Top man- 
agement", the political figures in the Congress and Executive, were able in 
this case to simultaneously nurture both the systematic approaches and the 
maverick idea. 
This brief example of bringing an idea to fruition in a large structure 
shows the power of recurrent general obstacles to such a course: the fear, 
distrust, and even greed of constituencies not perceiving benefits, the gen- 
eral inertia and resistance to change of administrative, planning and budget- 
ary units, and the stress and disruption of conflict among affected constit- 
uencies. It also shows some of the typical ways such barriers can be over- 
come. Among these were the simple persistence of idea proponents (largely 
because rewards to their promoting group in this case were very clearly 
visible), and their willingness to take full responsibility for getting the 
idea implemented, as opposed to expecting.upper management to carry the argu- 
ment for them. Important also was the survival instinct and economic stress 
which helped to overcome conventional inertia to new approaches, along with 
management's willingness and sense of security to experiment. This management 
security is crucial to create a climate, vital to the innovation process, in 
which failure or incomplete success is regarded as part of a learning process 
as opposed to a negative result. 
Perhaps most importantly, management was able to maintain the "split 
personality" thinking already discussed; that is, to simultaneously maintain 
a portfolio of main-stream incremental strategizing at the same time as in- 
vesting a fraction of policy thrust in an eccentric and untested channel. 
Almost by definition, the conventional, systematic planning process is un- 
likely to produce the truly innovative approaches. On the other hand, that 
systematic process is still necessary, to provide a framework for participa- 
tion, comunication, and action. Thus, despite the apparant contradiction 
of holding a set of carefully planned and developed ideas on an equal foot- 
ing with a few quite eccentric notions, this "split personality'' approach was 
essential in this case to the emergence of an idea far from main-stream think- 
ing. Ability to integrate the conventional and the eccentric strands out 
from this example as a key element of innovation management. 
It is interesting to compare, briefly, the "human factor" implications 
of this small business set-aside idea with a much more conventional national 
or corporate strategy for innovation management: reorganization of the ap- 
propriate organizational units. Reorganization is the most predictable way 
governments and other large organizations deal with changing priorities or 
new problems. It is also easy to see that while these steps may be neces- 
sary or have positive results, they also breed human reactions which can be 
very disruptive to achievement of goals. Both the former U.S. Government 
Administration of President Carter and the current Reagan Administration made 
government reorganization a major thrust of their programs. For instance, 
Carter labored hard and expended much political capital on the innovation of 
creating a "Department of Energy"; Reagan has done the same in seeking to 
disband this Department. Both (and many Congressmen) have also proposed 
reorganization of federal agencies to deal with the issue of stimulating 
industrial technology and increasing the competitiveness of U.S. products. 
Whatever the true goals, however, all of these proposed and actual reorgan- 
izations had the effect of mobilizing powerful drives for survival or hege- 
mony by affected subunits and individuals. The bureaucratic and political 
strategies to carry out these drives had little to do with the purpose of 
theproposed reorganizations, and drained energy from that purpose. The un- 
certainty of effect which were linked to these reorganizational proposals 
became the focal point of attention by many involved, as opposed to the 
original goal. In a crude political sense, the spectre of reorganization 
was used by the Presidents in both cases to gain the initiative and control 
over the bureaucracy; as long as a reorganization was pending no individual 
or subunit could afford to ignore top management. This is a very common 
human factor result, or even internally acknowledged purpose, for reorgan- 
ization in government and business. To understand reactions, it is crucial 
to recognize how little a reorganization strategy may in reality have to do 
with the usually stated objective of matching organization to function. The 
point Iwant to establishin looking by comparison at this more "conventional" 
innovation strategy is that just as many human factor obstacles may be trig- 
fered by a conventional approach such as reorganization, as by more novel 
ideas. Any new priority or strategy is loaded with human factor agenda 
which cannot be ignored if results are to be predicted. 
Let us turn now to another set of human factor management goals and 
similarly ask the question, via experience and case histories, of what are 
the inhibiting factors often blocking or confusing implementation. For this 
purpose we will consider the related management objectives of nurturing the 
creative individual in an organization, of building identity of goals be- 
tween individual and organization, and building a sense of responsibility 
and goal awareness at all levels of an organization. At IBM, and in most 
major industrial firms, these thrusts of innovation management have received 
enormous attention for some time, and yet problems of worker and management 
alienation and frustration persist. Why? 
Industrial firms tend to deal with the goals of creating individual 
creativity and loyalty by complicated rating, reward, and educational (pro- 
paganda) approaches. As an example, the numbers of patent applications or 
issuances may be tabulated for each individual or department, or other types 
of formula rating systems established. Sometimes these are engineered in 
elaborately complicated fashion. In the case of one major U.S. firm, every 
research staff member was asked to rate every other member on a number of 
criteria. The results became an enormous matrix of interlocking perceptions 
and intentions., Equally complicated formula reward systems generally accon- 
pany the rating approaches, ranging from tickets to the movie theatre or 
invitations to dinner, to cash bonuses and promotion steps. 
The factors that make such systems work usefully may, paradoxically, 
be some of the same factors which we can identify as obstacles to their 
effectiveness. I would characterize them, in summary, as manifestations of 
the acute capacity of humans to perceive accurately the dynamics of the sys- 
tem in which they function. That is, in a relatively small group, excel- 
lence, leadership, and creativity tend to be recognized with strong consen- 
sus despite or independently of rating systems. In general, management in 
such instances would probably wisely apply a formal rating system only to 
con£ irm the integrated perceptions of the individuals in the group. It would 
not be relied on to "discover" creativity or other qualities. The reward 
system would probably be similarly biased toward confirming instinct rather 
than strictly following numerical ratings. 
Even the obvious difficulties of this approach are clearly often fac- 
tored into the integrated view. It is indeed true that personal agenda of 
management or colleagues, which have no relation whatsoever to the recogni- 
tion of creativity, clearly can come into play in indivudal or group per- 
ception of the system. These may be fear, ambition, jealousy, sexual or 
racial attitudes, or many others. However, under proper conditions, the 
human integrating capacity can identify and discount these. No management 
reward and recognition system can succeed without very explicitly recogniz- 
ing these realities, despite the often professed intent of "objective" 
rating systems to overcome them. Integrating the explicit and implicit 
factors of rating systems, with their visible and invisible agenda, is 
another aspect of the need to maintain dual or multiple channel thinking in 
successful innovation management. 
In larger systems, where the formal results of the rating systems tend 
to dominate instinctive evaluations, the biggest obstacle to useful appli- 
cation of rating and reward systems is the same uncanny ability to perceive 
true system dynamics. Humans are ingenius in sensing how to manipulate the 
management system itself, as opposed to working toward the goals it was 
designed to achieve. Patent disclosure counting systems are a classic ex- 
ample. The greater the extent that rewards are based on such simplistic 
counting, the greater the extent to which work is directed to the format of 
patent disclosures quite independently of true needs for innovation. Even 
much more exquisitely designed ratinglreward systems appear to have remark- 
ably short "adaptation lives", the time in which it takes any group to see 
how to manipulate the ratinglreward system for individual or constituency 
purposes. 
Management strategies aimed at building identity of individual with 
organization goals similarly run into the obstacle of the integrating 
sophistication of human minds. Most significantly, human factor managers 
rarely appreciate the impact of historical practice, and the skepticism with 
which people approach claimed "new directions" and "new policies". Often, 
past experience where goal identity was built by survival instincts (war, 
impending financial collapse, etc.) is mistakenly taken by management as 
verification that the system succeeded in creating goal identity. The re- 
sult is that techniques which were spurious to the results obtained are 
enshrined and applied over and over again under conditions where they will 
not work. 
In fact, the systems that do work over long periods of time, in crisis 
and normal conditions, cluster around a simple concept: honesty. With 
this as the unifying principle, rating systems are ledto explicitly acknow- 
ledge the need to consider many and diverse qualitative and quantitative 
criteria in evaluating potential and actual contributions to creativity and 
innovation. They will explicitly acknowledge the need to balance the biases 
or personal agenda of the evaluator. The reward systems, which are designed 
to reinforce the innovative instincts and build identity with organizational 
goals, will not only be substantive in an absolute sense, but will be based 
on conveying to the contributing individual an appreciable fraction of the 
benefits brought to the organization. 
Similarly, management approaches keyed to developing responsibility 
for performance at all levels of the organization can take many forms, 
but must honestly demonstrate a willingness by management to take seriously 
problem-solving or innovation-producing approaches generated from below. An 
openness to risk-taking, and trust and support for best efforts even when cir- 
cumstances prevent following accustomed procedures, is the only way to truly 
reinforce the acceptance of responsibility at all levels of an organization. 
Similarly, a true commitment to open and honest communication along manage- 
ment chains, of both problems and opportunities, must be made despite per- 
ceived risks of early or wide dissemination of information. A history of 
se lec t ive  support for initiative, or se lec t ive  honesty about goals, problems, 
and intentions, and any other manifestation of incomplete honesty or commit- 
ment to trust, will frustrate the most enthusiastic management campaigns to 
build the innovation-producing sense of responsibility at worker and lower 
management levels . 
A last set of human factor goals to examine in this sense of realistic 
experience includes those of team building and promoting communication among 
individuals and organizational sub-units. As a participant from the U.S., 
I feel confident in speaking of the obstacles faced in the area of team 
building. It is obviously one of our cultural weaknesses in organization 
management, a mirror of the fact that nurturing independent and creative in- 
dividuals is one of our cultural strengths. 
So many of the incentive and reward systems in the U.S. management sys- 
tems are built on a foundation of competition that the obstacles to team 
building are deeply ingrained. Groups are often viewed as arenas for compe- 
tition, in which "winners" (and losers) are to be identified. It is rare 
where the groups are considered as indivisible units in which success is 
shared by all. In the circumstances where group success is established as 
a norm, it is often in terms of competition with other groups, where again 
clear classes of winners and losers are established. Free and open communi- 
cation between individuals and groups is one of the first casualties of such 
competitive systems. It is well known that "information" in large bureau- 
cratic systems becomes almost a commodity, being traded and bartered, and 
capable of establishing position in hierarchy. In an intensely competitive 
system it may be closely guarded, so that the synergistic power of combining 
indidivual and group ideas is lost. 
The impact of the breakdown in open communication is very often seen in 
the planning process. Organizational planning can often be a key element of 
internal communication, as important for that purpose as its value as a road- 
map for the future. The act of forming the plan facilitates exchange of 
ideas concerning opportunities and constraints in the future, and catalyzes 
the formation of mutually reinforcing networks which might otherwise have 
consisted of isolated, redundant, or contradictory initiatives. When compe- 
tition or rivalry restricts information flow, however, planning becomes an 
empty exercise, usually breeding only organizational cynicism based on the 
knowledge that real intentions are buried far beneath the visible planning 
documents. 
The most extreme expressions of the American "management by competition" 
theme are systems in which competition for survival is the driving force. 
Indivudals and groups are put in situations where only a limited number can 
survive economically, or as independent units, or as permanent employees, etc. 
The survival drive can have great innovation-stimulating effects, of course, 
as we have seen in discussing conditions needed for stimulating and bringing 
innovative ideas to fruition. On the other hand, an enormous price is paid 
in terms of the loss of the synergistic energy resulting from team building 
and open inter-personal and inter-group communication. 
Even in cases where competition is not itself the governing management 
principle, systems on a large and small scale are often designed to be a 
tense balance of conflicting and competing interests. The federal bureau- 
cracy in the United States is a prime example. Various agencies and subunits 
within them are constantly on guard against any dimunition of their authority 
or scope of concern; conversely they are always on alert for opportunities 
to probe into the territory of another. This seems to happen, paradoxically, 
even in a context of fatigue and frustration of over work. In many cases 
(e.g., regulatory agencies, the legislative-executive-judicial branch "check 
and balance" theory) the system was very explicitly structured with the in- 
tention of building-in these tensions of conflicting purpose. 
I am far from condeming competition or "checks and balances" as manage- 
ment strategies. They represent perhaps theoldest techniques for managing 
human affairs, with clear links back to ancient tribal practices. However, 
they clearly have their disadvantages in terms of effects on other human fac- 
tor goals, and we must be alert to these influences in planning overall 
strategies if we are to avoid disillusionment and frustration. The stress 
experienced in reorganization strategies, discussed earlier, may be the most 
vivid example of the "surprise" disillusionment often felt by management due 
to the impact of general reliance on competition management. In government 
and industry, like an ever-repeating morality drama, reorganization strate- 
gies are constructed to expedite new goals, and then mysteriously founder on 
the competitive territoriality of individuals and groups, bureaus, and de- 
partments. When we look at the human factor implications of competition- 
based management strategies, the reactions to reorganization ideas seem 
absolutely obvious and predictable. Yet over and over again, the need to 
deal with those implications as part of reorganization or other management 
strategies is constantly underestimated. 
I have discussed only a relatively few of many possible "human factor" 
management goals, in the context of a minute set of case histories. Yet I 
believe that some general themes emerge as predictable obstacles to the goals 
of stimulating innovation through human factor management, along with clues 
on how to overcome them. The obstacles are simply variations and combina- 
tions of the familiar human reactions tabulated in Table 1: insecurity, 
ambition, rivalry, inertia, distrust, status, greed, etc. 
Clearly, some conventional management strategies tend to exaccerbate 
these even though they may achieve some objectives in a narrow scope or limi- 
ted time frame. For example, management by fear of sanctions most notedly 
discourages risk-taking, inhibits communication, and breaks the identity of 
individual and organization. Management based on competition similarly des- 
troys communication, and weakens team building and opportunity for synergy, 
in addition to undermining identity with overall organizational goals. Fom- 
ula rating and reward systems, especially where manipulative in even the 
most subtle fashion, generally are mistargeted in effect, as participants 
rapidly adapt to counter-manipulation of the system itself. These patterns 
are familiar and predictable, and yet the enthusiasm or other motivations to 
"sell" new management approaches, or to seek a simplistic or convenient 
answer to a challenging situation, repeatedly blinds individuals and organ- 
izations to these realities. 
However, the examples examined, and many others, show that there are 
means to overcome these predictable problems. They may require flexibility, 
patience, investment, and risk-taking by management. Yet the rewards, of 
fully mobilizing individual and group potential for creativity and responsi- 
bility to achieve organizational objectives, are enormous. Moreover, the 
rapid emergence of a world economy based on the products of technological 
and organizational innovation, shows that the penalties for failing to ulti- 
lize this human capacity are increasingly severe. 
Among the management skills needed is the crucial ability to maintain 
simultaneously, and integrate, multiple patterns of thinking. Conventional 
planning and organizational strategies must be fostered at the same time 
that unexpected ideas and opportunities are nurtured. Maslow (1971) has re- 
peatedly stressed the great benefits deriving from the ability to integrate, 
in the individual mind, spontaneous and subconsciously-based bursts of cre- 
ativity with systematic patterns of thinking. 
The same integrative capacity is essential to maximizing innovation and 
creativity in management or organizations. It is this integrative capacity 
which can enable management to benefit from the best of modem rating and 
incentive systems, and yet overcome the mistargeting and other disadvantages 
that these inevitably bring. It is the same capacity which allows an effi- 
cient and smoothly running planning system, and yet allows the full advantage 
to be drawn from fortuitous events and unique individuals or situations. 
A second crucial element for fully mobilizing human potential is that 
of complete honesty in the reward structure and implementation of the man- 
agement system. The same abilities that make human beings so powerful when 
fully mobilized enable them to sense with uncanny accuracy dishonesty in 
goals or expression of management approaches. The long-range benefits of a 
management system based on honesty and candor are often counter-intuitive, 
because the near-term results may be obvious complication, disequilibrium, 
and dissatisfaction. Yet the high-level of performance of individuals and 
groups operating in a climate in which suspision and disillusionment are 
minimized is well documented. The innovative performance of subunits in an 
organization, or entire corporations, can often be directly correlated with 
the climate of honesty and candor conveyed by the reward and management sys- 
tem. The need for a management commitment to openness and honesty is not 
based on a moral or philosophical platitude, but on practical utility in 
stimulating the innovation process. 
A last major characteristic clearly needed to facilitate innovation 
management is linked to the first two. It is the maintenance of a climate 
to encourage risk-taking. The atmosphere of professional and personal secur- 
ity, management's ability to integrate and simultaneously nurture varying 
approaches, and the climate of reliable honesty and integrity are obviously 
part of nurturing risk-taking. Underlying this, however, must be the clear 
realization that risk and conflict are not inherently negative concepts for 
an organization. There is an emerging parallel to this thought in current 
discussion concerning public policy with respect to regulatory law and ques- 
tions of siting or allocaitng the negative aspects of modern technology- 
dangerous power facilities, waste disposal sites, etc. Where public policy 
debates formerly centered on risk or conflict avoidance, it became clear 
from many examples that avoidance strategies inevitably resulted only in 
transferring the risk or conflict from the immediate or local sphere of at- 
tention to a broader or longer-term arena in which the threats and tensions 
might turn out to be more severe. The only turly effective strategy is one 
of openly acknowledging the risks and conflict of any new or innovative ap- 
proach, and concentrating efforts on managing them skillfully, not hiding, 
escaping, or avoiding, them. Technological or management innovation strate- 
gies must similarly face directly the fact that risks and conflicts will be 
generated by new or unusual ideas, and consider that these risks and conflicts 
are simply a normal part of creative operations. Obviously the total conflict 
and risk generated must be weighed against the total benefits experienced in 
trying a given number of new initiatives, but a pretense or vain hope of 
avoiding them entirely and in every case would thoroughly destroy the capac- 
ity to innovate. 
I have valued the opportunity to present these ideas to the participants 
of this meeting, and look forward to hearingtheirreactions and observations 
from the experiences in the many diverse industrial and organizational set- 
tings represented here. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From the very beginning the project on Innovation Management in Electro- 
technology posed the crucial question: How to raise the ability of an indus- 
trial firm to more effectively manage the development and implementation of 
technological, organizational and social innovations? Within this question 
is an implicit assumption that there are two sides to the problem: supply 
and demand, i.e., the supply of innovations (or at least the potential for 
them) and, on the other side, the demand for them and the ability to imple- 
ment them. What kind of balance should there be between these two sides? 
Are social forces and interests equal on both sides? 
Several years ago Gabor (1970) pointed out that the various innovation 
types should be in a certain balance while Jungk (1976) announced the lack of 
a sufficient quantity of social innovations. These two authors thought mostly 
in general societal terms. I do think, however, that their reasoning is valid 
for the industrial firm case, especially those firms featuring intensive R&D 
activity and new technology application. A typical situation is the following: 
innovations (in abundance in leading economies) are developed and implemented 
with the aim of raising productivity, profits, competitiveness, etc. Until 
now this process was fairly effective and successful in spite of the fact that 
certain negative social side effects appeared. Recently we have been alarmed 
by diminishing productivity or, at least, by non-growth, even in countries of 
traditionally high productivity growth (e.g., the United States, as stated by 
the Center for Futures Research report). Do we have a case of some kind of 
general law for diminishing returns in technology as, e.g., Giarini and 
Louberge (1978) claim? 
Perhaps we have poorly managed innovations, i-e., technological innova- 
tions that do not match the organizational ones, meaning a gap between hardware, 
software and orgware, to use Dobrov's (1983) terms. It is true that new tech- 
nologies usually require some specific, one could even say predetermined, 
organization (i. e. , orgware) . We theref ore have technology for prof it making 
and competitiveness and often impose its organization on people. But what 
about people? We learn from simple observation and research reports that 
working people no longer want to work as machines (Porter et al. 1980). 
Moreover the adverse effects of technology also have an impact on their work- 
ing place and people believe less and less that "technology can be cured by 
more technology". They demand humanization of technology and improvement of 
working conditions; they demand participation, self -management and the right 
to be able to make a choice about new technologies (Zacher 1980). 
What should immediately be learned from this, shocking for some, experi- 
ence, is that traditional work ethics have gone*, and that the so called 
"human factor" of production becomes more and more a "subject of production" 
as pointed out recently by the late Czech humanist Radovan Richta (1971). 
This implies that the old technological rationality is no longer valid and 
that it ought to be combined with social and human rationality (Zacher 1981). 
For example, respecting the right to work as a strong political and social 
commitment (which is a rule in socialist countries) expresses nontechnologi- 
cal rationality. Some critics would say that it is also non-economic ration- 
ality. Perhaps, but only in the short run as proponents of the social and 
political rationality would answer. 
The implication therefore is that the old, traditional style of manage- 
ment is no longer valid because it is technocratic and bureaucratic; it 
overlooks the "human subject" and neglects its liberatory ambitions. My mes- 
sage as a social scientist to those firm's executives and engineers in this 
audience is the following: it seems more and more self-evident that innova- 
tion management is not merely a "technical thing" and not only a "managerial 
thing". This statement is crucial for understanding the modern "changing 
environment" for innovation management in industry and elsewhere. 
2 .  NEW METHODOLOGIES AND TECHNIQUES NEEDED 
What are the ways out of the "managerial trap'' related to technocratic 
types of organization and management? One way is to use "positive adjustment" 
strategyk* in the management of innovation on a firm level and implies 
management initiative or response to other initiatives. Needless to say all 
experiments are connected with some uncertainty (which is normal when tech- 
nology and technological risk are at stake). To start with some initiatives 
(e.g., humanization of work, job enrichment, etc.) involve having a good 
understanding of the processes, interests, conflicts and the various trade- 
offs that innovation can bring about. 
To fulfill the conditions of understanding the goal sufficient methodol- 
ogy and techniques to assess the phenomena involved are badly needed. Some 
useful methodologies havealready been developed and, to some extent, applied. 
One can mention such examples as: 
o technology assessment (TA); which is the anticipatory social 
assessment of technologies, projects, programs, etc. (also 
R&D processes) ; TA-however defined (Porter et al. 1980) comprises 
*Theseethics were historically discussed from the religious angle by 
Max Weber and from the social point of view (e .g., in Capital) by Karl Marx. 
**We refer to the term used in the OECD Report (1983). 
a set of methods and analytical techniques that can be applied 
on the firm level for innovation management*. 
o socia2 impact assessment ( S I A ) ;  sometimes regarded as a part of 
TA studies, is a decade old domain of research and activity de- 
veloping fairly fast. SIA is promising for innovation management 
evaluation, moreover it is social innovation itself. It can be 
added that SIA usually includes some involvement by "interested 
parties", i.e., citizens, workers or groups affected by the tech- 
nology, etc. TA can also be accompanied by such involvement. 
o impact assessment studies in general; some authors speak about 
integrated impact assessment (Porter and Rossini 1982) and cumu- 
lative impact assessment (Vlachos 1982). Studies of these types 
also frequently refer to environmental problems that can also be 
reflected on a firm level (which is important e.g., in cases of 
highly polluting plants such as electric power stations based on 
coal). 
o risk analysis; included in TA by some authors and not by others 
because of its specificacy. This domain is expanding rapidly as 
new technologies are connected with risks of various types. The 
risk of losing a job or being down-graded (which, for example, is 
pretty typical in cases of computer automation of processes which 
are becoming cheaper and cheaper due to the  microprocessor revo- 
lution" (Friedricks and Schaff 1982)). The risk of less occupa- 
tional safety (e.g., nuclear power plants are seen by workers and 
the public as being more risky than conventional work places) ; 
managers should have methods for eliciting workers' opinions re- 
garding the risks and hazards of newly implemented technologies 
and, alternatively, should communicate any information about 
risks to the workers, foremen, technical experts and decision 
makers at all levels of the firm. 
Risk perception research (Slovic et al. 1982) is crucial for successful 
innovation management. The Schurnpeterian individualistic entrepreneur who 
is innovative an£ risk-taking is not very actual anymore, the workers in the 
factory are the real risk takers and their risk is not only physical. Mary 
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) explain that risk selection is a social 
process. Among methods and analytical techniques, forecasting and systems 
analysis ought to be especially called for. The former because the impacts 
of new technologies should be anticipated (however retrospective, assessment 
can also be useful and instructive), and the latter because systems analysis 
is particularly excellent for investigating relationships, interaction nets, 
feedback loops, etc., which is the point in case of technology and workmen. 
*For us TA is not a method of decision making but an "undertaking" pro- 
viding information which can (or can not) be successfully used in the process 
of choice and decision making in the area of technology. Harvey Brooks (per- 
sonal communication) is a strong proponent of such a stand, i .e., that TA 
gives additional information input for the decision maker. 
3. NEW APPROACHES FOR BETTER INVOLVEMENT OF THE HUMAN FACTOR IN PRODUCTION 
AND INNOVATION 
It is an illusory opinion that management is solely a pragmatic activity. 
On the contrary its nature is social and it should be sensitive to the soci- 
etal and human issues that emerge when new technologies are introduced at the 
firm level. It is also true in the case of electrotechnology, however, this 
branch is relatively more capital-intensive than labor-intensive. In the last 
decades new experiements were conducted in many countries and their results 
can encompass present and future managerial philosophy and practice. These 
results undermined the traditional technocratic (in the prejorative sense) 
management approach and style. 
The technocratic management approach is mechanistic (the same can be noted 
about Taylorism) and would be most effective in the case of robots. Now we 
need more humanistic and "organic" material systems. By "organic" we mean sys- 
tems in which combining the requirements of innovation and production processes 
with aspirations, ambitions and culturally-based skills are natural and ef- 
ficient from technical economic, societal and human points of view. It is 
essential to promote the "organic" approach in management style in all areas 
of activity, i.e., social planning, personnel training, designing work groups 
and their socio-psychological environment, conflict resoltuion, work incentives 
and motivations, merit rating and rotation of managerial and technical persan- 
nel with respect to innovation process management, employee involvement in 
management, and so forth. 
Since only constant innovation assures a firm's success and competitive- 
ness, the style of innovation ,management is of critical important, i.e., how 
to achieve the highest possible creative potential of a firm? If we assume 
that at the moment technology is an independent variable (i.e., it is "given" 
or it is available in a "given" form), we have to accept the view that human 
factor involvement (we can consider organizational transformation under this 
label too) is crucial in a firm's strategy. The question therefore is how to 
encourage, enhance and promote optimiazation of the human factor involvement 
in general, and in the innovation process in particular? 
There are some general guidelines that indicate possible managerial ac- 
tivities which form specific "environments" (philosophical, political, social, 
organizationa, educational and so forth). These can be grouped as follows. 
3.1. Institutional and Legal ~ctivities 
Many examples from both East and West can be quoted here and are mostly 
of the "condition-creating" type. Institutional forms are popular especially 
where the role of the state (government) is important, and a strong belief in 
institutional solutions seems to be in the socialist (CMEA) countries, where 
workers' participation is developed step by step (see, for example, Semenov 
1983). Moreover, institutionalization seems to be an overwhelming process, 
with even trade union activities becoming more and more institutionalized as 
for examp.le,.theso-called "New Technology Agreements1'*, which impose important 
*See, for example, the TVC report on Employment and Technology, London 
1979. A checklist for negotiators on New Technology Agreements comprises the 
following issues: the principles of these agreements, aspects of union organ- 
ization and interunion relations, the provision of information, agreed plans 
on employment and output, retraining, hours of work, distribution of the tech- 
nology benefits, control over work, health and safety, procedures for reviewing 
progress. This particular report was devoted to the various effects and im- 
pacts of microelectronics. 
constraints on a firm's decision makers, e.g., "Employees should not be com- 
mitted to introduce new technology until full agreement has been reached on 
the whole range of negotiating issues", meaning that full consultation is re- 
quired before a decision on technology is taken. Moreover, it is postulated 
that "joint unionfmanagement study teams should be set up with the responsi- 
bility for monitoring the detailed effects of implementing new technology. 
Trade unions are definitely also creating a new environment for managerial 
decision making (it is demanded, for example, that research results on new 
technologies be redefined in terns of trade union actions, see, for example, 
Zacher 1981 and ILO 1982). The participation movement has also been institu- 
tionalized and legally defined, despite the fact that it begun from some grass 
roots activities, trade union demands and political party programs (i.e., 
Mitbestimung or Sozialpartnerschaft in the GDR and Austria, respectively) . 
3.2. Quality of Working Life (QWL) Approach and Activities 
The quality of working life seems to be an extremely promising experiment 
and a widening practice, although not yet institutionalized (at least not ful- 
ly). It is especially designed for the plan level and has been applied in 
technologically advanced branches of industry (such as automobile and telecom- 
municat ions, e. g . , Volvo, General Motors, ATT) . The experience gained by 
Volvo in the 1970s is significant in this respect: it was not only more ef- 
fective in job design, but the new strategy on production technology and work 
organization (concept of flexible technology, team work and a spirit of col- 
laboration) were diffused to all the product groups. Berth JBnsson, assistant 
to the President of Volvo writes: 
The base for this development must be new technology, the capability 
and knowledge among the employers cominbed with a managerial approach 
that mobilizes the potential of good working ability (JUnsson 1982). 
The Volvo experience is very important as an example of successful crea- 
tion, implmentation and diffusion of the organizational, social and at the 
same time technological innovation (or rather set of innovations). Based on 
the experience of the Kalmar plant six new plants have been built in Sweden 
and one in Holland. It is neither the Volvo experience per se nor its spec- 
ific characteristics (i.e., moving toward craftmanship in assembly operations 
and automation and manufacturing whenever feasible) that should be recommended 
but the conduct proper of the whole experiment. 
Two major phases of development can be identified at Volvo: 
' 1. The Spontaneous Trial Period where a number of initiatives on a vol- 
untary basis came from the shopfloor, supervision, managers, engineers, the 
union, doctors and others. and 
2 .  The SociotechnicaZ Strategy Period where a new strategy was formula- 
ted and implemented. 
Writes B. Jbnnson: 
We are right now in an advanced stage of the second phase which in- 
cludes new creative solutions to flexible hardware technology and 
the diffusion of ideas to 'volvo subsidiaries outside Sweden. By now, 
change has become institutionalized, with a variety of patterns but 
with a common ground. Learning and diffusion of ideas are occuring 
continuously (Jbnsson 1983) . 
It is worthwhile to note that the Volvo experiement was actively and ex- 
plicitly supported by top management. Management philosophy can be illustra- 
ted by the statement of P.G. Gyllenhammar, president of Volvo: 
Factory work must be adapted to people, and not people to machines. 
This calls for innovation both in the field of human relations and 
as regards technical aspects. I believe that humanization of work 
and efficiency can be compatible (Junnson 1982). 
The top management successfully overcame the resistance of some managerial per- 
sonnel. It can also be noted that the average age of the group mostly involved 
in and responsible for the experiment was the mid-thirties. 
The quality of life approach is becoming more and more popular and 
shows growing institutionalization. For example, in the case of General Motors 
and ATT, agreements between management and trade unions were negotiated and 
approved*. It seems that to a great extent these agreements are designed for 
purposes of collective bargaining, and therefore are in some sense defensive 
(from the trade union point of view). In the Agreement between General Motors 
Corporation and the UAW can be read: 
It is recognized that advances of technology may alter, modify or 
otherwise change the job responsibilities of represented employees 
at plant location, and that a change in the means, method or pro- 
cess of performing a work function including the introduction of 
computers or other new or advanced technology will not serve to 
shift the work function from represented to nonrepresented employees. 
(Agreement between G.M. Corporation and the VAW on 14 September, 1979 
Statement on Technological Progress.) 
The quality of life agreements appeal for material and psychological in- 
centives for the various categories of personnel involved in the innovation 
and production processes, and for socio-psychological developments of the col- 
lective as a factor for increasing the efficiency of its activity. In the 
CWA and ATT Statement of Principles on Quality of Work Life it is stated that: 
The essential component of a Quality of Work Life (QWL) effort is a 
process which increases employee participation in the decision which 
affect their daily work and the quality of their work life... The 
goals of QWL efforts are: (a) to employ people in a profitable and 
efficient enterprise; (b) to create working conditions which are ful- 
filling by providing opportunities for employees and groups at all 
levels to influence their working environment ... Quality of Work 
Life is not a "program": there is no universal or one best approach. 
It is a process which has great potential, but it can't be the answer 
to all the problem of employees, the Union, or the Company. 
According to M. Maccoby, the author of Gamesman, the QEL approach means a 
radical change in management as compared with traditional managerial approaches 
and practices. Maccoby's comparison between these two management approaches 
stresses the following domains: 
*Agreement between G.M. Corporation and the VAW on September 14, 1979, 
Statement on Technological Progress. 
o control 
control based on flexible guidance (as opposed to control based on 
commands and rigid rules, quantitative measurement, and unquestion- 
ning loyalty), quantitiative and qualitative evaluation according 
to economic, social and human principles, and trust rooted in shared 
goals and open communications. 
o leadership 
management as a resource-sharing power, clearing roadblocks, build- 
ing strategy , developing consensus (versus management as boss, 
monopolizing power and prerogatives), influence based on knowledge 
rather than hierarchy (versus paternalistic relationships at best 
or policing at works), relationships of respect. 
o work roles 
teamwork-interdependency, flexibility of roles (versus fragmenta- 
tion of jobs, uniformity of turf-oriented roles), socio-technical 
design of technology and jobs to promote optimal decision making 
(versus decision making moved upward). 
o training 
broad training, including group development of problem solving skills 
versus narrow training for simplified jobs. 
o motivation 
economic and sociallhuman shared goals (e.g., service, personal de- 
velopment, mutuality) versus economic interests only. Rewards to 
both individual and team (versus rewards to individual only), trust 
based on shared goals and principles (versus trust based on protec- 
tion) . 
o re lationships 
development of cooperative relationships among management (various 
levels), union and worker (versus adversarial relationship with 
union, overreliance on internal conflict and competition among man- 
agers, quality control as adversarial, interdepartmental rivalry), 
learning from each other (versus rivalry and unwillingness to 
learn from peers). 
o change strategy 
centralized determination of goals and principles, decentralized 
participation in reaching goals (versus top-down command, one best 
way) , respect for differences in approach, top-down (bottom-up 
strategy that encourages experimentation and uses volunteers; edu- 
cation, persuasion, and rewards to spread new ideas.*. 
*Maccoby ' s lecture at Salzburg Seminar. 
For some, however, this comparison can seem rather idealistic. I want 
to recall M. Maccoby's opinion that "idealism and caring is extremely practi- 
cal provided we create the structure for it." The quality of work life ap- 
proach can be recommended not as an ideology but rather as a more pragmatic 
tool in the West and East (in the latter it can even appear to be more suc- 
cessful). It is applicable on the firm level, it applies to electrotechnology 
and to electrotechnical firms (as described by Goncharov 1982, looking to 
improve innovation management. It is possible also to enrich by some aspects 
of the QEL the structure of an approach to R&D problems in big electrotechni- 
cal firms (so-called amalgamations) as described by Levuck and Vyshinskaya 
(1982). 
3.3. Implementation of Self-Management Principles 
To implement self-management principles needs the appropriate managerial 
style and different activities than in the case of technocratic management, 
institutional approach or the QWL approach. It is more or less only fully 
implmeneted in Yugoslavia and to some extent in Poland (in the framework of 
the new ongoing economic reform). Self-management principles are derived from 
the long lasting socialist tradition (see, for example, the works of Engles) 
and is basically different from the participation concept of the West where 
private ownership of the means of production is the rule. There are, however, 
controversies whether the socialist self-managed firms could be very effective 
in promoting innovations. Some specialists argue that some degree of state 
intervention and aid is necessary. However, self-management can have impor- 
tant positive indirect influences (political, social, psychological) on work- 
ing people and management, which can contribute to the success of innovation 
efforts. Anyway, more experience is needed as well as more empirical research 
in this respect. It should also be noted that the self-management approach 
becomes institutionalized too, but still it is specific enough to be presen- 
ted separately. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
It seems evident that successful innovation management on the firm level 
nowadays requires completely new approaches to human factor involvement. 
These approaches should be nontraditional or even counter-traditional. There 
are a few such approaches in operation in the West and in the East. Pragmati- 
cally taken, many of the new developments in general management and innovation 
management can be applied, adopted, transferred, improved in any system, under 
the condition that "people matter" (to quote Schumacher). 
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INNOVATION-THE HUMAN SIDE 
Got tfried Wolf 
Siemens AG, Vienna, Austria 
INTRODUCTION 
"Innovation, that  i s ,  the process of finding economic application 
for inventions. " 
This first definition of strategically planned changes and innovation 
is 40 years old. As is generally known, the statement was made by Josef A. 
Schumpeter. He even went a step further and called competition by means of 
problem-solving innovation "creative destruction." Figure 1 illustrates the 
innovation process. 
In any organization the complex problem of innovation is the most im- 
portant management function. Every country depends on the management of all 
economic, political, and scientific institutions or schools to take full re- 
sponsibility in the field and in the direction of meaningful innovative 
activities and to contribute to the development and application of the neces- 
sary measures. Whenever innovation is neglected over a longer time period- 
be it in the organization, in production technology, in management or in the 
products themselves-this fact will not only be reflected in increasing or 
decreasing profits, but will also affect the viability of an organization or 
enterprise as such. On the one hand, the innovation process is oriented 
towards the future (strategic thinking), on the other hand it is oriented 
towards comprehensiveness. It has to be kept in mind therefore that when 
developing innovations comprehensive solutions have to be found. For this 
purpose integral thinking and acting is required. System-oriented thinking 
frequently draws on analogies. Being a technologist I have thus chosen the 
control circuit to illustrate the respective relationships (see Figure 2). 
If we consider the main "control variablesv-or, in the manager's lan- 
guage "areas of effectiveness"-of an innovation process, human skills and 
human behavior prove to play the central role (see Figure 3). Being the 
I1 innovator" as well as the "user", "man" decides on the success or failure 
of an "innovation strategy", an "innovation plan" and an "innovation process". 
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Figure 2. Control cycle of an "innovation process". 
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Figure 3. Someof the main "control variables = areas of effectiveness" 
of innovation management. 
Management in general, and innovation management in particular, is faced 
with a production factor of a special kind, i.e., the human factor. Man has 
been and always will be-especially in the innovation process-a unique pro- 
duction factor, who requires special qualifications of those who are dealing 
with him. Man cannot be "processed", he can only be developed. And the direc- 
tion of this development is decisive as to whether the individual, as a human 
being, as innovator, and as a production factor, will become more creative, 
i.e., more productive, or whether he will eventually stop being productive. 
A n  innovation manager will only fulfill his purpose if he is effective, i.e., 
if he does the right things. In this context effectiveness is the degree to 
which he and his team reach the innovation target, which has to be reached 
according to the respective agreements. 
The value or the worthlessness of an innovation will be decided by the 
market, the customer, the user. To innovate successfully, i .e., effectively, 
means, above all, to understand the customer and the user of an innovation. 
Even if management and their team or organization have tried ever so hard to 
be innovative and to carry out an innovative process, i f  the user or custo- 
mer has been neglected i n  t h i s  process, their  money m y  be e f f i c i en t l y ,  but 
hardly e f f ec t i ve ly  invested i n  the innovation (see Table 1). Certainly ef- 
ficiency in the innovation process must not be neglected. But it is also 
important to point out that "know-why" and "know-what" range higher than 
"know-how". 
Table 1. 
an effective innovation 
An efficient innovation in comparison management who are primarily 
management prefer to: to concerned with 
- pursue the innovation pro- instead of making the right innovations 
cess according to schedule 
- solve problems according to instead of creating alternative problems 
established one-way systems 
- conserve and save resources instead of optimizing the utilization of 
resources 
- do its duty instead of obtaining results 
- reduce costs instead of increasing gains 
The "right" innovation rests on two pillars: 
1. the innovation process; and 
2. the feedback of the user as well as of all other "situation 
elements1' which can influence the success of the innovation. 
Thus, effective innovation management depends on the right approach to fre- 
quently changing situations. Since the term "situation" allows for an in- 
creasingly wide range of interpretations, it seems meaningful to present its 
main elements in Table 2. These have been developed in the last 70 years in 
about eight schools of thought, the first of which goes back to scientific 
management. 
Table 2. Different interpretations of the term "situation". 
- - - -  - 
Behavioral approach/ 
Decade School of Thought Situation element relationship between 
pos- 
sibly 
1990s 
scientific 
management 
human relations 
group dynamics 
management styles 
organization 
theories 
strategic planning 
project management 
innovation manage- 
ment and productive 
partnership 
working process 
and method 
collaborators 
colleagues 
supervisor 
organj zation 
markets 
projects 
cooperating 
partner 
- - -  - - -  
employer - work - worker 
employer - working 
atmosphere 
manager - team 
manager - collaborators 
manager - organization 
manager - market 
manager - project team 
innovation manager - 
alternative problem 
solutions 
Table 2, of course, only gives a very general picture; a more detailed 
classification is certainly possible. All schools of thought are highly 
active today. Different as they may be, they do, however, have one thing in 
common: the "human factor" as the core issue. The key element for innova- 
tions, as well as productivity and quality, are people, a fact which should 
not be forgotten (Figure 4). After all, technology is there for people. Any 
technological advances would be meaningless, unless they contributed to the 
well being of the people. People are in command of technology. 
Change too, must be accepted to a certain degree. We cannot go too far, 
but we must not fail by doing too little. Such changes occur naturally. It 
is within this context that improving innovation, flexibility, productivity 
and quality must be considered. 
Competition in the field of innovation, on the basis of new key technol- 
ogies and products, new sources of supply, and new organizational forms, has 
assumed new dimensions worldwide. Any innovation process is characterized 
by three points of emphasis: 
1. Situation and problem analysis forthe identification of a new 
technological, economic, or social demand which has to be 
supplied, or of a technological, economic, or social cause of 
a problem which has to be eliminated. 
2. The problem solution as such, i.e., an innovation which will 
cover the potential demand or solve the problem, must be 
problem-oriented and has to be developed in a creative as well 
as a methodical way. 
3. Implementation of the problem solution, which is frequently 
confronted by a high degree of resistance. 
1 
projects 
colleagues cooperatinu 
, partners 
innovation organizational 
coLlaborators working 
markets process and 
technology 
Figure 4. Situation elements of innovation management. 
Innovations are above all the results of creative thinking and produc- 
tive actions of individuals, groups, enterprises and whole companies. Whether 
we regard innovative planning of the future in terms of "global thinking and 
local action" or simply as a product innovation, a process innovation, or an 
innovated personnel and organizational development for safeguarding the future 
of its members, innovation invariably requires free creativity as well as 
problem-oriented creativity by qualified, motivated and responsible people. 
More than ever, human resources will have to be considered as the decisive 
strategic variable in mastering the future. Enterprises and companies of all 
countries only effectively meet the challenges of our time if they accept 
social innovation to range at least equal with technological and economic in- 
novation. Since it is obvious that a successful "creative destruction" can 
only be effectively applied in a situation in which people constitute the 
demand side and the driving force as well as the balancing counterpart to 
these forces, I would like to develop my paper along the polarity between 
"creative destruction" and "productive partnership", which are the two sides 
of one and the same coin. I will, however, concentrate more strongly on the 
core issue of "productive partnership". 
What does "productive partnership" mean? Productive partnership is a 
strategic concept. It follows the rules of a nonzero-sum game. In this case 
a better result is obtained for each partner-through the accumulation of 
forces-than one partner could have achieved by himself, as opposed to the 
principle of the zero-sum game, where the gain of one partner always results 
in the loss of the other. For the purpose of illustration I have chosen a 
well-known, extreme example. Let us assume that two people with highly con- 
tradictory personalities are locked in a cellar, in which the water keeps 
rising. Above them there is a trap door which can only be opened in a joint 
effort by both of them (see Figure 5). It can be assumed that everybody will 
prefer his life to his death. Thus two people will, regardless of their in- 
itial feelings and their prejudiced attitude towards each other, cooperate 
in order to open the trap door. The only possible problem they are faced 
with is "how" to coordinate their actions, and not "what" to do and "why". 
But the question of "how" is a question of creativity, i.e., of the common 
innovation potential available, of the productivity and of the will and the 
capability to form a partnership. 
THE SYNERGY EFFECTS IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
As we all know, synergy is the combined action of various factors, or- 
gans or partners towards a jointly planned achievement, as, e.g., in an in- 
novation process. Synergy effects are the utilization of available forces, 
resources, qualifications, experiences, devices, etc., for the implementation 
of tasks and projects. In the production process, comprising, e.g., the 
utilization of existing equipment, robots and procedures for manufacturing 
various products, in which experience can be applied, innovation synergy 
stands for the target-oriented use of existing human innovation potential, 
including motivation, creativity, productivity, etc., of the potential part- 
ners. 
On the occasion of a symposium of Nobel prize winners, Eugene Wigner 
supported and extended this line of thinking by the following argument: 
The world is more closely interrelated than has been so far assumed. 
The increasing necessityofreaching aims through cooperation re- 
quires a rejection of the friend-foe paradigm, i .e. , a rejection of 
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t h e  zero-sum behavior i n  favor  of t h e  non-zero sum behavior.  This 
means. the  acceptance of a p o r e n t i a l  pa r t ne r  and t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of 
common i n t e r e s t s  i n  an organized 'product ive  pa r t ne r s h ip  ' ' I  . 
One's own chances and, consequently,  one 's  own s e c u r i t y  a r e  p r imar i ly  based 
on t h e  s e c u r i t y  of t h e  p a r t n e r ,  so  t h a t  goods may be acquired and preserved 
i n  a p a r t n e r sh i p  s i t u a t i o n .  
The u t i l i z a t i o n  of synergy p o t e n t i a l s  e n t a i l s  s i g n i f i c a n t  behavioral  
changes, a r ev i s i on  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  condi t ions ,  technological  p rogress ,  j o i n t  
economic a c t i v i t i e s ,  and l a s t  bu t  no t  l e a s t ,  j o i n t  p lanning e f f o r t s  towards 
a common aim. These behavioral  changes r equ i r e  f l e x i b l e  th ink ing  and a r e  a l -  
ways connected with  a l e a r n i ng  process .  
When we speak of t he  synergy e f f e c t  we mean t h e  support ive  e f f e c t  t h a t  
va r ious  innovat ion a c t i v i t i e s  exe r t  upon each o t h e r ,  thus  y i e ld ing  b e t t e r  
o v e r a l l  r e s u l t s  than ind iv idua l  a c t i v i t i e s  (Figure 6 ) .  An innovat ion s t r a t e -  
gy would, t he r e f o r e ,  always tend t o  achieve a synergy e f f e c t ;  i n  t h i s  process  
i t  w i l l ,  however, a l s o  be necessary t o  recognize pos s ib l e  disharmonies a t  an 
e a r l y  po in t  i n  time and t o  t ake  p reven t ive  measures aga in s t  t h e i r  occurrence.  
Synergy e f f e c t s  can be b e s t  understood by way of t h e i r  development. When we 
look a t  t h e  behavior of systems, two d i f f e r e n t  components can be observed: 
one component i n  which a c e r t a i n  behavior i s  r e t a i ned  through nega t ive  feed- 
back; and a second one, i n  which a system becomes i n s t a b l e  and tends  t o  assume 
a d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e ;  t h e  l a t t e r  i s ,  e.g. ,  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  na tu r e  by t h e  t r a n s i -  
t i o n  of mat ter  from one aggregate  s t a t e  i n t o  ano ther ,  o r  i n  economics by ba s i c  
innovat ions ,  such a s  microe lec t ron ics .  
NO SYNERGY E PARTIAL SYNERGY c 3  
FAR-REACHING 
SYNE RGY 
Produc t iv i ty  
c r e a t i v e  
abundant 
powerful 
p r o l i f i c  . . . 
Par tnerhs ip  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
team ... 
INNOVAT I O N  SYNERGY FIELD KNOW-HOW EXCHANGE 
Figure  6. Synergy e f f e c t s .  
The b a s i c  i d e a  of a  c r e a t i v e  p a r t n e r s h i p  e q u a l l y  a p p l i e s  t o  p r o j e c t  
working groups, f u n c t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  u n i t s ,  whole e n t e r p r i s e s  and over- 
l app ing  systems. The i d e a  i s  based on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e ,  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  human communities, i n  which p e r s o n a l i t i e s  of d i f f e r e n t  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  mot iva t ion ,  and of v a r y i n g  innova t ion  p o t e n t i a l  
a r e  u n i t e d  towards one common aim. This  aim is  t h e  safeguard of long-term 
success  ( e f fec t iveness ) -a  j o i n t l y  accepted r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
Those v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  p lay  a  d e c i s i v e  r o l e  i n  an innova t ion  p rocess  a r e  
shown i n  Figure  7. They a r e  desc r ibed  i n  more d e t a i l  i n ,  among o t h e r s ,  t h e  
p u b l i c a t i o n s  of McGregor (1960),  Ouchi (1981), P e t e r s  and Waterman (1980) and 
Reddin (1970). F u r t h e r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  of t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  r e s u l t s  from d i scus -  
s i o n s  wi th  D r .  Vadim Goncharov and t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  of t h e  p a s t  Task Force 
Meetings. T h e i r  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  does no t  p r e s e n t  a  "con t ras t i '  b u t  a  " p o l a r i t y " .  
Pasca l  and Athos have (poss ib ly  in f luenced  by t h e i r  Japanese  exper iences )  
subdivided t h e  seven v a r i a b l e s  (of t h e  scheme developed by McKinsey e t  a l . )  
i n t o :  
t h r e e  s o f t  "St' and t h r e e  ha rd  "S" 
STYLE (behav io ra l  p a t t e r n s  and ST RATE GY 
forms of coopera t ion)  
STAFF ( c o l l a b o r a t o r s  and STRUCTURE 
q u a l i f i e d  managers) SYSTEM (procedures ,  methods, 
SKILLS ( c a p a c i t i e s  and capa- t echno log ies ,  
b i l i t i e s )  p rocesses )  
headed by AIMS, i . e . ,  s t r a t e g i c  t a r g e t s .  This  p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  p r i m a r i l y  in-  
tended t o  s t i m u l a t e  d i s c u s s i o n  ( see  Figure  8 ) .  I n  o p e r a t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e ,  
t h r e e  primary v a r i a b l e s  p lay  t h e  d e c i s i v e  r o l e  i n  innova t ion  p rocesses :  
S t y l e  Aims S t r u c t u r e  
S t a f f  S t r a t e g y  System 
S k i l l s  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  success  of f a i l u r e  of an innova t ion  p l a n  mainly depends on 
t h e  i n t e r f e r e n c e s  and t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  i . e . ,  on t h e  e f f e c t i v e  u t i -  
l i z a t i o n  of t h e  synergy f i e l d s .  However, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  has  n o t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  any proof of cause -e f fec t  cha ins  between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  atmos- 
phere  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  o r  between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  atmosphere and innova t ion  
capac i ty .  I n  h i s  Theory 2, Ouchi ( ) w r i t e s  t h a t ,  among o t h e r s ,  American 
managers a r e i n f e r i o r  t o  t h e i r  Japanese  co l l eagues  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  " s o f t  
St', p a r t l y  because they r e l y  more heav i ly  on t h e  "hard S". Pasca l  and Athos 
recommend t h a t  t h e  American managers should  l e a r n  from t h e  Japanese  t o  use  
more sublime methods than t h e  head-on approach t o  t h e  problem, i . e . ,  t o  use  
t h e  " d i g i t a l "  approach. 
C e r t a i n l y ,  " f a c t u a l -  and a n a l y t i c a l  methods of problem s o l u t i o n "  a s  w e l l  
a s  t a c t  and human warmth a s  an express ion  of " respec t  f o r  humanity" a r e  in-  
d i s p e n s i b l e  i n  any innova t ion  p rocess .  
"The Human Side" "The Orqanizational Side" 
F i g u r e  7. Reaching aims t h rough  c o l l a b o r a t i o n :  
"p roduc t ive  p a r t n e r s h i p ' '  
Reaching aims through s t r a t e g i c ,  t a c t i c ,  and 
o p e r a t i o n a l  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  r e s o u r c e s :  " c r e a t i v e  
d e s t r u c t i o n " .  
A . . . . . . . . . . HUMAN FACTORS IN INNOVATION PqANAGEVJNT (IM) 
B .......... STRATEGY AND LONG-TERM PLANNING IN IM 
C .....,.... ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN IPi 
Figure 8. Primary variables of the innovation process. 
STRATEGY : ACTIVATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
In strategic innovation management, human capital plays the key role. 
By means of the strategic application of the intellectual potential a higher 
performance is achieved with the same resources,whichmeans that, with refer- 
ence to the innovative process, higher effectiveness will be obtained through 
a better utilization of the innovation potential (Figure 9). In a competitive 
situation, quality has become an increasingly decisive factor with regard to 
the existing innovation potential and its application. The human resources 
are the total intellectual capacities of the staff of an organization. Ex- 
perience has shown that in an industrial production company, the unused in- 
tellectual resources are by far larger than is generally assumed, and little 
is yet known about their strategic significance. However, the mobilization 
of the total intellectual potential presents the only chance to be able to 
play a decisive role in international competition. 
The activation of the human factor mainly consistsin the development of 
an organizational atmosphere, in which each person is stimulated to contri- 
bute towards the human communityaswell as towards innovative activities and 
feels responsible forhis role in this process. Innovative activities require 
the full utilization of a participant's capacities and behavioral potentials, 
target-oriented work within the community, and his contribution to its fur- 
ther development with continuous loyalty, and they also give hima feeling of 
satisfaction with the success of his community. A team that can cooperate 
in a productive partnership will experience the highest effectiveness and its 
members will experience a feeling of success, if they participate directly 
in the achievements attained, as, e.g., in the profit of the enterprise and 
thus show solidarity and identify with its aims. Then and only then, will 
they invest over and above their usual contributions, especially in terms of 
creativity, i.e., "human capital", into the maintenance and further develop- 
ment of their organization. 
Motivation and a high innovation potential are the most important con- 
ditions for an effective innovation management. The innovation management 
will only be effecthe, if they produce-in agreement with all their staff- 
those innovations that guarantee the long-term effectiveness of their firm. 
The development of the human factor requires a constructive training program 
that deals with many aspects. In this program, the individual will not only 
learn new abilities and behavioral patterns, but will also get to know the 
spirit of the enterprise, which becomes integrated in his mind and usually 
acts as a creative stimulus. 
Creative partnership involves working ethics that emphasize the aspect 
of "work" as opposed to that of "labor". Work is that part of an activity 
that has a meaning in itself, irrespective of the monetary compensation, and 
is important for a person's self-realization. Labor, on the other hand, is 
bought for money. Work forms a community of creative and productive partners; 
this does not apply to labor. While the time for work is not strictly sepa- 
rated from the concept of spare time, as work has a meaning, e .g., of being 
a jointly aspired innovation, the time for labor is clearly differentiated 
from spare time. Creative "organizational families" do not distinguish as 
strictly between working time and spare time. They also meet informally in 
their spare time, as the work for their own creative activities, thus devel- 
oping a strong feeling of self-realization. 
STRATEGY: Activation and utilization 
of human capital 
Motivation I I\ 
Further education 
Result: Effectiveness 
Cooperation 
INNOVAT ION and increase 
Quality improvement of effectiveness through 
INNOVAT ION better performance with 
the same resources 
Experience of success OUTPUT INPUT 
Opt imi sm 
STYLE 
behavior of 
Figure 9. 
Reductions Result : Efficiency 
Rationalization (maybe) same performance 
Quantity increase with fewer resources 
OUTPUT INPUT 
DEMOTIVATION 
Experience of failure 
TWO alternatives of innovative MEASURES: Reorganization 
planning of the future. No successful strategy but 
conventional saving methods 
Innovative enterprises differ from less innovative enterprises in that 
they stay relatively healthy even in difficult times and that they create 
more new jobs in the long run than they lose old ones (Figure 10). A dis- 
ruption in the innovation process is dangerous, especially in rather tradi- 
tional, centralized organizations, which are oriented towards large projects 
and mass production. They have to take special care to be flexible and to 
adjust their capacities to the varying needs of medium and small industrial 
enterprises. Such an effort will only be successful if all possible measures 
are taken towards its realization. Target oriented innovative activities 
lead to innovative symbioses of intelligence, if creative partners search for 
new problem solutions (while positively accepting technology and preserving 
their own tradition), if they have a thorough knowledge of the appropriate 
creativity techniques and apply them accordingly (see Table 3). In the fol- 
lowing I will short recall the examples of "brain-storming" , "brain-writing" 
and "synectics". 
Goal 
Strategy 
INNOVATION PROCESS 
Decentralization Optimization of the organization Centralization 
Figure 10. Optimization of the innovation process; pendulum between innova- 
tive and less innovative organizations. 
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Brainstorming 
Probably the oldest and most popular of the group creativity development 
programs is brainstorming. Alex F. Osborn, a principal of a New York Adver- 
tizing agency, Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, originated the process and 
it gained international prominence by virtue of his 1952 best-seller Applied 
Imagination. Utilizing a co-equal group with mixed backgrounds, large quan- 
tities of ideas are encouraged-no matter how wild, fanciful or unfeasible 
they may at first seem. Quantity of ideas is the initial goal with evalua- 
tive judgment suspended until all of the ideas have been triggered. All fear 
of provoking negative reactions is eliminated, and "hitch-hiking" or "piggy- 
backing" of ideas is supported. The idea-sparking technique continues with 
evaluation, development and submission of the best ideas presented. 
Brainwriting 
North Carolina's Center for Creative Leadership uses many of the basic 
techniques of brainstorming, but also utilizes other idea-stimulating methods. 
One interesting concept is brainwriting. In the brainwriting approach, ideas 
are not discussed openly by the group butare jotted down on pieces of paper. 
The papers are exchanged, minus the writers' names, to other individuals who 
build upon the ideas and pass the paper on once again until all have had an 
opportunity to develop each of the basic ideas. 
Synectics 
The synectics method was developed by Synectics Inc. , of Cambridge, Mas- 
sachusetts, and is described at length in Raudsepp's ( ) book How t o  Create 
Nm Ideas for Corporate Profi t  and Personal Success. According to Raudsepp, 
Synectics stresses the 
". . .nonrational aspects of creativity, using analogies that provide 
novel contexts for approaching a problem with a fresh outlook. The 
two basic approaches in the Synectic's process are making the 
strange familiar and making the familiar strange." 
Although there are many innovative elements to Synectics, a most interesting 
technique was inspired by George M. Prince, President of Synectics, Inc. The 
technique, called "goal wishes" requires that an aspiring creative person 
fantasize about how a particular problem could be solved if there were not 
any fiscal or technical restraints. After compiling a list of such fanciful 
solutions, the client is asked to come up with the most absurd methods of 
achievement-so absurd that the client would probably expect immediate dis- 
missal had he seriously proposed them to his management. Known as the "get 
fired solutions", often at least one or two can eventually be refined into 
quite workable solutions. This is an excellent method of shaking loose re- 
pressed ideas. 
I would now like to illustrate some general criteria that have a strong 
influence on the effectiveness of the existing innovation potential. 
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F i g u r e  11. I n t e g r a l  i n n o v a t i v e  t h i n k i n g .  
THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CULTURE 
In the course of their development specific organizational and manage- 
ment cultures have evolved in individual organizations or enterprises, but 
also in individual industrialized nations. These specific cultures make 
them capable of reacting in an appropriate way to present and future challen- 
ges by means of adaptation and innovation. 
The Implementation of Organizational Changes Requires a Highly Qualified 
Innovation Management 
In the operational practice-especially of large enterprises-there is 
often a discrepancy between the effort and expenditure invested in the con- 
ception, analysis, presentation and discussion of organizational structures, 
and the introduction, implementation and actual effectiveness of these plan- 
ning processes. Frequently the organization has to pay for managerial mis- 
takes of the past. In general it can be said that a stabilizing tendency by 
means of increasing bureaucracy is inversely proportional to the readiness 
for innovation and structural flexibility. 
In an intercultural comparison the adaptation profiles of national econ- 
omies are fairly similar. Significant differences are, however, observed if 
the cultural conditions are taken under consideration; these may facilitate 
or impede adaptability to a changed environmental situation and may thus pro- 
mote or restrain the innovation potential. If a culture imposes restrictions 
on the organizational adaptation and innovation capacities, it may cause a 
potential weakness in the competitive position of its enterprises. 
A short comparison with the Japanese cultural conditions shows that a 
distinctive group orientation and a highly developed consent mechanism- 
which are characteristic of this society in general and its organizational 
system in particular-promote adaptability and continuously increase the in- 
novation potential, thus increasing conditions favorable for the survival of 
enterprises in the economic and social evolution process. 
Organizational Culture 
Many reorganization plans fail for lack of attention paid to organiza- 
tional/cultural aspects. In such cases naturally grown relationships are 
frequently neglected, which do, however, play a central role in the occupa- 
tional life of the members of an organization. According to William Osborne 
any enterprise forms, in the course of time, its own culture from "an organ- 
ized body of conventional understandings". According to Geerd Hofstede this 
leads "to a collective programming of human thinking", i.e., experiences 
which an organizational unit (e.g., an enterprise) has gained in the past by 
way of successful and unsuccessful problem solutions, are automatically 
transferred into the present thus "anchoring the present in the past". 
We have seen that apart from the environment, tradition also has an ef- 
fect on the organizational culture, especially as the organizational culture 
establishes the link between tradition and innovation and presents the com- 
mon denominator that is equally accepted by managers and staff-particularly 
in highly traditional enterprises. In the foundation phase of an organiza- 
tion only a slightly differentiated culture and thus a relatively broad 
orientation on new external influences can be observed; more advanced systems 
show, however-again according to Geerd Hofstede-an increasing detachment 
from external influences. In view of the permanent confrontation with new 
requirements an organizational culture is constantly pushed towards adapta- 
tion and pulled towards innovation. According to Hans-Peter Thurn, organ- 
izational cultures are only viable in the long run if they prove to be good 
problem solvers. 
In his book Management in Foreign CuZtures, Eugen von Keller summarizes 
the special characteristics of a culture in the following concepts: 
o Culture is man-man; it is a product of collective social thinking 
and acting of individual people. 
o Culture is supra-individual, a social phenomenon, which outlasts 
the individual. 
o Culture is learned by means of socialization and is passed on by 
means of symbols. 
o Culture controls our behavior; it is expressed in rules, standards, 
and behavioral codes. 
o Culture strives for internal consistency and integration. It is 
that instrument which enables society to adjust to its environment. 
For the individual person it provides approved methods and instru- 
ments to solve the problems of daily survival and to satisfy his 
basic biological and social needs. 
o Cultures are adaptable, and they are at the same time subject to 
adaptation and innovation processes. 
The special role of an organizational culture, i.e., to serve as a link be- 
tween tradition and innovation, shall be illustrated in the following example. 
If we consider a company with a sufficiently long history we find that its 
so-called foundation phase will be characterized by rather informal behavior- 
al patterns; in its more advanced stages of development, bureaucracy will, 
however, play an increasingly dominant role. 
According to the doctrine of the Austrian Nobel prize winner Friedrich 
August von Hajek, an organizational culture is marked by the duality of a 
bureaucratically "imposed order" and a "grown, spontaneous order". The lat- 
ter has been largely neglected in many Western and Eastern organizations, 
with the exception of the Japanese management forms. But it is the "grown, 
spontaneous order" that has a lasting effect on the attitude and the behav- 
ior of the management and the staff of an organization. It is usually 
stronger than any other order that is formally imposed by project plans, 
organizational handbooks, job descriptions and other organizational and man- 
agement directives. 
In his book Theory 2, William Ouchi illustrates the social background 
of the Japanese enterprises by the terms 'lcollectivism - homogeneity - 
stability", in contrast to the cultural background of the U.S. enterprises, 
which he characterizes by the terms "individualistic - heterogeneous - mobile" 
For Ouchi the weakness of the American cultural background lies in the fact 
that there is only limited solidarity and confidence in the cooperation be- 
tween managers and staff. What is attainable is only a loose coupling of 
their respective working processes. Prefabricated organizational solutions 
fail with respect to the development of completely new approaches to problem 
solutions. As the problem of harmonization becomes increasingly serious, the 
management will gain in terms of critical importance. A collectivisitic com- 
pensation system, as is practiced in Japan, favors organizational harmony. 
Generalists are preferred to specialists, as they guarantee job flexibility; 
a generalist will furthermore integrate the basic values of the organization- 
al culture in his personality and will, in any position, contribute to the 
success of the whole organization together with his colleagues. In Japan, 
this development of the qualifications of an individual person to cover var- 
ious branches in an enterprise is in full progress. In Europe, and especi- 
ally in the United States, such a development takes place mostly among enter- 
prises and here particularly within a special branch. 
The cultural differences thus have major consequences for the profes- 
sional qualifications and position of an individual person and they are re- 
flected in the enterprises and in the design of their management systems. 
The collectivisitic integration of a system is based on a general feeling of 
adherence to and mutual support of a group. The group forms its own cultural 
environment, it thus is homogeneous in itself and differentiable from other 
units. An "innovative" collectivism, as is at present documented by Japan, 
is only possible if the question of the necessary harmonization within the 
system is solved. Japan has managed to solve this problem by the explicit 
recognition of the grown, spontaneous order. 
The individualistic system strategy, on the other hand, concentrates on 
specialization as the main criterion for the qualifications and the position 
of an individual person. From the system's point of view the career of a 
specialist follows the lines of the functional hierarchy. In this way the 
boundaries between functional areas are frequently unsurmountable. The in- 
dividual departments form their own "subw-cultures. Thus an integration and 
coordination in the direction of uniform aspirations becomes very difficult. 
Recourse is sought in formal organizational and management systems which are 
then expected to superimpose uniformity on the entire system. Now, it can 
certainly be maintained that individualistic structures are more apt to meet 
the critical challenges of a company's survival by means of innovation. It 
must, however, be noted that in a collectivisitic organizational atmosphere 
any risk behavior necessitating innovation is usually avoided from the very 
beginning, which is mainly due to the technical and social dependence on the 
group. The creativity is directed towards risk reduction. The strength of 
this organizational-cultural approach finally lies in the imitation of suc- 
cessful innovations and their optimization in every detail. 
The example of Japan furthermore shows that on the basis of risk reduc- 
ing organizational forms new synergy fields with a high innovation potential 
can be opened up and utilized. The innovation potential will clearly be suf- 
focated by excessive bureaucracy. The tendency towards coordination and in- 
tegration, caused by division of labor and specialization, usually leads to 
excessive bureaucracy which leaves no room for the development of the exist- 
ing positive effects. The "organization man", who maneuvers himself through 
'a large organization, may claim to be individualistically oriented, but he 
is programmed towards risk avoidance just as a group member of a Japanese 
enterprise. He can hardly be expected to give innovation stimuli. After 
all these considerations we shold really design the organizational culture 
of our enterprises in view of future challenges in such a way that they in- 
corporate the apparently positive elements of both types of cultures, as far 
as they are compatible. An effective innovation management prefers an organ- 
ization which is flexible and adaptible to problems and people, and not a 
mechanistic organization that imposes its hierarchical structures on grown- 
up persons. 
The function of the subordinate units is (mainly) derived The function of the (largely independent) units is de- 
from the aims of the higher unit. rived from mutually adjusted strategies. 
F i g u r e  1 2 .  Risk r e d u c t i o n  and. a d d i t i o n a l  g a i n  t h rough  syne rgy  e f f e c t s  under  change.  
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FLEXIBILITY - INNOVATION - PRODUCTIVITY 
Flexibility of organization and staff 
Increase of innovation potential (job-relation ... ) 
Increase of productivity through synergy effects 
Individual risk in case of unforeseen changes 
Possibility of collective risk reduction 
0 SYMBOL FOR VIABLE ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS 
FROM SMALL GROUPS TO LARGE ORGANIZATIONS 
MAXIMUM SPACE UTILIZATION 
SMALLEST SURFACE AND INFORMATION 
FLOW, 
I.E. MINIMUM POINTS OF CONTACT 
AND MINIMUM COMMUNICATION 
OPTIMUM SPACE UTILIZATION 
LARGEST POSSIBLE SURFACE AND 
INFORATION FLOW, 
I.E. MAXIMUM POINTS OF CONTACT 
AND 
MOST COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNICATION 
A SYMBIOSIS IS THE CO-EXISTENCE 
OF HETEROGENEOUS SYSTEMS FOR 
THEIR MUTUAL BENEFIT: 
PHOTOSYNTHESIS - RESPIRATION 
COMPETITION - COOPERATION 
PHYSICS - PHILOSOPHY 
MALE - FEMALE 
EXPANDING - CONSERVING 
YIN - YANG 
WEST - EAST 
NORTH - SOUTH, etc. 
A SYNBIOSIS OF A CIRCULAR AND 
A STRAIGHT MOTION IS THE SPIRAL, 
THE SYMBOL FOR CYBERNETIC OR 
SYSTEM-ORIENTED THINKING 
Figure 13. Co-operation of various kinds of systems for their mutual benefit. 
Two organizational principles support the development of the human fac- 
tor in innovation management: 
1. The establishment of a project organization for operative and 
strategic innovation tasks. This means that according to the 
respective problem a project group is put together in which 
the project leader, who takes the responsibility for the pro- 
ject, is primarily in charge of motivation and coordiantion. 
The thinking and working process is not carried out in organ- 
izational "boxes" but in innovative projects. 
2. The consistent application of decentralization. Work is car- 
ried out in clearly defined units, together with many depart- 
ments and cooperating partners. Both organizational concepts, 
the project organization and the work carried out in clearly 
defined units, are, apart from being effective, conducive to 
the development of the communities in the sense of "creative 
partnerships" (Figure 14). 
WHICH GENERAL ABILITIES CHARACTERIZE AN EFFECTIVE INNOVATION MANAGER? 
Management Style 
follows a clear line in his management activities 
participates in the solution of problems and decision making 
negotiates and stipulates clearly defined aims 
motivates the team to reach the aim 
delegates (tasks and responsbilities) 
makes well-founded decisions and is responsible for them 
may form teams from various disciplines 
can interest and stimulate cooperators 
knows how to settle conflicts 
communicates orally and in writing with all levels 
promots a good working atmosphere, which has a positive influence 
on team work 
interacts with the upper management. 
Technological Know-How 
o understands the technology relating to the design, development, 
and realization of a project 
o understands the applications, market and customer demands 
o knows how to manage technologies 
o knows how to assess risks and make adjustments 
o can predict technology trends 
o contributes towards a problem solution 
o cormnunicates effectively with all project members. 
Experience in Administrative Matters 
o knows how to plan innovation projects 
o negotiates on resources 
o succeeds in obtaining promises 
o sets measurable yardsticks 

o schedules operational processes 
o establishes and maintains a reporting and checking system 
o establishes and manages a project control system 
o effectively applies progranrmanagement-instruments and 
techniques 
o carries out careful personnel planning. 
Organizational Talent 
o knows how the organization works and how effective cooperation 
can be achieved 
o sets up multi-functional teams 
o cooperates effectively with experienced management 
o understands organizational points of intersection 
o knows how to arrange an effective project organization. 
Entrepreneurial Functions 
o thinks/works from the perspective of the total enterprise 
o leads a project as a business 
o reaches the innovation aims. 
WHICH CRITERIA ARE DECISIVE FOR AN INNOVATION MANAGER? 
The usual definition of a manager stipulates that he should be a per- 
sonality who effectively guides his staff and their work and who is himself 
effective. This is, however, according to our earlier considerations of the 
most important situation elements and innovation variables, a too narrow 
definition. An innovation manager must be able to think as well as act in 
an entrepreneurial way. But he must also have one more quality which cannot 
be learned, a qualification he cannot acquire, a quality which he just has 
to have. This qualification is not genius, but character. 
What are the specific traits of character of an innovation manager? 
They cannot be generalized, as they are strongly influenced by the entire 
organizational culture within which innovations are made. But there are 
some common traits. 
Individualistic innovators, whether they are artists, scientists, en- 
gineers, economists, small groups of creative partnerships, project teams 
or others, i.e., all people of the past, present and future who have induced 
and will induce positive changes by means of target-oriented efforts, have 
one thing in common: they consistently invest their own capabilities in an 
innovation process, irrespective of the majority opinion. Only a small part 
of this effort is made for the purpose of innovation itself, the major part 
results from necessity. In this way people contribute unintentionally to a 
necessary renewal and thus to the welfare of humanity, which goes beyond 
all national, racial, confessional, and ideological restrictions. 
Any innovation in the form of a product or a process manifests an inten- 
tion, which is the cause of its invention; its implementation will then lead 
to new products, processes and structures. An innovation can thus be defined 
as an achievement expected to be reached before the product or process has 
been completed. 
APPENDIX: ARE JAPANESE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES TRANSFERABLE? 
G.A. Wolf - Laudon 
I n  today ' s  bus iness  atmosphere companies f a c e  new problems, unique op- 
p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h e  unexpected. Not only must corpora te  management cope on 
a r e a c t i v e  b a s i s ,  bu t  growth must be developed v i a  t h e  sheer  power of new 
innova t ive  ideas .  New products  and s e r v i c e s ,  e f f e c t i v e  world marketing 
s t r a t e g i e s  and e n t i r e l y  new technologies  must be developed-all r e q u i r i n g  a 
c r e a t i v e ,  f r e e  management s p i r i t .  No longer  can we condone Tay lor ' s  argu- 
ments t h a t  concluded, " . . . a l l  p o s s i b l e  b r a i n  work should be removed from t h e  
shop." The subsequent compartmentalization of both  work and management func- 
t i o n s  has o u t l i v e d  i t s  use fu lness .  This i s  t h e  i d e a  behind t h e  Japanese 
management s t y l e  and techniques .  
The cons iderab le  success  of t h e  Japanese economy has a t t r a c t e d  t h e  
world 's  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  s t r a t e g i e s ,  methods and t echn iques ,  i . e . ,  
t o  t h e  Japanese o rgan iza t ion  of work and workers. Many managers from Eas t  
and West have s t a r t e d  t o  s tudy  t h e  Japanese system, which appears  t o  t h e  
o u t s i d e r  as  a symbiosis of " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  c a p i t a l i s m  and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  
socia l ism" o r ,  a s  a new kind of "product ive  p a r t n e r s h i p  and corpora te  capi-  
tal ism". I n  t h i s  connect ion,  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  e x t e r n a l  p a r t i e s  a r e  immediately 
confronted wi th  t h e  ques t ion  of which elements (where, when, t o  what e x t e n t  
and how?) could o r  should be  considered i n  t h e i r  own s t r a t e g i c a l  p l a n s ,  i . e . ,  
which f a c t o r s  could o r  should 
a )  n o t  be t r a n s f e r r e d  
b) be p a r t l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  by u t i l i z a t i o n  of synergy e f f e c t s ,  o r  
c)  be f u l l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  systems? 
From t h e  European po in t  of view, t h e  symbioses shown i n  Table A 1  may, 
e .g . ,  l e a d  t o  a d e s i r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  management. 
Table Al. Symbiosis of Japanese and American Management Techniques. 
Japanese Possible and desirable American 
Management symbiosis of mainly Japanese Management 
Techniques and American management Techniques 
JMT techniques towards a (more AMT 
effective) universal manage- 
ment technique, e.g., for 
Europe 
Life-time employ- 
ment in one 
company 
Slow evaluation 
and step-wise 
Development 
towards 
generalists 
Self-regulating 
control 
Long-term employment of 
staff 
Slow evaluation and 
promotion of staff 
De-specialization in the 
course of the career and 
development towards 
generalists 
Self-imposed control com- 
bined with agreed control 
measures 
Frequent change of 
company 
Rapid evaluation and 
career 
Career through 
specialization 
Clearly specified 
controls 
Joint decisions Decisions based on general Individual decisions 
consent 
Joint Personal responsibility in Personal 
responsibility reasonably large units responsibility 
Total integration Integration of the person- Interest in staff 
of the staff ality of the staff members members limited to 
members including their private the working sphere 
sphere 
The effectiveness of a management is manifested in their ability to 
a) change complex situations and/or 
b) to adapt to these situations 
to such a degree that guarantees increasing success (output) with equal re- 
sources (input). Or, in other words, the effectiveness of a management can 
be measured by the degree of successful substitution of energy and resources 
by information. 
Japanese management has, since the end of World War 11, demonstrated 
its effectiveness, among others by means of the management innovations shown 
in Table A2. The main interest in the Japanese management system focuses on 
how it can satisfy two contradictory demands: 
a) Far-reaching job and income security 
b) Flexible, highly qualified and adaptable staff, and 
c) Flexible payroll costs depending on the company's success. 
Table A2. 
Tradition Strategy and Activity 
( Input (Transfer) 
Separate thinking 
separate labor 
higher 
productivity 
Higher quality 
higher cost 
1950 start of quality control. 
Increasing productivity through 
improving quality of each working 
process in every area of operation 
and all levels of management 
After implementing "TOTAL QUALITY 
CONTROL" in production and 
service, later on constant 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT also in 
sales, finance, administration, 
etc . 
Innovation 
(Output) 
are much more pro- 
ductive and 
creative workers 
Higher quality 
lower cost  
Larger lot After eliminating all defects in 
the production process, change 
of the production scheduling 
lower cost system and step by step auto- lower cost 
matization 
(Fundamental idea of TOYOTA1s 
KANBAN System) 
For further orientation, the most important elemgnts of success of an 
enterprise are illustrated in relation to each other and to the environment 
in Figure Al. Even this very simplified figure demonstrates the complexity 
of the subject. A further simplification is, however, required so that the 
presentation may be limited to the essential points. 
The Japanese management techniques are thus illustrated, compared and 
studied with respect to their synergy effects by concentrating on three key 
areas of the management : 
A. Human Factor - Style 
B. Strategy 
C. Organizational structures 
Other important situation elements will, however, have to be neglected be- 
cause of the limited space and time available for this discussion. 
The gap between the principal impossibility and the potential possibil- 
ity of fully transferring a method, a technique, etc., from one system to 
another is overcome by synergy. As has been pointed out before, synergy is 
the cooperation of various factors, organs, methods, techniques, processes, 
etc., or of "productive partners", towards a joint and coordinated achieve- 
ment. This givesrise to an innovative learning process which may lead to 
joint (symbiosis) or new organs, methods, techniques, processes, etc. (see 
Figure A2). 

no synergy - 
Management Hanagement 
Techniques Techniques 
p a r t i a l  synergy  f u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  - 
no t r a n s f e r  p a r t i a l  t r a n s f e r  f u l l  t r a n s f e r  
far - reaching synergy 
Condi t ion:  Condit ion:  
Readiness,  poss i -  Readiness,  _ ~ o s s i b i l i t y  
b i l i t y  and a b i l i t y  and a b i l i t y  t o  
t o  form "product ive  form "product ive  
p a r t n e r s h i p s "  p a r t n e r s h i p s "  
Common Management Techniques 
p r e s e n t  a chance f o r  ach iev ing  
New (and more e f f e c t i v e )  
Management Techniques 
Figure  A 2 .  Synergy e f f e c t s .  
In the following situation analysis it is assumed that the "potential 
partners" are willing to accept the "Japanese Management Techniques". Thus 
only the possibility and ability of transferring Japanese management tech- 
niques are assessed. The following criteria are partly taken from critical 
American and European situation analyses of the Japanese management. They 
may sometimes be exaggerated or inexact. They should, however, be sufficient 
for outlining a certain tendency, 
Japanese management techniques are: 
a) not transferable 
b) partly transferable by synergy effects 
c) fully transferable. 
A. THE HUMAN FACTOR a 
- 
The key idea of the Japanese "Corporate Capitalism" contains 
in its "capital" the investment aspect of the staff. They 
invest over and above their normal standards in terms of 
"human capital". 
The community of managers and staff directly benefits from 
the achievements of the enterprise and fully identifies with 
its aims. The old stock of the staff (permanently employed 
members) call the enterprise "out enterprise" because they 
consider themselves co-owners. 
The primary common aim of the staff and the managers is to 
guarantee long-term success of the enterprise 
A human community has evolved as a system of values which x 
did not develop the kind of individualism and personal rights 
that emerged in the West in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Frequently the role of the trade unions is compared to the 
role of "the mother at home" as opposed to the "father's 
role", which refers to the management. The fastest way to 
attai,n a top management position is often by starting as a 
trade union secretary. 
Frequently the Japanese do not distinguish as strictly be- 
tween working time and spare time. Japanese working groups 
also meet in their spare time, actively employing their 
intellectural abilities for the benefit of "their own enter- 
prise". In this way they get a strong feeling of self- 
realization. In other countries this is only expected from 
the management. 
Human harmony and cooperation is considered to be the most 
important condition for a management position. The higher 
his position, the more important it is for the manager to 
be in agreement with his staff and to promote their initiative. 
The superv i sor  has  t o  "bui ld  golden bridges" t o  be ab l e  t o  
draw back without  l o s i ng  h i s  face .  The s i g n a l s  on the  
eva lua t ion  of h i s  own person given by o the r  group members, 
and e s p e c i a l l y  by h i s  super io r ,  a r e  extremely s u b t l e ,  
though they a r e  cons t an t l y  challenged. 
There i s  a s t r ong  opera t ion  o r i e n t a t i o n  and a gene ra l i z a t i on  
of the  management through ex tens ive  r o t a t i o n .  
B. THE STRATEGY I N  JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 
The i n t e r l i nkage  of t r a d i n g  companies, indus t ry ,  banks and 
m i n i s t r i e s  (MITI and MOF) is  one of t h e  most important pre- 
r e q u i s i t s  of the  success fu l  Japanese economy. 
In  a - re la t ive ly  small-economic e l i t e  e f f e c t i v e  vo t ing  and 
consent procedures a r e  c a r r i e d  ou t  which, 
" in  p l o t t i n g  a s t r a t e g y  f o r  economic growth (MITI)" shape 
11 t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of indus t ry  by us ing  i t s  con t ro l  of investment 
and access  t o  technology t o  nu ture  some i n d u s t r i e s  and l e t  
o t h e r s  wane" (Chalmer Johnson i n  h i s  new book bJITI and t h e  
Japanese Miracle) .  
Owing t o  t h e  MITI vo t i ng  system Japan has today a l a r g e r  know- 
ledge and fur ther-reaching expereinces  than any o the r  country 
wi th  r e s pec t  t o  disencouraging out-dated i n d u s t r i e s  (e.g. ,  
wharfs,  petrochemical i n d u s t r i e s )  and support ing new i n d u s t r i e s .  
Japanese e n t e r p r i s e s  dispose of a world-wide sensory system f o r  
t r a c i n g  new i dea s  and t r ends ,  new research  and development pro- 
j e c t s ,  and t h e i r  r e s u l t s .  
The aim i s  h i ghes t  q u a l i t y  of t h e  r e s pec t i ve  product.  I n  t h i s  
way complaints and c r i t i c i s m  a r e  avoided and a l a r g e r  scope f o r  
pr ice-pol icy measures i s  gained. 
Qual i ty  i s  t h e  primary i s s u e  i n  production a s  wel l  a s  i n  market- 
i n g  and s a l e s  p o l i c i e s .  
New production concepts a r e  pragmatical ly  t e s t e d  on t h e  market. 
This  l eads  t o  a high i n t r oduc t i on  r a t e  of new products .  Pro- 
duc t s  which a r e  no t  accepted a r e  r ap id ly  withdrawn from t h e  
market. I f  t h e  products  a r e ,  however, success fu l ,  they w i l l  be 
suppl ied  i n  g r e a t  q u a n t i t i e s .  
An e s s e n t i a l  element i n  Japanese management seems t o  be t a rge t -  
o r i e n t e d  production.  
Spec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  i s  pa id  t o  t h e  market l e ade r ,  who presen ts  a 
g r e a t  amount of important informat ion f o r  a company's s t a f f ,  a s  
e .g. ,  "What do we have t o  do i n  t h e  development, production,  
and s a l e  c a t ego r i e s  t o  be b e t t e r  than IBM?"  
B1. THE STRATEGY: JAPAN 
The targets stipulated by MITI for the economy are 
evident. Four points of emphasis can be clearly 
recognized: 
for the US and Europe 
it seems to be: not: 
a b c  
o Independence of energy imports through the 
development of alternative industries. 
o Development of the information technologies 
of the 5th computer generation ("artificial 
intelligence") and thus the elimination of 
the weaknesses connected with the develop- 
ment and the supply of software. 
o The increased living standard of the Japanese. 
This also involves, apart from the environ- 
mental measures already enforced in the past, 
o the development of future technologies, such 
as, e.g., gene technology and similar new 
approaches which will result in industrially 
exploitable developments in the 1990s. 
In all these projects cooperation with other industri- 
alized nations is intentionally and consciously aspired 
in order to develop a climate of international trade 
which would prevent any future trade restrictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n  t h e  pa s t  10 - 15  years  considerable  a t t e n t i o n  was paid i n  Czechosovakia 
t o  t h e  problems concerning t h e  pe r s ona l i t y  of managers, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  
theory of management and courses f o r  managers. Various models f o r  a success fu l  
manager were c rea ted  and managers were t e s t ed  t o  f i nd  ou t  whether they 
possessed t h e  required c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
On t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  s i d e  t he  problems of managers were d e a l t  wi th  mainly 
by psycholog is t s  and s o c i o l o g i s t s .  Cer ta in  "profess iona l  b l indness"  appeared 
i n  t h e i r  approaches, a s  i n  t h e  v a s t  major i ty  of c a se s  they d id  no t  examine 
t h e  success  of managers'work i n  t h e  context  of concre te  condi t ions  ( t e chn i ca l ,  
socioeconomic, p o l i t i c a l ,  e t c . ) .  When we exclude a manager from t h e  context  
of t h e  above mentioned condi t ions  we a r e  a b l e  t o  ob t a in  only a considerably 
a b s t r a c t  model, which is of l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  use. 
A r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  approach c o n s i s t s  of examining t h e  performance*) 
var ious  s ucce s s f u l  managers opera t ing  under c e r t a i n  condi t ions  and comparing 
t h i s  performance w i t h  l e s s  success fu l  managers, i.e., t o  f ind  o u t  those  
f a c t o r s  which d i f f e r e n t i a t e  succ e s s fu l  managers from unsuccessful  managers. 
This approach i s  more advantageous mainly because c e r t a i n  ways of performance 
can be  more more e a s i l y  modified than t h e  f e a t u r e s  of a person, even i f  it 
i s  n o t  always easy t o  change t h e  accustomed working methods and t o  quickly 
overcome h a b i t s  formed over a long per iod.  
*) Managers' performance means he r e  t h e  management a c t i v i t y  performed by a 
manager i n  o r de r  t o  f u l f i l  h i s  ob j ec t i ve s .  I n  t h e  following paragraphs 
I s t r e s s  decision-making and t h e  implementation of t he se  dec i s ions .  
THE EXPECTED DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONS IN THE 80s 
From a sample carried out in 1981 in 12 industrial enterprises and 
companies it was found that the performance of top managers was basically 
determined by technical, economic and socio-political conditions. (The 
review was carried out as a half-standardized interview.) Hence, first of 
all it is necessary to make an analysis of the probable development of the 
above mentioned conditions during the 80s and then to evaluate the 
corresponding managerslperformance from the expected development (we 
are focusing here only on top managers operating in various enterprises 
and companies). 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON MANAGERS' 
PERFORMANCE 
It is generally presumed that time is marked by fast creation and 
introduction of technical innovations into the production. We are speaking 
about the so-called scientific-technical revolution. However, closer 
analysis of technical innovations proves that within the last approximately 
20 years, inventions in current products, materials and technologies were 
introduced, e.g., the electrotechnical industry is based on inventions dated 
from the end of the last century and the beginning of this century. 
In the recent years, research and development were basically concentrated 
on the solution of problems which could be quickly introduced in practice; 
consequently, scientific-technical development has speeded up. In the years 
to come, a turn to more radical changes can be expected, mainly in 
technolo~y. Research and development will begin the gradual orientation 
towards the solution of problems probably leading to radical concurrent 
changes in the methods of work, in organizational structure and in managerial 
performance. 
The introduction of additional technical changes influenced the managers1 
performance mainly in that they saw the focus of their work on the fast 
solution of clearly defined objectives. The implementation of additional 
technical changes implies a smaller risk of failure than the orientation to 
radically new materials, products, and technology so far not tested. In the 
managers'work, routine management approaches outweighed creative activities. 
When implying additional changes, it was possible to make use of experience 
gained in the previous practice. The managers'performance was principally 
based on the experience gained in the past. 
In the future, the focus of managers will probably be shifted to the 
sphere of creative management to the detriment of routine component of 
management. Radical innovations have certain features which influence the 
change of managers1 performance, namely: 
- a high risk of failure in the production and on the market; 
- unclearly defined objectives, long-term and difficult implementation; 
- difficult adaptation of personnel to the change of technical and 
other conditions (*t is necessary to overcome the resistance of 
personnel), 
The above mentioned f e a t u r e s  have impact on management work. It i s  
necessary t o  use o t h e r  methods of work i n  t he  r a d i c a l  innovat ion times than 
i n  t h e  per iod of add i t ona l  innovat ions .  Under these  condi t ions  only those 
managers who a r e  a b l e  t o  accept  high r i s k  appear t o  be  s ucce s s fu l .  Analyzing 
more c l o s e l y  t h i s  problem we may f i n d  ou t  t h a t  a s ucce s s fu l  manager i d e n t i f i e s  
himself  w i t h  t h e  new problem even i f  i t  is  connected wi th  high r i s k  of f a i l u r e ,  
however, he  be l i eve s  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i ts  implementation and commercial 
success .  The r a t e  of innovat ion r i s k  is  considerably s ub j ec t i ve .  From t h i s  
p o i n t  of view, a succe s s f u l  manager es t imates  t h e  r i s k  of f a i l u r e  lower than 
t h e o t h e r s .  On t h e  con t ra ry ,  an unsuccessful  manager s ee s  t h e  same problem 
as too high a r i s k  of f a i l u r e ,  because he does no t  be l i eve  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t o  overcome t h e  expected obs t ac l e s .  A success fu l  manager r e a l i z e s  t h e  r i s k ,  
however, and be l i eve s  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  overcome the  obs t ac l e s .  H e  s ee s  
h i s  oppor tun i ty  i n  t he  s o l u t i o n  of a d i f f i c u l t  problem and i s  s t r i v i n g  t o  
c r e a t e  such condi t ions ,  which would enable  him t o  implement such an oppor tun i ty  
An unsuccessful  manager does n o t  s ee  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  problem 
implementation. For a succe s s f u l  manager i t  pays t o  undergo t h e  s o l u t i o n  
of d i f f i c u l t  problems, f o r  an unsuccessful  manager these  problems cannot 
b e  solved.  
A s u c ce s s f u l  manager i s  a b l e  t o  f i nd  t h e  resources  f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of 
a d i f f i c u l t  problem, t o  mobi l ize  and use u n t r a d i t i o n a l  methods i n  o rder  t o  
e x p l o i t  t he  above mentioned resources  f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of new problems. 
Successful  managers a r e  so lv ing  unc lear ly  def ined ob j ec t i ve s  of r a d i c a l  
innovat ions  by means of var ious  methods, which can be summed up under t h e  
t i t l e  "systems approach". Unsucceseful managers usua l ly  backlog t h e s e  
problems o r  a r e  pass ing  them t o  t h e i r  subordinates .  Successful  managers 
a r e  marked by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they s ee  t h e i r  oppor tun i ty  i n  t h e s e  problems 
and g e t  involved i n  t h e i r  so l u t i on ,  and t r y  t o  understand t h e  problem 
as w e l l  a s  they can, they can give p r i o r i t y  t o  t he s e  problems. The given 
problem h as  s t r a t e g i c  importance f o r  them. The personal  s t r a t e g y  co inc ides  
t o  a considerable  e x t e n t  wi th  t h e  company s t r a t e g y ,  a s  such problems enjoy 
t h e  p K o r i t y  i n  t h e  whole o rgan iza t ion .  
It is  a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  mention how s ucces s fu l  managers dea l  wi th  
long-term ob j ec t i ve s .  Usually,  they d iv ide  t h e  problem i n t o  p a r t i a l  s t a g e s  
which they check and make conclusions  f o r  f u r t h e r  procedures. Sometimes, 
t h e  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  problem has  t o  be  b a s i c a l l y  changed o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of 
a given problem i s  stopped i n  time and t h e  resources  a r e  s h i f t e d  t o  o t h e r  
problems, From t h i s  con tex t ,  a success fu l  manager appears  t o  be  very 
f l e x i b l e  i n  h i s  i dea s ,  i n  decision-making and i n  t h e  implementation of h i s  
dec i s ions .  Sometimes, he  o f t e n  changes t h e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  o rgan i za t i ona l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  and con t ac t s  wi th  o t he r  o rgan iza t ions .  
Radical  innovat ions  usua l ly  do no t  enable  use of cu r r en t  knowledge, 
exper ience,  and h a b i t s .  They a l s o  change t h e  s t a t u s  of personnel w i th in  
t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  inc lud ing  informal  working groups. 
Successful  managers appear t o  be ready t o  give up cu r r en t  h a b i t s  and 
o r g a n i z a t i ona l  r e l a t i o n s .  They o f t e n  re-evaluate  t h e i r  management p r a c t i c e s ,  
a r e  s e l f - c r i t i c a l ,  dynamic i n  t h e i r  ideas ,  i n  decision-king and i n  f u r t h e r  
management a c t i v i t i e s .  They o f t e n  adapt themselves t o  changes. Besides t h a t ,  
they r e q u i r e  t h e  same f e a t u r e s  and performance from t h e i r  col leagues .  They 
a r e  no t  only a b l e  t o  adapt  themselves, they a l s o  he lp  t h e i r  co l leagues  t o  
t h e  same adap ta t ion .  The main method appears t o  be f requent  con t ac t s  wi th  
t h e i r  co l l eagues ,  f requen t  d i scuss ion ,  eva lua t ion  of success  o r  f a i l u r e s ,  
and o r i e n t a t i o n  of t h e  personnel  towards t h e  f u t u r e .  They use ,  e .g . ,  
bra ins torming,  informal  d i s c u s s i o n s  dur ing t h e i r  rounds through t h e  working 
s i t e s ,  and face-to-face d i scuss ions .  
Under such cond i t ions ,  a  s u c c e s s f u l  manager uses  usua l ly  democratic 
o r  l i b e r a l  management methods. He t r i e s  t o  convince and gain  t h e  support  
of h i s  personnel  f o r  new i d e a s .  He o f t e n  h a s  long d i s c u s s i o n s  which 
seemingly do n o t  touch t h e  problems of a  given o r g a n i z a t i o n .  General ly ,  
s c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c a l  development, economic problems, e t c . ,  a r e  being 
discussed.  The purpose i s  t o  bringyabout a c r e a t i v e  atmosphere and 
r e a d i n e s s  t o  s o l v e  f u r t h e r  problems. I n  case  of n e c e s s i t y ,  he  i s  capable  
of quick decision-making and enforcement of h i s  d e c i s i o n s ,  because he  knows 
what h e  can expect  from h i s  personnel ,  which arguments t o  use, and where he 
i s  r i g h t  o r  wrong. 
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMF'ACT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
MANAGERS 
Our c u r r e n t  management i s  based on t h e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of s t r a t e g i c  
decision-making. The five-year p lan ,  divided i n t o  p a r t i a l  s t a g e s ,  appears  
t o  be t h e  p r i n c i p a l  management t o o l .  I n  year ly  p l a n s ,  concre te  o b j e c t i v e s  
of i n d i v i d u a l  companies and e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  def ined through t h e  r e l e v a n t  
m i n i s t r i e s .  Besides t h a t ,  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l  companies and 
e n t e r p r i s e s  i s  determined by a series of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  
Expanded a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  appears  t o  b e  t h e  consequence of c e n t r a l i z e d  
management . 
Deta i l ed  c e n t r a l i z e d  planning was in t roduced i n  a  time of  l a c k  of 
resources .  Up t o  t h e  mid-1960s t h e  p r i n c i p a l  management o b j e c t i v e  was t h e  
i n c r e a s e  of l a rge-sca le  product ion i n  order  t o  balance supply and demand. 
The economic growth was secured b a s i c a l l y  by e x t e n s i v e  resources .  We have 
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i t  was necessary  t o  embark on t h e  road of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n ,  
which requ i red  h igher  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Gradually,  t h e  focus  of management 
was s h i f t e d  t o  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  dynamism, and q u a l i t y .  I n  1980, t h e  Czech 
Government approved :'the Complex Program f o r  t h e  Improvement of t h e  Management 
System A f t e r  1981!'. 
I n  y e a r s  t o  come, we may expect  l a r g e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of management, 
economic cond i t ions ,  and t h e  gradual  c r e a t i o n  of a l a r g e r  space f o r  t h e  
i n i t i a t i v e  of i n d i v i d u a l  companies and e n t e r p r i s e s .  The ex tens ion  of t h e  
decision-making a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  imply h igher  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  r e s u l t s  
achieved.  
I n  t h e  p a s t ,  both  t h e  management t o o l s  and economic c o n d i t i o n s  were 
cons iderab ly  novel ized.  Managers were operat . ing i n  considerably  s i m i l a r  
i n t e r - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and e x t e r n a l  cond i t ions .  A s  a  consequence, i t  was 
p o s s i b l e ,  i n  t h e  case  of n e c e s s i t y ,  t o  move managers from var ious  branches 
t o  h igher  managerial  d u t i e s  in o t h e r  branches.  I n  connection wi th  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of management t o o l s  and economic cond i t ions ,  t h e  p rev ious ly  
gained h a b i t s  w i l l  be t r a n s f e r r a b l e  p a r t l y  under d i f f e r e n t  cond i t ions .  
The mana,gement a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  c e n t r a l i z e d  management was aimed a t  
implementing given o b j e c t i v e s .  A s u c c e s s f u l  manager was a b l e  t o  f u l f i l  
given o b j e c t i v e s .  and mobi l ize  resources .  From t h e  p o i n t  o f  view of s u p e r i o r  
authorities it was difficult to judge objective reasons for the non-fulfilment 
of planned objectives. 
In comparison with the past, the decentralized management is marked by 
a certain "vacuum" in management tools (objectives, regulations, and 
procedures). This leads to differentiated approaches of managers. One 
group sees the opportunity for the development of their own initiative, 
the second lacks instructions. Hence, a successful manager becomes skilled 
in using the space for his management initiative oriented towards the 
effective production and increase of internal rationalization in a given 
organization. 
Successful use of larger space for decision-making and higher 
responsibility for the fulfilment of objectives require numerous changes 
in the accustomed methods and style of management. Faster reaction to 
external impacts increases the importance of coordinated work. Top managers 
must achieve fast and effective coordination of activities in various 
sectors, e.g., sales, production, and technical development. The importance 
of economic calculations, as a basis for rational decision-making, is being 
increased. It is necessary to decide and act with sufficient information, 
while a very important role is being played by the so-called "soft 
information", e.g., marketing, It is not possible to hide behind the 
decision of a superior authority. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE 
PERFORMANCE OF MANAGERS 
Social stability was a part of stable productive-technical and economic 
conditions. Considerable personal and organizational security was achieved. 
In the future, faster technological and production changes will require a 
series of unpopular measures consisting of fast re~qualification. Under 
these conditions, the successful managers will be able to convince the 
superior authorities about the efficiency of the change and will get the 
support for new activities. One of the m6st important components in 
management will be to overcome the resistance of the people to change. 
It seems that these processes will not always be simple and without problems. 
Managers will have to devote more time to communicating objectives, goals, 
strategy of organizational development, and common efforts in order to 
successfully implement the above mentioned objectives. 
The moral and political profile of the manager is a very important 
personal feature in socialism. Managers are entrusted with human, material 
and financial values, and they decide about their use. It must be admitted, 
however, that the manager is not bound to his/her organization and managerial 
duties by his property, nevertheless, he may be afflicted financially or 
removed from his post. Even in the case of his incorrect decision-making 
he does not always experience the full economic consequences, namely in 
strategic decision-making. 
In decentalized management, the space for initiative decision-making 
and social responsibility is being enlarged. Managers with social 
responsibility can be characterized by the following features: 
- knowledge of social priorities, objectives and personal 
identification with mentioned issues; 
- performance i n  accordance wi th  s o c i a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
and p r i o r i t i e s ;  
- d i v i s i o n  of management performance, t ime and energy between 
o p e r a t i o n a l  and c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  
I n  t h e  y e a r s  t o  come, t h e  focus  of t h e  management a c t i v i t y  w i l l  be 
s h i f t e d  i n t o  t h e  sphere  of c r e a t i v e  management, however, t h e  r o u t i n e  
component w i l l  n o t  be  neg lec ted .  Crea t ive  development a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  
complete t h e  e x i s t i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The importance of o p e r a t i o n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  drop on ly  r e l a t i v e l y .  
With t h e  forthcoming d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and enlarged framework f o r  
independent decision-making t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n c o r r e c t  decision-making 
and implementation w i l l  grow. Therefore ,  i t  w i l l  b e  necessary  t o  p repare  
managers f o r  demanding q u a l i t a t i v e l y  new o b j e c t i v e s .  Only high q u a l i f i e d ,  
morally and p o l i t i c a l l y  mature managers w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  meet such 
requirements.  I n  t h i s  connection,  t h e  importance of prepar ing cadres  and 
t h e  f u r t h e r  development of q u a l i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  d u t i e s  w i l l  ga in  
g r e a t e r  importance. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING MANAGERS QUALIFICATION 
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  can be  de f ined  a s  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  perform a  p a r t i c u l a r  
duty .  Every person must have b a s i c  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  du ty ,  
which can b e  b a s i c a l l y  developed by p r a c t i c a l  exper ience requ i red  by t h a t  
duty and must a l s o  absorb t h e o r e t i c a l  knowledge. General ly ,  i t  impl ies  t h e  
r e l a t i o n  of unique and genera l  components. I n  o rder  t o  a c q u i r e  t h i s  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  both  components must always be  p r e s e n t .  P r a c t i c a l  competence 
can be def ined a s  s k i l l ,  t h e o r e t i c a l  competence as knowledge.*) 
I n  t h e  pe r iod  of e x t e n s i v e  q u a l i t a t i v e  changes, i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  use  
o t h e r  m e t h ~ d s  of q u a l i f i c a t i o n  development than i n  t h e  pe r iod  of smal le r  
changes. F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h e  development of q u a l i f i c a t i o n  must b e  der ived 
from t h e  f u t u r e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  n o t  from p a s t  exper ience.  The d i s c o n t i n u i t y  
of t e c h n i c a l  development is  a  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  of q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
development. 
The s o l u t i o n  of t h e  same category of problems, which i n  t h e  p a s t  had 
followed from considerably  s t a b l e  cond i t ions ,  enabled t h e  development of 
management s k i l l s .  A q u a l i f i e d  manager was marked by exper ience which was 
demonstrated i n  h i s  f i rm decision-making, s o l u t i o n  of problems and t h e  speed 
of h i s  r e a c t i o n .  The educa t iona l  system b a s i c a l l y  enabled ga in ing  genera l  
knowledge about t h e  r e g u l a r i t y  and p r i n c i p l e s  of phenomena conduct. The 
focus  of t h e  educa t iona l  p rocess  was i n  handing over a  bu lk  of knowledge, 
P a s t  exper ience was only  a  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of s k i l l  and knowledge, 
*) Besides t h e  two mentioned p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of d i r e c t  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  whole s e r f e s  of i n d i r e c t  components, a s  
e .g . ,  t h e  impact of t h e  p a r t f c u l a r  environment i n  which a  person i s  
opera t ing .  Family background, hobbies,  l e i s u r e ,  e t c .  a l s o  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  development of q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  These impacts can o f t e n  have 
cons iderab le  importance. 
The programs of educational courses for managers were considerably 
unified, the difference was only vertical: one type of course was usually 
attended by managers of the same rank, e,g., general managers and managers 
of large companies, 
In the future, it will be necessary to adjust the educational process 
to new conditions. Young people acquire basic knowledge and attitudes at 
school. The educational system must pay more attention to the creative 
thoughts and dynamic approach to work. Tt will be necessary to teach young 
people not to be afraid of changes and innovation, but to see in them the 
opportunity for self-realization in work. It will be necessary to train a 
collective approach to the solution of complex problems. 
The working site has an unalterable position in the development of 
qualification, The educational system prepares a young person only 
theoretically, with a greater or smaller specialization rate for a particular 
job, The trained adolescents may be defined as some "semi-finished article", 
which can be completed only by practice. Only the practice will show who 
has management capabilities, The working site creates basic management 
attitudes, approaches to decisionrmaking, priority system in selection of 
working methods, etc, 
It will be necessary to differentiate more between the development of the 
qualification of cadre reserves and managers that already have particular 
responsibilities. It will be necessary to prepare the cadre reserves not 
only for the requirements of a new duty, but at the same time to help them 
get rid of previously acquired habits and attitudes. The courses executive 
managers will have to be oriented towards future opportunities, while in the 
past the focus was on the solution of current problems. 
The development of the qualification of managers will have to be 
considerably differentiated. It will be necessary to carry out the 
differentiation according to the responsibilities and individualization 
depending on the concrete needs of the managers. For example, one type of 
course for general managers will not be sufficient. The educational courses 
could become an effective tool for the qualification developmentyc-only if 
they are part and parcel of a systematic and differentiated plan for the 
personal development of individual managers. Besides the above mentioned 
courses it will be necessary to use other forms, such as study trips to 
other companies both in our country and abroad, stages with superior 
authorities, cooperation with scientific and educational institutions, and 
the participation in the solution of their problems. The basic component 
is self-study. 
The active participation in the preparation of important central 
decision-making (e.g., development of branch structure, energetics, large 
cities, endronment, relation of companies-community) can also be considered 
part and parcel of the development of training managers. 
The dynamic and differentiated development of the qualification 
corresponds to the dynamic and differentiated production--technical and 
socfal conditions. The environment, in which managers are operating, 
including the impact of economic and moral stimulation, plays an unalterable 
role, 
CONCLUSION 
So far the management of innovations was in the majority of cases 
considered the domain ~f speckal$sts, mainly technicians. In the future, 
this sphere will become an important component of management, namely top 
managers. It is necessary to prepare managers for these responsibilities. 
At present, no university trains its undergraduates for management. This 
is not possible, because the decision of selecting managers is taken in 
companies, usually several years after graduation. The environment in a 
company has a decisive impact on the discovery of talented managers and on 
the development of their qualifications. 
The development of the qualification of managers in external courses 
can be considered as a supplementary source, which can complete, and 
further develop or dump certain components of the qualification. However, 
it cannot completely substitute the real environment of a company with all 
its peculiarities, possibilities and problems. Economic and moral 
stimulation, as a part of the performance of managers, creates an important 
component of the qualification development. 
In the coming years, it will be necessary to create such an environment, 
which will motivate managers to creative orientation to the fulfilment of 
social objectives and at the same time will enable them to find the 
opportunity for self-realization. The qualification development will have 
to be understood in terms of self-realization of the managers'personality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Westinghouse has introduced several participative management or employee 
involvement programs within the corporation. The importance of such effort 
was addressed by Mr. Doug Danforth, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Office 
of Westinghouse in remarks presented at a Quality Circle Recognition 
Conference. He stated that, "... I suspect that participative management 
will ultimately have a greater impact on the future of Westinghouse than 
all of the robots ... computer systems ... word processors ... and 
miscellaneous new technology we have on order" (Danforth 1981). 
The Quality Circle (QC) program is the most widely implemented employee 
involvement activity within Westinghouse. It is described in detail in the 
next section of this report. 
Examples of advanced efforts include autonomous work groups, employee 
task forces, and employee awareness activities. The section of the report 
entitled Other Prgrams contains a brief description of these approaches. 
QUALITY CIRCLE PROGRAM 
The Westinghouse Quality Circle program has been in operation for five 
years. It has grown from an initial seven circles to more than 2,000, and 
is still expanding. 
This program is viewed by many as one of the most, if not the most, 
successful QC effort in the United States. Not only has the program grown 
in size, but tangible benefits have been recorded for both the participants 
and the corporation. 
Lessons learned from the Westinghouse QC experience are presented in 
a recent book by Mr. Ralph Barra (1983), Director of Corporate Ouality 
Mr. Barra has provided material about the Westinghouse QC program that was 
helpful in preparing this section of this report. His cooperation is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
The Westinghouse Productivity and Quality Center has responsibility for 
coordinating the QC program within the corporation, for training facilitators, 
and for promoting circles among workers and managers. Individual locations 
and/or operations make the decision about participating in the program. 
Management of operations participating in the QC program have had to 
accept certain responsibilities (Barra 1980). First, and most important, 
management must welcome and accept employee participation in problem-solving 
and decision-making. This includes being patient through the growing pains 
and stresses that accompany the transition to worker participation. 
The second management responsibility is to provide the infrastructure 
to support the QC program. This includes trained and capable facilitators, 
meeting rooms, training materials, and time on the job to conduct meetings. 
In addition, organizations within a division not involved in circle operations 
must be encouraged to cooperate with the circles. Collecting information and 
developing problem solutions may involve many parts of the total organization. 
A third responsibility of management is to create a system for recognizing 
the achievements of circles. Barra (1980) states that self-respect and self- 
esteem are the energies that power the program, while recognition is the fuel. 
The QC program is part of a people-oriented management policy. The 
objectives are to provide opportunites tor workers to perfom team efforts, 
to participate in problem-solving rather than simply following directions, 
and to develop a sense of belonging to the organization, 
Barra (1980) has summarized the quality circle concept as it relates 
to Westinghouse: 
Quality circles is based on the concept that people will 
take more interest and pride in their work if they are allowed 
to influence decisions made about their work. Increased 
interest and pride will directly result in improved quality 
of work. 
Quality circles creates in the individual a sense of 
participation and contribution and recognizes the individual 
desire to participate in solving quality problems. 
Circles promotes a managerial behavior which recognizes 
the intellectual potential of the average human being and 
taps this potential by involving people in a quality 
consciousness. 
Circles restores a critical dimension to work, the 
opportunity to think, to commit one% mind as well as one!s 
hands to the job. 
The growing demands and expectations of even more educated 
people in our work organizations must be dealt with by a 
cooperative approach which develops a two-way respect between 
worker and supervisor, or thinking "us" instead of "we" versus 
"they". 
Quality circles provide training and structured 
opportunities for people to become actively involved in a joint 
problem solving process. It is a people-owned program, not 
management-owned. And it is people building, not another cost 
reduction program. 
It provides employees with the opportunity for personal 
growth and development, self-respect, self-esteem, self- 
fulfillment, and achievement at work. 
Most important, it enables people to participate in 
improving their jobs. This builds more pride and a sense of 
belonging into the relationship between a company and the 
employee. It also develops a team feeling of cooperation and 
togetherness. 
The QC identifies important problems within its organization, and 
determines which of these will be studied based on a consensus of circle 
members. The circle is under no pressure to select problems whose solutions 
will result in cost reductions or productivity and quality improvements. 
A QC continues to operate as long as it is functioning in a problem- 
solving mode. Following disposition of one problem, the circle typically 
begins work on another issue. This method of operation differs from project- 
oriented task forces that usually disband after the project is completed. 
Approach 
Organizations within Westinghouse identify individuals to attend a four 
day QC facilitator training course. Upon completion a participant is capable 
of establishing and conducting a QC program in his or her division. Each 
facilitator is responsible for one to about 10 circles, depending on the size 
and the demands of the organization. 
Each QC has a leader who usually is a first-line supervisor. Leaders 
receive two days of training, provided by the facilitator, on circle concepts 
and principles. A leader then recruits four to 12 workers within the leaderl,s 
organization to form a circle. Care is taken to ensure that circle members 
are truly volunteers, and not forced to join the group. 
During the initial six or so meetings the facilitator teaches circle 
members problem-solving techniques, and methods to present conclusions and 
recommendations to management. 
Circles normally meet on company time for one hour each week. Meetings 
are conducted in rooms away from the participant work stations. 
A circle studies problems identified by its members and agreed to by 
consensus. The circles are encouraged to begin by first considering simple 
problems that can be solved in a short time and with a high probability of 
success. It usually requires about four to eight weeks to complete a problem 
analysis, including presentation of conclusions and recommendations to 
management. Management may adopt, suggest refinements, or reject the 
recommendations. 
It has been found that management must treat the QC concept and specific 
circle recommendations seriously if the program is to be successful. 
Management must give timely and full attention to circle presentations. 
Good suggestions must be implemented, and explanations provided for ones 
that are rejected. 
Circle participants normally receive no monetary rewards for 
recommendations that are adopted. Recognition, however, is provided at 
the local level for successful efforts. In addition, the Productivity and 
Quality Center coordinates an Annual Recognition Conference at which 
outstanding efforts from around the Corporation are recognized and prizes 
awarded. 
No constraints are imposed on functions that may start a QC. 
Westinghouse has circles from many diverse activities, such as manufacturing, 
purchasing accounting, secretarial, engineering, supervision, and field 
services. 
The overall assessment of the QC program is that both erqployees and the 
corporation have benefited. Although no formal total program evaluation has 
been performed, indicators show positive results in many areas, 
One indicator relates to the growth of the program over a five year span. 
It has grown from seven circles in August, 1978 to more than 2,000 in August, 
1983, with more being added each month. More than 20,000 workers are QC 
participants. This sustained growth is impressive when contrasted with the 
results of the vast majority of participative management initiatives. Such 
programs often flourish initially but fail within a short period of time. 
An attitude survey administered to circle members ~rovides insights 
into employee views of the program (Barra 1983) : 
- Has the quality circles program made your job more enjoyable? 
Yes - 82% 
- Have you spent some of your own time (lunchtime, breaks, at 
home, etc.) on quality circle matters? 
Yes - 88% 
- Should the quality circle program be continued and extended to 
other groups? 
Yes - 100% 
Most QC recommendations presented to management are accepted and 
implemented. For example, one division reports (Frick and Powell 1983) 
that about 90 percent of its circle recommendations have been adopted. 
No attempt has been made to calculate the total economic benefit to 
the corporation of the QC program. However, one operation reported 
(Frick and Powell 1983) verified savings of more than $850,000 since 1979. 
In addition, some operations report less absenteeism and employee turnover 
since the program has been in place. 
Many examples exist of successful recommendations developed by circles, 
A few of these recommendations that involved documented savings are as 
follows (Barra 1983 and, Frick and Powell 1983) : 
- Purchasing circle recommendation reduced the amount of overshipped 
material supplied by vendors for an annual cost savings estimated 
at $600,000. 
- Supervisor circle recommendation reduced fuel consumption of 
vehicles by 15 percent for an estimated savings of $100,000 
over a five year period. 
- ' Manufacturing-circle recommendation reduced by one week 'the 
operation cycle time of a deshrinking process resulting in a 
savings of about $180,000 each time the procedure is used. 
- Manufacturing circle recommendation improved the way test 
adapters were made accessible to assembly line workers 
resulting in an estimated $22,000 savings. 
- Engineering circle recommendation improved the design review 
process resulting in increased engineering productivity and 
lower design costs, 
It is not possible to directly link recent increases in Westinghouse 
productivity and quality levels to the QC program. This is due to other 
programs occurring at the same time that involved technological changes in 
offices and factories. Even so, Mr. Thomas Murrin, President of one of the 
major groups within Westinghouse,-has been quoted as saying that the circles 
were "a significant factor" in increasing productivity in one of his large 
organizations. 
Challenees to Success 
A successful QC program, such as at Westinghouse, faces many challenges. 
Initially, the shift from centralized management decision-making to sharing 
of power and decentralization of certain decision-making can cause major 
difficulties. Following implementation of a program, challenges develop 
due to the expectations created in workers and management. Finally, yet 
another set of challenges must be addressed as circle members mature and 
want to extend the worker involvement process to a broader set of problems. 
The decision to implement the Westinghouse QC program was made by top 
management. It was decided to utilize the Japanese QC Circle approach as 
a model, but to modify it as necessary to satisfy the Westinghouse culture. 
Excellent interest was expressed by employees, in participating in the 
program. The labor unions, middle managei-s, and staff personnel were most 
concerned about the potential shifts of power and decentralization of 
decision-making, 
Westinghouse management worked with its unions to minimize conflict. 
Presentations were made about QC concepts and techniques. Some union leaders 
and Westinghouse managers visited Japan together to observe quality circles 
in action. To reduce fears that the QC program might interfere with union 
concerns, it was decided that circles would not be permitted to deal with 
areas traditionally handled by collective bargaining. 
Three of the four major unions representing Westinghouse either have 
remained neutral or even endorsed the program. The president of one union 
local was quoted in a newspaper article (Singletary 1982) as saying, "As 
long as the employees and supervisors don't get into contractual issues, I 
think the program will develop a good relationship between both sides." 
Some middle managers and staff personnel may be concerned that some of 
their responsibility, authority, and prerogatives may be lost with a QC 
program. It has been reported (Atwater 1981) that lack of middle management 
support has been a major impediment to the success of QC efforts in many 
American companies. Westinghouse emphasized top level management commitment, 
education, and patience in dealing with this challenge, 
Upper level managers provided frequent and strong support for the 
program throughout its introduction and growth. Within some corporate 
groups middle managers were required to report at frequent intervals on 
program status and progress. 
Education courses were provided to increase awareness of circle goals 
and methods. Middle managers attended circle meetings and management 
presentations of recommendations. 
It was emphasized to management and workers that the QC progran was a 
team-building activity, not a cost cutting or productivity improvement 
program. Therefore, all personnel directly or indirectly involved must 
have patience. With the passage of time tangible team building and economic 
results began to be visible. These positive results made it easier to 
influence middle managers and staff personnel about the worth of the QC 
program. 
Many participative management programs fail after a successful 
introduction. There are many reasons for their demise. One important 
reason is that expectations develop about the program and its results. 
When these expectations are not met, and remedial action is not taken, the 
program may falter, and then fail. In Westinghouse, several strategies were 
followed to minimize such difficulties. Top management support of the program 
continued to be provided. Successful circle recommendations were given wide 
publicity, and circle members given recognitlon, A few circles that were no 
longer functioning in a problem-solving mode were disbanded. Training was 
provided circle facilitators and members in advanced problem-solving 
techniques to enable circles to address more difficult problems. 
Two key ingredients to the Westinghouse program were the development 
and implementation of a consistent and standardized training program, and 
a dedicated corporate staff that fosters and maintains a communications 
network for participants throughout the corporation (Frick and Powell 1983). 
A successful QC program will create circle members who want to modify 
the program. A real challenge exists to satisfy such workers within the 
framework of management willingness to further decentralize decision-making 
and sharing of power. 
Individuals involved with one of the most advanced and successful 
programs at any Westinghouse division have published thoughts on the 
current program and possible change (Frick and Powell 1983). "Mature" 
circle members have pointed out: 
- The difficulty in selecting a project that is perceived as 
important to both management and circle members, 
- The constraints of the one hour a week meeting format on the 
resolution of "important projects." 
- Lack of opportunity for members to work with a variety of 
people on different projects. 
The authors (Frick and Powell 1983) also report two important management 
concerns : 
- A desire for more involvement in project selection and the 
overall efforts of their circles. 
- Recognition of the need to align circle activities with the 
major objectives of the department. 
The authors (Frick and Powell 1983) conclude by stating that most 
organizations needed a structured and visible program to stimulate a shift 
toward participative management. The QC program satisfies that need, and 
provides workers and management with a training vehicle to understand 
responsibilities and implications of participative management. Eventually, 
the QC concept of participative management should be institutionalized 
within the organization. 
In spite of the suggestions made above, there may be real advantages in 
maintaining an ongoing QC program even after the entire corporation becomes 
"mature" in QC operations. The Japanese have maintained an active and 
successful QC Circle program for more than 20 years. Obviously, benefits 
are perceived in continuing the activity. 
There are advantages to an organization for circles to operate 
independently in identifying workplace problems and selecti.ng the ones to 
be addressed through a consensus process. Without th?s independence, the 
group may give too much emphasis to management problems. 
One of the approaches being used at Westinghouse to more fully utilize 
capabilities of "mature" circles is to encourage them to address more 
difficult problems. Management that has become "comfortable" with the QC 
concept makes more information available about operations and difficulties. 
The circles are in a better position, then, to identify and select important 
and difficult problems. 
Another thrust for quality circles is problem prevention. The current 
emphasis is on problem resolution. 
Future Directions 
The QC program as it exists will continue to grow within Westinghouse. 
Even though more than 20,000 workers are involved in the program, they 
account for fewer than 20 percent of the work force. There is a need to 
expand the program to involve more workers and more managers. 
The experiences with the program provide a solid foundation upon which 
to expand worker involvement activities. Such developments will occur in 
organizations in which management and workers are ready for such a move.. 
Expansion of worker involvement will eventually lead to institutional- 
ization of the concept as part of the normal operation of the organization, 
The QC program provides an important first step in establishing worker 
involvement in an organization. The program will be completely successful 
when it and its extensions have achieved full utilization of the human 
resources available. 
OTHER PRO GRAMS 
Westinghouse has implemented a variety of employee involvement programs 
(Springer 1983). A few of these will be discussed briefly. Mr. Jack Springer 
is familiar with most of these efforts. His cooperation in providing 
information is gratefully acknowledged. 
Autonomous work groups have been started in several locations. In one 
plant of about 100 employees, five autonomous groups have been established. 
The groups have defined mutually acceptable boundaries between their 
respective operations. Each group develops its own objectives, and is 
selfmanaged with a group advisor rather than a supervisor. 
Results with this program have been favorable, The level of production 
has been much higher than originally forecast. Overtime has been reduced 
from a high to a very low level. The employees and plant management have 
been very pleased with the approach. 
Employee task forces have been implemented at many locations. This 
approach typically involves management identifying a need or a problem, 
although in some instances employees may bring the problem to the attention 
of management; establishing an employee task force; and giving the task 
force autonomy and resources to solve the problem and to develop a 
recornended course of action, 
Two successful employee task forces have dealt with layout problems. 
One group was responsible for laying out the electrical assembly area in 
which group members worked. Its recommendation was adopted with good 
results. A significant productivity increase was measured, employees were 
very satisfied with the redesigned facility, and a cost savings was 
realized. 
Another employee task force at a different location was given 
responsibility for laying out a new plant cafeteria. There had been many 
complaints about the previous cafeteria. Group recommendations were 
accepted and complaints have initially disappeared. 
A successful employee involvement program may involve sending employees 
who will be responsible for operating a new piece of equipment to the 
supplier plant during the final fabrication and check out period. The 
employees become familiar with the equipment and usually "champion" its 
introduction into his organization. 
Employees have participated in awareness programs. They visit 
customers, suppliers and trade shows to obtain a better understanding of 
the environment in which their work is performed. The results have been 
favorable as evidenced by improved attitudes about the corporation and 
their work. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Westinghouse experience with employee involvement programs has been 
very positive. The corporation has experienced tangible productivity gains 
and cost savings. Less tangible but very important is the improvement in 
program participant teamwork and attitudes about work and the corporation. 
It has been found that many employees welcome the opportunity to 
participate in an involvement program. It is necessary, however, that the 
program be perceived as meaningful. Management must agree to share power 
and decentralize decision-making if a participative management activity is 
to succeed. Additionally, until employee involvement concepts have been 
institutionalized within an organization, it is necessary to provide a 
strong administrative organization to guide the effort and make the program 
succeed. 
A successful involvement program, even if limited in scope, can produce 
a group of employees who want to share even more power and participate in 
helping making decisions that are more important to their organization. 
These individuals are a powerful resource. The challenge to management is 
to develop and implement programs that will fully utilize this resource 
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INTRODUCTION 
The most fundamental t r a n s i t i o n  taking p l a c e  i n  i n d u s t r y  today i s  
almost c e r t a i n l y  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of computer based automation i n t o  t h e  
manufacturing process .  From a long term p e r s p e c t i v e  i t  i s  easy t o  compare 
i t s  impact w i t h  such fundamental p rocess  innova t ions  as t h e  f i r s t  use  of 
steam power, t h e  replacement of d r iv ing  b e l t s  by e l e c t r i c a l  motors,  and t h e  
development of t h e  assembly-line. But a s  Keynes has  reminded us :  long term 
a n a l y s i s  i s  easy.  The r e a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  problem, and a t  p r e s e n t  one most 
u regen t ly  f e l t  by a m u l t i t u d e  of f i r m s ,  is  what t h e  s h o r t  term response t o  
t h i s  t echnolog ica l  cha l l enge  should be. The s h o r t  term problems a r e  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  r e c e n t  e s t i m a t i o n  of a Dutch engineer ing c o n s u l t a n t  t h a t  
25 percent  of a l l  robo t  systems i n s t a l l e d  i n  Dutch i n d u s t r y  a r e  p r e s e n t l y  
n o t  opera t ing .  They s tand  i n  t h e  corner  l i k e  a new wind-up toy t o  which 
t h e  c h i l d  has  no key.  The cause  is  not  t e c h n i c a l  b u t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l .  I n  
t h i s  paper we w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  p a s s  by a d i scuss ion  of t h e  t e c h n i c a l  p o t e n t i a l  
and, i n  t h e  long term, undoubtedly g r e a t  e f f e c t s  of computer based automation 
i n  favor  of a di.scussi.on of t h e  manager ia l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i s s u e s  involved 
i n  i t s  in t roduct5on.  We wi.11 conclude wi th  some recommendations f o r  more 
e f f e c t i v e  c o r p o r a t e  and government p o l i c i e s  i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  based on p a s t  
s t u d i e s  of t h e  innova t ion  p rocess  and Dutch exper ience wi th  s t i m u l a t i n g  
product i n n w a t 5 o n  i n  smal l  and medium s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s .  
TIE NATURE OF THE TECHNOLOGY 
It i s  f i r s t  necessa ry  t o  say  a few words about t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  
fundamental process  innova t ion  t h a t  we a r e  d i scuss ing .  A number of terms 
* This  paper i s  i n  p a r t  based on t h e  r e s e a r c h  program on "F lex ib le  
Automat5on" c a r r i e d  ou t  by t h e  Center f o r  Technology and P o l i c y  S tud ies  
TNO and supported by t h e  Dutch Min i s t ry  of Science and Education.  The 
opinions  expressed a r e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l f t y  of t h e  au thor .  
have been launched t o  denote  t he  newwave of m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c s  based 
automation t h a t  i s  t h e  sub j ec t  of t h i s  paper. 
Ejramples of such terms a r e  I n d u s t r i a l  Robots (IIZ), CAD/CAM, F l e x i b l e  
Automation and F l e x i b l e  Manufacturing. Use i s  according t o  t h e  au tho r ' s  
po in t  of view, o r  according t o  whatever product he happens t o  be s e l l i n g .  
These terms gene ra l l y  s u f f e r  from focusing on one a spec t  of t he  automation 
process  a t  t h e  expense of o t h e r s .  I n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  over lap,  and 
i n  any ca se  most au thors  do n o t  bother  t o  g ive  a c l e a r  c u t  d e f i n i t i o n ,  
p r e f e r r i ng  t o  proceed from a l im i t ed  number of hardware wamples .  However, 
i f  we want t o  d i s cus s  t h i s  t o p i c  a s  a general  i n d u s t r i a l  t r end  o r  a s  a 
problem of innovat ion management, i t  seems b e s t  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  observed 
development merely a s  r r the  i n t roduc t i on  of computer based automation i n  
t h e  manufacturing of d i s c r e t e  products". Our s t a r t i n g  po in t  is  t h e  computer, 
because whether we t a l k  about t h e  vacuum tube based computers t h a t  made t h e  
f t r s t  NC-mach5nes p o s s i b l e  o r  t he  p resen t  'computer on a ch ip ' ,  t h i s  p iece  
of micro-electronic technology c l e a r l y  d i c t a t e s  t h e  speed of t h e  o v e r a l l  
development no ma t t e r  what complementary t echnolog ica l  developments such 
a s  sensors ,  v i s i o n ,  sof tware ,  and handling equipment con t r i bu t e .  Th is  
speed causes  t h e  i n n w a t i o n  t o  be fundamental  ath her than incremental .  
The computer moreover embodies t h e  micro-elect ronics  t h a t  r ep r e sen t s  a 
fo re ign  technology f o r  most manufacturing f i rms .  The example of t h e  response 
of t h e  Swiss mechanical watch i ndus t ry  t o  competit ion from e l e c t r o n i c  time- 
keeping technology demonstrates t h e  degree t o  which i n d u s t r i a l  o rgan iza t ions  
r e s i s t  adapting a t o t a l l y  fore2gn technology. Even wi th in  e lect rotechnology 
t h e r e  i s  a d h e r s i t y  of t e chn i ca l  c u l t u r e s ,  some of which ( f o r  example, 
producers of high v o l t a g e  ~ ~ t c h e n g  equtpment 1 regard mirco-electronics  a s  
a f o r e ixn  technology. Slamntng up w e  can s ay  t h a t  from the  po in t  of view 
of human f a c t o z s  i n  5nnwa t ion  management t h e  two most important a spec t s  
of t h e  new technology aye i t s  "foreiznness" t o  t h e  exi!sting t e chn i ca l  c u l t u r e  
and i t s  r a d i c a l  na tu r e  i n  terms of speed of development of t e chn i ca l  
oppo r tun i t i e s .  
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 
It i s  f i r s t  necessary t o  d i s cus s  t h e  economic and bus iness  s t r a t e g y  
r a t i o n a l e  f o r  focusing our a t t e n t i o n  on process  innovat ion.  What i s  t h e  
p resen t  economic p o s i t i o n  of European indus t ry  t o  which innovat ion po l icy  
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  po l i cy  wi th  regard t o  t h e  i n t roduc t i on  of computers i n  
t h e  manufacturing process  must address  i t s e l f ?  T r a d i t i o n a l l y  Western- 
European weakness has  been viewed ~ 5 t h  r e spec t  t o  US economic s u p e r i o r i t y  
and defined i n  terms of an  insuf f  i r i e n t l y  l a r g e  market f o r  succe s s fu l  
commerc5alization of advanced technology, e s p e c i a l l y  new products .  
Governments have attempted t o  improve t h e  economies of s c a l e  by j o i n t  
programs t n  B5g Science. But l a ck  of t r u l y  coordinated European i n d u s t r i a l  
p o l i ~ i e s  and t he  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  homogenous market f o r  hixh technology 
products  have proh ib i ted  catching up d t h  t h e  US, d e s p i t e  many Euroepan 
sc5en t i fSc  breakthroughs.  This  s i t u a t i o n  is  convenient ly  i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
Gellman Research Associates  I n c . ' s  r e p o r t  of 1976 wfiich c l a s s i f i e s  500 
t e chn i ca l  innovat ions  made between 1953 and 1973 by provenance and degree 
of importance. I n  t h e i r  ranking t h e  US occupies  a dominant p o s i t i o n  with 
234 innovat ions .  Of f u r t h e r  s i gn i f i c ance  is  t h a t ,  of t he se  innovat ions ,  
27 percent  were new technolog ies ,  39 percent  were c l a s s i f i e d  a s  major 
improvements and 41 percen t  a s  r e l a t i v e l y  minor modi f ica t ions  of e x i s t i n g  
technologies .  A s  shown *n 'Figure 1 a well-balanced p a t t e r n  of innovat ion 
i s  shown by t h e  US. The UK, t h e  l a r g e s t  and perhaps most t y p i c a l l y  Western 
European r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  t h e  sample, claim a r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l e r  number of 
45 c a s e s  of innovat ion,  w E c h  inc lude  56 percen t  new technolog ies ,  40 percent  
major i m p r w m e n t s ,  and only  4 percent  r e l a t i v e l y  minor modi f i ca t ions  of 
e x i s t i n g  technologies .  Japan had 26 innova t ions ,  but  only 8 pe rcen t  were 
r a t e d  a s  new technolog ies .  Although q u a n t i f i c a t i o n s  of t echnolog ica l  
advances should always be t r e a t e d  wi th  same r e s e r v e ,  F igure  l m a y  se rve  
t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  l a c k  of balance in t h e  European innova t ive  record .  The 
a n a l y s i s  a l s o  p o i n t s  u p  a specka l  t h r e a t  t o  European compet i t iveness  i n  t h e  
com5ng years .  I n  t h e  f 5 f t i e s  and s i x t i e s  f n d u s t r i a l  compet i t ion was s t i l l  
dm5nated  by product t n n w a t i o n  and new technologies .  Although Europe 
lagged behind t h e  BS kn eommerciali 'zation, i t  s t i l l  exce l l ed  a t  c r e a t i n g  
breakthroughs.  'Many observers  f e e l  t h a t ,  due t o  t h e  maturing of many of 
t h e  dominant technolog*es i n  t h e  s e v e n t i e s  and e i g h t i e s ,  t h e r e  has  been a 
s h i f t  i n  t h e  d i ~ e c t i o n  of technolog5cal change from c r e a t i n g  new products  
t o  improving t h e  pzoduction process  of e x i s t i n g  ones.  A new emphasis on 
c r e a t i n g  new produc t s  5s n o t  expected u n t e l  a f t e r  1990. W l e  such 
observat5ons a r e  necessa r i ly -  s p e c u l a t i v e ,  they  seem t o  f i t  wi!th r e c e n t  
h i s t o r y  and e x i s t i n g  themi-s about technology l i f e  c y c l e s  and long waves 
i n  econom5c development, 
Europe seems i l l -prepared t o  meet t h i s  type of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compet i t ion,  
based on reflihement of e x i s t i n g  teehnolog5es and opt imizing q u a l i t y  and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y .  A t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  coming 1 0  y e a r s  t h e  main compet i t ive  c h a l l e  
cha l l enge  widl cane from Japan,  w h k h  5s a l s o  outperforming t h e  US under 
t h e  new t e c h n o l o g i ~ a l  m P e s  of t h e  game. Some examples h e l p  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
thks  p o i n t ,  By t h e  1970's  Japanese manufacturers  produced up t o  350 
motorcycles per man-year, compared t o  11 by t h e  BS f i r m  Harley-Davidson 
and 14 by B r i t a i n ' s  W T  Group. Ih t h e  Japanese automobile i n d u s t r y  l a b o r  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  Ancreased 8 t o  9 pe rcen t  pe r  yeaF in t h e  s e v e n t i e s  compared t o  
3 t o  4 pe rcen t  in t h e  US (Abernathy and Clark ,  1981).  The average assembly 
t ime per  c a r  according t o  t h e  same au thors  i s  112.5 h o u ~ s  f o r  t h e  Ford Motor 
Company and 47.5 hours  f o r  T o k p  K o g p .  The productfon of a c o l o r  TV i n  
Europe o r  t h e  US ~ e q u i ~ e s  2 t o  3 t h e s  t h e  hours used i n  Japan. Of 300,000 
memory c h i ~ s  r e c e n t l y  t e seed  by HewZett-Packard t h e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  of t h e  
worst  Japanese sapp1i-e~ was s$x t imes b e t t e ~  than of t h e  b e s t  'US s u p p l i e r .  
Japan now produces 90 percen t  of t h e  world v ideo  t a p e  recorder  market,  
inc lud ing  60 percen t  of t h e  FRG market,  85 percen t  of t h e  UK market and 100 
percen t  of t h e  US market. Japanese  v i s i t o r s  t o  European f a c t o r i e s  a r e  
repor ted  t o  be amazed at  t h e  backward methods of product ion.  
Super iar  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and q u a l i t y  a r e  l ead ing  t o  a r a p i d l y  i n c r e a s i n g  
market s h a r e  f o r  Japanese producers.  F igure  2 shows t h e  r e c e n t  and expected 
declime of t h e  European s h a r e  of t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  markets  i n  t h e  t o t a l  
consumer goods market ,  based on r e c e n t  r e s e a r c h  a t  t h e  D e l f t  Graduate School 
of Planagement (Van %pen, 1982). Japanese p r o d u c t i v i t y  and q u a l i t y  i s  now 
forming a d i r e c t  t h r e a t  n o t  on ly  t o  e x i s t i n g  employment i n  mature European 
i n d u s t r i e s  such a s  sh ipbu i ld ing  and automobiles,  as has  been s u f f i c i e n t l y  
documented elsewhere,  but  a l s o  t o  p o t e n t i a l  new employment i n  new technology 
o r i e n t e d  s e c t o r s ,  of which our d a t a  on TC markets can g i v e  only a p a r t i a l  
view. Some add i tkona l  suppor t  i s  given by d a t a  gathered by Nomura Research 
I n s t i t u t e  about s h a r e s  of world markets of a number of leading-edge products  
by Japan,  t h e  US and t h e  Federa l  Republic of Germany (Table 1 ) .  
new technologies 
" - -  - - - - - - - -1. 
minor major 
modifications improvements 
U. S. : 237 cases 
new technologies new technologies 
minor maj or minor ma j or 
modifications improvements modifications improvements 
Japan: 26 cases U.K.: 45 cases 
Figure 1. Relative frequency of three kinds of innovations between 1953 
and 1973 in the US, Japan and the UK. 
Data: Gellman Research Associates (1976). 

Table 1. Share of major countries in leading-edge products. 
* 
Japan (24%) U.S.A. (58%) FRG (18%) 
Semiconductor IC 343.2 (24%) 1,023.6 (72%) 60.7 ( 4%) 
('79 Y Bil.) 
Computers 
('79 Y Bil.1 1,123.4 (20) 3,838.6 (70) 538.9 (10) 
VTR 
('79 1,000 units) 220.4 (95) (-1 e 100 ( 5) 
NC Equipment 
('79 1,000 units) e 17.2 (62) e 9.1 (33) e 1.5 ( 5) 
NC Machine tools 
('79 1,000 units) 14.3 (58) 7.1 (29) 3.3. (13) 
Aircraft Engines 
'78 Y Bil.) 279.3 ( 3) 7,269.1 (88) 701 .O ( 8) 
Plant 
('76 Y Bil.) 3,125.9 (18) 6,995.0 (40) 7,441.3 (42) 
Antibiotics 
('79 Y Bil.1 658.0 '(62) e 324,3 (30) e 85.5 ( 8) 
Note: e: Estimates by Nomura Res. Institute (NRI) 
Source: Zaikai Kansoku (busines review1 Dec. 1980, NRI. 
* share of combined GNP in parentheses. 
A t  t h e  macroeconomic l e v e l  Table 2 shows t h e  t r e n d s  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  
manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s  i n  s e l e c t e d  c o u n t r i e s  between 1960 and 1980. The 
Japanese g a i n s  can only  b e  termed s p e c t a c u l a r .  Observers tend t o  agree  t h a t  
Japanese performance i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  not  merely t h e  r e s u l t  of such 
economic f a c t o r s  a s  wage l e v e l s ,  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on imports ,  h igh  r a t e s  of 
savings  and investments ,  a r t i f i c i a l l y  low i n t e r e s t  e t c .  I t  seems more 
r e a l i s t i c  t o  recognize  t h a t  t h e  Japanese  a r e  winning i n  an  a r e a  of 
t echnolog ica l  change t h a t  most f i rms  i n  Europe and t h e  US have hard ly  even 
discovered,  namely modem product ion technology. Its key element i s  
computer technology. The major o b s t a c l e  is t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h i s  
technology i n t o  t h e  product ion o rgan iza t ion ,  o r  i n  o t h e r  words: t h e  
management of p rocess  innovat ion.  For t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f i rm,  f ind ing  t h e  
c o r r e c t  response i s  a l l  t o o  o f t e n  a ques t ton  of s u r v i v a l .  
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PROCESS E'NOVATION 
I f  we a g r e e  f r m  t h e  a b w e  Ciscuss ion t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
cf c m p u t e r  based p rocess  technology i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  compet i t iveness  of 
OUT i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  nexc quest2on becomes how t o  ach ieve  t h i s .  For t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  t h i s  i s  a m a t t e r  of improving i ts  management of process  
innovat ion.  For i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c y  t h i s  is a m a t t e r  of f i n d i n g  and 
implementi.ng a p p r o p r f a t e  s t h l a t i o n  measures,  p r e f e r a b l y  based on a 
good unders tanding cf  t i le management problems 2nvolved. Aiter a l l ,  we do 
no t  want a Concorde p ~ o j e c t  i n  t h e  a r e a  of r o b o t i c s .  Empirical  r e s e a r c h  
on and w e l l  documented exper ience w+th t h e  process  of innova t ion  should be  
our guide;  s p e c i f i c  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of computer based automation 
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  much more voluminous r e s e a r c h  on innovat ion i n  g e n e r a l .  
The f i r s t  l e s s o n  from r e s e a r c h  on t e c h n i c a l  innovat ion is g e n e r a l l y  t h a t  
response t o  demand ('demand p u l l ' ]  r a t h e r  than response t o  t e c h n i c a l  
f e a s i b i l i t y  ( ' technology push ' )  5s t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  r o u t e  t o  innovat ion.  
This  should warn u s  f o r  an  i n f a t u a t i o n  wi th  hardware s o l u t i o n s .  This  i s  
t h e  major shortcomi.ng of most of t h e  stadi.es t h a t  t a k e  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r o b o t ,  
t h e  ' f l e x i b l e  m a n u f a c u t r h g  system',  o r  t h e  'unmanned f a c t o r y '  a s  a s t a r t i n g  
p o i n t .   compute^ based antomati.on can be  a most important  t o o l ,  b u t  n o t  t h e  
s o l u t i o n .  Important sources  of demand p u l l  a r e  t h e  market and changes i n  
f a c t o r  pr%ces ,  b u t  f o r  p rocess  h n w a t i w n  c e r t a i n l y  a l s o  s i g n a l s  from t h e  
f i r m ' s  own p ~ o d z l c t i a n  o r g a n i z a t i a n .  Rather than buying s tandard  automation 
e q u $ p e n t ,  utmost c a r e  should be taken t o  adapt  t h e  new technology t o  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  demands of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  fi.m. Ex is t ing  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r e n g t h s  
and t r a d i t i o n s  should be  taken i n t o  account.  F u l l  u s e  of t h e  f i r m ' s  e x i s t i n g  
e x p e r t i s e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  should be  made. Involvement 
of t h e  shop f l o o r  is t o  p rocess  innovat ion what market surveys  are t o  
product innovat ion.  
Th is  means t h a t  a g r e a t  d e a l  of a t t e n t i a n  and time should be  devoted t o  
determining the type of equcpnent t h e  f i m  needs i n  terms of requ i red  
f u n c t i o n s ,  degree of f l e x i b i l i t y  of t h e  new system, e t c .  dur ing t h e  phase 
of pre-planning, P l o ~ t i m e r ,  J.  (1982) found t h a t  some 60 percen t  of t h e  
problems w i t h  33 FMS case  s t u d i e s  by I n g e r s o l l  Engineers i n  t h e  US were 
d i ~ e c t l y  a t t r i .bu tab le  t o  poor pre-planning a t  t h e  o u t s e t .  Other problems 
according t o  t h r s  study were-in o rder  of t h e i r  importance-lack of a c l e a r  
p l a n  f o r  achiwving o b j e c t i v e s ,  a l a c k  of unders tanding of t h e  d i v e r s i t y  and 
complexity of t h e  p roduc t s  t o  be  produced, an inadequate  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
requ i red  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  and a l a c k  of o rganfza t ion  champions. 
Table 2 . ~roductivit~l growth in manufacturing industries of selected 
countries : 1960.1980 . 
(Index: 1877 = 1001 
~ n i i e d  West United 
Year Stales France Germany Japan Kingdom 
........... ..... 
1860 ..................... 60.1 40.0 40.0 21.7 58.3 
1961 ..................... 61.7 41.9 42.1 24.6 58.8 
1962 ..................... 64.4 43.8 44.7 25.7 60.3 
1963 ..................... 69.0 46.4 46.8 27.7 63.5 
1964 ..................... 72.4 48.7 50.3 31.5 67.9 
Output per hour . 
SOURCES: Department of Labor . Bureau of Labor Statist~a . Office 01 Productivity and Tech- 
nology. 'International Comparisons of Manufactur~ng Productivity and Labor Costs . Preliminary 
Measures for 1980. ' May 20. 1981 . mimeograph . 
From: Science Indicators (NSF. 1980) . 
The second l e s s o n  from s t u d i e s  of t e c h n i c a l  innovat ion i s  t h a t  
o rgan iza t ions  tend t o  r e s i s t  innovat ion.  I n  t h e  a r e a  of p rocess  innovat ion,  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i t  can be  shown t h a t  d i f f u s i o n  of t e c h n i c a l l y  and economically 
proven innovat ions  beyond t h e  f i r s t  u s e r  t o  u t i l i z a t i o n  by 50 percent  of t h e  
f i rms  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  branch of i n d u s t r y  i s  a process  of many y e a r s  ( see  f o r  
example Mansfield,  1968, and Nasbeth and Ray, 1974).  It is  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  
recognized t h a t  t e c h n i c a l  performance wi th in  i n d u s t r i e s  d i f f e r  widely.  
Di f fe rences  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  between f i rms  by a f a c t o r  of two o r  t h r e e  have 
been found t o  b e  n o t  uncommon. Four l e v e l s  of t echnolog ica l  performance i n  
t h e  a r e a  of process  innovat ion can be  i d e n t i f i e d :  
11 l ead ing  edge technology; 
2 )  s ta te-of- the-ar t  technology; 
31 common p r a c t i c e  technology; and 
42 backward technology. 
The economic p o t e n t i a l  helping f i rms  t o  s h f f t  from lower l e v e l s  of 
product ion technology (e.g. ,  'backward' o r  'common p r a c t i c e ' )  t o  h igher  
l e v e l s  is  v e r y  s u b s t a n t i a l .  Our a n a l y s f s  of Japanese i n d u s t r y  l e a d s  t o  
t h e  conclusimn, shared  by many e x p e r t s ,  t h a t  i t s  compet i t ive  s t r e n g t h  
l i e s  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  p ropor t ion  of f i rms  opera t ing  a t  t h e  l e v e l  
of s ta te-of- the-ar t  technology. V i s i t o r s  t o  Japanese  f a c t o r i e s  r a r e l y  
r e p o r t  see ing  technology n o t  f a m i l i a r  i n  Europe, b u t  Japanese  s t r e s s  of 
modern production technology l e a d s  t o  an a p p l i c a t i o n  of e x i s t i n g  technology 
t o  t h e  utmost of the2r  p o t e n t i a l .  
From t h e  pofn t  of view of government p o l i c y  i t  should b e  recognized 
t h a t  l ead ing  edge technology 5 s  almost i r r e l e v a n t  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  p r a c t i c e .  
Much can be  gained however from t h e  process  of technology t r a n s f e r  from 
higher  t o  lower l e v e l s  of technology. To promote i n d u s t r i a l  compet i t iveness  
t h e  major t h r u s t  of government programs should be aimed a t  he lp ing  f i rms  
m w e  someways from @common p r a c t f c e '  t o  ' s ta te-of- the-ar t '  technology. 
Even then f t  s h m l d  be  understood t h a t  i t  w i l l  probably  be impossible  t o  
reach the v e r y  many f e ~ m s  a t  t h e  l e v e l  of backward technology. It should 
Be set f imnly 5n our m h d s  t h a t  government programs which do n o t  reach 
f i r m s ,  d f ~ e c t l y  o r  indn8irectlp, below t h e  l e v e l  of ' leading edge' technology 
~$11 have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on i n d u s t r i a l  compet i t iveness .  An e f f e c t i v e  
organi.zati.on of t h e  process  of technology t r a n s f e r ,  o r  ' d i f f u s i o n  and 
u t i l i z a t 5 o n  of Rnowledge' is c r i t i c a l  t o  any program aimed a t  i n d u s t r i a l  
inn ova t ton.  
A f i r m t s  p a l c e  on t h e  continuum from lead ing  edge technology t o  backward 
technology depends on such economic f a c t o r s  a s  degree  of compet i t ion and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  , b u t  a l s o  on i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  a s  c o r p o r a t e  
c u l t u r e  and ri.sk averseness .  Such f a c t o r s  culminate,  i m p l i c i t l y  o r  
e x p l f c i \ t l y ,  i n  t h e  corpora te  s t r a t e g y ,  which can vary  s t r o n g l y  w i t h i n  an 
indus t ry .  Burton Kle in ,  us ing  examples from a .0 .  t h e  US s t e e l  and 
automobile i n d u s t r f e s ,  s t r e s s e s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  l e a d  t o  t h e  
avoidance of iylnuvatimn t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  on ly  f e a r  of c o r p o r a t e  c o l l a p s e  
( h i s  concept of "the hidden foot"]  w i l l  cause  a f i r m  t o  seek fundamental 
change. T r a d i t i a n a l  economiw f o r c e s  such a s  p r o f i t  maximization a r e  
insuf  f ?c fen  t . 
Research on product innovation has pointed ou t  t h a t  i n n w a t  i v e  f i rms  
gene ra l l y  dis t ingui ' sh  themselves from o t h e r s  i n  hav5ng an e x p l i c i t  innovation 
o r i en t ed  corpora te  s t r a t e g y .  (See a l s o  H. N y s t r h ' s  (1979) d i s t i n c t i o n  
between p o s f t i o n a l  and i n n w a t i v e  f f m s ) .  Having an  e x p l i c i t  s t r a t e g y  
wi th  r e spec t  t o  product5on technology seems s i m i l a r l y  t o  be a necessary 
condft ion f a r  lnavihg a f i m   close^ t o  state-of-the-art  o r  leading-edge 
technology f n  t h e  a r e a  of process  5nnovatPon. 
THE STIMULATION OF FUNDAMENTAL F30CESS TNWVATTON 
Having sketched t h e  natupe of t he  new technologc ia l  and economic 
chal lenge fac ing  Western Europe and t he  management problems involved, we 
should now t r y  t o  come t o  some suggest5ans f o r  a c t i on .  For i nd iv idua l  
f i rms  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  mr a n a l y s i s  goes i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of paying more 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  ~ e q u i r m e n t s  of t h e  product2on organizatfon and developing, 
through a process  of o rgan i za t i ana l  development, an  e x p l i c i t  corpora te  
s t r a t e g y  i n  t he  a r e a  of process  innovat ion,  For government po l icy  makers 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  mole d i f f i c u l t .  I f  modern p~oduc t2on  technology i s  n o t  i n  
t h e  f i r s t  p l ace  a problem of dwelopPng advanced hardware, then so lu t i ons  
f a l l  ou t s i de  such a t r a d i t i o n a l  a r ea  of government programs a s  R&D. More 
advanced ~ o b o t s  do l i t t l e  t o  k p l r w e  f ae tov i e s .  On t h e  o the r  hand governments 
r i g h t f u l l y  f e e l  ill a t  e a se  $n t e l l k g  f i rms How t o  so lve  t h e i r  o rgan i za t i ona l  
o r  managerial  problems. This is  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i f  a l a r g e  number of f i rms 
need t o  be reached i n  o rder  t o  have e f f e c t .  
I suggest  t h a t  governments can l e a r n  a l esson  from a r a t h e r  unique Dutch 
program f o r  t h e  s t h u l a t i o n  of product innovat ion which was i n i t i a t e d  i n  
1979. In  t h a t  year  t h e  Dutch government s t a r t e d  a s p e c i a l  program t o  
s t imu la t e  innovat ion i n  indus t ry ;  no t  d i r e c t l y ,  bu t  through t h e  i n t e rven t i on  
of ex t e rna l  consu l t an t s .  The t a s k  of t h i s  "Project  I n d u s t r i a l  Innovation 
( ~ i i - b ) *  was t o  he lp  e x i s t i n g  smal l  and medium s i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  (SME) t o  
innovate  : 
- t o  t each  100 SPlE how t o  i-nnovate; 
- t o  i v l c~ease  t he  Dutch supply of consu l t an t s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of innovat ion 
by t r a i n i n g  and coaching 70  management consu l t an t s  i n  a i d ing  these  
100 f i rms ;  and 
- t o  prove t h e  f e a s M 5 l i t y  of speci!alized innovat ion consu l t ing .  
The new concept of i n n o v a t h n  consu l t ing  had been developed a t  TNO by 
expe~innental  p r o j e c t s  i n  forms Pn t h e  previoas  yea r s .  The concept is  based 
on t h r e e  p r i nc ip l e s :  
1 )  Innovation 5s ~adi.call .change. 
2 1  The innovat ian process  is  a l ea rn ing  process .  
* There a l s o  was a sheer  p r o j e c t  "PSi--a", des5gneb t o  help  new, h v e n t i o n  
based f i m s ,  which need n o t  be diwwssed i n  t h i s  contex t .  
3 )  Process consu l t a t i on  is  more succe s s fu l  2n implementing innovat ion 
than o the r  types  of consu l ta t ion  (e ,g . ,  exper t  consu2tatiwn).  
The t o t a l  h d g e t  of the  program was about $ 3 mi l l i on .  Most of i t  was 
used t e  subs id ize  t h e  consu l t ing  f e e s  f o r  70 percen t .  The r e s t  was spent  
on t he  t r a i n i n g  of consu l t an t s  and program c o s t s .  Of 300 f i rms  106 were 
f i n a l l y  s e l ec t ed  f o r  part9c5pat5on. Although t h e  allowed f e e  was 30 percent  
lower than t h e  nsmalmarke t  f e e ,  200 consu l tan t s  app l ied ,  of wh5ch 51 were 
f i n a l l y  s e l ec t ed  by, f c r s t ,  t h e  program and, second, by a p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
f i rm.  I n  t he  majoricty of t he  f i m s  t h a t  were a t  last count a t  o r  nea r  t h e  
completion of t h e  consultimg process  (48 consu l t an t  days) a d e f i n i t e  dec i s ion  
had been made about &at kind of innovatfan they should develop. Because 
t h e  Pi\i+b i n t e rven t i ons  a r e  desi.gned t o  he lp  a f i rm from t h e  e a r l y  
reconnaissance of a need f o r  innovatimn towards t h e  d e f i n i t e  choice  of a 
w e l l  descr ibed i n n o v a t b n  ob j ec t i ve ,  F t  2s  t oo  e a r l y  t o  eva lua te  t he  
program im terms of hard edeonomir f i g u r e s .  A s  soon a s  t h e  f i rm  i s  a b l e  
t o  proceed t h e  p rocess  on i t s  own, the Pii-b i n t e rven t i ons  a r e  stopped. 
The program i s  only intended t o  help  d e f i n e  t he  corpora te  s t r a t e g y  f o r  
innovat ion and t o  t each  how t o  do it. I n  80 percen t  of t h e  cases  t h i s  
ob j ec t i ve  has  been reached. The development s t a g e  is  t h e  t a s k  f o r  t h e  
f i rm  i t s e l f .  Many of t h e  51 partic+pati.ng consu l t ing  f i rms  a r e  repor ted  
t o  cont inue t o  apply t h e  innovat ion consu l t ing  approach ou t s i de  t h e  
Pii-b program. Becanse of t he se  r e s u l t s  t h e  Dutch m i n i s t e r  of Economic 
A f f a i r s  has  now extended t h e  p ro j ec t  f o r  2.5 yea r s .  
CONCLUSION 
In  t h i s  paper I have t r i e d  t o  present  t he  case  f o r  viewing human f a c t o r s  
i n  innovat ion management not  a s  pos s ib l e  obs t ac l e s  t o  be d e a l t  wi th ,  but a s  
the  necessary d r i v ing  f o r c e  behind a l l  conceivable  success fu l  innovat ion 
p r o j e c t s .  This  i\s e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  f o r  process  innovat ion,  which i s  gene ra l l y  
completely in te r twined  with organ5zatimnal innovat ion.  Ruman f a c t o r s  need t o  
be mobilized a t  t h e  s t a r t  i.£ t h e  in tegrat imn of new technolgoy and processes  
i n t o  exis t img production s p s ~ e m s  5s t o  be r e a l i z e d .  I f  they a r e  on ly  
considered a s  obs t ac l e s  t o  be  d e a l t  wi th  a f t e r  t h e  hardware has  been put  i n  
p lace ,  bo th  t h e  khmanst '  and t he  new technology w i l l  s u f f e r .  The main 
conclasi\on of t h i s  paper is t h e ~ e f o r e  t h a t  t h e  development of a corpora te  
s t r a t e g y  toward p r o h c t i a n  technology is t h e  most important t o o l  f o r  
achiteving snece s s f a l  in tnodzlotbn of t h e  computer in t h e  manufacturing 
process.  
On t h e  quest ion of designing a po l icy  instrument t o  promote process  
innovat ion I have suggested t h a t  we take  a cue from a successful Dutch 
program, Pid-b, f o r  t h e  promotian of product innovati.on through t h e  
development of a system of imnovatiwn consu l tan t s .  Pii-b t eaches  
consu l t an t s  how t o  wide f i rms  i n  developing an innovatiion s t r a t e g y .  The 
goa l  is t o  become widely d iz fused  i n  endustry  and sel f -support ing a f t e r  an 
iul;i\ri\al l ea rn ing  process .  I n  t he  a r e a  of process innovat ion such an approach 
could be succe s s fu l  because s o  many of t h e  innovat5on management p r i n c i p l e s  
apply.  Of course  t h e  consu l t an t s  w i l l  a l s o  need t o  be w e l l  versed i n  t h e  
s u b j e c t s  of production technology and automation. 
F i n a l l y  I r e a l i z e  t h a t  p rogress  i n  IX, CAD/CAM and f l e x i b l e  automation 
a l s o  depends on c r e a t i v e  r e sea r ch  and development $n hardware and sof tware .  
In no way am I saying t h a t  i t  is  u s e l e s s  t.0 fund t h e s e  more narrowly 
techn5cal  a c t i v i t s e s ,  But i t  seems t h a t  e f f o r t s  t o  improve t h e  
o r g a n i z a t b n a l  i n t r o d u c t i b n  of Ehe new technology have been r e l a t i v e l y  
neg lec ted .  F r m  t h e  po in t  of view of where t o  pu t  your (government) 
money among many pol5cy a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  developing t h e  a r t  
of t h e  management of p rocess  i n n w a t i o n  through a system of c o n s u l t a n t s  
would be  a ve ry  good choice .  
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INTRODUCTION 
Aftsr the second world war the structure of the Finnish economy changed 
considerably. Industrialization increased as shown by the strong shift of 
the work force from the agricultural and forest sectors to industry and ser- 
vices. However, the proportion of agriculture is still larger in Finland 
than in most advanced OECD-countries. 
The main features in the development of the Finnish production structure 
during the last twenty years have been the diversification of the metal in- 
dustry and the strong development of the electronics industry. However, the 
production structure of Finland is still rather one-sided and thus easily 
vulnerable. Also a rather small part of our industrial production is research 
intensive compared with several of our competitors, and the particularly west- 
oriented export of Finland still emphasizes capital-intensive and relatively 
little processed products. These facts have been important starting points 
for the discussions in our country on the acceleration of technological devel- 
opment and the importance of governmental technology-political measures. 
According to the plans made in the early 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  research funding will be 
increased in coming years, and great efforts will be made in order to attain 
a more rapid growth than the average increase in expenditures, due to the 
nature of research and development activities as a creator of innovations. 
Both the public sector and'business and industry must endeavour to obtain this 
goal. 
The share of technical research and development of gross domestic expen- 
diture on R&D (GERD) in Finland in 1981 was nearly 60%. This was divided be- 
tween the three main parts of technical R&D in the following way: business 
enterprise sector 80%, the Technical Research Center of Finland (VTT), 15%, 
and technical universities 5%. The share of the business enterprise sector 
on GERD is about 60% which is quite close to the average for OECD countries. 
According to the official statistics of Finland the number of companies per- 
forming R&D in 1979 exceeded 500. R&D in the business enterprise sector is 
quite strongly concentrated in big companies. 
VTT is a government research institute covering a diversified and wide 
range of research work. Its principal task is to create, maintain and develop 
the technical knowledge needed by the Finnish economy and the administrative 
bodies. Its main activities are research and development work, testing and 
inspection work, and information service. Priority is given to applied re- 
search related to concrete problems and needs. VTT is an exceptionally di- 
verse research institute and its 30 laboratories cover most fields of tech- 
nology. With its broad range of operations, VTT is in an excellent position 
to combine the expertise of several fields in resolving a single problem. The 
most important fields of research at VTT are building and cornunity technology, 
materials and processing technology, energy and information technology. At 
the moment VTT's personnel number over 2,200. 
VTT carries out research work on its own initiative with financing from 
the state budget and commissioned tasks from domestic and foreign companies. 
At present the commissioned tasks already comprise over one half of VTT's 
activities. The contractual assignments are mainly debited at cost price. 
VTT has quite an important role in Finland, both as a typical research insti- 
tute and as a service organization. This is why the role of VTT in creating 
innovations has, during the last few years, been a topic of lively discussion 
and study. The results of this discussion can be summarized as follows: VTT 
develops products and processes mainly on commission from companies and, in 
general from the point of view of the companies, these are a smaller or bigger 
part of a wider innovation process. Only in some cases, at least so far, can 
VTT take responsibility for the whole innovation process. Development or 
innovation work done on VTT's own initiative is primarily to develop instru- 
ments for VTT's own use. VTT also improves the general conditions of innova- 
tion activities by performing other tasks. 
From VTT's experiences the following are especially important starting 
points and premises for further cooperation between VTT and industry: 
o VTT has the knowledge about the latest research results; 
o VTT has the opportunity to act as a supplementary to industrial 
innovation capacity and as a leveller of summits; 
o VTT has the capacity to give the special experience needed by 
industry and theopportunity to act as a performer in wide poly- 
technical tasks; 
o VTT is able to work impatially and to take responsibility for 
the strict orders given to the time table, costs and quality of 
a project; and 
o VTT is able to apply the working principles familiar to industry. 
In VTT innovation activities the main advantages are, first, the wide scope 
of VTT and, secondly, the good relationsips with industry on the one hand and 
on the other,technical universities. The structure and organization of VTT 
give rise to a very broad base of knowledge within a project using expertise 
from different fields. VTT is somewhere between universities and industry, 
and this location enables the contacts with both sides that is necessary for 
product development. From industry VTT can get the needs and boundaries given 
by practice. Good relations with the world of pure research gives knowledge 
of available new methods. To be able to keep the standard high enough also 
requires good international contacts with both industry and research institu- 
tions. 
QUALIFICATION OF RESEARCHERS AND OCCUPATIONAL SOCZALIZAT ION 
One way to study the qualification of researchers is to analyze it as a 
result of an occupational socialization process. This process can be defined 
asa"continuous personality structuring which takes place when a person re- 
sponds to the demands (partly contradictory) of the production process" 
(Groskurth 1979:lO). This approach makes it possible to analyze the special 
requirements caused by VTT's unique position in the national research system. 
About 80% of the researchers at the Electrical Engineering Laboratory 
have an academic background and most of them are recruited immediately after 
their examinations when the socialization process of young researchers is not 
yet completed. The work orientation, conceptions regarding "good work" and 
norms of working are, therefore, greatly molded according to the demands and 
models offered by the organization. As a result of its position between 
basic research and development work, VTT has to unite traditionally contradic- 
tory requirements and ways of working to develop its own unique type of qual- 
ification and organizational character. This problem can be described as fol- 
lows: how to combine such qualifications as the readiness to follow the de- 
velopment of basic research and methods, knowledge of different applications, 
basic understanding of the economical aspects of innovations and the prepared- 
ness for efficient and responsible work in strictly scheduled product develop- 
ment projects. 
To unit such qualification requirements special values, norms and manage- 
ment procedures are needed. For instance, the responsibility of all team 
members in the project is a norm that necessarily must be transmitted by the 
organization. This norm, however, is not necessarily natural to researchers 
with academic backgrounds. In the same way, the qualification of researchers 
at VTT can be seen as the development of a "special type of researcher" with 
qualities corresponding to the demands of VTT's special position. The basis 
for this qualification is adequate work orientation, clear idea of special 
knowledge and the way of working needed at VTT. These conceptions are partly 
transmitted to a new researcher through the routine work act~vity. But, to 
form a conscious work orientation, explicit analysis of the necessary demands 
of work activity is needed. 
This analysis of requirements can best be performed as part of the goal 
setting and planning process. The analysis of organizational goals, the 
"business idea" and the premises of successful innovat ions (the necessary 
know-how, forms of organizing the work) deal with the very basic qualification 
requirements needed in research and development work. 
Because of its position VTT also has certain special motiviation sources. 
Among others these motivating factors are: stimulating and varying work; pos- 
sibilities to influence the industry; and the opportunity for national contacts 
which may provide future scientific career possibilities. In the DAMATIC pro- 
ject case study by Dr. Andersin (1983), the quality of goals turned out to be 
important for the motivation of researchers. This fact could be expressed in 
that motivation comes from outside, from the utility and uniqueness of planned 
results, not from the inner needs or drives of a researcher. This unity of 
high motivation and challenging goals raises the importance of goal quality 
and goal-setting asabasic factor pushing the qualification of researchers in 
an organization forward. 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
There is a well established tradition in innovation research to compare 
projects that have led to successful innovations with those that have led to 
failures in particular companies (see, for example, Kulvik 1977, Rothwell 
1977, Rubenstein et al. 1976, and Freeman 1982). Though the studies have 
mainly concentrated ontechnological innovations in industrial firms, some of 
the findings provide an adequate framework for looking at human factors in 
innovation management also in supporting technology development institutions 
like VTT. 
The majority of successful innovations arise in response to the recog- 
nition of a market need of one sort or another (need-pull) as opposed to the 
recognition of a new technological potential (technology-push). But as 
Freeman (1982) and Sahal (1981) have pointed out most innovations involve 
some imaginative combination of new technical and market possibilities. As 
both the market and technology are continually changing, innovation is a 
coupling process to link these two processes together. The management of 
this sort of process, which takes place in the minds of imaginative people, 
is most difficultandgets.even more problematic when the knowledge of tech- 
nical possibilites and market needs are brought together from different or- 
ganizations. This is the case in most contract research projects in which 
the technological know-how is provided by the research institution and the 
market and production knowledge by the firm. 
Successful innovat ion, while enj oying good inter-f irm comnication, 
must establish efficient communication links with outside scientific and 
technical establishments-,. as well as with the customers, and make deliberate 
efforts to survey potentially useful externally-generated ideas. VTT's per- 
sonnel generally have good and close relations with the scientific community 
because of: 
o the convenient geographical location (VTT and the technical uni- 
versity are side by side); 
o VTT's recruitment practice (VTT recruits mainly from the univer- 
sities) ; 
o VTT's substantial own basic and applied research. 
But here again, communication with the other end of the innovation process, 
i.e., the customers, remains insufficient. 
This communication problems brings with it another relevant problem, 
namely the different communication habits of scientists and engineers (see, 
for example, Rothwell and Zegweld 1981:152-153). Scientists tend to mainly 
look at the primary literature and form "invisible colleagues" among their 
peers. They appear to be little constrained by the bounds of the firm, and 
their rewarding system is outside their administrative organizations. En- 
gineers, on the other hand, look more to secondary literature and draw very 
much on their own personal experience. They are very much bound by the firm 
and its rewarding system. At VTT the form of communication has traditionally 
been that of scientists, but along with the change in VTT's role, communica- 
tion forms are also changing. So far there have been no systematic efforts 
to promote this change by means of, for example, splitting the personnel into 
those performing scientific research and those involved mainly in development. 
Also, the incentives have been more like those of science, and in the future 
new rewarding methods have t o  be developed. One i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  recogni-  
t i o n  of t h e  new requirements  i s  t h e  p lan  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  market ing f i r m  "VTT 
Technology1' t o  c r e a t e  new channels  t o  t h e  markets.  
An e x p l i c i t  and a c t i v e  product development o r  innovation p o l i c y  a s  an 
a i d  t o  s t r a t e g i c  p lanning seems t o  be a t t ached  t o  h igh  innova t ion  a c t i v i t y .  
Th i s  p o l i c y  has  t o  be convered i n t o  expl ic i t  research and development objec- 
t i v e s  ( s e e ,  f o r  example, Blake 1978, Ormala 1983) because they: 
o  t i e  t h e  r e s e a r c h  f u n c t i o n  c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  
o rgan iza t ion ;  
o  h e l p  t o  convey t h e  s t r a t e g y  def ined by t h e  t o p  management 
of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  lower l e v e l s  i n  an o p e r a t i o n a l  form; 
o  form t h e  b a s i s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  making i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of t h e  
o rgan iza t ion .  
Successful  innova to r s  tend t o  be s t r o n g l y  committed t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of an  
o rgan iza t ion .  I n  r e s e a r c h  i n s t i t u t i o n s  eng ineers  and s c i e n t i s t s ,  who a r e  
involved i n  i n d u s t r i a l  innovat ion,  f a c e  t h e  problem of d u a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  
Should they  be committed t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  o r  of t h e i r  own 
organ iza t ion?  T h i s  problem may become t r i c k y  i f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  t u r n  out  t o  
be c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  A t  VTT t h e  s o l u t i o n  has been t o  d e f i n e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  
broadly  a s  p o s s i b l e :  VTT should do every th ing  t o  suppor t  t h e  development of 
t h e  F i n n i s h  economy. This  fo rmula t ion  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  n o t  ve ry  e x p l i c i t !  
Success fu l  innova t ion  t ends  t o  be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  an open horizontal 
management s t y l e  which i s  o rgan ic  r a t h e r  than  mechan i s t i c ,  p a r t i c u l a r y  wi th  
regard  t o  t h e  R&D and marketing func t ions .  The management a t  VTT has  t r a -  
d i t i o n a l l y  been r e l a t i v e l y  d e c e n t r a l i z e d ,  and w i t h  t h e  adopt ion of t h e  mat r ix  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e  development has  been towards an even more d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
system. I n  some p r o j e c t s  it  even has  been p o s s i b l e  t o  adopt management rou- 
t i n e s  and p r i n c i p l e s  from t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ,  which has  eased t h e  coopera t ion  
cons ide rab ly .  
There i s  no doubt t h a t  success  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  wi th  t h e  pre- 
sence i n  t h e  f i r m  of one o r  two key individuals (product champion, bus iness  
innova to r ,  t e c h n i c a l  innova to r )  who a r e  committed t o ,  and who e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  
suppor t ,  t h e  innova t ion  (Rothwell 1977:202). To be e f f e c t i v e ,  moreover, t h e  
bus iness  innovator  must have s u f f i c i e n t  power and a u t h o r i t y  t o  p o s i t i v e l y  
a f f e c t  t h e  course  of t h e  innova t ion ,  which means t h a t  he should hold a  p l a c e  
h igh  enough i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  h i e r a r c h y  and have g r e a t e r  s e n i o r i t y .  The 
most important  q u e s t i o n  concerning t h e  r o l e  of t h e  technology development 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  whether t h i s  product champion can be from o u t s i d e  t h e  innova- 
t i n g  f i r m ,  o r  whether t h i s  f u n c t i o n  can be d iv ided  i n t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  innova- 
t o r  and commercial innovator .  However, a s  t h e s e  "key individuals ' '  a r e  of 
g r e a t  importance t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s  f i r m s ,  such persons  a r e  a t  l e a s t  a s  impor- 
t a n t  i n  technology development i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The r e c o g n i t i o n  of t h i s  f a c t  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  conclus ion t h a t  among t h e  most important  management r e s p o n s i b i l -  
i t i e s  i s  ensur ing  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  always has such persons  a v a i l a b l e ,  
and t h a t  eve ry th ing  i s  done t o  suppor t  them. 
I n  t h e  fo l lowing  s e c t i o n s  t h e  a s p e c t s  and problems of management r a i s e d  
i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  b e d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  l i g h t  of some of VTT's development 
p r o j e c t s  i n  e l ec t ro techno logy .  
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS CARRIED THROUGH AT VTT 
A New Automation System 
VTT p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  development of anew microprocessor-based automa- 
t i o n  system f o r  t h e  Valmet Corporation.  The system i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  descr ibed 
by Wahlstrom e t  a l .  (1983). Andersin (1983) d i scusses  t h e  p r o j e c t  i n  d e t a i l  
and g ives  t he  customer's  po i n t  of view of t h e  p r o j e c t .  The fol lowing a r e  
some comments about t h e  r o l e  of VTT. 
The main development phase l a s t ed  l e s s  than  a year  and, hence, t h e r e  
was considerable  time pressure  on t h e  p ro j ec t  group. The p ro j ec t  group was 
h igh ly  motivated.  A t  VTT t h e  reasons may be t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  system was 
unique and many new techniques  and ideas  could be app l ied .  Moreover, t h e  
same people a t  VTThadbeen spec i fy ing  t h e  system from the  very beginning, 
and t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  system was t h e i r  own seems t o  have been encouraging. 
Also, t h e  knowledge of t h e  importance of t h e  p ro j ec t  was very motivat ing.  
When t h e  new system was int roduced t h e r e  was a r e a l  market need f o r  i t .  It 
had only onecom pe t i t o r  which had been on t h e  market f o r  f ou r  years .  Today 
t h e r e  may be about 50 such no tab le  systems ava i l ab l e .  The new, more e f f i -  
c i e n t  system was int roduced a t  t h e  beginning of an investment per iod i n  
Finnish indus t ry .  
The arrangements f o r  t h e  p ro j ec t  (see  Andersin 1983) enabled f r u i t f u l  
communication w i t h i n t h e p r o j e c t .  About 30% of t h e  work of VTT was a l s o  done 
i n  premises ren ted  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t .  When people were c lo s e  t o  each o the r  it 
was easy t o  agree  about d e t a i l s  i n  t h e  system, and due t o  v iv id  communication 
everyone received a l l  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  information without  arranging s p e c i a l  
information d i s t r i b u t i o n .  A t  t h e  beginning of t h e  cooperat ion,  t h e  communi- 
c a t i o n  h a b i t s  were very  d i f f e r e n t  a t  VTT and Valmet. During t h e  p r o j e c t  t h e  
r e s e a r c h e r s  learned t h e  eng ineer ' s  language and communication was no longer 
a problem. 
The customer's  ob j ec t i ve s  f o r  t h e  p ro j ec t  were a l s o  adopted by t h e  VTT 
people and no g r e a t  c o n f l i c t s  i n  t h i s  respec t  were no t iced .  However, dur ing 
some extremely s t r e s s i n g  per iods  some cormnents about t h e  nece s s i t y  of work- 
ing dur ing weekends and l a t e  i n  t h e  evening were heard.  It should be men- 
t ioned  t h a t  VTT cou l dno t  a r range  f o r t h e  same f l e x i b l e  overtime compensation 
a s  Valmet d id .  
The management s t y l e  of the  p ro j ec t  employed weak p ro j ec t  o rgan iza t ion  
t h a t  allowed f o r  independent work w i th  f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  r e s u l t s  
f o r  everyone. The t o t a l  support  from Valmet top management was a l s o  appre- 
c i a t e d  by t h e  p r o j ec t  group. Three VTT l a b o r a t o r i e s  ( E l e c t r i c a l  Engineering,  
Telecommunications andMedica1 Engineering) were involved. The organ iza t ion  
of VTT allowed f o r  good cooperat ion between t he  l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  and t h e  labor- 
a t o r y  d i r e c t o r s  recognized t h e  importance of t h e  p r o j e c t .  Although t h e  pro- 
j e c t  was r e a l  team work t h e r e  were key i nd iv idua l s  both i n  t h e  management 
and i n  t h e  p r o j ec t  group, i n  t h e  following f i e l d s :  
- arrangements of resources  
- adoption of end u s e r ' s  needs i n  t he  system 
- f unc t i ona l  approach t o  t h e  system s t r u c t u r e .  
The p r o j e c t  was success fu ly  brought t o  an end although a continuous updating 
i s  going on. However, two nega t ive  aspec t s  of t h e  p r o j e c t  have t o  be men- 
t ioned: 
o  some prov is iona l  so lu t i ons ,  which were made due t o  t he  time 
pressure ,  became permanant. 
o  documentation was no t  always complete dur ing t h e  i n t ens ive  
development per iod.  Th is  a f f e c t e d  t h e  s ta r t -up  procedure.  
A Seeing and Learning So r t e r  
VTT developed a  new s o r t i n g  system f o r  t h e  Par tek  Corporation dur ing  
1977-1980. The system which i s  descr ibed by MHenpaa e t  a l .  (1982) should be 
ab l e  t o  s o r t  d i f f e r e n t  types  of p iece  goods, and t h e  s o r t i n g  of lime-stone 
was chosen a s  t he  f i r s t  app l i c a t i on .  The market need f o r  t h i s  type of pro- 
duct was ind ica ted  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  automatic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of lime-stones 
allowed f o r  u t i l i z a t i o n  of about 30X more rock ma te r i a l  than by using t h e  
hand picking method. The customer was a l s o  looking f o r  new products and 
ma te r i a l  s o r t i n g  was seen t o  be a  s u i t a b l e  f i e l d .  The prototype was i n s t a l -  
led i n  a  lime-stone m i l l  i n  1980 and t h e  fol lowing year  Par tek  came t o  a  
l i c ense  agreement wi th  a  mu l t i na t i ona l  company who now markets t h e  system 
world-wide. Parket  now has s i x  lime-stone s o r t i n g  systems i n  operat ion.  
The system was mainly developed a t  VTT with in  a  normal p ro j ec t  organiza- 
t i o n  and a l l  t he  work, from the  very f i r s t  ideas  t o  t h e  prototype,  was done 
a t  VTT. Hence mot iva t ion  was very  high because own so lu t i ons  could be t e s t e d  
i n  r e a l i t y .  Moreover t h e  problem was t e chn i ca l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  e .g . ,  ca lcula-  
t i o n s  showed t h a t  t he  problem could not  be solved using a  conventional ap- 
proach. As t he  p ro j ec t  was done mainly a t  VTT, normal management s t y l e  was 
used. The main reason f o r  t h e  success was t h a t  a  working p ro j ec t  group could 
be found. Communication was q u i t e  informal wi th in  t h e  p r o j e c t .  The pro jec t  
group comprised of 4-5 people,  a l l  of whom worked i n  t he  same labora tory  and 
came i n  d a i l y  contact  wi th  each o ther .  The group a l s o  arranged spec i a l  meet- 
ings  t o  d i s cus s  d i f f e r e n t  t e chn i ca l  so lu t i ons .  I n  o rder  t o  t r a n s f e r  informa- 
t i o n  t o  t h e  customer, one person from Parket worked wi th  t he  p ro j ec t  a t  VTT 
f o r  ha l f  a  year.  The ob j ec t i ve s  of t he  p ro j ec t  were q u i t e  c l e a r  both f o r  
VTT and f o r  t h e  customer. However, t h e r e  were some d i scuss ions  between t he  
two p a r t i e s  about what type  of t e chn i ca l  s o l u t i o n  would give t h e  be s t  r e s u l t .  
The p ro j ec t  group had t o  mot ivate  t h e  chosen so lu t i ons  very  c a r e f u l l y ,  and 
t he se  d i scuss ions  a l s o  ind ica ted  t h e  customer's  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  p ro j ec t .  
The customer was, perhaps,  given b e t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  looking i n t o  
t h e  p ro j ec t  than i s  usua l  a t  VTT. This ,  however, f a c i l i t a t e d  cooperat ion 
and a l s o  made l a t e r  phases e a s i e r  t o  c a r ry  through. The d i v i s i o n  of t h e  pro- 
j e c t  i n t o  c l e a r l y  def ined p a r t s ,  where some v i t a l  func t ions  had t o  be demon- 
s t r a t e d  before  a  dec i s i on  t o  cont inue could be made, gave t he  customer good 
con t ro l  of t he  p r o j e c t .  I n  t h e  beginning t h e  enthusiasm of some key individ-  
u a l s  a t  Par tek  was needed t o  ge t  t he  dec i s i on  t o  s t a r t .  This dec i s i on  a l s o  
depended on t h e  f i r s t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  system, which were done a t  VTT. 
La te r  during t he  p ro j ec t  a l l  t h e  p ro j ec t  members worked c o l l e c t i v e l y  t o  ob t a in  
t h e  wanted r e s u l t s .  
A Training Simulator For Operators of Nuclear Power P l an t s  
From 1976 t o  1980 VTT p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  development of a  t r a i n i n g  sim- 
u l a t o r  f o r  opera to rs  a t  t h e  two nuc lear  power p l an t s  i n  Lovisa. The s imulator  
which i s  descr ibed by Heimburger e t  a l .  (1982) was de l ivered  t o  t h e  use r  
(Imatran Voima Oy) by Nokia E l ec t ron i c s .  VTT p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  p ro j ec t  a s  
a  consu l tan t  bo th fo rNok ia  and f o r  t he  use r .  
Several  people were working i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  where a  new product  was de- 
veloped.  They had good mot iva t ion  because they  f e l t  t h a t  i t  was important  
t o  succeed. Before t h e  product development p r o j e c t ,  VTT had t aken  c a r e  of 
t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  f o r  t e n d e r s  and t h e i r  e v a l u a t i o n  and p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  making 
f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s imula to r .  For Nokia t h e r e  was a  market 
need because t h e r e  was no s imula to r  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t r a i n i n g  o p e r a t o r s  i n  
Lovisa.  The same type of n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s  were going t o  be b u i l t  i n  
many o t h e r  European c o u n t r i e s  and, hence,  Nokia saw t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  new 
bus iness .  The p r o j e c t  was done a t  Nokia and a l l  t h e  VTT people  who worked 
a s  c o n s u l t a n t s  f o r  Nokia worked i n  t h e  Nokia p r o j e c t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  wi th  t h e  
work being done a t  t h e  f a c t o r y  us ing  Nokia's f a c i l i t i e s .  Th i s  arrangement 
aga in  al lowed f o r  c l o s e  communication. Informat ion w i t h i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  was 
a l s o  d i s t r i b u t e d  by a r rang ing  one day seminars a t  c e r t a i n  i n t e r v a l s  d u r i n g  
which t h e  p r o j e c t  people p resen ted  t h e i r  work, a t  t h e  same t ime r e c e i v i n g  
documentation on work a l r e a d y  done. 
I n  t h i s  p r o j e c t  no d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  communication h a b i t s  could  be no t i ced .  
The people from VTT had, f o r  a  long t ime,  been working w i t h  automation i n  
nuc lea r  power p l a n t s  and had l ea rned  t h e  language used. People a t  Nokia had 
a  s i m i l a r  background. The o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  p r o j e c t  were c l e a r  t o  everyone. 
The main o b j e c t i v e  was t o  g e t  t h e  system ready i n  t ime.  The t ime  schedule  
was r e a l i s t i c  and was con t inuous ly  checked and up-dated. Hence everyone i n  
t h e  p r o j e c t ,  from t o p  management t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  group,  knew t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a t u s .  
Management was c l e a r ,  w i t h  well-defined r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  P rogress  was followed 
by a  coord ina t ion  group which conta ined r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of Nokia, Imatran 
Voima and VTT. Th i s  group made a l l  t h e  major d e c i s i o n s  and was w e l l  aware 
of t h e  p r o j e c t  s t a t u s .  A l l  p a r t i e s  (Nokia, Imatran Voima and VTT) had as-  
s igned experienced people  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  and a l l  were i n  some way key i n d i -  
v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t .  People  from two VTT l a b o r a t o r i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  
t h e  p r o j e c t  ( i .  e .  , from E l e c t r i c a l  Engineering and Nuclear Engineer ing) .  
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h i s  paper ,  t h e  r o l e  of VTT i n  i n d u s t r i a l  innova t ions  h a s  been d i s -  
cussed and t h r e e  completed product  development p r o j e c t s h a v e b e e n  p resen ted .  
I n  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r s  were w e l l  mot ivated,  and it i s  be l i eved  
t h a t  t h i s  mot iva t ion  i s  based on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  same people worked on t h e  
p r o j e c t  from t h e  ve ry  beginning u n t i l  t h e  " b i t t e r  end'.'. They could s e e  
t h e i r  e a r l y  d r a f t s  coming t o  c o n c r e t e  working end products .  Besides  motiva- 
t i o n ,  t h e  fo l lowing a s p e c t s  a r e  of g r e a t  importance i n  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  such 
a s  VTT: 
1. The i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  making con tac t  w i t h  VTT when t h e r e  i s  a  per-  
ceived need f o r  r e s e a r c h  and development a r e  important .  It seems 
obvious t h a t  VTT should s t r i v e  t o  develop i t s  image and c o n t a c t s  
t o  make such i n q u i r i e s  more l i k e l y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  impor- 
t a n c e  of pe r sona l  c o n t a c t s  between VTT s t a f f  and p o t e n t i a l  cus- 
tomers should n o t  be underes t imated.  
2. The i n i t i a l  work w i t h  t h e  customer i s  impor tan t ,  because h e r e  VTT 
has  t o  show t h e  customer t h a t  it has  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  s o l v e  h i s  
problems. I n  two of t h e  desc r ibed  c a s e s  VTT d i d  t h e  f i r s t  rough 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  us ing  p u b l i c  funds.  These s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  were pre- 
sen ted  t o  t h e  customer s o  t h a t  he could check whether t h e  approach 
was a p p r o p r i a t e .  
3.  Broad con t ac t s  wi th in  VTT enable t h e  use of t he  r i g h t  resources  
f o r  every problem, and t he  customer can be d i r ec t ed  t o  t h e  lab- 
o r a t o r y  which i s  most s u i t a b l e  t o  so lve  h i s  problems. 
4. The s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of a new product must no t  be changed dur ing 
t h e  p r o j ec t .  I n  t h e  descr ibed p r o j e c t s  no major changes were 
done. Th is  f a c t  seems t o  depend on t h e  way t he  products  a r e  
s pec i f i ed .  The s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  were given i n  f unc t i ona l  terms 
using t h e  u s e r ' s  viewpoint and he was always represented when 
t he  system func t ions  were discussed.  I n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  a 
top-down approach was used where t h e  system was divided i n t o  
smal ler  and smal ler  f unc t i ona l l y  well-defined p a r t s .  
5.  The t e s t i n g  of a new system i s  c r i t i c a l .  During t h i s  phase,  
everyone t r i e s  t o  t u r n  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  somebody e l s e .  
Tes t ing  i s  e a s i e r  i f  t h e  system i s  divided i n t o  func t i ona l l y  
well-defined and well-documented p a r t s  w i th  c l e a r  i n t e r f a c e s .  
6. No e x t r a  p r e s su r e  should be put on people who have a l ready  given 
t h e i r  a l l  f o r  t he  p r o j e c t .  I n  such cases  it  i s  b e t t e r  t o  make 
t h e  time schedule more r e a l i s t i c .  
7. The t r a n s f e r  of informat ion from VTT t o  t h e  customer has  t o  be 
arranged i n  goodtime. I n  ' a l l  t h e  descr ibed cases  t h e  represen- 
t a t i v e s  of VTT and t h e  customer worked under t h e  same c e i l i n g  
f o r  some time. Other s i m i l a r  arrangements a r e  a l s o  pos s ib l e .  
I f  a p r o j ec t  i s  wel l  planned, and both p a r t i e s  a r e  aware of each o t h e r ' s  
c a p a c i t i e s  and needs,  an innovat ion p r o j e c t  has a.good chance t o  succeed, 
a l though t he  ob j ec t i ve s  of VTT and t h e  cusomter may sometimes d i f f e r ,  i . e . ,  
when t h e  customer wants a product but  VTT has t o  t ake  ca r e  of a l l  i t s  employ- 
e e s ,  which means t h a t  t he  be s t  resources  cannot always be a l l o c a t e d  t o  every 
p r o j e c t .  Through a s u i t a b l e  use of both young and experienced people i n  t h e  
same p r o j e c t ,  t h e  younger have a chance t o  l ea rn .  
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HUMAN DILEMMAS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the main body of Business Policy litera- 
ture has emphasized general management creativity and innovation as the keys 
to successful strategic planning (Christensen et al. 1982). A strategy or 
plan of action, according to this point of view, is supposed to define an 
organization's goals and objectives, the pattern of internal resource allo- 
cations, competitive risks, and plan implementation and control procedures 
(Patz 1981). Furthermore, when the organization under consideration is a 
business firm, strategic planning serves as the crossroad for innovations in 
product and process technologies and innovations in approaches to markets 
(Koch 1974). 
This view of strategic planning, although heavily influenced by indus- 
trial organization economists (Porter 1981), has always been rather "human" 
or behavioral in its emphases (Patz 1976). Nevertheless, a new term "stra- 
tegic management" has been coined as a more inclusive symbol for the strate- 
gic planning plus strategic behavior point of view (Schendel and Hofer 1979). 
Almost always, of course, strategic behavior refers to the actions and in- 
teractions of the general managers doing the strategic planning. 
Also, much of the research on strategic behavior follows fairly typical 
lines. That is, the important questions focus on what kinds of people are 
creative and innovative in general management positions, whether or not plan- 
ning behavior can be made more efficient in one sense or another, and which 
intervention methods are more or less useful for changing the behaviors of 
a planning group (Mitroff and Emshoff 1979). 
These issues are important ones and need to be pursued in all kinds of 
societies, including those making the transition from "smokestack" to infor- 
mation based economies. Nevertheless, information based economies are gen- 
erating an entirely new set of human issues that will profoundly affect the 
strategic planning process. The purpose of this paper is to discuss a few 
of them and their strategic planning implications. 
HUMAN STRATEGIC ISSUES OF THE NEW HIGH TECHNOLOGIES 
Beginning with the obvious, the phrase "high-technology" means something 
quite different in the 1980s than it did in the 1950s. Three decades ago, 
high technology products were jet liners, first generation computers, and 
sophisticated plastics made possible by the manipulation of molecular struc- 
tures. They were admirable achievements, but they only enhanced the social 
and economic thrusts of the times. Today's products are artificial intelli- 
gence, automated factories, distributed data processing, international data 
transfers, robotics, and several others. Automated factors, for example, 
include CAD/CAM/CAT, that is, computer aided design, computer aided manuf ac- 
turing, and computer aided testing. 
The technologies of thirty years ago appear almost as distant to today's 
developments as the self-sufficient castles of feudalistic times did to the 
new factories of the industrial revolution (Durant 1944, 1950, 1975). Yet, 
the strategic, let alone human, implications of thesemorerecent developments 
have been largely ignored in the academic and trade literatures. Hardware 
and software occupy center stage with only minor efforts being devoted to 
manufacturing strategy and human problems in an information society (Skinner 
19 78). 
Nevertheless, the information revolution is causing another social and 
economic upheaval. The evidence is obvious. It ranges from high inflation 
and unemployment rates to the development of altogether new industries, de- 
fense systems, and social mores. In short, several symptoms of this revolu- 
tion are now apparent, and as can easily be supposed, they are primarily 
human concerns. Briefly, key human issues of an information society are: 
1. A further uncoupling of the relationship between productivity 
and consumption. 
2. A new independence within economic units among their growing 
international independence. 
3 .  A transfer of power within economic units. 
4. A new sources of risk-anticipation. 
Likewise, their strategic planning consequences are: 
1. A wider range of self-determination. 
2. A fortuitous business risk distribution. 
These are not independent issues, nor are they totally interdependent. The 
easy distinctions of probability theory do not apply. Furthermore, because 
they are human issues, they have to affect individual and group aspirations 
and expectations. In other words, they have to affect fundamental creative 
and innovative process (Secord and Backman 1974). 
A PROBLEM OF DEFINITION 
When the first of these human issues is considered-the relationship 
between productivity and consumption-otherwise reasonable people lose their 
perspective rather easily. One person's aspirations are another's expecta- 
tions, and the scales of justice do not distinguish very well among the ef- 
forts that individuals make and the results that they achieve in the pursuit 
of individual rewards. Nevertheless, some crude distinctions can be made 
regarding human factors in the overall strategic management process. 
First, few people would disagree with the argument that the rewards for 
an individual's contribution to an organization are at least delayed in time 
if not uncorrelated with the effects of the contributi0.n. Performance mea- 
surement methods are just not that precise, and not many people responsible 
for deciding merit differentials would prefer a greater degree of accuracy. 
A substantial degree of error always aids austere as well as beneficent 
largesse. 
Second, the coming information society is not making these difficult 
merit distinctions any easier. Agriculture, manufacturing, and mining are 
already within the province of flexible machinery and robots (Scientific 
American 1982), and the office of the future is not far behind (~anagement 
Technology 1983). Automated retail.ing is now a reality with videotex (Byte 
1983), and the microcomputerization of education is already past its begin- 
ning stages (Watt 1983). In other words, the relative dominance of machines- 
not people-in productivity matters is becoming absolute. 
Yet people-not machines-are the primary consumers of goods and servi- 
ces. Thus, a difficult question has been raised, and it can be asked in 
several different fashions. For example, what will it mean to "work" for a 
living in an information society? How will the concept of "income" be de- 
fined? Or, how will the results of machine productivity be distributed among 
people? 
Strategic planners will have to face this question, in the above forms 
and several others, and possible answers are not very clear. Work, income, 
and the distribution of wealth lie at the "human" core of strategic manage- 
ment. Why elsewouldpeople engage in such an exhausting process as strate- 
gic planning for economic competition? 
This is just one dilemma, however, in the coming strategic management 
puzzle. It willmost likely interact to some degree with the others to be 
discussed in the following paragraphs, but it gnaws at our very existence. 
Some sort of relationship between productivity and consumption seems almost 
sacred. 
OTHER DILEMMAS 
Less sacred, perhaps, are political and economic risk issues. Even with- 
out naming the issues, this territory should be familiar. But, the informa- 
tion (high technology) society has added some new dimensions. The most obvi- 
ous one, of course, is the totally international nature of today's business 
environment. 
Independence and Interdependence 
In fact, the international interdependence among economic units is such 
a well-respected truism, that theabsence of this recognition just a few de- 
cades ago is surprising by comparison. Markets are now worldwide, not just 
local, and every strategic planner has to recognize this. 
But, there are more important "truisms" to be observed. Among these 
are the following: 
1. International business alliances can be made in several directions- 
each one with a different marketing, production, and financial management 
purpose that nevertheless adds to the viability of the entire multinational 
enterprise. It is simply not imperative that parochial arrangements be main- 
tained. Automobile manufacturing and assembly, oil production and distribui 
tion, and international shipping-to cite a few examples-can be negotiated 
in several directions. An individual firm composed of several interdependent 
multinational constituencies is a powerful source of economic safety (Ruten- 
berg 1982). 
2. This international range of competitive alternatives not only allows 
but also invites a significant increase in the number of strategic planning 
choices within an individual firm. As a result, the choices among alterna- 
tive market behaviors have more or less equal face validity (Patz 1982). 
3. Any specific strategic choice, among this class of equally reason- 
able ones, is difficult to verify and justify given cross cultural data dif- 
ferences, deficiencies, and errors. These data problems are common to re- 
gional or national strategic planning efforts. International business plan- 
ning, on the other hand, not only faces the same issues on a nation by nation 
basis but also has to deal with the translation of findings to some common 
basks. 
4. In short, an ambiguous international environment provides a great 
deal of choice independence within economic units that are otherwise inter- 
nationally interdependent. That is, strategic decision making is becoming 
more a matter of opinion than a matter of fact. 
What decision makers declare to be relevant in the determination of 
which goods and services to produce is at least as important as actual market 
forces. The inexorable machinations of these forces may be dominant in the 
very long run. On the other hand, predictions of market structures and dynam- 
ics are about as accurate as the performance appraisal methods mentioned 
earlier. Therefore, one hypothesis regarding the independence of strategic 
choices within economic units is that these choices are at least as effective 
in determining market structures and dynamics as well as vice versa. 
Power Transfers 
Of course, such internal independence-as it always has-leads to power 
struggles. Some person, or more often, some group has to decide where re- 
sources are to be allocated in the pursuit of goals that are defined more as 
a matter of opinion than as a matter of fact. This is not new. What is dif- 
ferent is that the new high technologies are changing "who decides." 
Distributed data processing is a prime example; and, like all information 
processing terminology, the term "distributed", when used with "data-processing'' 
belies its real significance. The main issue, as far as data processing people 
are concerned, is how to maintain control over organizational operations. Any 
optimal use of information for decision making purposes is strictly coinciden- 
tal (Weinberg 1983). 
Most important, what is strategically important to a firm is determined 
by who has access to ~ t s  information processing unit. Information can be 
manipulated, denied, and modified by anyone whose best interests are served 
by such procedures and has access to the necessary information channels. 
This is not a game; it is a matter of power. Furthermore, power interests 
in any organization are not best served by clear, concise, accurate, and 
readily verifiable information (Cyert and March 1963). 
Distributed data processing enhances power transfers because it allows 
greater generation, modification, use and control of an organization's data 
base by its information processors. It is an ironic outcome of decreased 
information processing costs that more and more people can have access to a 
firm's information base with little interference. In the words of one chief 
executive, "We are risking our business on what those people do!" 
Anticipation Risk 
A greater access to and use of information, however, has more than in- 
ternal organizational effects. Almost all firms can play the "information 
game" and, of those who can, most do. Relatively sophisticated economic and 
financial models, analytical tools that once were available to only a fortu- 
nate few, are now on sale at a minor cost in any microcomputer store. Fur- 
thermore, dozens of multinational information services are available without 
any additional computer hardware than a modem (Desktop Computing 1983). 
But, due to this enhanced computing power, every firm may anticipate 
the rangeof strategic actions available to every other firm in its markets. 
Detailed projections can be k d e  for each alternative taking into account 
product lines, markets, new ventures, and the financial conditions of the 
main competitors. Of course, these projections are made against each of the 
main strategic alternatives available to the firm doing the analysis, and 
several interesting results are obtained. The simplest ones, of course, are 
pro forma projections for all the firms included in the analysis. 
Many firms are already doing this, but some analysts tend to stop at 
this point and argue for the strategic alternative that yields the most des- 
irable pro forma statements. Others tend to go further and attempt to specify 
strategic actions that should be taken if and when: 
1. Competitars' behavior is significantly different than expected. 
2 .  Market conditions change due to factors other than competitors' 
behavior-including economic cycles affecting demand growth and 
decay, government actions (such as regulation and tax code 
changes), and labor negotiations. 
3 .  Other low probability events occur-such as possible mergers, 
acquisitions, diversifications or research breakthroughs. 
In so doing, these latter analysts are bringing competitive actions 
closer and closer to real time. They are making "anticipation time" to stra- 
tegic actions by competitors more important than reaction time. Said in 
another way, a long sought after goal of strategy formulation and implementa- 
tion (Business Policy) is at hand. That is, offensive and defensive strate- 
gies can be formed, in fact, before they are needed. 
But, since anyone can do ~ t ,  each firm's business strategies carry a 
higher risk. Many other firms are anticipating a given firm's strategic al- 
ternatives, and the cost of doing so is very low. More important, the prob- 
ability of implementing viable competitive strategies-and successfully com- 
bating market threats-is rather high. 
The US microcomputer industry is one example of the phenomenon. Many 
firms are surviving even though six months to one year is not an unusual life 
expectancy for many hardware and software items. This time span is too short 
for firms to survive simply by copying one another's product innovations and 
bringing them to market. The products and manufacturing processes are too 
complicated for that. In short, their strategies have to be anticipatory. 
Likewise, with the advent of national and international data transfers, 
the banking industry has entered the world of high technology and anticipatory 
strategies. The bewildering array of new financial instruments is offered 
too closely in time from too many banks for them to be simple copies. If 
nothing else, the information systems and business forms take too long to de- 
velope for a bank to remain competitive simply by copying its rivals. 
EXPANDED SELF-DETERYINAT ION 
Of course, firms can and do engage in industrial espionage in order to 
reduce their anticipation risk. This is another human dilemma of strategic 
management in an information society, In spite of the fact that the success 
to failure ratio of such efforts is probably fairly low. In fact, such ef- 
forts may increase anticipation risk simply by forcing firms to anticipate 
them. Even if the net effect of industrial espionage is nil, these three 
basic social and economic phenoman-independence within a greater interna- 
tional interdependence, intraorganizational power transfers, and anticipation 
risks-have a combined influence on several strategic planning issues. Two 
are noted in this paper. 
First, the range of organizational self-determination or discretion is 
increasing in several important dimensions. An obvious one is location. The 
information society does not depend upon navigable rivers and natural harbors 
to the extent that industrial society does. Climate and access to other des- 
irable geographic features can dominate in the location of a firm and its 
various facilities. Certainly this is already the case in several areas of 
the world. 
Equally important, if not more so, is the fact that distributed informa- 
tion encourages the making of key decisions at other than top management 
levels. Time is money, but information is power. Those who have access to 
it-and can manipulate it-can make strong arguments for resource allocations 
that favor their programs, markets, and products. 
Add to this problem the difficulties associated with justification and 
verification of any strategy in the face of competitors1 anticipation, and 
several power bases within an organization become contenders for discretion- 
ary prerogatives. In short, because of the new technologies, an old strate- 
gic management task is coming to the forefront. That is, it is becoming more 
and more difficult to maintain a coalition when independence, information and 
anticipation forces are pulling it apart. 
Even the ruling group of the organization or coalition, the top manage- 
ment team, has its problems. It has to deal with conflicting demands for re- 
source allocations from different information centers that all too often use 
the firm's own data base, have a reasonable face validity, and pit against 
each other the barely latent sympathies of the rullng group. When nonruling 
groups face each other however, sympathies are anything but latent. 
Symptoms of these fragmenting forces at other organizationlevels are 
abundant. For example, compensation problems-particularly the compensation 
of sales people and worker participation in compensation decisions; produc- 
tivity disputes; and the nonacceptance of computerized systems by those ex- 
pected to use them are common examples at the operating levels of many busi- 
ness firms. To make matters worse, when computerization and automation occur 
in several places at once in a firm, and when performance measurement of 
those involved is difficult (the same strategic justification and vertifica- 
tion problem at the operating level), the relative values of individual inputs 
and outputs in the production process can be easily confused. 
Moreover, middle management fears of being replaced by information sys- 
tems at the administrative level are even more dramatic. According to one 
estimate, "When the factoryofthe future arrives, the workers on the shop 
floor will be the least affected, while automation will obviate entire layers 
of middle management" (Kindel and McDermott 1982). Of course, in several 
American and Japanese factories this sort of "estimate" is already a reality. 
In all cases, however, the coalition maintenance problems of ruling coalition 
or strategic managers have increased. 
In other words, self-determination is a mixed blessing for the partici- 
pants in modern organizations. In exchange formorenumerous degrees offree- 
dom, top managers have a much more difficult coalition maintenance task; 
middle managers are simply trying to survive; and everyone else is trying to 
deal with a nebulous performance measurement and reward system. Especially 
with this last problem-performance and rewards-the previously noted and 
mounting problem of productivity and consumption in an information society 
will stradn the creativity and innovation of general managers. 
FORTUITOUS BUSINESS RISKS 
Last, but most important, anticipation risk is affected by expanded 
self-determination and power transfers. The computational power referred to 
earlier, and the flexible strategies that can result, are not immune to the 
power struggles of fairly independent organization participants. Rightly or 
wrongly, in any particular circumstance, indcviduals and groups will view 
their self-determination rights as paramount--more important, that is, than 
the execution of the ruling coalition's intended strategy. Perceived and 
actual productivity/consumption discrepancies will enchance these difficul- 
ties; and, with increased access to important information, the bases of such 
difficulties will be easy to justify. 
In short, anticipation risks-with a fairly well-defined probability 
distribution-can and sometimes will become fortuitous business risks. That 
is, the possible outcomes of a particular strategic choice, given the strate- 
gic choices of all main competitors, will be impossible to define. In program 
managementterms,the costs, time required, and ultimate profitability of im- 
plementing a particular strategy will become "unknown-unknowns". 
This sort of condition can result from technology alone. For example, 
the development of a new weapons system is oftentimes begun when it is well- 
known that its successful deployment will depend upon technologies that have 
not yet been developed. Likewise, commercial projects such as the Alaskan 
pipeline (Patz 1981) and Kodak's SX-70 camera (Steiner and Miner 1977) have 
begun under the same conditions. 
But, the purpose of the above argument is to suggest that human factors 
are and will be more important than technical ones. A wider distribution of 
independence and decision making power is the key. It allows more people to 
participate in strategic decision making; thus, it allows these same people 
to bend the process to their own interests. It is again ironic that another 
outcome of decreased information costs is a simultaneous increase in the 
probability of individual freedom and organizational chaos. 
The net result, of course, is that strategic outcomes cannot be very 
well defined in advance, and the ability to predict them is severly attenu- 
ated. In fact, prediction becomes far less important than maintaining a co- 
alition and pursuing some sort of flexible strategy. 
In traditional terms, a flexible strategy is one based upon the antici- 
pation of change. In periods of great technological change, however, fortu- 
itous or accidental futures reinforce and amplify change, and planning becomes 
a real time issue. Real time planning, in short, will be concerned with mar- 
ket dynamics of at least shorter durations than in the recent past and pos- 
sibly with wider fluctuations. 
Taking multiproduct firms as an. example of such dynamics, market share 
battles will take less time but occur more often as industry product-market 
structures undergo continuous rather than discrete changes. Product life 
cycles will diminish as the rate of technological (product and process) in- 
novations increases. And there may be some increase in mergers and acquisi- 
tions that attempt to reduce risks through integration and diversification. 
Again, the microcomputer industry is a leading example of these phenom- 
ena, but other industries are demonstrating the same characteristics. Banking 
has already been mentioned; and others include the machinetool,photographic 
equipment, office equipment, and aerospace industries-to name a few. Even 
the US automobile industry is beginning to reassert itself and cause a few 
dynamics in at least its domestic markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Of course, more turbulent market dynamics pose another human dilemma in 
the information society. People may tolerate high levels of uncertainty for 
a long time, especially in these beginning and novel stages of the revolution. 
However, as the years pass and the novelty begins to wear, it is not unreason- 
able to assume that general human tolerance levels for such conditions will 
diminish. Humans do search for certainty and definition in their lives 
(Secord and Backman 1974), and there is no reason to suppose that an informa- 
tion society will profoundly affect basic human motivations. 
The new so-called "cottage-industries" that have developed, especially 
around software design, are a case in point. The archetypical scene is one 
of several individuals working alone in front of their CRT's, communicating 
with each other via their modems only when absolutely necessary. There may 
be an occasional group meeting for coordination or sales purposes, but most 
of the time people work in their homes. 
This sort of existence may suffice for some people and, in fact, it does. 
Most people, however, develop and validate their self-images and world views 
through interactions with other people on a regular basis (Mead 1934). These 
interaction regu1.arities govern not only our thoughts, feelings, and percep- 
tions, but they also teach us how to anticipate other people and respond to 
their actions. It seems highly unlikely that a fairly isolated existence in 
front of a CRT will become very much of a substitute for regular human ex- 
change. 
Likewise, large performance/reward imbalances within an organization 
usually become known when information is exchanged as part of normal human 
interactions. This phenomenon is not new; it is as old as human existence. 
What probably will be new is that people will tolerate only narrower and nar- 
rower income distributions, thus, more and more identical consumption possi- 
bilities. The reason, in short, is the uncoupling of productivity and con- 
sumption made possible in an information society. If individual contributions 
to p r o d u c t i v i t y a r . e d i f f i c u l t  to trace, why:should consumption patterns have 
a large variance? 
In other words, market thus organizational turbulence and reward inequi- 
ties will become matters of even greater concern for general managers in an 
information society than they are in an industrial society. Evidence for this 
statement already exists and is reported regularly in business newspapers and 
magazines. That is, chief executives and other top managers regularly report 
that they spend more than half of their time on government, labor and public 
relations problems. In fact, one recent article suggests that public relia- 
tions experts will be tomorrow's chief executives (Cannon 1983). Clearly, 
someone else will have to attend to the technical and financial details of 
business. 
Indeed-as the preceding discussion of anticipation risks, power trans- 
fers, and independencelinterdependence suggests---managing innovation on the 
general management level will be concerned to a large extent with the main- 
tenance of viable coalitions. A wider range of self-determination and for- 
tuitous business risks appear to be focusing general management attention in 
that direction. In fact, the final irony of the information society may be 
that general managers will "run-the-organization" and someone else wi'll "run- 
the business." Only a few years ago, one of the main reasons for buying a 
computer was to help general managers run the business. 
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THE FUTURE GENERATION-A GENERATION OF INNOVATORS 
Evka Razvigorova 
I n s t i t u t e  o f  Socia Z Management, So f ia ,  Bulgaria 
Modern society depends very strongly on science and technology and, in 
the future, these two main factors will become more determining. The growth 
of science and technology to satisfy the growing and emerging needs of soci- 
ety is the main objective of modern production in all areas. Therefore, 
innovations, both in industry and in all other areas, are vital and inherent 
for modem society. Innovations change working conditions, educational en- 
vironments, the way and conditions of life. The easier and more impercept- 
ibly these changes are made and the less social contradictions they cause, 
the easier it is to implement each innovation, and the easier and quicker it 
is to pave the way for technical progress. 
While in the 1950s and 1960s many industrial firms ignored the impor- 
tance of the human factor in the management of innovation processes, today a 
glance is much more frequently cast at the methods used for the effective 
use of human potential in progress and productivity. But the fact that we 
are here today to talk about the role of the human factor in innovation pro- 
cesses makes our conviction deeper that, in these conditions, it is difficult 
to findthelabor force (potential) that is ready and capable to adapt to the 
new requirements of technical progress*. 
The motivation, the stimulus to creativity, to cooperation and readiness 
to accept innovation, is one of the main tendencies in the modern management 
of innovation processes. How do we solve this problem? 
1. MICROCOMPUTERS - A BASIS OF INNOVATIONS IN THE 1980s 
Since 1950 the computer has played an important role in the field of 
technological development. Today, large computer systems, and small personal 
*Dr. Thomas Moss, Human Factors in Innovation and Productivity, Task 
Force Meeting, Leningrad, May 1982. 
computers are common in big organizations, for individuals and for special- 
ists. Gradually, data processing, by means of highly efficient computers, 
has turned into a need not only in industry but in the social sphere and in 
everyday life, especially in education. It has been determined that micro- 
computers, as a primary innovation, have entered electrical engineering and 
electronics and have become a basis for the increase in productivity and ef- 
fectiveness in all spheres of human activity. It has been predicted that, 
so far, microcomputers have revealed only about 20% of their technological 
possibilities and that in the following twenty years will reveal the remain- 
ing 80%. The period from 1984 to 2000 is expected to be an epoch of impor- 
tant main innovations in the field of microcomputers, and around the years 
2000 to 2025 new inventions can be expected in the domain of energy sources*. 
At present, innovation activities require more interdisciplinary studies 
which will result in workable innovations, satisfying the increasing needs 
of people. The strategy now is to unify and promote the innovation activi- 
ties of all key areas, including data processing, communications, etc. The 
next "boom" in microcomputers will entail wide interdisciplinary studies and 
will bring many secondary innovations in all fields of human activity, in- 
cluding social activity. The next 20 years will be the years of the micro- 
computer, but it will cause many changes in science and technology and in 
study methods as well. 
2. TRAINING OR EDUCATION 
What are we doing today to prepare the personnel potential for the big 
change of tomorrow? The serious changes in the technique and technology of 
tomorrow will lead to important changes in everyday life, in the social 
sphere and in education. This in turn will impact human relations in all 
(small and big) other spheres -- the family, the team, society as a whole. 
Are people ready to accept this technical revolution easily? 
Today we develop, train and retrain employees to meet the requirements 
of the organization, of their job, of life. First, we look for and evaluate 
the conditions and requirements and then we organize training and retraining. 
Very often it happens tomorrow. It delays the process of adoption of new 
techniques and technology; and the tempo of learning new knowledge is lost 
and at best it makes the man a party (if not a well-intended observer) of 
technical progress and not an initiator of the new. 
Today the idea of "training for innovationf1** is attractive and may be 
the appropriate answer to some problems. But what we need tomorrow is not 
"training for innovation" but eventually ''training and education for innova- 
tion". We need a generation of innovators, who accept the technical revolu- 
tion as their natural environment, and as a natural course of development. 
Innovators, promoters, implementors -- these are the people needed by indus- 
try. If a generation grows in a natural environment of technique and tech- 
nology and more precisely of microcomputers and computers, it will continue 
refering to its assistance and will try to develop this natural companion in 
everyday life. This approach to the training and education of the younger 
generation will create the possibilityforeliminating the negative effects 
*Cesare Marchetti, Society as a Learning System: Discovery, Invention 
and Innovation Cycles Revisted; Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
18: 267-282 (1980). 
**Gottfried Wolf, Training for Innovative' Activity, IIASA CP-82-00 (1982). 
of innovat ions ,  and of new in format iona l  technology i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  It w i l l  
a l s o  provide t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of avoiding undesired s o c i a l  traumas i n  comuni-  
c a t i o n s  a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  in format iona l  "boom" and t h e  f a s t  advent of t h e  
computer i n  everyday l i f e .  
3 .  APPROACH TO PROBLEM SOLVING 
Solving t h i s  problem i s  a d i f f i c u l t  and complex t a s k  which can only  b e  
solved by systems a n a l y s i s .  Th i s  s e t  of t o o l s  i s  s t i l l  n o t  used f o r  s o l v i n g  
t h e  problem of t h e  behavior  o r  r e l a t i o n  of c h i l d r e n  and t h e  younger genera- 
t i o n  wi th  t h e  computer, o r ,  on a wider b a s i s ,  wi th  t h e  modern t e c h n i c a l  revo- 
l u t  ion .  
The problem, a s  a l ready  noted,  i s  complex and covers  n e a r l y  a l l  spheres  
of human a c t i v i t y :  t r a i n i n g ,  educat ion,  indus t ry ,  sc ience .  Therefore ,  in- 
t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  s t u d i e s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  w i l l  g ive  f a s t e r  and more important 
r e s u l t s .  The e f f o r t s  of many s p e c i a l i s t s  and wide i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cooperat ion 
a r e  needed t o  achieve success  i n  t h i s  complex, b u t  very p e r s p e c t i v e  f i e l d  of 
study. Maybe it i s  n o t  i n c i d e n t i a l  t h a t  we a r e  approaching t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Youth's Year, dec la red  by t h e  United Nations a s  1985. Maybe on t h e  eve of 
1985 s c i e n t i s t s  and s p e c i a l i s t s  w i l l  r e a l l y  f a c e  a problem, r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
f u t u r e  genera t ion  and t h e  whole development of s o c i e t y .  
4 .  IMPACT ON INDUSTRY 
A s  a l r e a d y  mentioned, t h e  method of t r a i n i n g  and educat ing t h e  f u t u r e  
genera t ion  w i t h  regard t o  t e c h n i c a l  progress  i s  a complex i s s u e  which w i l l  
have an  e f f e c t  on a l l  spheres  of human a c t i v i t y .  However we h e r e  a r e  mainly 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  impact of t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  on i n d u s t r y  and t h e i r  use  f o r  
managers . 
A new approach t o  t r a i n i n g  and educat ion o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of " t r a i n i n g  
and educat ion f o r  innovation" w i l l  g i v e  indus t ry  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of having 
a n  "ab le  and knowing" personnel  p o t e n t i a l ;  people who a r e  n o t  a f r a i d  t o  en- 
counter  unknown techniques  t h a t  a r e  complex and r e q u i r e  new knowledge and 
new s k i l l s .  So t h e r e  w i l l  b e  people who have accepted new techniques  and 
technology a s  a n a t u r a l  process  i n  t h e i r  everyday l i f e ;  people who can work 
wi th  microcomputers, who have t h e  microcomputer a s  a n a t u r a l  companion i n  
t h e i r  environment and know t h a t  i t s  p e r f e c t i o n  can be  only  of u s e  both  f o r  
man and s o c i e t y .  This  personnel  p o t e n t i a l  i s  a n a t u r a l  environment f o r  new 
ideas ;  a s  it produces an  i n n e r  p o t e n t i a l  and d r i v e  f o r  c r e a t i v i t y  and i n i t i -  
a t i v e ,  and it does no t  need a d d i t i o n a l  promotion, s t i l l  l e s s  t r a i n i n g  and 
r e t r a i n i n g .  The presence of such personnel w i l l  e a s e  innovat ion p rocesses  i n  
t h e  o rgan iza t ion  and w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  l e a d  t o  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of some new problems 
wi th  regard t o  coopera t ion  i n  i d e a  development, cho ice  of t h e  b e s t  idea ,  e t c .  
It can b e  maintained t h a t  innovat ion i s  born under p r e s s u r e  of a new 
idea ,  b u t  f o r  t h i s  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  needs some c r e a t i v e  f e a t u r e s ,  i n i t i a t i v e  
and c r e a t i v i t y .  The educat ion of t h e  young genera t ion  i n  t h i s  l i n e  w i l l  pro- 
v i d e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  each member of s o c i e t y  and of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  
become an innovator .  
5. STATE OF THE PROBLEM 
For the time being the problem regarding education and training of the 
new generation in such a way that it will decrease the deformities arising 
from the co-existence with computers, and which will make computers part of 
man's natural environment so as not to cause psychic traumas and deformi- 
ties, is considered and studied unilaterally by different sciences with dif- 
ferent purposes. Such main problems as future computerization and changes 
in the social mileu, the adaptation of young people to science and techno- 
logical progress in general, and to microcomputers in particular, and the 
use of the creative activity of the young people in the field of science and 
technique, are left out of the scope of many studies. 
The use of computers in education is studied, but it is mainly done to 
ease the education process and to increase the volume of presented informa- 
tion, it is done less to achieve social, universal or industrial oriented 
goals. 
The People's Republic of Bulgaria has a continued and lasting interest 
in the problems of affording opportunities for the young generation to develop 
as harmonious and creative personalities with great possibilities for manifes- 
tation and deployment of their talents in science, technology and the arts. 
Therefore, the problem is of considerable interest for us and we would wel- 
come and support the formation of interdisciplinary and international groups 
to study these problems. Seminars are being held in Bulgaria on the problems 
of computer use in education, with children's meetings on technical and sci- 
entific arts, and a regulated movement among the youth, i.e., "technical and 
scientific work of youth" is seriously developed. These types of activities 
are developed on a larger scale and the People's Republic of Bulgaria will 
hail all steps for the organization of research programs which will create 
opportunities for accumulating new ideas, decisions, proposals and studies 
in this field. 
ROLE STRUCTUKES AND CREATIVE POTENTIAL OF WORKING TEAMS 
V.N. Ryssina and G.N.  Koroleva 
AZZ-Union Research In s t i t u t e  for Systems Studies, 
Moscow, USSR 
I n  t h e  process  of c r e a t i o n  and i n t r o d u c t i o n  of any fnnovation--new 
technology, p rocess ,  product o r  s e r v i c e ,  etc.- there a r i s e  new, h i t h e r t o  
unknown problems t o  be  solved p r a c t i c a l l y  a t  a l l  s t a g e s .  A t  an e a r l y  s t a g e  
t h e s e  would b e  l a r g e l y  R&D problems. La te r  problems of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
and managerial  n a t u r e  such a s  i n d u s t r i a l  engineer ing r e l a t e d  t o  a product 
( s e r v i c e )  o r  a s s i m i l a t i o n  of new technology (p rocess ) ,  e l i m i n a t i o n  of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  o r  psychologEca1 b a r r i e r s  t o  innovat ion i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  and 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  of t h e  u s e r  (customer) f o r  consumption of a new product 
( s e r v i c e ) ,  e t c .  
Each of t h e  above-mentioned problems g i v e s  b i r t h  t o  completely new 
t a s k s  and r e q u i r e s  innova t ive  i d e a s  and their v e r i f i c a t i o n  and implementation. 
The newer t h e  problem, t h e  g r e a t e r  should b e  t h e  degree  of c r e a t i v i t y  employed 
f o r  i ts  s o l u t i o n .  Those t a s k s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  innova t ion  i n t r o d u c t i o n  s t a g e ,  
e .g . ,  connected wi th  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  system, may be s i m i l a r  
i n  t h e i r  nove l ty  and complexity t o  those  a r i s i n g  a t  t h e  b i r t h  of t h e  innova t ion  
( formulat ion of t h e  f i r s t  hypo thes i s  and t h e i r  l o g i c s )  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  l e v e l  of 
t h e  requ i red  c r e a t i v i t y  is concerned. 
It fo l lows  from t h e  above t h a t  one of t h e  d e c i s i v e  f a c t o r s  f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  
innovat ion c r e a t i o n  and i n t r o d u c t i o n  is t h e  c r e a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  and teams c a l l e d  upon t o  s o l v e  t h e  innovat ion r e l a t e d  problems. 
Nowadays, s f n c e  l a b o r  has  acquired a c o l l e c t i v e  c h a r a c t e r ,  t h e  c r e a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  of teams working on new, n o n - t r i v i a l  problems seems most important 
f o r  a s h o r t e r  l ead  t ime, and a h igher  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of innovat ion i n t r o d u c t i o n .  
I n  t h i s  connect ion one of t h e  most promising i d e a s  would be  t h e  
improvement of t h e  socio-psychological  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  teams engaged i n  
c r e a t i v e  work. Th is  i d e a  is  based on t h e  "program and r o l e "  approach t o  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  teams' a c t i v i t y  
Stud ies  show t h a t  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of resea rch  teams i s  g r e a t l y  dependent 
on i t s  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  of a team is  t h e  
t o t a l i t y  of s c i e n t i f i c  r o l e s  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t i n g  between them. 
The r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  i s  formed i n  t h e  process  of v a r i o u s  components of 
r esea rch  a c t i v i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  between i n d i v i d u a l  members of t h e  resea rch  
team. It i s  expressed i n  t h e  s t a b l e  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  of i t s  members i n  t h e  
performance of s p e c i f i c  hmogeneous func t ions  ( i f  they perform t h e s e  
f u n c t i o n s  wi th  i n t e n s i t y  and s u f f i c i e n t  r e g u l a r i t y )  and t h e  i n t e n s i t y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f o r  t h i s  r o l e  i s  above t h e  average f o r  t h e  team a s  a whole. 
It is  obvious that t h e  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  i t s e l f  is  t h e  main determinant  
of a r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  i n  a r e s e a r c h  team. D i s t r i b u t i o n  of s c i e n t i f i c  r o l e s  
among t h e  team's members i s  a l s o  inf luenced by a number of o b j e c t i v e  and 
s u b j e c t i v e  f a c t o r s .  The former inc lude  p r i m a r i l y  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  d i v i s i o n  
of l a b o r ,  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of func t ions  i n  any j o i n t  a c t i v i t y ,  and t h e  team's 
formal s t r u c t u r e .  
The s u b j e c t i v e  f a c t o r s  inc lude :  
a )  l e v e l  of s p e c i a l  t r a i n i n g  of t h e  team members (more c r e a t i v e  r o l e s  
r e q u i r e ,  a s  a r u l e ,  a h igher  l e v e l  of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ) ;  
b) t h e  pe rsona l  and psycho log ica l ly  d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e s  of team 
members : m e n t a l i t y ,  temperament, c h a r a c t e r ,  i n c l i n a t i o n s ;  
c )  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  a team; and 
d) c r e a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  a s s o c t a t e s .  
One can d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  fol lowing r o l e s  i n  a r e s e a r c h  team: 
1. Leader-organ&zer. The person playing this r o l e  is  or ien ted  towards 
t h e  team's a c t i v i t y .  He s k i l l f u l l y  coord ina tes  t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  team 
members, organizes  a c t i v i t y  t o  accomplish t h e  ass igned t a s k ,  mot iva tes  
members t o  perform t h e i r  f u n c t t o n s ,  and provides  f o r  f r u i t f u l  s c i e n t i f i c  
i n t e r a c t i o n .  This  r o l e  i s  u s u a l l y  played bv t h e  formal head of t h e  team 
who thereby a c q u i r e s  t h e  s t a t u s  of an informal  l e a d e r .  
2. Generator of ideas. The person who p lays  t h i s  r o l e  should be  a b l e  
t o  g rasp  t h e  problems b e t t e r  than o t h e r s ,  c o n s t a n t l y  supply new i d e a s  and 
n o n - t r i v i a l  s o l u t i o n s ,  f ind  unsought-for a n a l o g i e s  r e v e a l i n g  t h e  problem 
from a new a n g l e ,  e t c .  
3. Critic. This  i s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  r o l e  f o r  any s u c c e s s f u l  c r e a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y  in sc ience .  The c r i t i c  f i n d s  weak and s t r o n g  p o i n t s ,  formulates  
t h e  p r o s  and cons of i d e a s ,  methods, approaches; doubts  every th ing ,  and 
u rges  t h e  t e a m  t o  deba te  t h e  e x i s t i n g  o r  suggested s o l u t i o n .  
4. Eruddte. T h i s  r o l e  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by broad s c i e n t i f i c  e r u d i t i o n .  
The person playing i t  reads  a l o t ,  knows a l o t ,  and w i l l i n g l y  s h a r e s  h i s  
knowledge, and i s  always capable  of g i v i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  re fe rence .  
5. Performer. T h i s  person should have one main pre-requis i te- the  
a b i l i t y  and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  work under t h e  guidance of o t h e r s .  The performer 
in a team i s  l a r g e l y  engaged i n  execut ing a c t i v i t y :  he can make experiments 
as per  ass igned program very  w e l l ,  make c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  t h e  requ i red  documentation, 
drawings, accounts  ( r e p o r t s )  and perform minor jobs  ass igned him by t h e  l e a d e r .  
6 .  PractzYianer. This  r o l e  c o n s i s t s  in e s t a b l i s h i n g  con t ac t s  wi th  
process  eng ineers ,  those  engaged t n  t h e  production process ,  t h e  c l i e n t s  and 
consumers. The p r a c t i t i o n e r  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  development s t age  
of research  f ind ings .  Be looks  upon each i s s u e  w i th  respec t  t o  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  
e f f e c t  and i s  capable  of persuading people t o  s ee  t h e  use fu lness  of a new 
development. 
A l l  t h e  above r o l e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  process  i n  a research  
team. The b e s t  number of r o l e s  i n  a team i s  a d i f f i c u l t  ques t ion  s i n c e  one 
can i d e n t i f y  very s u b t l e  nuances of t h e  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  and thereby increase  
t h e  q u a n t i t y  of pos s i b l e  r o l e s .  I n  any case  t h e  number and assortment of 
r o l e s  i n  a research  team should correspond wi th  t h e  r e s ea r ch  a c t i v i t y  s t r u c t u r e  
and completely provide f o r  i t s  e n t i r e  process .  
We have made an empir ical  s tudy of r o l e  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  research  teams i n  
a s e r i e s  of r e s ea r ch  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of engineering.  Before 
summarizing t h e  s tudy ,  l e t  us  po in t  ou t  t he  t h r e e  b a s i c  v a r i a b l e s  used f o r  
t h e  study: 
1. e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of a r e s ea r ch  team's a c t i v i t y  and i t s  management; 
2.  t h e  degree ( l e v e l )  of c r e a t i v i t y  of a r e s ea r ch  program; and 
3 .  t h e  r o l e  p r o f i l e  of t h e  l e ade r  and xeam members. 
Effectiveness of the research team's act2vity and i t s  management. So 
f a r  t h e r e  has  been no s i n g l e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  eva lua t ing  t h i s  v a r i a b l e .  I n  our 
study exper t  judgment served a s  a b a s i s  f o r  performance eva lua t ion .  Th is  
technique i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e l i a b l e  t o  determine r e l a t i v e  ( i f  no t  abso lu te )  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  of some o r  o t he r  r e s ea r ch  team. D i r ec to r s  of i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e i r  
d e p u t i e s  f o r  sc ience ,  and heads of major s c i e n t i f i c  u n i t s  ( d iv i s i ons ,  
l a b o r a t o r i e s )  acted a s  expe r t s .  
The degree ( leve l ) ,  oj'creativ$%y of a research program was determined by 
exper t  judgment wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  nove l ty ,  u t i l i t y  and o r i g i n a l i t y  of t h e  
program. 
The role  profi le of the leader and members of the research team was 
determined by means of cross evaluations (including self-evaluation) by the 
leader of the team on: 
1. a c t u a l  performance ( regu la r ly ,  a s  a r u l e )  of some o r  o ther  
sc ient2ff .c  f unc t i ons ;  
2. q u a l i t y  of t h e f r  performance (eva lua t ion  made by t h e  l e ade r  and 
members of t h e  team). 
In  t h e  course  of t h e  s tudy  t h e  followkng s t a g e s  o r  research  a c t t v i t y  
were i d e n t i f i e d  : pre-program, problem s e l e c t i o n  and i t s  s o l u t i o n ,  r e s ea r ch  
program e l abo r a t i on ,  implementation, app l i c a t i on  (publ ica t ion  of r e s u l t s ) ,  
and acceptance of t h e  r e s u l t s  by t h e  c l i e n t s  ( u se r s ,  i ndus t ry ,  e t c . ) .  
The s tudy has  shown t h a t  i n  each s t e p  of t h e  r e s ea r ch  program 
implementation of c e r t a i n  s c i e n t t f i c  r o l e s  o r  t h e i r  conf igura t ions  were 
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h a t  s t e p  only and e s s e n t i a l  f o r  i t s  
s u c c e s s f u l  accomplishment. 
A t  t h e  pre-program s t a g e  t h e  problem i s  no t  ye t  e x p l i c i t l y  def ined ,  only 
broad problem a r e a s  a r e  I d e n t i f i e d .  The f i n a l  o b j e c t i v e  of t h i s  s t a g e  i s  t o  
d e f i n e  f e a s i b l e  problems. Of primary importance here  a r e  t h e  r o l e s  of 
' 'generator of ideas"  and "erudite".  
A t  t h e  problem s e l e c t i o n  s t age  a dia logue from among a c e r t a i n  s e t  of 
problems occurs  between t h e  "generator of ideas" and t h e  " c r i t i c " .  These 
r o l e s  become dominant i n  t h e  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  r e s ea r ch  team. A 
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  i s  played here  by t h e  l eader  who o f t e n  makes t h e  f i n a l  
problem formulat ion.  Problem s e l e c t i o n  is  an  important component of 
c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  
A t  t h e  e l abo ra t i on  s t a g e  t he  heav i e s t  burdens a r e  shouldered by t h e  
"organizer",  "generator of ideas"  and " c r i t i c "  a s  this s t a g e  r equ i r e s  n o t  
only t h e o r e t i c a l  work f n  fomulat i 'ng hypotheses,  searching f o r  adequate 
so lu t i ons ,  e t c . ,  b u t  a l s o  job d i s t r f b u t i o n  among t h e  team members. 
The implementation s t a g e  i s  charac te r ized  i n  t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r  and 
performer r o l e s  come t o  t h e  foreground. The l e ade r  coord ina tes  t h e  e f f o r t s  
of t h e  team members and c o n t r o l s  their performance. 
A t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  s t a g e  t h e  l e ade r ,  p r a c t i t i o n e r  and performer r o l e s  
a r e  t h e  most important.  
Analysis of t h e  empi r ica l  m a t e r i a l  has  revealed only minor d i sc repanc ies  
in t h e  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e s  of r e s ea r ch  teams working on research  programs that 
r e q u i r e  d i f f e r e n t  c r e a t i v i t y  l e v e l s .  I n  teams with  d i f f e r e n t  research  
programs t h e  s p e c i f i c  weight of each r o l e  i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  t h e  same. The 
only t h ing  t h a t  i s  no t  t h e  same is t h e  r ep r e sen t a t i on  of f unc t i ons  concentra ted 
i n  t h e  r o l e  of "p r ac t i t i one r " .  Research problems that r e q u i r e  teams w i th  
a higher  l e v e l  of c r e a t i v i t y  a r e  l e s s  o r i en t ed  towards immediate p r a c t i c a l  
app l i c a t fon  of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e i r  work. 
Analyzing t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s ,  one n o t i c e s  that they a r e  
d i f f e r e n t  i n  e f f e c t i v e  and non-effective teams. This  d i f f e r ence  is  
charac te r ized  by two f a c t o r s :  
1. i n  e f f e c t i v e  teams a l a r g e r  number of members have an a c t i v e  r o l e  
p r o f i l e ,  i. e .  , a t  l e a s t  i n  one r o l e  t h e i r  performance i s  higher  
than t he  s tandard ;  
2.  t h e  presence of a d i s t f n c t  l e ade r  i n  each r o l e  is more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
f o r  e f f e c t i v e  teams than  f o r  non-effective teams, i . e . ,  t h e r e  i s  a 
more r i g i d  r o l e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  t h a t  l e ads  t o  c l o se r  s c i e n t i f i c  
con t ac t s ,  and a g r e a t e r  need f o r  cooperat ion.  
Of g r e a t  s ignif i 'cance is t h e  composition of t h e  r o l e  ensemble e s t ab l i shed  
i n  a research  team. Teams con ta in ing  "generator of ideas",  " c r i t i c "  and 
"erudi te"  work most eff e c t f v e l y ,  whi le  teams composed j u s t  of "generators",  
" c r i t i c s "  o r  ' ' e rudi tes t '  a r e  less e f f e c t i v e  and o f t e n  f a i l  t o  accomplish t h e  
ass igned t a s k .  
One of t h e  powerful f a c t o r s  in f luenc ing  t h e  performance of research  teams 
is  how t h e  r o l e  i s  perceived by t h e  l eader .  The b e t t e r  he perce ives  t he  r o l e s  
of t h e  team members, t h e  more e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  research  team he heads works. 
Of no l e s s  importance f o r  t h e  intra-group e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i s  t h e  r o l e  
p r o f i l e  of t h e  l e ade r ,  i . e . ,  t h e  assortment of s c i e n t i f i c  r o l e s  he p lays  i n  
his own team. The l e ade r  as a r u l e  plays  t h e  r o l e s  of "generator  of ideas' '  
and "erudite".  Th ts  ou t l ay  i s  confirmed by t h e  ob j ec t i ve  f a c t s  and t h e  
opinions  of t he  l e ade r s  themselves as t o  how t h e  r o l e  func t ions  a r e  performed 
by them. From our  viewpoint,  t h e s e  r o l e s  a r e  opt imal  f o r  t h e  l e ade r  of a 
research  team, a s  he should possess  broad knowledge i n  h i s  own and r e l a t e d  
f i e l d s  of sc ience ,  a b i l i t y  t o  genera te  new idea s ,  f i nd  non - t r i v i a l  approaches 
t o  t h e  problem r e s o l u t i o n ,  e t c .  
We t u r n  now t o  t h e  r o l e  of "organizer". The l i t e r a t u r e  on t he  s ub j ec t  
always emphasizes that t h e  l e ade r  of a research  team should a l s o  perform 
organizing func t ions  but i n  r e a l i t y  the  formal l eader  is  no t  always t h e  
o rgan izer  of t he  team's r e l e v a n t  a c t i v i t y  aimed a t  t h e  r e s ea r ch  program 
implementation. It is  remarkable that i n  nea r l y  ha l f  t h e  cases  of our study 
these  func t tons  a r e  assumed by another  member of t h e  team. However, t h e  
performance of t h e  r o l e s  of "cri t2c1'  and "performer" by t he  l e ade r  have a 
nega t ive  e f f e c t  on t h e  team's ac t i v%ty .  
It should be pointed ou t  t h a t  t h e  r o l e  p r o f i l e  of t h e  l e ade r  i s  inf luenced 
by t h e  r o l e  p r o f i l e s  of t h e  team meinbers, and v i c e  versa .  For i n s t ance ,  i n  
highly q u a l i f i e d  r e sea r ch  teams where the l e ade r  has no i n t e l l e c t u a l  
s u p e r i o r i t y  h i s  exce l lence  as "generator of ideas' '  w i l l  be lower i n  comparison 
w i t h  o t h e r  members of t h e  team. 
The r e s u l t s  of the s tudy permit  a number of i n t e r e s t i n g  and cons t ruc t i ve  
conclusions  concerning improvement of r e s ea r ch  teain management through 
s e l e c t i o n  of opt imal  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e s  and e f f e c t i v e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  team's 
p o t e n t i a l .  
Knowledge of t h e  r e s ea r ch  team's r o l e  s t r u c t u r e s  may be h e l p f u l  t o  t h e  
l eader  a t  a very e a r l y  s t a g e  of t h e  team's formation.  I n  recrui tment  of 
s c i e n t i f i c  personnel  t hc  l e ade r  ( a f t e r  ba s i c  acquaintance wi th  t h e  work of 
t h e  cand ida tes  and persona l  in te rv iews)  may form a prel iminary opinion of 
t h e  a b i l i t i e s  of some o r  o t he r  person, decide what func t ions  w i l l  be performed 
by him, and whether he or she  w i l l  f i t  i n t o  the  team's r o l e  ensemble. 
Shaping a r e s ea r ch  team, t h e  l e ade r  should provide f o r  a "generator  of 
ideas",  "erudi te"  and " c r i t i c "  who w i l l  make the  team's core .  The team t h a t  
does  not  possess  people corresponding wi th  t h e  above r o l e s  cannot hope f o r  
e f f e c t i v e  r e sea r ch  a c t i v i t y .  
It is assumed t ha t  t h e  l e ade r  can a c t i v e l y  in f luence  shaping the r o l e  
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  his team, no t  only by r e c r u i t i n g  t h e  app rop r i a t e  b r a i n  but  a l s o  
by developing t h e  requ i red  q u a l i t i e s  ( a b i l t t i e s )  in t h e  team members. He can 
do t h i s  by ass ign ing  them w t t h  ever  more soph i s t i c a t ed  func t i ons ,  thereby 
r a i s i n g  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i ona l  l e v e l .  
Regular eva l ua t i on  of team members' performance of t h e i r  r o l e s  w i l l  
considerably he lp  t h e  l e ade r  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
formation of f o r ce s  f o r  some s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  and organ iza t ion  of s c i e n t i f i c  
d i scuss ions .  Knowledge of r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  dynamics w i l l  con t r i bu t e  t o  a more 
e f f e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of e f f o r t  a t  va r i ous  s t a g e s  of research  program 
implementation. 
There i s  another  conclus ion t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r  must make a f t e r  acquaintance 
wi th  t h e  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  theory :  he himself should avoid assuming t h e  r o l e s  
of " c r i t i c "  o r  "perf ormer" bu t  f i n d  o t h e r  people capab le  of performing t h e s e  
f u n c t i o n s .  
A l l  t h e  above c o n c l u s ~ o n s  stem from t h e  s tudy  mentioned e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  
paper. 
Our nex t  hypothes i s  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h a t  the conclusions  shaped i n  t h e  
course  of t h e  s tudy  o r  r e s e a r c h  teams can be app l ied  t o  teams engaged i n  
o t h e r  types  of c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  It i s  based on t h e  unders tanding t h a t  
t h e  l e v e l  of c r e a t i v i t y  r e q u i r e d  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  problem depends on 
i t s  nove l ty  and n o t  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  t a s k  ( t h e o r e t i c a l ,  t echno log ica l ,  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  e t c . ) .  Handling new problems t h a t  a r e  n o t  prone t o  t r i v i a l  
approaches and techniques ,  t h e r e  a r i s e s  a need f o r  new hypotheses,  t h e i r  
v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  c r i t i c a l  examination and o r g a n i z a t i o n  of e f f o r t  toward t h e i r  
s o l u t i o n .  Consequently, t h e r e  emerges a need f o r  performance of t h e  same 
f u n c t i o n s  and a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  same a b i l i t i e s  of people who p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  of t h e s e  problems a s  in r e s e a r c h  teams. It i s  q u i t e  
n a t u r a l  t o  expect t h a t  a s  a r e s u l t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  i n s i d e  t h e  group and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of l a b o r  t h e r e  w i l l  appear d i s t i n c t  b e a r e r s  of some o r  o t h e r  
r o l e s  s i m i l a r  t o  those  in a r e s e a r c h  team, a s  w e l l  a s  a c e r t a i n  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  
whose n a t u r e  w i l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  inf'luence t h e  team's performance. 
These conclus ions  may b e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  teams engaged in a l l  s t a g e s  of 
innovat ion processes  t o  s o l v e  v a r i o u s  t a s k s .  It i s  confirmed by t h e  above- 
s a i d  independence of t h e  r o l e  s t r u c t u r e  conf igura t ion  from t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  
l e v e l  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  t a s k s  t o  be solved.  
Th is  hypothes i s ,  undoubtedly, r e q u i r e s  exper imental  t e s t i n g .  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most technological change involves organizations; most new ideas come 
from individuals orthe interaction between two or three individuals. The 
management of organizations is often concerned'with preserving the present 
rather than creating the future but creative individuals usually need access 
to the resources of organizations in order to turn their ideas into reality. 
There is often a problem-how to harness the creativity of individuals to 
the resources of organizations. 
One solution to this problem is for an individual to gain control of an 
organization and there are many examples of technological change resulting 
from the activities of a creative individual either owning or managing an 
appropriate organization. The early history of the uses of electricity is 
full of such people. Werner Siemens, for example, founded the firm Siemens 
and Halske as a vehicle for his ideas on electromagnetic telegraphy. 
This approach of replying on individual entrepreneurs is favored by be- 
lievers in the virtue of free-market competitionand is reflectedinGovernment 
action to encourage the setting up of small firms. Nonetheless, large organ- 
izations do exist and are sometimes responsible for technological change. 
Even Governmental organizations (normally thought of as bureaucracies) can 
be responsible for technological change. Thus the revolutionary Republic of 
France was responsible for installing the first semaphore-type telegraph fol- 
lowed by the British Government and the Prussian State Government. Similarly, 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber was the result of government action in 
the USSR followed by Germany and then the United States (the British did not 
bother because prior to 1941, they controlled the supply of natural rubber). 
Organizations have to have a management system and one responsibility 
of management is the management of innovation. This paper poses the question 
of how can management make use of the creativity that resides in individuals. 
The question is tackled in four parts. What is the nature of technological 
change? Can this process be managed? Where do creative individuals fit into 
the process? Can individual creativity be "managed"? 
2. THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Many observers of the phenomenon of technological change have suggested 
that there are two different driving forces, the first being creativity which 
produces new products to manufacture, new ways of producing old products (in- 
cluding new ways of organizing production), new ways of storing, distributing 
and financing products and also new waysof obtaining and transmitting informa- 
tion about all of the above activities. The second driving force is contained 
in the expression, "necessity is the mother of invention", which suggests that 
when the need for a solution to a problem is great enough, even the most con- 
servative of organizations will initiate change (the ultimate need being the 
need to survive). 
Various versions of this dichotomy exist. The Manchester study of Award- 
wining innovations in the UK (Langrish, et al., 1972), suggested the terms 
"discovery push" and "need pull" to describe the two forces and further sub- 
divided discovery push into science push and technological push whilst need 
was divided into customer need and management need to demonstrate that "need" 
is a wider phenomenon than the concept of market demand. 
In the USA, Utterback (1974) expressed the two forces as technical oppor- 
tunities and need with need being sub-divided into market need, mission need 
(which in the USA means a stated government requirement) and production need 
which is an internal need of an organization to improve its productive effic- 
iency. Utterback lists eight different studies of technological innovation 
and interprets their results as showing that between 66% and 90% of examples 
of technological innovation arise from "needs". 
The Sussex comparison of successful and failed attempts at technological 
change in the UK (Science Policy Research Unit, 1972) seemed to support the 
Utterback conclusion in that out of over 100 variables the one that most dis- 
tinguished success from failure was attention to the needs of potential cus- 
tomers. 
The Manchester study mentioned above has been misquoted by several authors 
as lending support to the view that "need pull" predominates. What the study 
actually said on this issue was three things: (i) very few of the 84 cases 
fitted either the need pull or the discovery push models in that both forces 
had to be present, (ii) if instead of looking at the overall process of tech- 
nological change, one confined the question to what stimulated an Award win- 
ning firm into taking action that led to technological change then need pull 
predominates numerically, but, (iii) in the small number of cases involving a 
large degree of technological change (such as the Hovercraft and the Pilking- 
ton Float Glass Process), discoverypushis more important. 
Whilst assertions about need have to be treated with care, one thing is 
quite clear from the above studies namely that simple views of the process of 
innovation as "discovery" followed by application, prototype production, etc., 
are not adequate to describe the complexities of the ways in which technologi- 
cal change takes place. 
This has important practical implications for the management of creativ- 
ity. For example, it used to be believed that creative individuals like 
scientists should be left on their own to make discoveries which could then 
be assessed to see if an "application" could be found. By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, policy makers both in industry and government were realiz- 
ing that this approach was not working. 
The American "Hindsighttt study (Isenson, 1969), was prompted by politi- 
cians asking why should the US Navy be spending money ontheoretical research 
by scientists in universities. The Navy's claim that advances in military 
technology were "applications" of scientific advances were not supported by 
the study which instead leant support to the view that technological advances 
rested on other technological activities directed towards stated aims (the 
study used "mission-oriented" to describe such activities which were found 
to be numerically much more predominant than "curiosity-oriented" activites). 
The above studies can be interpreted as saying that organizations often 
seem to initiate change because there is a need for change. Such change, 
however, often seems to depend on the presence of individuals who might be 
called "creative" but not necessarily creative in the sense of technical or 
scientific creativity. 
As long as innovation is thought of as a process started by discovery 
or invention, the person responsible for the discovery or invention will re- 
ceive considerable acclaim. Thus in the UK most people believe that we have 
penicillin because Fleming discovered it and we have TV because Baird inven- 
ted it (in other countries the names may be different but it is still believed 
that innovation is the end result of a processes started by a named individu- 
al). A careful examination of the history of penicillin and TV shows that 
the named individuals were NOT particularly crucial to subsequent events (the 
"breakthrough" that led to penicillin being used was the concept of chemo- . 
therapy which was NOT developed by Fleming. Modern TV depends on cathode- 
ray tubes; Baird's system was based on an older technology). 
The displacement of the "discovery-push" model of innovation should in- 
volve a displacement of the importance of the individual "discoverer". This 
is not to say that individuals cease to be important. Rather, it means that 
other kinds of creativity must be recognized. 
If the most important step in the process of innovation is not "discovery" 
but something else, say "x", then the role of individual creativity in "x" 
needs identifying. To do this we need a new model for innovation. Before 
describing this new approach it is necessary to discuss further the claimthat 
a certain kind of creativity has been over-emphasized as this goes against 
many popular assumptions. 
One reason for claiming that some attribute which might be called inven- 
tiveness (in the sense of a propensity to produce technical inventions) is 
not as important as previously thought is derivable from considerations of 
the probability of improving something. 
Patents are awarded to individuals who invent something having novelty, 
a different way of doing something. However, different is not the same as 
better. Given a hand of playing cards at Poker, a different hand can easily 
be obtained but the better the original hand the less likely is a new hand 
to offer an improvement. 
Technology might have some similarities with card playing. In the very 
early days, of say aeroplanes or steam locomotives (band hand), almost anything 
new would also be better but with a developed technology (good hand) such as 
electrical power generation almost anything different would not be better. 
This is why most patented inventions are never used and this is a reason 
why the type of creativity associated with inventions may not be as crucial 
as some other type of creativity. In the case of a well developed technology, 
the most important creative activity could be associated with problem recog- 
nition and definition, i.e., identifying where there is scope for improvement 
rather than problem solving, i.e., inventing the improved technology. 
Another reason for stressing the importance of problem recognition and 
definition is again probabilistic in that there can be ten different techni- 
cal possibilities for solving a problem. Only one needs to work but if the 
problem definition is wrong no solution however technically brilliant will 
result in an overall improvement. The Hovercraft, for example, can be seen 
as a technically brilliant solution to the wrong problem. So can the Concorde 
(which is a solution to the problem of how to make an aircraft fly faster in- 
stead of solving the problems of cost and noise). 
Any discussion of creativity and innovation must therefore extend beyond 
the type of creativity associated with discovery and invention. To do this 
we need a better frameowrk for discussing innovation. 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AS THE INTERACTION OF THREE SYSTEMS 
It is suggested that the process of technological innovation can be 
viewed as having necessary inputs from three systems. These are the technical 
system which consists of existing and imagined hardware, the advantage system 
which determines whether a new addition to the technical system is actually 
better or not and the resource system which determines whether a particular 
organization has the capability to develop a better technical concept. 
This view of inputs from three systems can be seen as a statement that 
the success of a technological change requires three necessary conditions to 
be present: 
1) A technical concept capable of being developed to the stage of 
achieving:- 
2) an advantage over alternative technical concepts; and 
3) the capability of developing (1) to the stage of achieving (2). 
The technical concept may be a brand-new idea or discovery, a new combination 
of ideas (old and new) or an old concept not previously developed because of 
lack of (2) or (3). 
The advantage can take a variety of forms. The capability also has dif- 
ferent aspects including money, skills or the availability of some particular 
form of organization necessary to achieve the development of the technical 
concept. 
The three conditions can be illustrated by reference to examples in which 
one of the conditions is missing. A cure for cancer is an example of condi- 
tion (1) being missing. There is lots of advantage awaiting such a cure and 
no shortage of money or skills for development. What is missing is the concept 
of what to develop. 
It can be argued that the hovercraft is an example of condition (2) being 
missing. Here we have a new technical concept, government money for develop- 
ment through NRDC, someveryskilled design effort; and yet firms have gone 
bankrupt attempting to manufacture Hovercraft (Johnson 1974). The problem 
with the hovercraft is the absence of any real advantage over alternative ways 
of traveling from A to B. The helicopter can also travel over land and water 
and the hydrofoil is increasingly being used for short-distance water trans- 
port. The Concorde might also fit into this category of having no advantage. 
Examples of the third condition being absent are frequent in developing coun- 
tries, where technical concepts may be prevented from providing an advantage 
through lack of money and technical skills. 
The three conditions have to co-exist in the same place and time. For 
example, when the US army was in Vietnam, many soldiers contracted malaria 
and several pharmaceutical firms started programs aimed at the development of 
new improved antimalarial compounds. Although some potentially important dis- 
coveries were made, the American withdrawal from Vietnam led to the dropping 
of development work on antimalarials. So we now have the situation where con- 
ditions (3) and possibly (1) exist in one place and condition (2) somewhere 
else. This is not to say that the pharmaceutical firms are deliberately with- 
holding some new wonder drug from those parts of the world where malaria is 
common. It means that the pharmaceutical firms do not see any net advantage 
to themselves in spending a lot of money on testing new compounds in the hope 
of finding a better drug which even if it existed would not produce enough 
financial return to pay for the development costs. 
This situation also illustrates the point that whether a new technical 
concept possesses an advantage or not is usually a matter of speculation un- 
til it has been tested. Finding out if an advantage exists or not can be very 
expensive so it is necessary to state that innovation is attempted when there 
exists a "perceived net advantage" to be gained from the use of a "capability" 
in developing a "technical concept" that is considered capable of development 
to the stage of obtaining the advantage. 
If the attempt fails, it could be that the perception of the advantage 
was incorrect, the technical concept was in fact not capable of development 
to the advantage stage or the capability of carrying out the development did 
not exist. (An example of the latter is the case of an electronics firm that 
attempted to develop the concept of numerically-controlled machine tools to 
the stage where it would make a profit from selling them. The attempt failed 
because the firm lacked capability in the design of machine tools.) 
The three systems which contributed the three necessary conditions are 
not static but continually changing and interacting with each other and also 
with other systems of society. For example, the technical system interacts 
with an independent scientific system, the perceived advantage system with 
political, economic and marketing systems and the resource system interacts 
with financial and educational systems. 
4. CAN INNOVATION BE MANAGED? 
To what extent is a complex process involving the interaction of several 
systems capable of being controlled? The concept of Technological Determinism 
has been discussed elsewhere by this author (Langrish 1977) and it sometimes 
seems that technological change can be viewed as a Darwinian struggle for sur- 
vival. Most discussion is confined to two of the three systems mentioned 
above-the technical and the resource systems. However, the addition of an 
advantage system makes clear one difference between biological evolution and 
technical evolution that the "climate" for competition can be controlled. 
An example may help to illustrate the importance of control of the advan- 
tage system. Synthetic rubber was first produced in a small factory in 1912 
by a group of Manchester chemists who developed the so-called Buna rubber. 
However, this development did not survive because it had no advantage over 
natural rubber obtained from plantations. In particular, the price of the 
synthetic material was about fifteen shillings per pound when the price of 
the natural product, although fluctuating, remained below two shillings per 
pound and the technical properties at that time were slightly inferior to 
those of the natural product. There was no advantage therefore, to any com- 
pany in developing synthetic rubber; nor was there any advantage to the 
British nation. As the majority of the rubber plantations were owned by 
Britain there was no national advantage to be gained from developing a rival 
product. 
The situation in Germany, however, was different. Under the Nazi govern- 
ment of the late 1930s, it was realized that Germany at war would need con- 
siderable supplies of rubber. There was therefore an advantage to be gained 
from the development of synthetic rubber and the capability existed in the 
German chemical industry. The main problem was solved by manipulating the 
advantage system as perceived by private industry. The German government im- 
posed an import tax on natural rubber so as to make it more expensive than 
synthetic rubber, which then had an advantage in the eyes of German industri- 
alists. It was not until the Japanese took over the natural rubber planta- 
tions that the rest of the world saw an advantage in synthetic rubber. A 
massive investment program, involving government-owned factories in the USA, 
Canada and Russia was able to supply the wartime needs of the Allied nations. 
This example illustrates the fact that in a conflict between national 
interests and the interests (perceived advantages) of individual firms in a 
private-enterprise system, there exist two alternative ways of government to 
control the introduction.of new technology. The first can be seen as direct 
control of the capability system (e.~., government-owned factories) and the 
second as manipulation of the advantage system (e.g., differential taxation). 
As the first alternative is not very popular in some countries more attention 
needs to be given to the possibilities of the second. 
Control of the advantage system offers a possibility for nation states 
to indulge in competition and also produce more beneficial effects from tech- 
nology at the same time. 
For example, the British Government is worried about the imports of 
foreign cars. It does not wish to impose controls of a conventional nature 
as it fears retaliation against our own exports. It could however use the 
desire to obtain beneficial effects as a way of controling imports. It could 
say, for example, that all cars sold in Britain must conform to some stan- 
dard of safety where this standard involved some new British technology 
which otherwise would have no competitive advantage. (It might even say that 
in order to protect the quality of working life, all cars sold in Britain 
must be manufactured under working conditions approved of by British unions.) 
This technique is being used by the USA to restrict Concorde through 
anti-noise regulations. A whole new vista of international technological 
competition could emerge. Individual firms could see an advantage in devel- 
oping "nice" technology if they thought that their government would bring in 
regulations insisting that new standards of "niceness" were obligatory or at 
least carried some tax advantage. 
Because the present structure of the advantage system is economic, coun- 
tries and firms are forced to become more efficient, which in the long run 
means that people must be either subjected to greater stress or be unemployed. 
The way out is to change the rules of the game in such a way that technology 
capable of improving the quality of human life is given some advantage. 
The above discussion illustrates that a fresh approach to thinking about 
innovation can give a fresh insight into the types of creativity required. It 
is possible for a person to be creative in thinking about the advantage sys- 
tem. Under some circumstances, such creativity could be more important than 
the creativity of invention. 
5. THE ROLE OF CREATIVE INDIVIDUALS IN INNOVATION 
Some of the evidence for claiming that creativity within the innovation 
process is not just discovery and invention, comes from case studies of tech- 
nological change which aimed to find out how things happen at the level of 
the firm. 
The Manchester study of innovation (Langrish et al., 1972) attempted to 
identify factors which enabled firms to succeed. Partly to the surprise of 
the authors of that study, the factor which occurred more frequently than any 
other was what they called the "top person phenomenon", the presence of an 
outstanding person in a position of authority, a manager or director who made 
a special contribution to the innovation. Considerable care was taken in 
forming this conclusion; supporting evidence was looked for and the uncorrob- 
orated testimony of the person concerned was not accepted as evidence for the 
importance of a "top person". The top person phenomenon was the most fre- 
quently occurring factor in all of four technological subdivisions (the case 
studies were divided into chemical, electrical, mechanical and craft) and was 
also the most frequently occurring factor in the small sample involving large 
degrees of change in technology. 
The roles performed by these top people were any one or any combination 
of the following three: 
I .  The Technical Entrepreneur. A small number of the cases studied in- 
volved an unusual individual of high technical creativity who had solved the 
problem of the interaction between organizational structure and the creative 
individual by creating his own organization as a vehicle for his technical 
skills. 
Thus, Sir James Martin combined the roles of Managing Director and Chief 
Designer of Martin-Baker Aircraft. He worked from about 7.30 in the morning 
until 20.30 at night during the week and until 16.30 on Saturdays. He per- 
sonally approved each drawing and modification before it went to the produc- 
tion department and was responsible for creating a firm employing about 2,000 
people having started with two men and a boy. Similar, Martin Wood started 
Oxford Instruments by making magnets in his own home. Such individuals un- 
doubedly exist but are comparatively rare. Most of the cases involved top 
people in the following two categories. 
2. The Problem Definer. Many of the firms in the study produced their 
successful innovations because a senior person was in a position to define 
new areas of activity for the company. Such activity often involves creative 
insight into opportunities that can be taken or constraints that can be re- 
moved. Thus Laze11 of Beechams who was trained as an accountant was respon- 
sible for directing Beechams research efforts towards semi-synthetic penicil- 
lin. He did this as a result of studying American sales figures and buying 
the best scientific advice that was available to work towards a commercially 
identified market. The Beecham scientists working in a country house would 
not have done this on their own. Nor would the marketing department have 
known about semi-synthetic penicillins which did not then exist. In a func- 
tionally organized firm, it seems to require someone at the top of the pyra- 
mid to put together commercial and technical information in a creative manner. 
3. The Resource Provider. The third role of the top person is to ensure 
sufficient resources to guide an innovation through its development stage. 
(This can, of course, be a recipe for disaster if the idea is a bad one.) A 
certain type of creativity is involved in selecting which ideas to back and 
in obtaining resources either from inside an organization or from other sour- 
ces, such as Government. 
The development of Procion Dyes by ICI illustrates this role. Procion 
Dyes are an example of "discovery push" in that they were discovered by two 
ICI employees Stephen and Ratee who were following their own ideas. However, 
two Directors spotted the importance of the discovery and put the large re- 
sources of ICI into development. In the words of one of the Directors, "the 
two of us were able to ginger the whole development machinery into an unusual 
activity". These three top roles can be interpreted in terms of the three 
system view of innovation with each role being directed towards one of the 
systems. 
The study also identified other key individuals in the process of inno- 
vation. Such individuals who were not top people were mainly of the techni- 
cally creative kind. In terms of the breakdown between technologies, these 
other individuals occurred most frequently in the electrical area. Several 
of the technically creative people whose presence was vital to the success 
of an innovation were not university graduates but older people, educated at 
evening classes. Ransom of Short Brothers, for example, had no formal en- 
gineering qualifications but as design draughtsman contributed no less than 
eight out of 18 patents taken out on the Seacat missile system. 
It is possible for people outside the technical area to play an impor- 
tant role in innovation. Staff of a marketing department, for example, may 
spot some change in the advantage system which offered scope for technical 
change. However, in the 84 case studies, we found only one example of a 
sales employee making a successful suggestion to a research department with- 
out the intervention of a top person. This probably says more about the 
nature of hierarchical organizations than about individuals. 
6. CAN INDIVIDUAL CREATIVITY BE MANAGED? 
This question is usually posed in terms of providing suitable environ- 
ment and incentives to encourage individual creativity where creativity is 
seen as technical creativity. However, this paper has attempted to show that 
such a view of the question is inadequate. 
The creativity of management itself needs to be recognized. The Swedish 
engineer, Dr. Erik Haeffner, who as a Vice President of the Swedish Inventors 
Association might be thought to favorthe old view, has stressed the importance 
of creative management. He claims: 
"All evidence points to the decision-making process itself being 
a creative function. The person concerned must have knowledge 
and experience, partly the same ingredients that are needed for 
the creation of an idea, in order to make the correct decision 
and to dare invest in a new product. It is therefore important, 
if innovation activity is to produce a return, that great atten- 
tion should be paid to creative ability when selecting leaders 
for development work, and that creativity should be regarded as 
a desirable qualification" (Haeffner 1972). 
Even if we can find creative managers who will interact with the advantage 
system, define problems, etc., large organizations require organizational 
structures capable of encouraging all types of creativity. 
The first step towards better organizational structures is the realiza- 
tion that in some circumstances, groups can be more creative than individuals. 
Much creativity consists of a new combination of existing ideas. Where the 
existing ideas are present in different people, it requires some kind of in- 
teraction to produce the combination. 
In the area of technical creativity, it has long been recognized that 
the lone inventor or discoverer can be bettered by teams of people. The Ger- 
. man Dyestuffs Industry in the last century was the first to employ a team of 
scientists in their search for new and better dyes and there are many exam- 
ples of discoveries being made as a result of interactions within a team 
environment. 
Can the team approach be used in other areas of creativity? The role of 
the "top person" as problem definer as discussed above can certainly be made 
the task of a team. Several organizations have benefitted from a "think tank" 
or a new ventures group where interdisciplinary teams are given the task of 
thinking about the future. 
Such groups should not be confused with coordinating committees where 
people are concerned with protecting their own power structures and status 
quo rather than creativity. Creative groups normally involve people outside 
the power system of large organizations. 
Another way of encouraging creativity is to free people from concern with 
daily problems through a revision of existing functional boundaries. Many 
organizations are structured into research, production, marketing, etc., in 
ways which prevent creative thinking for the future. 
It is possible however to structure an organization in terms of its time 
span of concern. Production, sales and quality control are all concerned with 
the present and could be structured together. New product research and design, 
experimental manufacture and long term marketing are all concerned with the 
future and could be given an organizational unity. Between these two extremes 
there could be another group concerned with existing problems of manufacture, 
quality, distribution, etc., but given the time to tackle such problems in a 
creative manner, free from interfunctional disputes. 
Another f u n c t i o n  of t h e  c r e a t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  i s  o f t e n  l o s t  i n  l a r g e  
o rgan iza t ions  i s  t h a t  of what might be  c a l l e d  "resource  r e a l l o c a t i o n " .  I n  
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  s o c i e t i e s  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l  t o  s p o t  waste 
resources  and t u r n  them i n t o  u s e f u l  r esources .  The waste s o l v e n t s  of t h e  
pharmaceutical  i n d u s t r y ,  f o r  example, a r e  waste because pharmaceut icals  re-  
q u i r e  very pure s o l v e n t s .  Such s o l v e n t s ,  however, a r e  purchased by en t re -  
preneurs wi th  small  companies who t u r n  them i n t o r a w m a t e r i a l s  f o r  t h e  p a i n t  
indus t ry  and o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  do not  r e q u i r e  such pure  s o l v e n t s .  
Could l a r g e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  r e c r u i t  c r e a t i v e  "resource  r e a l l o c a t o r s "  wi th  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  t a s k  of having a c r e a t i v e  look a t  waste? Such an  a c t i v i t y  could 
a l s o  lead t o  new products  and processes .  
It i s  hoped t h a t  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  has demonstrated t h a t  c r e a t i v i t y  i n  
innovat ion i s  much more than inven t ion  and t h a t  t h e  management of innovat ion 
i s  much more than c r e a t i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  inven t ion .  Management i t s e l f  should 
be a h igh ly  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  t h a t  no t  only  encourages new i d e a s  but  makes 
s u r e  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  problems a r e  s e l e c t e d .  
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MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS : IMPLEMENTATION OF A SEMINAR FOR THE 
UPPER MANAGEMENT OF SIEMENS AG 
D i e t e r  Hempel 
Siemens AG, 
Munchen, FRG 
SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
This  psper i s  based on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  success  of any l a r g e  
i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  depends t o  a ve ry  l a r g e  e x t e n t  on how i t s  human 
resources  a r e  u t i l i z e d  and t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two b a s i c  approaches i n  mobi l iz ing 
t h e s e  human resources .  One i s  t o  t r y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  people a s  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
The o t h e r  approach is  t o  u s e  systems a s  a means of s t e e r i n g  t h e  behavior of 
people.  
Budgeting would be an example of t h e  systems' approach. In t roduc ing  
seminars on manager ia l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  f o r  upper management provides  an 
example of t h e  people-oriented approach. 
Within SIEMENS AG we b e l i e v e  t h a t  g e n e r a l l y  speaking both  a s p e c t s  a r e  
e q u a l l y  important .  Of course  i t  depends on a given s i t u a t i o n  whether one 
p u t s  more emphasis on t h e  one o r  t h e  o t h e r .  
This  is  one of t h e  reasons  why we f e e l  a manager should s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  
a b i l i t i e s  t o  diagnose t h e  r a p i d l y  changing s i t u a t i o n s  c o r r e c t l y  and t o  improve 
h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  a c t  f l e x i b l y  according t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  demands of v a r i o u s  
s i t u a t i o n s .  
So whi le  read ing  t h i s  paper on t h e  implementation of a seminar on 
managerial  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  f o r  upper management of SIEMENS AG one should 
keep i n  mind t h a t  i t  is  j u s t  one measilre v i t h i n  a ve ry  complex s e t  of 
e f f o r t s  t o  mobi l i ze  human resources .  
SIEMENS AG: SOME KEY FIGURES 
SIEMENS i s  one of t h e  wor ld ' s  l ead ing  companies i n  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  and 
e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y ;  i n  terms of s a l e s  i n  t h i s  s e c t o r  it ranks  among t h e  
f i v e  l a r g e s t  i n  t h e  world. The broad spectr im of products ,  focusing on 
power eng ineer ing  and communications, extends  from t h e  e l e c t r i c  motor t o  
t h 2  power p l a n t ,  from t h e  te lephone t o  t h e  l a r g e  computer, and from 
e l e c t r o n i c  components t o  X-ray departments.  The i n t e n s i v e  r e s e a r c h  and 
development work draws p r i m a r i l y  on t h e  innova t ive  p o t e n t i a l  of e l e c t r o n i c s .  
Products  and systems bssed on e l e c t r o n i c  tachnology account  f o r  almost  
50 percen t  of our s a l e s .  Through a world-wide s a l e s  and manufacturing 
o rgan iza t ion  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  we l l  over 102 c o u n t r i e s  we make more than h a l f  
of our s a l e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  F e d e r a l  Republic of Germany. 
I n  September 30, 1982 SIEMENS employed a t o t a l  of 324,000 people 
throughout t h e  world;  of t h i s  number roughly one-third were working abroad. 
The work f o r c e  i n c l u d e s  s c i e n t i s t s ,  eng inee rs  and t e c h n i c i a n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
commercial s t a f f ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  workers,  s k i l l e d  and s e m i s k i l l e d  l a b o r  
t r a i n e e s ,  and temporary s t u d e n t  l a b o r .  
Its s i z e  and v a r i e t y  of p r o j e c t s  enab le  t h e  company t o  o f f e r  i t s  
employees job o p p o r t u n i t i e s  s u i t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  t a l e n t s  and c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
S i z e  and v a r i e t y  of job  demands a l s o  c r e a t e  cons ide rab le  cha l l enges  t o  
management and c a l l  f o r  a pe r sonne l  p o l i c y  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
which a l low f o r  e x t e n s i v e  d e l e g a t i o n  and a good match of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
and aut lmr5ty .  
STEMENS AG : OFF-THE-SOB TRATNING PROGRAM F O R  MANAGERS 
I n  o rde r  t o  h e l p  managers t o  cope d t h  problems d e r i v i n g  from t h e s e  
cha l l enges  STEMENS has  e s t a b l i s h e d  v a r i o u s  measures f o r  management 
development which i n c l u d e  bo th  on- and off-the-job t r a i n i n g .  
The off-the-job program s t a F t s  ~ 5 t h  a set of t h r e e  seminars which 
b u i l d  upon each o t h e r .  
S t a r t i n g  w i t h  f i r s t - l i n e  izanagers (not  f o ~ e m e n  f o r  whom t h e r e  2s  a 
s e p a r a t e  program), each  seminar draws p a r t i c i p a n t s  from d i f f e r e n t  rank 
l e v e l s ,  Iioughly spealting t h e  ajms of t h e s e  seminars  a r e :  
- t o  acqua in t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i t h  company g o a l s ;  
- t o  make r e s p o n s % b i l i t i e s ,  aims,  and problems of bo th  groups and 
c e n t r a l  d i v i s i o n s  t r a n s p a r e n t ;  and 
- t o  develop an unders tandfng f o r  each o t h e r ' s  problems through 
p e ~ s o n a l  c o n t a c t  among p a r t i c i p a n t s  and t o p  l w e l  managers. 
Following t h e s e  seminars ,  which a l l  managers should a t t e n d  dur ing  t h e i r  
c a r e e r  development, t h e ~ e  is  a s e t  of problein-oriented seminars which a r e  
more o r  l e s s  opt imnal  and whfch draw t h e i ~  p a r t i c t p a n t s  mainly  from upper- 
and top- level  managment.  Contents of t h e s e  seminars  a r e  g e n e r a l  management, 
p o l i t i r a l  i s s u e s ,  problem-solvfng-techniques and languages.  Th i s  is  where 
t h e  M a n a g e ~ i a l  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  Seminar f T t s  i n .  
THE 3-D PIANAGERIAL FFFECTIVENES S SEMWAR 
For b e t t e r  understand5ng of t h e  implementation p rocess  a s h o r t  
d e s c r i y t i o n  of the seminar i t s e l f  may be of some help .  
It has been developed By ? ro fe . s so~  W,J, Reddin and forms an i n t e g r a l  
pa r t  of h i s  organizatcon development programs. Its funct ions within these 
programs i s  t o  s t a r t  the  unfreezing process.  He descr ibes  t he  seminar a s  
follows: 
What i s  Managerial Effect iveness? 
Managerial e f f ec t i venes s  i.s "the ex ten t  t o  whtch a manager achieves 
the  output requirements of h f s  posit ion".  This concept of e f f ec t i venes s  
i s  t he  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i'n management. I t  2s r e a l i s t i c  and unambiguous- 
concerned ~ 5 t h  output r a t h e r  than input ,  with what a manager achieves,  
r a the r  than does. Managerial e f fec t iveness  is  measurable i n  output terms. 
The 3-I) 'Manageri.al Ef fec t iveness  Semimar teaches t he  manager how t o  do t h i s .  
The 3-D Learning P ~ o c e s s  
The 3-D Managerial Effect iveness  Seminar i s  a r e s i d e n t i a l  learning 
experi-ence. Hours a r e  long. About e ixh ty  percent of t he  learn ing  takes  
place 13x1 teams of from f i v e  t o  e ixh t  managers-which corresponds roughly 
t o  t he  span of cont ro l .  
. The 3-D Managerial Effect iveness  Seminar confronts  t he  teams with a 
wide v a r i e t y  of problems genera l ly   elated t o  methods of achieving 
e f fec t iveness  through an accura te  recagnit5on of t he  r e a l i t y  of a s i t u a t i o n ,  
and the  bes t  approach t o  managkg 5t. The seminar begins a t  5.30 p.m. on 
Sunday, and ends a t  12.30 p.m. on t h e  s i x t h  day, 'Friday. 
Prework 
Each pa r t f c ipan t  ' receives  a pa r t i c ipan t  R i t  before coming t o  t he  seminar. 
This cons i s t s  of t h r e e  t e x t s ,  wal l  c h a r t s  and a Seminar Workbook. The bas ic  
t e x t  i s  Planagerkal Effect iveness .  T h i s  explaims t h e  3-D Theory and shows 
how 5 t  i s  applfed t o  imprave e f fec t iveness .  Ef fec t ive  S i tua t iona l  Diagnosis 
i.s a s e l f - i n s t r u c t i ~ n  book whirh teaches t h e  manager how t o  diagnose 
s i tua t imns  accurately-so t h a t  he may make moTe e f f e c t i v e  dec is ions .  
Effect iveness  Areas shows t h e  manager how t o  descr ibe  h i s  job i n  e f f ec t i venes s  
terms. Well defined "ef fec t iveness  areas" a r e  a p re r equ i s i t e  t o  s e t t i n g  
accurate  ob jec t ives .  The Semtnar Worksbook contains  ques t ionna i res ,  s t y l e  
t e s t s ,  e f f ec t i venes s  inventor ies ,  seminar t a s k s ,  case s t u d i e s ,  team diagnosis  
instruments and o ther  lea rn ing  a i d s .  
Dependkg on t he  pa r t i c ipan t s '  pr9or knowledge and ind iv idua l  capaci ty  
and dedica t ian ,  seminar prework general ly  takes  from f i f t e e n  t o  twenty-five 
hours t o  c m p l e t e .  
Day 1 and 2--Concept Mastery 
P a r t i c i p a n t s  work t n  teams t o  deepen t h e i r  understanding of the  bas ic  
concepts re la tcng  t o  e f f ec t i venes s ,  ob jec t ives ,  s i t u a t i o n  management and 
managerial behav5or. Teamwork s k i l l s  a r e  a l s o  learned during t h i s  per iod,  
and r e g u l a ~  ~ e v 5 e w s  of indiv2dual and team e f f ec t i venes s  a r e  ca r r i ed  out .  
Day 3--Case Study. A p p l i ~ a t i ~ n  
Ef fec t iveness  concepts a r e  appl ied t o  w r i t t e n  case  s t u d i e s ,  so  t h e i r  
p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  demonstrated and lea rned .  Th is  day t r a n s f e r s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  l e a r n i ng  i n t o  p r a c t i c a l  app l i c a t i on .  Team bui ld ing  s k i l l s  a r e  
a l s o  p rac t iced  and reviewed. 
Day 4 ,  5 and 6--Application t o  .Self 
The e n t i r e  second ha l f  of t h e  3-D Managerial Ef fec t iveness  Seminar 
a p p l i e s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  concepts t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t ' s  a c t u a l  work s i t u a t i o n .  
Day 4 5s spen t  on e f f ec t i venes s ,  day 5 on managerial  behavior ,  and day 6 on 
s i t u a t i o n  management. The l a s t  t h r e e  days demand a high degree of involvement 
from a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
Post  Seminar-On-the-Job Appl icat ion 
The manager u s e s  t h e  conceptual and p r i n t ed  t o o l s  t h e  3-D Managerial 
Ef fec t iveness  Seminar has provided. He may u s e  them t o  r ede f ine  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
i n  output  t e n s ,  t o  work w i t h  subord ina tes ,  coworkers and h i s  supe r io r  on 
o b j e c t i ve s ,  t o  change h i s  l e s s - e f f ec t i ve  behavfor,  o r  he may decide t o  
change h i s  work sktuatcon.  
THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  answer the  quest ion a s  ' t o  how t h e  process  go t  s t a r t e d .  
There were many d i s cus s i ons  i n  seminars,  dur ing p r o j e c t s  of o rgan i za t i ona l  
change, both formal and informal  which f i n a l l y  l e d  t o  an o v e r a l l  consensus 
t h a t  we would need some kind of t r a i n fng  i n  l e ade r sh ip  behavior f o r  upper 
management. So t h e  next  ques t ion  was, what should t h i s  seminar look l i k e  
and how could w e  g e t  t h e  commfment of t h e  Managing Board. 
One f i r s t  s t e p  in solvfng t he s e  problems was t o  make t h e  t op i c  of 
"Leadership S t y l e  and Ef fec t iveness"  p a r t  of a "Workshop" o r  "Information 
Form"  POT upper management. Thfs imformat5on forum was s e t  up t o  d i s cus s  
problems t h e  company would have t o  cope wi th  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  The method 
used was mainly g ~ o u p  d i s cus s i ons  and pos t e r  s e s s ions .  
One outcome of t he se  d i s cus s ions  was t h a t ,  a s  seen by upper managers 
themselves, t h e r e  was a need f o r  more t r a i n i n g  i n  l eadersh ip .  A s  a f u r t h e r  
s t e p  t h e  Cent ra l  Personnel Depavtment w a s  commissioned t o  conduct some 
research  i n t o  what t h e  needs f o r  t r a i n i n g  were i n  some more d e t a i l .  
From t h e  ~ e s u l t s  of th5s  research  we dweloped  t he  ba s i c  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
t h e  des5gn of t h e  sem5nar. Some of these  c r t t e r i a  were a s  fol lows:  
- t h e  seminar should go hand i n  hand with  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of de lega t ing  
and matching ~ e s p o n s i b i . l i t y  and au tho r i t y ;  
- 5t should he lp  t h e  ind2viduaI manager t o  analyze h i s  s i t u a t i o n  by 
himself ;  
- i t  should no t  s e l l  some kind of ideology bu t  r a t h e r  he lp  towards 
more c l a r i t y  i n  s e t t i n g  ob j ec t i ve s  and measuring r e s u l t s ;  
- i t  should he lp  towards b e t t e r  cooperat5on wi th in  teams and between 
t e m s  ; 
- f t  should h e l p  t o  develop human resources ;  and 
- i t  should match wi th  i n t e r n a t 5 o n a l  s t andards .  
It would have been q v f t e  a cha l l enge  f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l i s t s  of C e n t r a l  
Personnel Department t o  develop such a seminar themselves.  But f o r  reasons  
which need n o t  be  expla ined t o  t h e  p rac t i c5an  they  decided t o  answer t h e  
q u e s t i a n  "make o r  buy?" i-n favor  of "buy". 
Af te r  some "market r esea rch"  we came t o  t h e  conclus ion t h a t  we should 
t a k e  a  close^ 1ooR a t  t h e  3-D Managerial E f f e c t i v e n e s s  Seminar. We s e n t  a 
group of managers from d i f f e r e n t  functfons,etg,,production, r e s e a r c h  and 
development, s a l e s ,  admimist ra t ian  and personnel t o  an open seminar i n  
England. 
These managers repor ted  t o  t h e  ~ e s p e c t i v e  commfttee of t h e  Managing 
Board and it was decided t o  have two s m l t n a ~ s  i.n company and a s k  t h e  
p a r t i c i y a n t s  f o r  f u r t h e r  evaluatixim. 
According t o  this dec5sfon we asked Reddim Assoc ia tes  t o  conduct t h e s e  
two s e m i n a ~ s  w+th thei 'r s t a f f  i n  Englltsh a t  OUT management i n s t i t u t e  i n  
Germany. Evaluat ion of t h e  seminar by t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t  t h e  end i s  p a r t  
of t h e  seminar des ign  and i t  turned ou t  t o  be ve ry  p o s i t i v e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  each seminar we had a follow-up meeting h a l f  a year  l a t e r .  The e v a l u a t i o n  
of t h e  seminar a t  t h a t  p o i n t  showed an  even more p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  toward 
i t  and t h e r e  was q u i t e  an  amount of evidence t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  had 
s t a r t e d  working w i t h  some of t h e  seminar concepts i n  t h e i r  own a r e a  of 
responsLbTlt ty ,  
T h i s  f i n a l l y  l ed  t o  t h e  dec i s fon  of t h e  Managing Board t o  cont inue wi th  
t h e s e  semfnars,  t o  have our own s t a f f  t r a i n e d  a s  t r a i n e r s  and t o  cooperate  
on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of t h e  mate r5a l s  2nto G e m n .  
'RESULTS AND iPI7RTlER DEVELOPMENTS 
It took u s ,  a s  a company, about 2% y e a r s  t o  d e c i d e  on t h e  implementation 
of t h e s e  seminars.  It took u s  5 y e a r s  t o  have some 750 upper managers a s  
p a r t i c i p a n t s .  We int roduced t h e  follow-up meet ings  a s  a p a r t  of t h e  seminars 
because t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  wanted t o  s h a r e  t h e i r  exper iences  i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  
what th.ey had l ea rned  a t  t h e  seminar i n t o  p r a c t i c e .  
The process  of implementation i s  s t i l l  going on. A t  t h i s  moment one can 
say t h a t  t h e  seminar has  been broadly  accepted a s  a means of i n d i v i d u a l  
development. There i s  q v f t e  an amount of t r a n s f e r  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  pe rsona l  
a r e a  of r e s p o n s i b f l i t y  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i c i p a n t  i s  concerned. There 
a r e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  communicating some good i d e a s  where p a r t i c i p a n t s  meet 
p a r t n e r s  who haven ' t  been t o  t h e  seminar,  and t h u s  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  some 
h e s i t a t i o n  a s  t o  how some of t h e  seminar concepts  a r e  i n  harmony w i t h  
company r e g u l a t i o n s  and c u l t u r a l  environment. But t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  con t inue  
has  been taken,  and t o  make p a r t i c i p a t i o n  mandatory f o r  managers who a r e  t o  
be  promoted t o  c e ~ t a i n  f u n c t i o n s  and l e v e l s  of h ie ra rchy .  We f i n a l l y  hope 
t h a t  more and more p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  send t h e i r  own subord ina tes  t o  t h e  
seminar and then s t a r t  working t o  des ign  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e i r  own 
u n i t  i n  a  more e f f e c t i v e  way. 
Maybe we could have been more e f f e c t i v e  o u t s e l v e s  i n  managing this 
i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ n  p rocess .  But t h e r e  is  one th ing  we have l e a r n t :  T t  t a k e s  
time and needs a  continuous e f f o r t  t o  spread new i d e a s  i n  a  l a r g e  
o rgan iza t ion .  
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN A PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation is one of the most important aspects of the everyday practice 
of management and one of the central themes for much of the literature and 
research in the field of management psychology. A well founded gross theory 
of motivation has been established in the form of the Maslow hierarchy of 
needs, but the fine structure within the different need levels still lacks 
generality. 
This study is confined to motivation within the highest need level, i.e., 
the need for self-actualization. It is in the form of a case study of a 
specific product development project concerning a complex process automation 
system which was successfully developed by a group of highly motivated people. 
Being a case study the findings cannot be generalized, although in the 
experience of the author many of the findings are consistent with those in 
similar projects. The final conclusions are presented as a list of statements 
A somewhat similar case study describing a highly motivated project 
aiming at developing a new computer has been published by Tracy Kidder (1981)~. 
In the present study a series of unstructured informal interviews were 
conducted with seven persons representing various tasks within the project. 
Although the total number of persons participating in the project during the 
period of observation (1978 - 1980) was 36, the interviews gave such a 
consistent picture of the motivational aspects that they can with reasonable 
assurance be regarded as representing the entire group. 
The author of this paper was not directly involved in the development 
project although he followed it closely from his position at headquarters. 
In this paper we shall first present the result of the project--the 
DAMATIC process automation system--and the project organization. This will 
be followed by a narrative account of the interviews. The conclusion takes 
the form of a list of statements reflecting the motivational factors and a 
discussion of the general validity of the findings. 
THE DA'MATIC PROCESS AUTOMATION SYSTEM 
In the mid-1970s the Valmet Instrument Works lost a number of prestige 
orders to Honeywell, who had recently put on the market an entirely new 
digital process control system intended to replace conventional pheumatic 
and electronic analog process control systems. To stop this undesirable 
course of events the Instrument Works decided to develop a similar system. 
The system, called DAMATIC, turned out to be much more than merely a 
copy of the Honeywell system. DAMATIC, a distributed communications-oriented 
microprocessor-based automation system, incorporates a large number of 
innovations which were not present in any competitive system, for example: 
- Integration of both continuous and logic control functions in one 
single system. Even today there are still only a couple of 
successful installations of competitive systems of this kind. 
- Extremely high systems reliability. Approval given by such rigorous 
testing institutions as the International Instruments Users 
Association WIB, and Det Norske Veritas. 
- Open-ended and flexible systems architecture and communications 
structure permitting unprecedented application orientation and 
adaptation to each customer Is special needs. 
- A high level problem oriented programming language that can be used 
by process instrumentation engineers with no computer background. 
The success of the system has been demonstrated by the fact that to date 
about 200 DAMATIC systems have been sold all over the world without any 
instances of customer dissatisfaction. This is an impressive record taking 
into account the size of the Instrument Works, which is only about one tenth 
that of its largest competitors. The cost of the smallest installation sold 
to date is about US$ 30,000 and the largest about US$ 6 million. 
DAMATIC is described in more detail by Wahlstrum et a1 (1983). 
THE PROJECT 
The project can be divided into the following parts: 
- A feasibility study and project planning carried out by the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland with Instrument Works" participation during 
part of 1976 - 1977. 
- Development of specifications by the Instrument Works and the 
Technical Research Centre starting in early 1978. 
- The development of the hardware by the Instrument Works starting 
mid-1978. 
- The development of t h e  system sof tware  by t h e  Ins t rument  Works w i t h  
t h e  Technical  Research Centre  and o t h e r s  a s  s u b c o n t r a c t o r s  s t a r t i n g  
i n  l a t e  1978. 
- The dwelcpment  of t h e  app l i ca tkons  so f tware  by t h e  Ins t rument  Works 
s t a r t i n g  Tn l a t e  1978. 
- Del ive ry  of  t h e  f i r s t  DAMATIC i n  t h e  summer and f a l l  1979. The 
o r d e r  f o r  t h i s  system had been rece ived  one year  e a r l r e r .  
- Continued development a f t e r  t h e  f t r s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  Th i s  phase 
was s t a r t e d  i n  f a l l  1979 and i s  s t k l l  going on. It i s  beyond t h e  
scope of tMs paper.  
The f e a s k b i l i t y  s t u d y  was carrked o u t  tndependent ly  by t h e  Technical  
Research Centre  a s  t h e  Ins t rument  Works d t d  n o t  have enough knowledge of 
d k g i t a l  systems a t  t h a t  t ime.  Th i s  phase,  t o o ,  i s  n o t  covered by t h i s  
paper. 
The hardware and b o t h  of t h e  so f tware  p r o j e c t s  were c a r r i e d  out  under 
I n s t r m e n t  Works' p r o j e c t  management a l though same of t h e  p r o j e c t  personnel  
were from t h e  Technccal  Research Centre  and o t h e r  s u b c o n t r a c t o r s .  Most of 
t h e  Ins t rument  Worksr so f tware  p e ~ s o n n e l  were newly employed from o u t s i d e .  
Throughout t h e  p r o j e c t  a customer adv i so ry  board c o n s i s t i n g  of key persons  
in t h e  F i n n i s h  p rocess  i n d u s t r y  a c t i v e l y  followed t h e  p rogress  of t h e  
p r o j e c t ,  providing f r e s h  i d e a s ,  encouragement and c r i t i c i s m .  
When t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  had been ,received i n  summer 1978 customer key 
personnel  g o t  v e r y  a c t i v e l y  involved i n d i r e c t i n g  t h e  p r o j e c t  according t o  
t h e i r  s p e c i d  needs ,  
Yuch of t h e  work w a s  done o u t s i d e  t h e  Imstrvment Works kn s e p a r a t e  
p r e m i ~ e s  ren ted  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  t h i s  pmpose ;  a smal l  p a r t  was done a t  t h e  
Lnstrument Works and a t  tlre T e c h n i ~ a S  R e s e a ~ c h  Centre.  When t h e  system 
had been sbiyped t o  the f i . r s t  customer t h e  p r o j e c t  group moved t o  work a t  
t h e  cus tomer ' s  premises  f o r  a t h e .  
The t o t a l  e f f o r t  spen t  on t h e  p r o j e c t  between 1976 and 1980 i s  Valmet's 
t r a d e  s e c r e t .  Never the less ,  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  considered t o  be  l e s s  than 
t h a t  spen t  by l a ~ g e  compet i to r s  on developing s i m i l a r  systems. Three 
persons  weTe i n i t i a l l y  employed on t h e  p r o j e c t .  At t h e  peak 36 persons  
were d i ~ e c t l y  i.nvolved, of whom 16 were from t h e  Technical  Research Centre  
and o t h e r  subcon t rac to r s .  
MOTTVATION ACCORDING TO THE PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
A l l  t h e  i n t e r v i e w e e s  agreed t h a t  mot iva t ion  was e x c e p t i o n a l l y  h igh 
among p a r t i c i p a n t s  up t o  and inc lud ing  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  Th i s  high 
l e v e l  of mot iva t ion  was demonstrated by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  people  on t h e  
p r o j e c t  worked l i t e r a l l y  day and n i g h t ,  s a c r i f i c i n g  family  and o t h e r  
pe r sona l  i n t e a e s t s ,  and becoming emot ional ly  involved i n  t h e  outcome of 
t h e  p r o j e c t .  
Var iaus  demoti-vating e f f e c t s  were e x p e r i ~ n c e d  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  customer 
i n s t a l l a t i a n .  These were mainly  caused by s h e e r  f a t i g u e  and by some 
antagonism between t h e  sof tware  and t h e  hardwere gvoups. It was a l s o  
considered demotivating n o t  t o  know "what t o  do next";  it was f e l t  t h a t  
everything had a l r e a d y  been made and de l ive red  t o  t h e  customer. Th is  
period fol lowing t h e  f i ~ s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  phase $s no t  covered by t h i s  s tudy.  
When asked what t h e y  thought was t h e  foremost reason f o r  t h e i r  
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  h ixh  mot iva t ion ,  most f n t e w i e w e e s  gave t h e  uniqueness of t h e  
t h e  system t o  be  developed. "We had t h e  f e e l f n g  we were making something 
a b s o l u t e l y  new and unprecedented f n  t h e  h5story  of process  automation." 
Interviewees  q u a l i f i e d  t h f s  s ta tement  by mentioning new t e c h n i c a l  
f e a t u r e s  no t  p resen t  i n  compet i t ive  systems. Others mentioned t h a t  t h e  
advanced technology employed was new t o  them. "I: was working wi th  something 
new t h a t  I h e w  was important f o r  me t o  know about." 
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  success  of t h e  pvo jec t  was of v i t a l  importance t o  
t h e  s u r v i v a l  of t h e  Instrument Wo~ks 5n competf t ive  m a ~ k e t s  was a h igh ly  
mot ivat ing f a c t o r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  t h e  executiwes involved.  The Technical  
Research Centre  employees a l s o  mentioned t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  of being confronted 
f o r  t h e  f i ~ s t  ime w i t h  an  important r ea l - lTfe  p ~ o b l e m  of l a r g e  p ropor t ions .  
The importance of t h e  p r o j e c t  was accentuated by t o p  management suppor t .  
"When we asked f o r  resources  we go t  them." "Top management was i n t e r e s t e d  
and showed i t  . I' 
Next t o  t h e  uniqueness and importance of t h e  end product ,  people seemed 
t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  cons iderab le  freedom of a c t i o n  g iven  t o  them. This  ranged 
from execu t ives  having t h e  r i g h t  t o  dec ide  on product s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  
t e c h o l o g y  t o  be used,  and d i v i s i o n  of work and resources ,  t o  t h e  people  
b u i l d i n g  t h e  system having t h e  r i x h t  t o  dec5de on t e c h n i c a l  d e t a i l s  and 
t h e i r  own working t imes and h a b i t s .  It was a l s o  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  people 
involved d id  n o t  have any d u t i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
Top management s t y l e  was desc r ibed  a s  s o f t  ( i n  a p o s i t i v e  and mot iva t ing  
way) and democratic.  "The top  man always l i s t e n e d  t o  u s  b e f o r e  he made a 
dec i s ion  about m a t t e r s  of concern t o  us ."  "There was a complete absence of 
compet i t ion among t h e  team members." 
The high q u a l i t y  of t h e  p r o j e c t  personnel  was mentioned i n  s e v e r a l  
in te rv iews ,  Most of them were v e r y  young, which was considered a p o s i t i v e  
f a c t o r .  "Young people have t o  make a c a r e e r ,  and they have t h e  necessary  
stamina and endurance." Even i f  most of than were young and r e l a t i v e l y  
inexperi.eneed, they imcluded people wi th  " the  h i g h e s t  Iwel of know-how 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  Fi.nland." Such were some of t h e  e x p e r t s  from t h e  Technical  
Research Centre  and some of t h e  employees of t h e  Instrument Works who had 
e a r l i e r  taken p a r t  in developing E W T I C  100, a s u c c e s s f u l  e l e c t r o n i c  analog 
c o n t r o l  system, and a m~croprocessor-based x-ray genera to r  ( t h e  f i r s t  i n  t h e  
world) .  
Host of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  f e l t  t h a t  working c o n d i t i o n s  were e x c e l l e n t  
and had a p o s i t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e i ~  mot ivat ion.  They mentioned t h a t  they 
enjoyed working 2n peace and i s o l a t i o n  ( the  premises ren ted  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  
wege some d i s t a n c e  from t h e  main p l a n t ) .  "We were n o t  d i s t u r b e d  by v i s i t o r s  
and undue management a t t e n t i o n . "  "The i s o l a t i o n  c rea ted  e x c e l l e n t  team 
spiri t .  " 
The p o s i t i v e  f a c t o r s  5ncluded s eve ra l  r e f e r r i n g  t o  p r o j e c t  management 
and leadersh ip .  "Objectives were c l e a r  from the mtset f o r  a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
on t h e  p r o j e c t .  Abundant resources  and top management support  were a l s o  
ment5oned a s  were good organixati 'on, divssi'on of work and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
and flow of information.  Such important f a c t o r s  a s  d i v i s i o n  of t he  system 
i n t o  subsystems w i t h  a c l e a r  d e f h i t i o n  of t h e  boundaries between t h e  
s u b s ~ t e m s  seemed t o  have been w e l l  understood. Such l e ade r s h ip  "ginnnicks" 
a s  kirk-off meetings,  c e l e b ~ a t i w n s ,  5nfomna1 ge t - toge thers  and sauna 
weni'ngs were abundantly used and g r e a t l y  apprecfated.  
The sof tware  people were motivated by w ~ k i ' n g  d t h  and having t h e  
r e s p o n s i 6 i l i t y  f o r  a l l  t h e  d i f  f e r e n t  phases of dwelopimg t h e  subsystem 
ass igned t o  them: def in ing  t h e  subsystem, plannimg 5ts implementation, and 
programming, t es t img,  and doczlraenting i t .  They obviously p r e f e r r ed  t h i s  
h o l i s t i c  approach t o  t h e  u sua l  assembly-line method of sof tware  work. 
Without excepti'on everybody agreed on t h e  importance of working c lo se ly  
toge ther  ~ 5 t h  t h e  customers: 
- The customer o r de r s  put tremendous, mot ivat ing pressure  on t h e  
p r o j e c t  schedule i n  a p o s i t i v e  sense.  An expensive p l a n t  would 
have been s tanding i d l e  i f  DAMATTC had no t  been ope ra t i ona l  by 
t h e  f i ~ s t  days of J u l y  1979. T t  was emphasized t h a t  t h e  p ressure  
came d i r e c t l y  from t h e  customer t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  members and no t  
along t h e  u sua l  o r gan i za t i ona l  channels which perhaps would have 
been considered demotivati'ng . 
- The keen i n t e r e s t  of customer personnel i n  t he  success  of t h e  
pzoj  e c t  was exper5enced a s  hi'ghly mot iva t ing ,  e s p e c i a l l y  because 
some of t h e  p r i n c i y a l  innovatimns emanated from the  f i r s t  customer 
t o  buy t h e  system. 
7 Working phys i ca l l y  c l o s e  t o  a customer, even i n  t he  customer's  
p l a n t ,  g i ve s  a f e e l i n g  of working w2th smmething t ang ib l e  and 
important im c o n t r a s t  t o  aeadem2c work, 
- The i n t e r e s t  of t h e  speciwl customer adv isory  board i n  t h e  
development work was a1s.o seen a s  a pos - f t ive  f a c t o r .  
One of t h e  persons interviewed mentioned a r a t h e r  cur ious  f a c t o r  which 
may be t r u e  never the less :  "We d id  no t  r e a l l y  know i n  advance what a 
tremendous r i s k  of f a i l u r e  t h e r e  was i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  and how d i f f i c u l t  and 
complicated it r e a l l y  was. Had we known, our mot iva t ion  might have been 
lower and t he  r e s u l t s  correspond5ngly less f avora We. " Several  of t he  
in tenr iewees  thought t h a t  "good luck'' was an important success  f a c t o r  i n  
t h i s  p r o j e c t .  
The p r o j e c t  w a s  a good demonstratian of t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of some 
t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts ,  e .g . ,  t h e  theory of r e l i a b s l i t y ,  and some advanced 
computer sc ience  s u b j e c t s ,  e . g . ,  i n  cormnuni'cations and high l e v e l  languages.  
This  was f e l t  by the young and h igh ly  q u a l i f i e d  group t o  be  worthwh*le 
per se, 
Some s t r i c t l y  personal  f a c t o r s  were a l s o  mentioned. These included 
t h e  opportuni ty  of doing a s  much paid overtime a s  one wanted. 
Thi* sectiwn t ake s  the, form Q$ a set of mot iva to r s  t h a t  t h e  au thor  
be l i eve s  are. tltue. a s  m c h  f o r  t h i ~  p ro j ec t  a s  f o r  s i m i l a r  complex development 
p r o j e c t s  being iraplemented f o r  the  f i ~ s t  ime, a s i n g  new technology. No 
order  of importance i s  given although some of t he  mot iva tors  received 
w i d e ~  support  than o the r s .  
- tJorki'ng on p r o j e c t s  s t a f f e d  wi th  b r i l l i a n t  young people a longside 
o l d e r ,  more e x p e r i ~ n e e d  people. 
- Creat ing somethfng t h a t  is bel ieved by t h e  team members t o  be  new, 
advanced, and unique. Th5s a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  methods used a s  wel l  a s  
t o  t h e  end ~ e s u l t ,  
- Outside pyessure in t h e  form of a  f ixed  de l i ve ry  time o r  f e a r  of 
l o s ing  t h e  market t o  competit ion esgecea l ly  when t h i s  p ressure  is  
d i ~ e c t e d  s t r a i g h t  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  g ~ o u p .  
- Working c l o s e  t o  t a n g i b l e  problems and s i t u a t i o n s .  
- Working on a  well-managed p r o j e c t .  "Well-managed" means a l l  t h e  
u sua l  q u a l i t i e s  such a s  e f f e c t i v e  de l ega t i on  of a u t h o r i t y  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  a  low organ iza t iona l  l e v e l ,  c l e a r l y  understood 
ob j ec t i ve s ,  top management support  and a t t e n t i o n ,  and democratic 
l eadersh ip .  
- F i r s t  c l a s s  resources ,  premises and o t h e r  working condi t ions .  
A glance a t  t he  above list sugges t s  t h a t  it is almost t r i v i a l .  The 
only mi ld ly  s u r p r i s i n g  s ta tement  is  t h e  one i nd i ca t i ng  t h a t  "outs ide  pressure"  
i s  b e n e f i c i a l  f o r  mot ivat ion.  P r o j e c t  members a r e  u sua l l y  sh ie lded  from such 
pressure ,  which tend t o  be  t h e  concern of t h e  management. The importance of 
providing f i ' r s t -c lass  working condit%ons 5s no t  s u r p r i s i n g  but  is  o f t e n  
overlooked by management, 
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TRAINING OF HUMAN RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION 
Oldr ich Cervenka 
Technical Director, CKD Praha, Prague, CSSR 
One of t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  more o r  l e s s  in f luences  an innova t ion  from the  
o r i g i n  of an i d e a  t o  i t s  r e a l i z a t i o n  i s  t h e  human f a c t o r .  I n  my b r i e f  pre- 
s e n t a t i o n  I would l i k e  t o  mention some of t h e  methods and exper iences  con- 
ce rn ing  t r a i n i n g  and development of human resources  i n  innovat ion c r e a t i o n  
and r e a l i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  concern CKD Praha. 
S t a f f  educat ion i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c ,  engineer ing,  marketing,  management 
and product ion f i e l d s  e s s e n t i a l l y  concerns two major groups of people: t h e  
s t a f f  a l r e a d y  employed by t h e  c o n c e r n , a n d s t u d e n t s  of u n i v e r s i t i e s  and secon- 
dary schools  and appren t ices  who have e i t h e r  been p repar ing  themselves f o r  
t h e  work w i t h i n  t h e  concern o r  who a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  f u t u r e  employment i n  
t h e  concern. 
The main goal  of educat ion i s  t o  c r e a t e  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i v e  
management of changes occur ing  through s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge and aimed a t  t h e  
r a p i d  r e a l i z a t i o n  of t h e s e  changes i n  t h e  form of product o r  technology in- 
novat ion.  The ways l e a d i n g  t o  t h i s  goal c o n s i s t  i n :  
o inc reased  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ,  f a c i l i t a t i n g  l e a r n i n g ,  understanding and 
employing new s c i e n t i f i c  knolwedge and thus  be ing  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  
adapt q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  p rospec t ive  needs;  
o developing t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  manage, o rgan ize  and cooperate  i n  
teams a s  an i n e v i t a b l e  p recondi t ion  f o r  s o l v i n g  new. t a s k s ;  
o developing t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  t a c k l e  problems i n  a new c r e a t i v e  
manner . 
To ensure  t h s e  goa l s ,  CKD Praha employs p a r t l y  i t s  own f o r c e s  and p a r t l y  the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  fo l lowing from long-term c o n t r a c t s  concluded more than 10 
y e a r s  ago wi th  
- t h e  Char les  Univers i ty  of Prague 
- t h e  Czech Technical  Univers i ty  i n  Prague 
- The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 
- the School of Economics in Prague. 
CKD Praha's own forces are concentrated in the so-called "Works Insti- 
tute", the aim of which is to train and increase the qualifications of the 
technical staff and workers of the concern. This is achieved by organizing: 
o courses and seminars on special topics, e. g., computer technol- 
ogy, automation of technological processes, realiability of 
machines and quipment , rationalization, management, etc. ; 
o preparatory courses for study at secondary schools and univer- 
sities; 
o adaptation courses for new employees with secondary and univer- 
sity education who, during the first year of employment go 
through so-called entrance practice in accordance with the 
concern's pre-set and quarterly evaluated program; 
o re-qualification courses ; 
o courses for increasing the qualifications of workers. 
Approximatrey 200 people, of which 90% are CKD employees, take part in ensur- 
ing the special contents of these courses. All costs connected with the 
training are covered by CKD. 
In 1982, for example, more than 7,000 technicians and 12,000 workers took 
part in courses and seminars for increasing qualifications. 1,310 employees 
attended study courses, 273 of which were at university level, and 82 attended 
special studies to achieve a higher academic degree -- "Candidate of Science1'*. 
Employees attending courses and qualifying for university-level or higher 
academic degrees receive certain exemptions from their work for study and 
examinations with no loss of earnings. 
On the basis of the experience of the CKD Works Institute, results from 
these courses and seminars are better when there is a higher share of lec- 
turers directly from CKD, and a necessary prerequisite is, of course, to use 
the best CKD specialists for these lectures. This is usually very difficult 
with respect to their busy timetables, etc., and, of course, in finding suit- 
able substitutes for the times they are away from their work place. It is 
difficult to convince managers that they are also an object as well as a sub- 
ject of the training: they usually understand well why they have to further 
educate themselves, but they usually consider that the education of others 
should be the duty of specialised departments only. 
From the viewpoint of utilizing external sources for the education of 
CKD staff, i.e., cooperation with universities and the Czechoslovak Academy 
of Sciences, I would like to mention several principles on which this long- 
term cooperation is based. It is developed in: 
o basic and applied research in the form of a mutual exchange of 
results; cooperation of departments in solving and realizing 
approved research tasks; mutual assistance in the field of 
*Equivalent to Doctor of Technology (editor's note). 
measurement and ins t rument  technology i n  s e l e c t e d  exper imental  
.work; and a s s i s t a n c e  i n  ins t rument  and equipment product ion.  
o  educa t ing  s t u d e n t s ,  post-graduates and s c i e n t i f i c  personnel  s o  
t h a t  o rgan iza t ions  can mutually f a c i l i t a t e  o rgan iz ing  education- 
a l  s t a y s  of t h e i r  employees i n  e x t e r n a l  departments.  
o  c r e a t i n g  jo ing  resea rch  c e n t e r s  o r  l a b o r a t o r i e s .  
o  mutual u t i l i z a t i o n  of s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  t h e  s p e c i a l  and educa t iona l  
bodies  of both  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
General agreements on cooperat ion,  a s  a  r u l e  f o r  f ive-year  pe r iods ,  a r e  
f i l l e d  wi th  concre te  c o n t r a c t s  between t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f a c u l t i e s  o r  r esea rch  
departments of t h e  Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences  and t h e  r e s e a r c h  and de- 
velopment departments of i n d i v i d u a l  CKD e n t e r p r i s e s  o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  CKD Re- 
sea rch  I n s t i t u t e ,  which a r e  then i n  d i r e c t  working c o n t a c t .  
The exper ience of t h e  l a s t  t e n  years  has  shown t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  
l a r g e  CKD s c i e n t i f i c  and r e s e a r c h  base ,  it would n o t  be  p o s s i b l e  t o  s o l v e  
a l l  t h e  necessary  and t e c h n i c a l l y  demanding t a s k s  wi thout  t h i s  cooperat ion.  
Moreover, t h e  d i r e c t  c o n t a c t  between t h e  resea rch  and development s t a f f  of 
CKD and t h e  departments of b a s i c  resea rch  a t  t h e  i n s t i t u t e s  of t h e  Czecho- 
s lovak Academy of Sciences  and u n i v e r s i t i e s  enables  CKD employees t o  f u r t h e r  
i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and t o  become acquainted wi th  t h e  l a -  
t e s t  r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s .  Also,  t h e  d i r e c t  c o n t a c t  between t h e s e  resea rch  de- 
partments and product ion departments provides  t h e  oppor tuni ty  f o r  d i r e c t  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  of t h e  achieved r e s u l t s  wi th  i n d u s t r y  needs and opens t h e  door 
f o r  t h e i r  r a p i d  r e a l i z a t i o n .  
Th is  c l o s e  coopera t ion  wi th  i n d u s t r y  a l s o  f a c i l i t a t e s  s o l v i n g  t a s k s  
which go f a r  beyond t h e i r  own p o s s i b i l i t i e s  wi th  regard t o  investment,  ma- 
t e r i a l  and personnel  demands. 
Las t  b u t  n o t  l e a s t ,  c r e a t i n g  j o i n t  teams f o r  s o l v i n g  concre te  s c i e n t i f i c  
and t e c h n i c a l  t a s k s  i s ,  i n  our  exper ience,  one of t h e  b e s t  ways t o  develop 
t h e  cooperat ion,  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and management s k i l l s  of workers towards r a p i d  
r e a l i z a t i o n  of innovat ion.  
The i n s t i t u t e s  of t h e  Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and u n i v e r s i t i e s  
enables  CKD employees t o  a t t a i n  h igher  academic degrees.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
a  number of l e a d i n g  s p e c i a l i s t s  t ake  p a r t  i n  t each ing  s t u d e n t s  i n  t h e  form 
of e x t e r n a l  p rofessorsh ips ,  a s s i s t a n t  p rofessorsh ips  and membership i n  exam- 
i n a t i o n  boards,  s c i e n t i f i c  counc i l s ,  e t c .  Also t h e  m a t e r i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  of 
i n d u s t r y  f a c i l i t a t e s  b u i l d i n g  s p e c i a l i z e d  departments f o r  educa t ing  s t u d e n t s  
aimed a t  p r o s p e c t i v e  f u t u r e  needs. The f a c u l t y  of e l e c t r i c a l  eng ineer ing  a t  
t h e  Czech Technical  Univers i ty  i n  Prague, f o r  example, e s t a b l i s h e d  a  s p e c i a l  
c e n t e r  f o r  t h e  educa t ion  of des ign  eng ineers  employing CAD i n  t h e  department 
of e l e c t r i c a l  machines, and a  c e n t e r  f o r  s t u d e n t s  s p e c i a l i z e d  i n  des igning 
microe lec t ron ic  p a r t s ,  making f u l l  use  of computer technology, was e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  t h e  department of m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c s .  
Bui lding t h e s e  c e n t e r s  a t  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  enables  s t u d e n t s  t o  become 
acquainted wi th  t h e  chosen t o p i c s  dur ing  t h e i r  s tudy  and, through p a r t i c i p a -  
t i o n  i n  s o l v i n g  a c t u a l  t a s k s  s e t  by i n d u s t r y ,  become acquainted wi th  t h e  work 
they w i l l  do i n  p r a c t i c e .  Th i s  speeds up t h e i r  a d a p t a t i o n  and, i n  manufac- 
t u r i n g  p l a n t s ,  can a l s o  speed up t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of new technology, which i s  
sometimes met wi th  a  conserva t ive  a t t i t u d e  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  s t a f f .  
In 1982, for example, almost 100 tasks concerning CKD Praha innovations 
were solved in cooperation with the Czech Technical University in Prague. In 
the electrical engineering branches they concerned the further development of 
power semi-conductor devices,automated management systems, drives fed from 
semi-conductor converters, special measurement technology, use of opto- 
electronics, automation of design engineering, automation of testing, etc. 
The task of educating new CKD employees, who are graduates of technical, 
economic, management or other schools, is undertaken by state vocational 
schools and universities. The education of production workers is undertaken 
by CKD in its so-called "Apprentice Training Center". Study at secondary vo- 
cational schools lasts four years, and, depending on the branch, four or five 
years at technical universities. Branches at the faculty of electrical en- 
gineering have five-year study periods. 
The possibility also exists for part-time study (for employed persons) 
which lasts six years. The main bulk of this part-time study consists of 
studying the literature on one's own, with students attending consultations 
10 to 15 times a year. At the m d  of each term they are put through practi- 
cal exercises and sit for examinations. Altogether in 1983, 273 CKD employ- 
ees attended the university level courses for employed persons. 
Post-graduate work enables university graduates to widen thier knowledge 
of the latest developments in a particular field. This is organized in the 
form of external study and has an innovation, specialization or re-qualifica- 
tion character. In 1983-1984, for example, the following courses were organ- 
ized at the faculty of electrical engineering: 
computing methods of dynamic systems - innovation. 
automated management systems - re-qualification. 
microprocessors and microcomputers - innovation. 
technology of hybrid integrated circuits - specialization. 
computer software - specialization. 
communication systems with program control - specialization. 
increasing quality and reliability of electronic products - 
specialization. 
economical utilization of energy in industry - innovation. 
microelectronics and opto-electronics - specialization. 
transmission technology - innovation. 
Study at Czechoslovak schools, including medical care, is free of charge. 
Any student whose parents' income per member of the family falls below a cer- 
tain minimum is also awarded a state scholarship. Where good results are 
achieved, another second type of scholarship ,is granted. Apart from these 
two types of state scholarships, students can also be awarded scholarships 
from enterprises or from the central bodies of state administration. Scholar- 
ships from enterprises, in the amount of 30-35% of an average monthly wage 
in the CSSR, areprovided for five years to students who agree to work in a 
given organization for five years after finishing their studies. In 1982, 
CKD granted such scholarships to 194 students. On the whole CKD annualy en- 
gages almost 200 university graduates and 300 graduates from secondary vo- 
cational schools. 
The long-term cooperation between CKD and universities, based on con- 
tracts, the participation of CKD specialists in the education process at the 
universities and in their management bodies, and the transition of a number 
of leading CKD specialists into the roles of assistant professors, professors 
and deans has  f a c i l i t a t e d  i n  formulat ing f u t u r e  i n d u s t r y  requirements a s  f a r  
a s  t h e  educat ion of new s c i e n t i f i c  workers and engineers  i s  concerned, and 
i n  r e a l i z i n g  them i n  t h e  form of in t roduc ing  new s tudy s u b j e c t s ,  even whole 
branches of s tudy,  and b u i l d i n g  l a b o r a t o r i e s  and o t h e r  f a c i l i t i e s .  
I n  1982, f o r  example, t h e  School of Economics i n  Prague in t roduced a  
new branch of s tudy,  i . e . ,  " S c i e n t i f i c  and Technical  Information" -- t h e  
aim of which i s  t o  educate  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d .  Requa l i f i -  
c a t i o n  post-graduate s tudy  i s  a l s o  organized i n  t h i s  branch as  we l l .  For 
t h e  f u r t h e r  educat ion of t h e  product ion category of employees, CKD has i t s  
own so-cal led Apprent ice  T r a i n i n g  Center,  which annual ly  accep t s  almost 
1,500 p u p i l s  a t  t h e  end of t h e i r  b a s i c  nine-year schoo l  educat ion.  Here 
s tudy i s  organized i n  three-year cyc les  dur ing  which t h e  a p p r e n t i c e  acqu i res  
b a s i c  t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  knowledgeinaspecialtraining c e n t e r .  During 
t h e  l a s t  yea r  they o b t a i n  t h e  necessa ry  product ion t r a i n i n g  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  
f a c t o r y  where they w i l l  l a t e r  work. S e l e c t  branches of e l e c t r i c a l  engineer-  
i n g  t r a i n i n g  were in t roduced s e v e r a l  yea rs  ago w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  develop- 
ment of new e l e c t r o n i c  branches and new technolog ies  (NC machines, automation, 
e t c . ) .  Here an extended t h e o r e t i c a l  s tudy  and f ive-year  per iod of apprent ice-  
s h i p  t r a i n i n g  i s  necessary .  Tra in ing  is  f i n i s h e d  by t a k i n g  school-leaving 
exams and i s  of t h e  same l e v e l  a s  secondary v o c a t i o n a l  educat ion.  
The aim of t h e s e  measures was t o  b e t t e r  p repare  product ion workers f o r  
t h e  complicated t a s k s  involved i n  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment product ion and i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and i n  making f u l l  use  of.NC technology i n  product ion techniques .  
E x i s t i n g  exper ience shows t h a t  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  p a r t  of t h e  s tudy  i s  r a t h e r  
good, t h e r e a r e ,  however, c e r t a i n  comments concerning t h e  p r a c t i c a l  t r a i n i n g ,  
Experience has  shown t h a t  innovat ion processes  a r e  more demanding w i t h  regard  
t o  management a c t i v i t y  and i t s  i n t e n s i t y  and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  The dependence 
of innovat ion r e s u l t s  on t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of managers and workers i n  re-  
sea rch ,  development, product ion and marketing i s  obvious. Education i s  one 
of t h e  t o o l s  f o r  developing o rgan iza t ion  and human resources  management. 
Therefore ,  we consider  paying due a t t e n t i o n  t o  educat ion goa l s  a s  one of our 
main t a s k s  and we make every e f f o r t  t o  ensure  t h a t  educat ion i s  n o t  an aim 
i n  i t s e l f ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a  source  and s t i m u l a t o r  f o r  t h e  f u r t h e r  development of 
human resources .  
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I n  t h e  innovat ion l i t e r a t u r e  one o f t e n  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  product innovat ion 
from process  innovat ion.  The l a t t e r  almost f nva r i ab ly  d e a l s  w i th  process  
innovat ion i n  t h e  product5on a r ea .  In  t h5s  paper I w i l l  touch upon another 
type of process  innovat ion,  namely wi th  r e s pec t  t o  management dec i s i on  
making, through t h e  u se  of dec i s ion  support  systems (he r ea f t e r  DSS) . My 
examples wi.11 i.n f a c t  r e l a t e  t o  marketing problems, and I w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  
more spec2f5cal ly  d i s c u s s  market2ng decfs ion  support  systems. 
Many models a r e  b u i l t ,  few a r e  used 2 s  a "dictum" t h a t  has  almost become 
a common p l ace  i n  t h e  Operations/Management Science l i t e r a t u r e .  There has 
been much concern wi th  t h i s  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  i n  t h e  Management Science 
p rofess ion ,  and oveT t he  l a s t  15 years  o r  s o  a very  s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t  was 
made t o  remedy t h e  s i tuat i -on.  P a r t l y  a s  a r e s u l t  of t h a t  e f f o r t ,  l a b e l s  
such a s  Decision Support Systems, I n t e r a c t i v e  Systems, Decision Calculus  
Models and t h e  l i k e  a r e  a l s o  becoming household words. Although t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n t  l a b e l s  may ~ e f e r  t o  somewhat d5f f e r e n t  t h ings ,  they have i n  common 
t h a t  they a r e  blendimg d a t a ,  s t a t h t i c a l  methods, mathematical  models and 
techniques  and e a s i . 1 ~  manipulable and i n t e ~ a c t i v e  input-output dev5ces.l)  
The system 2s t y p i c a l l y  h t e n d e d  t o  he lp  management in monitori-ng, analyzing 
and a c t i n g  upon f t s  envi-ronment. Pi'gure 1-based on Li ' t t l e  (1979)-shows a 
g raph ica l  r ep r e sen t a t i on .  
My main ob j ec t i ve  here  w i l l  be t o  d i s cus s  a s e t  of f a c t o r s  t h a t  
determine t h e  l ike l ihood  of acceptance,  and t h e r e f o r e  of usage of such 
DSS. Here we w i l l  pr imar i ly  d e a l  wi th  t h e  human aspec t s .  We w i l l  a l s o  
u s e  DSS and models in terchangeably.  
The l ike l ihood  of model acceptance depends on t h r e e  main ca t ego r i e s  of 
fac to rs :* )  
1. Model-related f a c t o r s .  
2 ,  Organization-related f a c to r s .  
Figure  1. Main components of a  marketing d e c i s i o n  support  system. 
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3 .  Implementat5on s t r a t e g y  f a c t o r s .  
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Likelthood of implementat5on of deccsi-n support  systems w i l l  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  p lace  depend on t h e  under lyfng models, and more i n  p a r t i c u l a r  on 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  r e l a t e  t o  ( i )  model s t r u c t u r e ;  ( i i )  pa ramete r iza t ion ;  
( i i i l  v a l i d a t c o n ;  and ( i v )  cost-versus-benef i t  c o n s i d e r a t  ions .  These f a c t o r s  
and subfac tozs  a r e  15s ted  in Table  1. Most of t h e s e  have been d i scussed  a t  
l e n g t h  e l ~ e w h e r e . ~ )  Tn t h i s  paper we w i l l  r e s t r i c t  ourse lves  t o  making some 
comments on paramete r fza t ion .  
Paramete r iza t ion  of models is  o f t e n  a  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k .  I n  many c a s e s  
h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  a r e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  i n  q u a n t i t y ,  q u a l i t y  o r  v a r i a b i l i t y  t o  
permit  r e l i a b l e  e s t i m a t i o n  by,  f o r  example, econometric techniques .  More 
important ,  howwer,  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  even when such es t imat ion  i s  f e a s i b l e ,  
t h e  u s e r s  of DSS t y p i c a l l y  r e s e n t  k t  on t h e  ground t h a t  t h e  p a s t  cannot 
s e r v e  a s  an  adequate b a s i s  f o r  f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n  making i n  a  changing and 
dynamic environment. 'Marketing DSS t h e r e f o r e  become much more accep tab le  
when a  p rov i s ion  is  made f o r  supplying s u b j e c t i v e  i n p u t s  and s u b j e c t i v e  
e s t i m a t i o n .  The b a s i c  i d e a  being t h a t  t h e  manager's exper ience is  used 
f o r  pa ramete r iza t ion  r a t h e r  than t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t s .  'Managers t y p i c a l l y  
favor  t h i s  approach f o r  two main reasons:  ( i )  They b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  
day-to-day exper5ence w2th t h e  market envrionrnent g i v e s  them a  much more 
Table 1. Model r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s .  
Model S t ruc tu r e :  o Simple 
o Complete 
o Adaptive 
o Robust 
Parameter izat ion:  o On t h e  b a s i s  of ob j ec t i ve  d a t a  
o On t h e  b a s i s  of experience 
Val idat ion:  o "Face" v a l i d i t y  
o S t a t i s t i c a l  v a l i d i t y  
o P r ed i c t i ve  v a l i d i t y  
o Va l i d i t y  i n  use 
Cost and Benef i t s :  o Cost 
o Di rec t  b e n e f i t s  
o I n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t s  
up-to-date view of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  f o r ce s  a t  work i n  t h e  market p lace  than do 
h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a ;  ( i i )  It a c t i v e l y  involves  them i n  t h e  development of t h e  
DSS, and a s  such con t r i bu t e s  t o  team bui ld ing  between developers and u se r s  
of t he  system, and t o  g iv ing  t he  u se r  a f e e l i n g  of con t ro l  over t he  DSS. 
A warning may be i n  o rder  here .  I n  some ca se s  managers w i l l  e x p l o i t  
sub j ec t i ve  es t imat ion  t o  cons t ruc t  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  prophecies.  Let u s  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  wi th  an  example from a company t h a t  wanted t o  apply a DSS 
t o  improve t h e  process  of a l l o c a t i n g  marketing resources  t o  i t s  d i f f e r e n t  
product l i n e s .  One of t h e  i npu t s  i n t o  the  system was t h e  s u b j e c t i v e l y  
measured responsiveness of t h e  market t o  these  resources  ( r e l a t i v e  t o  
compet i t ive  e f f o r t )  and t o  a change i n  q u a l i t y  of t h e  product ( r e l a t i v e  t o  
q u a l i t y  of competing produc ts ) .  The curve l abe led  " f i r s t "  i n  Figure  2 
shows t h e  estimated response curve f o r  one of t h e  product groups o r i g i n a l l y  
prw5ded by company management. Ih f a c t ,  i t  turned ou t  t h a t  t h e  company 
wanted t o  abandon t h e  product l i n e .  Given t he  i n i t i a l  response curves  t h e  
DSS ind ica ted  t h a t  t h e  product group was p r o f i t a b l e .  Management t h e r e f o r e  
re-estimated t h e  response curves  u n t f l  i n  a t h i r d  i t e r a t i o n  ( see  curves  
l abe led  "thi.rdl' i.n F igure  2)  t h e  DSS was conform t o  t h e i r  a p r i o r i  th ink ing  
s i n c e  5 t  ind ica ted  t h a t  any d o l l a r  invested en t he  marketing of t h i s  product 
group would have a nega t ive  r e t u r n .  
We should add t h a t  t h e  danger of misusing sub j ec t i ve  es t imat ion  is  much 
smal ler  f o r  r e c u r r e n t  dec i s i ons  where people can be e a s i l y  made accountable 
f o ~  t h e i ~  judgments by l a t e r  conf ron ta t ion  between estimates and r e a l i t y .  
I n  s i n g l e  dec i s i on  s i t u a t i o n s  asking people t o  c a r e f u l l y  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  
judgments may a l s o  reduce t h e  danger. 
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Figure 2a. Market share  a s  a func t ion  of r e l a t i v e  personal  s e l l i n g .  
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Figure  2b. Market share  a s  a func t ion  of r e l a t i v e  value.  
I n  any even t ,  i t  is  f a i r  t o  say t h a t  t h e  i n t roduc t i on  of exper ience 
based paramete r iza t ion  has  been t h e  s i n g l e  most important f a c t o r  i n  improving 
t h e  degree of acceptance of DSS i n  marketkng, and i n  reducing t he  r e s i s t a n c e  
t o  change assoc ia ted  wi th  t h e  in t roduc t ion  of a DSS. 
ORGANIZATTON RELATED PACTORS 
Decisimn support  systems a r e  developed i n  co l l abo ra t i on  wi th ,  and used 
by, people who work im o r g a n k z a t i ~ n s ,  The probab i l2 ty  of model acceptance 
w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  no t  j u s t  be dependent on model r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s ,  but  w i l l  a l s o  
be inf luenced by human components. We can s tudy t he se  a t  t h r e e  l e v e l s :  a t  
t h e  personal  l e v e l ;  a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t he  r e l a t i o n  between model bu i l de r  and 
u s e r ;  and a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  o rgan tza t ion .  
Personal  Level 
Dkffenent i nd i v i dua l s  have d$f fe ren t  capac5 t ies  f o r  process ing informat ion.  
Some aTe capable  of processimg s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of v e r y  complex and i n t r i c a t e  
islformatisn,  w h e ~ e a s  o t h e ~ s  a laeady exper ience 8 i . f f i cu l t i e s  i n  t r y i n g  t o  
i n t e g v a t e  informat+on a t  much lower l e v e l s  of complexity. I n  o ther  words--and 
t o  use  t h e  terminology of Schroder , Driver and Stzeuf e r t  (1967) - - in tegrat ive  
comp1exi.t~ v a r i e s  a c r o s s  i n d i v i d u a l s .  O r  i.f w e  t r a n s l a t e  t h a t  in terms of 
models: The opt imal  degree  of model deeai.1 v a r i e s  a c r o s s  u s e r s .  A s  a 
consequence i t  5s desi .rable t o  h 5 l d  models 5n an  i m t e r a c t i v e  and modular 
way. A s  such t h e  u s e r  can t h o u g h  answering a series of q u e s t i o n s  i n  an 
i n t e r a c t i v e  mode, s e l e c t  t h e  model complexi.ty most s u i t a b l e  t o  him. 
I n t e r p e r s o n a l  Lwe.1 
A c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  i n  determining t h e  implementation chances i s  t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  between model buclder  (MB) and model u s e r  (MU). Churchmar. and 
S c h a i n b l a t t  (1965) have proposed a simple typology d e s c r i b i n g  f o u r  b a s i c  
p a t t e r n s  of k n t e r a c t i a n  between managers and r e s e a r c h e r s .  I f  we s u b s t i t u t e  
manager by lnodel u s e r  (MU) and resea rcher  by model b u i l d e r  (MB) we o b t a i n  
t h e  typology desc r ibed  i n  Table 2 .  
Table 2 .  Model b u i l d e r  (MB) - model use r  (MU) i n t e r f a c e .  
MB 
understands 
MU 
MB 
does n o t  understand 
MU 
MU understands MB Mutual 
unders tanding Communication 
MU does no t  
understand MB Separa te  func t ions  
'Roughly speakimg t h e  e n t r i e s  can b e  descr5bed as fol lows:  
Separate function. The f u n c t i o n  of MU and MB a r e  seen a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
s e p a r a t e .  It i s  a s i t u a t i o n  where l i t t l e  o r  no i n t e r a c t i o n  t a k e s  p lace .  
C o m i c a t i o n .  Here i t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  MU does n o t  need t o  have 
deep i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  problems f a c i n g  t h e  MB. It i s  then t h e  MU who must 
p e n e t r a t e  t h e  way of th ink ing  of t h e  MB, such t h a t  he  can more c a r e f u l l y  
communicate h i s  problem t o  t h e  l a t t e r .  
Persuasiun. I n  t h i s  p a t t e r n ,  t h e  MI3 must p u t  s u f f i c i e n t  e f f o r t  i n t o  
g e t t i n g  a grasp of t h e  problems and t h e  way of th ink ing  of t h e  MU. The 
underlying assumption i s  t h a t  t h e  MU is  too  busy t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  himself wi th  
t h e  methodology and t h e  jargon of t h e  MB. 
M~ttwZ under)standi?q. T h i s  c e l l  combines t h e  p o s i t i v e  a s p e c t s  of 
communi.catton and persuasion.  
It should be clear that this typology re resents the extremes of a 
continuum, and that refinements are possible.e) The simple representation, 
however, suffices for our purpose. Tt is instructive to examine what MBs 
and MUs themselves consider the appropriate pattern of interaction. We 
first refer to two American studies, one by Dyckman (1967) and another by 
Duncan (1974). Some elements of the study are shown in Table 3. Again we 
use MBs and MUs rather than researchers and managers. The figures in the 
table are to be interpreted as follows: In the Dyckman study, for example, 
16 percent of the MBs agree that separate function is an appropriate pattern 
of interaction. In the category of MUs 42 percent agree. The sum of each 
column is larger than 100 because respondents may find more than one pattern 
appropriate.  his seems to have been very much the case in the Dyckman study. 
Table 3. ~ppropriate pattern of interaction as seen by model builders (MB) 
and model users (MU). 
MBs Agree MUs Agree 
Dy ckman Duncan Dy ckman Duncan 
(1967) (1974) (1967) (1974) 
Separate function .16 .03 .42 .01 
Communication .56 .ll .64 .07 
Persuasion .69 .37 .53 .35 
Mutual understanding .62 .77 .58 .83 
From the Dyckman study we retain that MBs and MlTs have substantially 
different opinions, more in particular concerning the appropriateness of 
11 separate function". This figure is especially high for MUs. "Persuasion" 
dominates "communication" for MBs, and the reverse is true for MUs. 
The results of the Duncan study, published seven years later, are 
quite different from those obtained by Dyckman. Almost nobody agrees with 
"separate function1'. "Persuasion" dominates "communication1' for both 
categories of respondents, and "mutual understanding1' is seen as appropriate 
by almost 80 percent. On average MBs and MUs roughly share the same opinions. 
Thus it appears that in the United States much has changed between1967 and 
1974. 
It is therefore interesting to make a comparison with a study carried 
out by Vandenbroucke in 1979. In Table 4 we have taken the average of the 
results for MBs and MlTs from Table 3. It is striking how close the findings 
of Vandenbroucke correspond to those of Dyckman. It is an indication that in 
Europe (or at least in Belgium) the development and use of management science 
in practice runs 10 to 15 years behind the United States. 
Returning to Table 3, we notice a trend towards "mutual understanding", 
with yet a strong position for "persuasion". We should, however, also ask 
ourselves the question as to whether "mutual understanding1' is realistic or 
realizable. Hammond (1974) has observed that managers and model builders 
Table 4. Comparison American and Belgian study. 
MBs and MLls agree with 
Dyckman Duncan Vandenbroucke 
(1967) (1974) (19 79 
United States Belgium 
Separate function .29 
Communication .60 
Persuasion .61 
Mutual understanding .60 
differ from each other on many dimensions, such as, goal orientation, time 
horizon, comparative expertise, style of interpersonal relations, problem 
definition, desired degree of structuredness, etc. Without further exploring 
these points, we can nevertheless conclude that the profiles of MBs will 
strongly differ from these of MUs. In that sense "mutual understanding" 
may to a certain extent be utopian. We cannot expect both MB and MLl to be 
specialists in marketing, and statistics, and mathematics, and econometrics, 
and mathematical programming, and informatics, etc. It will be more 
realistic to bring distinctive competences together and to develop systems 
that make it easier on them to work together. Looking at modern DSSs we 
observe that their users do not have to get training in the areas of 
specialization of those who develop them. In that sense we can position 
the evolution of the last 10 years near the category "persuasion", on 
the continuum "persuasion", "mutual understanding. " 
Level of the Organization 
There are many characteristics of the organization itself that should 
have an influence on DSSs. I will single out one of them, namely hierarchical 
structure. 
Much of the earlier work on building models or decision support systems 
did not explicitly take the existing organizational structure into account. 
Yet if we want these systems to be used in practice, they must (at a minimum 
in the early stages of development) accept the organizational structure as 
given. 
Secondly, many of the existing DSSs deal with partial aspects without 
hierarchical linking of, and feedback between, the parts, 
For example, there are DSSs for allocating marketing resources to 
product groups or strategic business units (an aggregate problem); others 
to allocate resources to products within a group (a more disaggregate 
problem); still others to allocate a marketing budget to diffe'rent marketing 
instruments for a given product (a detailed problem). Until recently these 
various problews were treated by separate DSSs. Only now are DSSs being 
developed that enable hierarchical linking and feedback through a sequence 
of aggregations (see Figure 3) . These systems borrow heavily from the work 
on linking aggregate and detailed scheduling in production, and on 
hierarchical approaches to solving large scale problems. The closer 
correspondences of such integrated DSSs to existing hierarchical structures 
in organization is a factor that again favors acceptance. For a detailed 
application in marketing, see Naert, Gijsbrechts and Weverbergh (1983). 
Allocation to 
product groups 
(strategic business 
units) 
I 
Allocation to 
products within 
a group 
I 
Allocation to 
communication 
instruments 
Figure 3. Hierarchical linking of aggregate and detailed decisions. 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
The traditional approach to model building starts with the specification 
of the relevant variables and the mathematical relation between them. This 
is followed by estimation of the parameters, validation and implementation. 
These are steps that were already listed in Table 1 and therefore are model 
related. 
However, we also pointed out that decision support systems are not. 
developed in a vacuum, but in organizations, and that we should therefore 
take these organizations and their members into consideration. It then 
follows that a process approach is to be preferred. In practice that boils 
down to the fact that specification, estimation and validation are preceded 
by a number of other steps. We will briefly describe them: 
1. The mode2 buiZder as change agent, 
Introducing decision support systems is a form of organization 
development, The model builder should therefore be considered 
as a--in most cases external--change agent. As a result it is 
worthwhile to exploit the findings from research on organization 
development when studying the implementation of DSSs. 
2 .  MB-MU interface.  
To be effective the change agent must develop good contacts with 
the users, and the change must come about through close cooperation. 
3. Problem def in i t ion.  
The change agent will take sufficient time to get a thorough 
understanding of the problems for which his intervention is 
requested. Only then should he start tackling them. 
4 .  Model structure as a function of  intended use. 
A number of the model structure characteristics should depend on 
what one intends to do with the model. A model may, for example, 
be suitable for forecasting, but not for deriving normative 
conclusions. 
The desired degree of robustness therefore also depends on the 
intended use. Models should not be more complicated than necessary 
and useful. 
5 .  Starting from exis t ing procedures. 
Models will be more easily accepted if one takes existing procedures 
into account. There will indeed in most cases be good reasons for 
using these procedures. Building from and on what currently exists, 
rather than starting from scratch, should therefore be recommended. 
For an example we refer to Naert, Gijsbrechts and Weverbergh (1983), 
where a planning procedure is proposed for allocating marketing 
resources to product groups and to products within each group. As 
a basis they took the planning procedure currently applied by the 
firm, and the new system was as much as possible translated in 
terms of the old one. As such, the transition to the new system 
was much easier to follow by product management, and one also 
realized more quickly that the system results in a very substantial 
improvement. 
Evolutionary Model Building 
Models should not be built in all their ramifications right from the 
start. A typical scenario proceeds as follows: Managers and model builders 
begin by defining the most important elements of the problem, and their 
interrelationships. After a few meetings a first simple model is developed. 
The managers are completely involved, and it is therefore more likely that 
they will understand the model and be interested in its potential. On the 
basis of experience-in-use, they will gradually add new elements and refine 
others. The model therefore becomes more complex, but management nevertheless 
maintains understanding, because the extensions were made on their demand. 
It is through this process that the criterium "simple" and "complete" can 
be reconciled. 
To maintain this evolutionary character, and yet be able to realize 
economies of scale in model construction, we again plead for modularity. 
In essence that implies that a model is built as a set of components or 
submodels. The ultimate model that will be suitable for the user and 
adapted to his experience then comes about by simple linking of a number 
of these components and submodels. 
User Friendliness 
Models have a better probability of being used if they are easy to work 
with, that is if they are made user friendly. In the first place that requires 
easy communication with the model, i.e., one that is adapted to the work and 
communication habits of the user. That is the reason for programming models 
in an interactive mode. 
It must also be possible for the user to intervene. In other words he 
must, for example, be allowed to adjust some of the parameters. That will 
particularly be the case when parameterization is data based. Parameters 
estimated on the basis of historical data indeed measure a more or less 
average effect. It should be possible to correct them on the basis of more 
specific and up-to-date information of the management. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion we can say that success in implementing decision support 
systems--apart from the intrinsic qualities of the system--depends on the 
ability to obtain strong personal involvement of the various affected parties, 
team building, and efforts to overcome resistance to change. The relevant 
human factors are therefore very closely related to those one finds in 
implementing innovations in general. 
FOOTNOTES 
1) Little (1979, p. 11) defines a marketing decision support system as "a 
coordinated collection of data, systems, tools and techniques with 
supporting software and hardware by which an organization gathers and 
interprets relevant information from business and environment and turns 
it into a basis for marketing action". 
2) This is roughly the same structure as used in Leeflang and Naert (1978). 
The discussion here however emphasizes the human factors and also 
contains new elements accumulated since the publication of that 1978 
paper. See also Naert (1984) on which much of this paper is based. 
3) For the model structure criteria see Little (1970) and Naert and Leeflang 
(1978, Chapter 6). The other factors listed in Table 1 are treated at 
various places in Naert and Leeflang (1978) and more in particular in 
Chapters 3, 11, 12 and 14. 
4) See, for example, De Brabander and Edstrum (1979). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  r e p o r t  d e a l s  wi th  p r a c t i c a l  exper iences  obta ined dur ing  a c t u a l  
r esea rch  and development work i n  t h e  company Oy Stramberg. The company 
i t s e l f  i s  presen ted  i n  two e a r l i e r  IIASA r e p o r t s  ( P o t i l a  1982 and Karttunen 
1983). Many of t h e  thoughts presented i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  were in t roduced 
dur ing d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  company's Research Centre ,  which mainly 
concen t ra tes  on r e s e a r c h  and development work r e l a t e d  t o  heavy e l e c t r i c  
appara tus  and t rans formers ,  The Management t h e o r i e s  used i n  t h e  R&D 
work a r e  presented i n  modern l i t e r a t u r e ,  one source  being t h e  Harvard 
Business Review. I n  t h e  conclus ions  based on observa t ions  of p r a c t i c a l  
work, some s ta tements  of a  t h e o r e t i c a l  n a t u r e  a r e  a l s o  given.  
Although r e p o r t i n g  on a c t u a l  cases  g i v e s  r e l i a b l e  m a t e r i a l ,  i t  should 
be  remembered t h a t  t h e s e  r e f e r  t o  s p e c i a l  circumstances.  Under o t h e r  
circumstances o t h e r  f a c t o r s  may l e a d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  conclus ions .  For 
example, t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e  and h i s t o r y  of an  e n t e r p r i s e ,  d i f f e r e n t  types  
of products  and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  background of t h e  people may produce 
d i v e r s e  r e s u l t s .  
WHAT ARE HUMAN FACTORS? 
Human f a c t o r s  may be divided i n t o  two c l a s s e s ,  both of which a r e  
equa l ly  important .  The f i r s t  c l a s s  r e l a t e s  t o  pe rsona l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
and human a b i l i t i e s  such a s  c r e a t i v i t y ,  determinat ion,  a c t i v i t y ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  
and e x p e r t  knowledge. Some of t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  may be improved by 
t r a i n i n g ,  some a r e  of a  b a s i c  n a t u r e  and cannot b e  changed. One of t h e  
problems of a  manager i s  t o  choose those  people among new personnel  whose 
b a s i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  s u i t a b l e  and n o t  t o  make h i s  d e c i s i o n  based only 
on those  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which may be improved by t r a i n i n g .  
The second important c l a s s  of  human f a c t o r s  r e l a t e s  t o  i n t e rpe r sona l  
r e l a t i o n s .  The a b i l i t y  t o  cooperate  and work i n  a team, and t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  i n s p i r e  and lead  o t h e r s  a r e  some examples of t h i s  category.  Motivation 
a l s o  belongs more t o  t h i s  category than t o  t h e  f i r s t  one. Many o rgan i za t i ona l  
problems a l s o  h a v e  a component which should be handled when speaking about 
human f a c t o r s .  Some forms of o rgan iza t ion  prevent  ind iv idua l  a c t i v i t y ,  some 
encourage i t .  It i s  no t  pos s i b l e  t he r e fo r e ,  t o  exclude o rgan i za t i ona l  
problems when speaking about human f a c t o r s .  
A very important human f a c t o r  of t h e  second c l a s s  i s  t h e  behavior 
of s u p e r i o r s  towards people working i n  R&D. Even a bad organ iza t ton  may 
work wel l  i f  t h e r e  i s  a l e ade r  wi th  t h e  r i g h t  a t t i t u d e s  and behavior,  
a l t e r n a t i v e l y  a good organ iza t ion  may t o t a l l y  f a i l  i n  t h e  oppos i te  case .  
Most of t h e  human f a c t o r s  of t h e  second c l a s s  may be  improved by t r a i n i n g  
and changing t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  Sometimes t he  b e s t  s o l u t i o n  can be found 
by t r a n s f e r r i n g  a person t o  another  p o s i t i o n  no t  belonging t o  R&D. 
I n  t h e  fol lowing,  human f a c t o r s  a r e  no t  t r e a t e d  s epa ra t e ly  according 
t o  t h e  above c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  bu t  a r e  handled toge ther  from d i f f e r e n t  po in t s  
of view. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF R&D RESULTS 
It i s  an accepted f a c t  i n  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  one of t he  
most important p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  an e f f e c t i v e ,  
cont inuing development of products .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  work i s  needed f o r  
s u r v i v a l ,  no t  j u s t  f o r  success .  It i s  a l s o  s t a t e d  many t imes today t h a t  
it i s  not  R&D i t s e l f  b u t  t h e  r e s u l t s ,  whcih a r e  needed. 
Af te r  t h e  Second World War a b e l i e f  o f t e n  found i n  i ndus t ry  w a s  t h a t  i f  
you g ive  enough manpower, f i n a n c i a l  resources  and a f r e e  hand t o  R&D, new 
products  would come ou t .  Today, R&D departments a r e  considered more l i k e  
o t h e r  departments r equ i r i ng  exac t  p lans  and u s e fu l  r e s u l t s  dur ing a 
reasonable  time. I f  t h e r e  i s  no planning and con t ro l  of work, e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  b i g  R&D departments,  t h e r e  i s  a danger of l o s ing  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  and 
using t h e  time i n  u s e l e s s  e f f o r t s ,  o r  f o r  people t o  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  own 
s c i e n t i f i c  c a r ee r  r a t h e r  than t o  work f o r  t h e  b e s t  of  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e .  Of 
course,  some freedom of cho ice  should be  l e f t ,  t h e  ques t ion  is  how t o  f i nd  
an optimum. 
The b a s i c  human f a c t o r s  a r e  t h a t  a l l  R&D personnel r e a l i z e  t he  importance 
of t h e  development work r e s u l t s  and accep t  t h e  nece s s i t y  of planning and 
reasonable  con t r o l .  I f  bo th  of t he s e  b a s i c  condi t ions  a r e  accepted,  i t  i s  
easy t o  cont inue by t r a i n i n g  and developing t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  and improving 
t h e  genera l  premises f o r  e f f e c t i v e  working. I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, one of 
those  i s  no t  accepted,  ha rd ly  any measure can he lp  t h e  R&D a c t i v i t y  from 
being i n e f f e c t i v e .  
DIFFERENT TYPES OF TASKS I N  R&D 
When d i scuss ing  t h e  human f a c t o r  i n  innovat ion management i t  i s  necessary 
t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many types  of R&D and t h a t  i n  each type  t h e r e  a r e  
many d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of jobs .  R&D i s  no t  some kind of cont inuing innovat ion 
process ,  no t  i s  i t  a process  where a l l  s t e p s  a r e  c a r e f u l l y  c a l cu l a t ed  and 
planned beforehand. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  b i g  moments of g r e a t  i dea s  a r e  very 
except ional .  When an i dea  i s  born the  work which fol lows t o  r e a l i z e  i t  
i s  u s u a l l y  very hard and var ious  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and disappointments a r e  
very common. Only a small amount of o r i g i n a l  i dea s  which seem t o  be very 
promising a t  f i r s t ,  su rv ive  t o  t h e  s t a g e  where they a r e  a l s o  success fu l  
on the  market. 
The development of a product a s  a whole can be divided i n  two phases: 
t h e  f i r s t  phase i s  t h e  s t a r t i n g  per iod,  and t he  second phase r e a l i z a t i o n  of 
t h e  i d e a .  Usually t h e  second phase r equ i r e s  much more time, money and work 
than t h e  f i r s t  even i f  t h e  f i r s t  inc ludes  some prel iminary t e s t s  i n  o rder  
to  s e e  something about  t he  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of t h e  new idea .  Depending on t h e  
product,  both  phases may r e q u i r e  very d i f f e r e n t  t a s k s  and a l s o  people f o r  
t h e i r  r e a l i z a t i o n .  The following list gives  some examples arranged i n  
p a i r s ,  and each p a i r  g ives  two examples which a r e  oppos i te  t o  each o the r .  
P a i r  1. 
- Keeping a good product a b l e  t o  compete on t h e  market. 
- Developing a completely new product us ing a new technology. 
P a i r  2 .  
- Developing a product  s t a r t i n g  from raw ma te r i a l s .  
- A product  composed of p a r t s  made by o the r  manufacturers.  
P a i r  3 .  
- Developing a product which r equ i r e s  many experiments.  
- A product which can be designed completely on t h e  drawingboard.. 
D i f f e r en t  development methods a r e  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  var ious  ca se s  s h a m  
on t h e  l i s t .  The organ iza t ion  of t h e  work may a l s o  be  d i f f e r e n t  a s  we l l  
a s  t h e  answers t o  va r i ous  problems r e l a t i n g  t o  human f a c t o r s ,  
The fol lowing s t e p s  a r e  needed i n  near ly  a l l  c a s e s  of t he  f i r s t  phase 
of development work: 
- a problem o r  a market need i s  observed; 
- f a c t s  about the  problem a r e  gathered; 
- i d ea s  f o r  so lv ing  t h e  problem a r e  sought; 
- one o r  a few i dea s  a r e  chosen f o r  f u r t h e r  eva lua t ion ;  
- a f i n a l  choice  i s  presented f o r  approval.  
It i s  c l e a r ,  t h a t  no one person could be  optimal f o r  a l l  s t e p s ,  and one 
of t h e  manager's maim t a sk s  i s  t o  f i n d  t he  b e s t  pos s tb l e  choice .  
REOUIREMENTS FOR R&D PERSONNEL 
Research and product development inc ludes  many d i f f e r e n t  t a sk s  and 
jobs ,  t h e r e f o r e  d i f f e r e n t  types  of people a r e  a l s o  requ i red .  I n  t h i s  
chap te r ,  a  survey of the  d i f f e r e n t  requirements needed is  given without 
going i n t o  d e t a i l s .  Many of t h e  requirements mentioned he r e  r e l a t e  no t  
only t o  s i n g l e  persons bu t  a l s o  t o  the  o rgan iza t ion .  It should be arranged 
no t  a s  a n  obs t ac l e ,  bu t  t o  g ive  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and t o  encourage the  r i g h t  
ac t ions .  
I n  s p i t e  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  t a s k s ,  i t  i s  seldom pos s ib l e  o r  even usefu l  
t o  f i n d  a  new person f o r  every t a s k  i n  the  chain  of even ts  included i n  t h e  
development of a  product.  Normally the  same person o r  persons compose a  
group t h a t  t akes  c a r e  of t h e  whole process ,  Sometimes they may need he lp  
from d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of t e chn i c a l  exper t s ,  bu t  i n  p r i n c i p l e  the  o v e r a l l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  i s  t h e i r s .  The requirements f o r  managers 
concen t ra te  on t he  fol lowing po in t s :  
- dec i s ion  t o  s t a r t  development work; 
- dec i s ion  t o  s t o p  t h e  work; 
- fol lowing t h e  p rogress  of t he  work, 
A manager i s  no t  u sua l l y  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  decide t o  s t a r t  o r  s t o p  development 
work by himself .  Large p r o j e c t s  u sua l l y  need t o  inc lude  more dec i s ion  l e v e l s ,  
However, t h e  R&D manager should be a c t i v e  and a b l e  t o  gTve welliargumented 
proposals  concerning t he  dec i s ions .  
Following t h e  p rogress  of work means no t  only t ak ing  p a r t  i n  formal 
meetings, where t h e  p rogress  i s  discussed and compared t o  t imetab les .  It 
i s  a l s o  necessary t h a t  t he  manager v i s i t s  t h e  people engaged i n  t h e  a c t u a l  
R&D work f requen t ly  enough i n  o rde r  t o  ge t  a  r e a l  p i c t u r e  of t he  s i t u a t i o n .  
Motivation of t he  personnel  w i l l  a l s o  be  improved when t h e  supe r io r s  show 
a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  work, 
Stopping a  p r o j e c t  because of bad r e s u l t s  i s  one of  t h e  managerk 
d i f f i c u l t  jobs. Even i f  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  i t  i s  very important and bad 
p r o j e c t s  should be  stopped a s  soon a s  t h e  r e s u l t  becomes evident .  On t he  
one hand, a  manager r equ i r e s  courage and, on t h e  o t h e r ,  good personal  
behavior i n  o rder  t o  w i n  understanding f o r  t he  dec i s ion  and t o  keep t h e  
people involved motivated f o r  new jobs .  
During t h e  s t a r t i n g  per iod of a  p r o j e c t ,  the  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
f o r  persons involved a r e  t he  following: 
- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  unde.rstand c l e a r l y  what t he  market need o r  t h e  
problem i s  f o r  which t he  product should be  developed; 
- t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  high innovat ion and c r e a t i v i t y ;  
- a good knowledge of t echnolog ica l  and manufacturing p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  
- good connections t o  informat ion sources  about t h e  changes of 
technology; 
- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  o n e t s  own view and p roposa l  c l e a r l y  and 
h o n e s t l y ,  
I n  t h e  f a s t  changing f i e l d  of  technology s p e c i a l  means a r e  o f t e n  
needed t o  speed up and promote t h e  f low of  knowledge from t h e  o u t s i d e  
world t o  t h e  company. Gatekeeper a b i l i t y  i s  o f t e n  mentioned i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e ,  and t h e s e  people  a r e  wel l -sui ted  t o  f o l l o w  p r o g r e s s  and r e p o r t  
any new happenings t o  t h e  r i g h t  people.  It i s  t h e  du ty  of  a l l  peop le  
involved t o  u s e  t h e i r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and fo l low p r o g r e s s ,  b u t  some peop le  
a r e  more s u c c e s s f u l  a t  t h i s  and they  could  b e  c a l l e d  ga tekeepers ,  
The r e a l i z a t i o n  p e r i o d  starts a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  made and 
some product  i d e a s  a r e  chosen f o r  development. It i s  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  of 
R&D t h a t  t h e  major p a r t  of man hours ,  money and o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  used,  
Typ ica l  t a s k s  i n  t h i s  phase  a r e  e . g , ,  des ign ing  p r o t o t y p e s ,  t e s t i n g  them, 
e v a l u a t i n g  r e s u l t s  and making conc lus ions .  Good c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  f o r  
people  engaged i n  t h e s e  k ind of t a s k s  are: 
- a  good knowledge o f  t h e  manufactur ing p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  
- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  e a s i l y  a d a p t  t o  new methods; 
- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  work t o g e t h e r  w i t h  people  i n  o t h e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
( i . e . ,  p roduc t ion ,  market ing ,  t e s t i n g ) ;  
- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  work t o  long-range p l a n s  and t i m e t a b l e s ;  
- a n  hones t ,  hard-working c h a r a c t e r ;  
- a n  independent ,  sometimes headst rong c h a r a c t e r .  
A s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  r e a l i z i n g  new p r o d u c t r i d e a s  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
on ly  a  small pe rcen tage  of new i d e a s  a r e  a  s u c c e s s .  Development work o f t e n  
produces r e s u l t s  which n e c e s s i t a t e s  s topp ing  t h e  work. From t h e  mot iva t ion  
p o i n t  of view such s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  very  d i f f i c u l t  b u t  cannot b e  avoided,  and 
t h i s  l e a d s  t o  a  s p e c i a l  requirement  f o r  RhD people :  
- t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  a  f a i l u r e  work should go on w i t h  o t h e r  s u b j e c t s  
e f f e c t i v e l y  and mot iva ted ,  
A good knowledge of manufactur ing p o s s i b i l i t i e s  was mentioned i n  t h e  
p reced ing  list.  I n  p r a c t i c a l  l i f e  t h i s  requirement  can b e  f u l f i l l e d  i n  a  
good way, when product  development i s  performed ve ry  n e a r  t h e  manufactur ing 
p lace .  When RhD peop le  d a i l y  s e e  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n , i t s  changes and d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
they may t a k e  them b e t t e r  i n t o  account  i n  new produc t s .  
The pe r iod  of new product  r e a l i z a t i o n  sets requirements  on t h e  l e a d e r  
o f  t h e  development group which a r e  combined under t h e  t i t l e  "product  
champion" i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  It i s  o f t e n  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  one o f  t h e  most 
d i f f i c u l t  j obs  o f  a  product  champion may b e  t o  s o l v e  t h e  c o n f l i c t s  i n s i d e  
t h e  company t h a t  a r i s e  because  of t h e  new product  and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  op in ions  
about  it.  
MOTI'VAT I O N  
The main condi t ions  f o r  a high motivat ion t o  do t he  r i g h t  th ings  may be 
l i s t e d  i n  many ways. The fol lowing l is t  gives  a s ub j ec t i ve  choice  of some 
of t h e  important po in t s :  
- What t he  r i g h t  th ings  a r e  should be wel l  known. The company 
s t r a t e g y  and ob j ec t i ve s  should be c l e a r l y  seen.  
- One's own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  work i s  high.  
- There should be a t r u s t i n g  atmosphere regarding t he  eva lua t ion  
of proposals  and es t imat?on of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  work. The 
i nd i v i dua l  person should have t he  f e e l i n g  t h a t  h i s  work i s  
r a t e d  j u s t l y .  
- Each person should regard h i s  own job important f o r  t h e  company 
and be  s o c i a l l y  r a t e d .  
- Also necessary,  e spec i a l l y  f o r  younger people,  job r o t a t i o n  
t o  improve motivat ion.  
The above f a c t o r s  may be most ly  influenced by t he  manager-level. The 
manager's own behavior i s  t h e  most important f a c t o r  in f luenc ing  motivat ion 
i n  h i s  department.  
There a r e  of course  always people who do not  g e t  on we l l  i n  R&D work or 
who a f t e r  a few years  of R&D work would l i k e  t o  do something e l s e .  The b e s t  
way t o  so lve  t h i s  i s  t o  arrange f o r  a t r a n s f e r  t o  another  department.  It i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  a l i s t  of personal  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which would guarantee  
beforehand t h a t  a person would have a high motivat ion i n  R&D t a sk s .  On t h e  
one hand, ve ry  d? f f e r en t  people seem t o  g e t  on we l l ,  and on t he  o ther  a 
'1 t y p i c a l  researchman" may ask f o r  a t r a n s f e r  t o  t he  marketing department. 
High-level R&D people a r e  o f t e n  independent people wi th  good profess iona l  
s k i l l s  and would a l s o  be high-level people i n  many o the r  t a sk s  o ther  than 
R&D . 
To answer t he  ques t ion  what i s  more important f o r  mot ivat ion,  management 
behavior and t h e  company's o rgan iza t ion  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  o r  one 's  inner  
p r o p e r t i e s  t o  f i n d  mot iva t ion  i n  one 's  work i s  no t  easy.  Inner  p r o p e r t i e s  
a l s o  seem t o  be very  important and he r e  t h e r e  may a l s o  be d i f f e r ences  caused 
by d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  and s o c i a l  backgrounds. 
TRAINING POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
I n  a dd i t i on '  t o  ba s i c  educat ion a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s ,  continuous t r a i n i n g  
5s needed f o r  s eve r a l  reasons:  
- t o  keep up-to-date wi th  changing technology; 
- t o  t r a i n  people f o r  new jobs f o r  t h e  time when t h e  old  ones 
have become obso le te ;  
- t o  t r a i n  people f o r  teamwork, development of c r e a t i v i t y  and i n  
problem saying techniques ; 
- t o  t r a i n  t h e  managerial  l e v e l  i n  modern management methods; 
- t o  t r a i n  t e chn i ca l  people t o  s e e  t h e  economic s i d e  of th ings ;  
- t o  show new p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  open new con t ac t s  and l e a r n  new 
ways of th ink ing .  
Training has  many important ob j ec t i ve s .  I t s  e f f i c i e n c y ,  however, 
is  o f t en  very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  es t imate .  If no cons idera t ion  i s  given t o  
t he  e f f i c i e n c y  of t r a i n i n g ,  it  may be r e a l l y  low. The t r a i n i n g  events  
may be used more f o r  r e c r e a t i o n  and meeting o ld  f r i e n d s ,  which a l though 
a l s o  could prove u s e f u l  and good f o r  mot ivat ion,  may lead t o  a neg l ec t  
of t h e  purpose behind t h e  t r a i n i n g .  The most important and perhaps a l s o  
t h e  most f r u i t f u l  s o r t  of t r a i n i n g  a f t e r  ba s i c  s t u d i e s ,  i s  t h a t  performed 
dur ing normal working. The company's s p e c i a l i t i e s  a r e  u sua l l y  learned 
dur ing t he  f i r s t  two yea r s  and i t s  products and methods f a m i l i a r .  For 
R&D people t h i s  should no t  mean, however, t h a t  they  go i n t o  d e t a i l s ,  
because t h e i r  main t a s k  should be t o  work with  new products and old  ways of 
of th inking could be a hindrance here .  Training i n  t h e  working p l ace  a l s o  
con t inues  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  few years .  It i s  then no t  u sua l l y  c a l l e d  t r a i n i n g ,  
but  ga ther ing  exper ience.  When new t a sks  r e q u i r e  new knowledge t o  be found 
i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o r  from expe r t s ,  the  d i r e c t  need and u se  make t h e  " t ra in ing"  
ve ry  e f f e c t i v e .  
Another u s e f u l  way of l ea rn ing  i s  t o  v i s i t  exh ib i t i ons ,  c l i e n t s ,  
conferences and o the r  companies working i n  t h e  same f i e l d .  Espec i a l l y  i n  
b ig  companies R&D people may f e e l  themselves too  i s o l a t e d  from t h e  ou t s i de  
world and t he se  k inds  of v i s ? t s  a r e  t he r e fo r e  important.  I n  d i s cus s ion  w i th  
customers many good ideas  f o r  products  niay a r i s e ,  which would no t  be found 
i n  t h e  l abora tory  o r  textbooks.  Also t h e  v a l i d i t y  of one 's  own ideas  can 
be b e t t e r  t e s t ed  when th lnk ing  how they could ope ra t e  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  condi t ions  
descr ibed by pos s ib l e  u s e r s  of t h e  product.  For advanced R&D people another 
f r u i t f u l  occasion f o r  l ea rn ing  a r e  d i scuss ions  w i th  co l leagues  ou t s i de  formal 
conference meetings.  The newest happenings and t r ends  a r e  o f t e n  f i r s t  
mentioned i n  s m a l l  c i r c l e s ,  whereas they may be heard a year o r  two l a t e r  
i n  t h e  conference h a l l .  
I n  improving e f f i c i e n c y  t h e  f i r s t  th ing t o  make su r e  of i s  t h a t  t he  
person t o  be s en t  t o  a t r a i n i n g  event r e a l l y  i s  motivated t o  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  
and needs t he  a b i l i t i e s  t o  be t aught .  He should a l s o  be on such a l e v e l  that 
t h e  event i s  n e i t h e r  too d i f f i c u l t  nor too easy f o r  him. The i n t e r e s t  of a 
foreman 2n t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  t r a i n i n g  a l s o  improves e f f i c i ency .  I f  it i s  
known t h a t  he i s  g o h g  t o  a sk  about t h e  h p r e s s i o n s  received and maybe 
a r range  an i n t e r n a l  meeting where t he  person involved should g i v e  a summary 
t h e  r e s u l t s  of t he  t r a i n i n g  w i l l  be more e f f e c t i v e .  
Too many t r a i n i n g  even ts  may a l s o  lower e f f i c i ency .  The r i g h t  number 
of t r a i n i n g  dayslyear  depends very  much on t he  s i t u a t i o n .  It may be s eve ra l  
monthslyear i f  a new technology i s  t o  be adapted.  Such t r a n s i e n t  pe r iods  
excluded, t h e  range may be some dayslyear  o r  some weekslyear depending on 
t h e  sub j ec t ,  person and what i s  included i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
everybody working a c t i v e l y  i n  R&D t a sk s  should have yea r l y  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  
improve h i s  a b i l i t i e s .  
The eva lua t ion  of t rakn lng  r e s u l t s  i s  e a s i e r  f o r  t e chn i ca l  ma t t e r s  than 
f o r  courses  on e .g . ,  problem so lv ing  o r  innovation technqiues,  project- leading 
methods or managing by ob j ec t i ve s .  People a r e  o f t e n  very e n t h u s i a s t i c  
af  t e r  r e t u rn ing  from t r a i n i n g  events  of t h e  l a t t e r  cha r ac t e r .  It may 
occur,  t h a t  ve ry  l i t t l e  from t h e  new information i s  i n  use  a f t e r  s eve ra l  
months. One pos s ib l e  reason i s  o f t e n  t h a t  t he se  of new methods 
r e q u i r e  t h a t  a  g r e a t  p a r t  of t h e  personnel s t a r t  t o  use  t h e  new method. 
A s i n g l e  person can hard ly  u se  them alone and e f f i c i e n c y  i s  improved, 
when s eve ra l  a c t i v e  persons p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  t r a i n i n g .  Even then t h e  
manager should a l s o  push a c t i v e l y  and show himself t h a t  t h e  new way of 
handling th ings  i s  r e a l l y  being used. Another reason f o r  small, long-time 
changes may a l s o  be t h a t  t h e  new methods a r e  perhaps no t  always so  good a s  
adver t i sed .  Some cau t ion  should theref  o r e  be exerc i sed ,  and they should 
no t  be pu t  i n  use  by f o r c e .  This may lead t o  harmful confusion and 
d i s tu rbances  i n  t h e  good working atmosphere. 
DANGER OF COMMITTEES 
Developing a  product i s  always a  c a se  of both cooperat ion and ind iv idua l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  P r a c t i c a l  exper iences  seem t o  show t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  of R&D 
work a r e  b e t t e r  when t h e  person i n  charge of t h e  p r o j e c t  has  a  high degree 
of independency and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  regarding t h e  p r o j e c t .  However, t h e  
p r o j e c t  l e a d e r ' s  super io r  cannot de l ega t e  a l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  him, t h e  
super io r  has  t o  make dec i s i ons  regarding s t a r t i n g  and stopping t h e  p r o j e c t  
a s  wel l  a s  t o  fo l low i t s  progress .  
I n  some p r o j e c t  o r g a n h a t i o n s  a  b ig  formal s t a t u s  is given t o  committees 
who i n  t h e i r  meetings handle t h e  r e p o r t s  of t h e  p r o j e c t  l e ade r  and make 
decisi 'ons on how t o  cont inue.  The au tho r ' s  opinion i s  t h a t  i f  it r e a l l y  i s  
t h e  committee t h a t  makes dec i s i ons ,  then t h e  p r o j e c t  may s e r i o u s l y  be  i n  
danger. The lack  of t h e  comm?ttee's r e spons?b i l i t y  causes low motivat ion 
and. t h e i r  dec i s i ons  may be inconsequent.  Committees a r e  a  ve ry  u s e f u l  
ins t rument  f o r  discuss2ng r e s u l t s  and presen t ing  d i f f e r e n t  views, however, 
dec2sions should be l e f t  t o  one respons ib le  person. 
Nearly a s  bad, o r  maybe worse, than deciding committees i s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
where t h e  p r o j e c t  l eader  has  t o  wa i t  f o r  t a c t i c a l  dec i s i ons  regarding t h e  
p r o j e c t  from many managerial  l e v e l s  above him. When dec i s i ons  a r e  made 
phys i ca l l y  and o rgan i za t i ona l l y  f a r  from t h e  a c t u a l  work by people who do 
no t  know t h e  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  presumable r e s u l t  i s  bad mistakes  and slow 
progress .  
The i nd iv idua l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  p r o j e c t  l eader  does no t  mean that 
he does n o t  need con t ac t  and he lp  from h i s  super io rs .  I n  a  good working 
atmosphere, t h e  p r o j e c t  should g e t  t h e  support i t  needs from managerial  
l e v e l s  and should a l s o  keep them 2nformed of what happens. When t h e  
p r o j e c t  l e ade r  o r  people working i n  t h e  p ro j ec t  ask f o r  opinions  o r  advice  
it  i s  a l s o  ve ry  important f o r  mot ivat ion purposes t h a t  they g e t  f a s t  feedback 
from t h e  managerial  l e v e l  and o the r s  who a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  work. A 
good designer  o r  research  worker i s  no t  always a  good p ro j ec t  l e ade r .  He 
may have d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  de l ega t i ng  and superv i s ing  t h e  o ther  t a s k s ,  and 
may t r y  t o  do too much himself .  Management should be aware of t h i s  and 
g i v e  him advice  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t age s  of t h e  work. When choosing a  p r o j e c t  
l eader  t h i s  p a r t  of t h e  t a s k  should be c a r e f u l l y  taken i n t o  account.  
Sometimes it i s  b e t t e r  t o  choose f o r  a  l eader  a  person whose a b i l i t y  a s  a  
l eader  i s  known and no t  nece s sa r i l y  t h e  b e s t  des igner .  
J O B  ROTATION 
Job r o t a t i o n  i s  a very  u s e f u l  way t o  in t roduce new people t o  t h e  
e n t e r p r i s e  and o f t e n  R&D departments a r e  t h e  f i r s t  p laces  f o r  a newcomer. 
Usually i t s  atmosphere i s  neare r  t o  t h a t  of u n i v e r s i t i e s  than i n  production 
o r  marketing departments.  Th is  may however sometimes cause problems f o r  
t he  R&D department. Even though i t  i s  good f o r  R&D t o  g e t  young people, 
i t  a l s o  needs q u a l i f i e d ,  experienced personnel .  The problem i s  how t o  
give t h e  people remaining i n  R&D a wide enough knowledge of t h e  company 
with.out los ing  them i n t o  o the r  departments.  Another problem i s  t h a t  s en io r  
people working f o r  B&D should a l s o  r e a l i z e  t h e  va lue  of t h e i r  work f o r  t h e  
company, even i f  they  see  a cons tan t  stream of young people coming i n  and 
ou t  t o  o the r  jobs .  There a r e  s eve ra l  ways t h e  managerial  l e v e l  should 
motivate  people t o  s t a y  i n  R&D, a s  presented i n  t he  chapter  on motivat ion.  
THE NEED FOR FEEDBACK 
It i s  a common human c h a r a c t e r i s t h  t h a t  t he  r e s u l t s  of one 's  own work 
should be eva lua ted .  lh R&D t h i s  should be s p e c i a l l y  s t r e s s ed  because t h e r e  
i s  perhaps a g r e a t e r  danger than elsewhere,  t h a t  work remains unnoticed.  The 
work of R&D is o f t e n  busy work, revo lu t ionary  r e s u l t s  come very  seldom. 
The rece iver  of proposals ,  r e s ea r ch  r e p o r t s  and o the r  documents should 
always g ive  some c l e a r  comment. Even a nega t ive  answer i s  b e t t e r  than  no 
answer o r  too genera l  an answer. It can be s a i d  t h a t  a good answer i s  t h e  
new jobs ,  which show t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of r e s u l t s  from previous  ones has  been 
good. It would however be b e t t e r  i f  t he  feedback, a t  l e a s t  f o r  bigger  jobs,  
comes soon a f t e r  t h e  work i s  ready. One of t he  most important feedbacks is 
t h e  proper s a l a r y  development. A manager should a l s o  g ive  i ncen t i ve s  f o r  
improvement t o  any p o i n t s  i n  t h e  a c t 2 v i t i e s  which a r e  no t  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  and 
should a l s o  express Ids thanks f o r  good performances. Feedback should a l s o  
go i n  t h e  o ther  d i r e c t i o n .  I n  a good working atmosphere t h e  manager should 
g e t  informat?on about f e e l i n g s  and hopes dur ing normal d a i l y  d i scuss ions  - 
without  any s p e c i a l  arrangements. 
The f i r s t  important human f a c t o r  t o  be considered i n  R&D i s  t h e  choice  
of people f o r  B&D t a sks .  Because t h e r e  a r e  many types  of work s t a r t i n g  wi th  
t h e  f i r s t  idea  t o  t h e  ready product ,  no t  only one type of cha r ac t e r  i s  needed. 
Many people, f u l f i l l i n g  normal qua l ? f i c a t i ons ,  can f i n d  a s u i t a b l e  p l ace  i n  
R&D. The qyes t ion  is more one of mot ivat ion than o the r  human f a c t o r s .  
The second important t a s k  r e l a t i n g  t o  human f a c t o r s  i s  t o  make t he  
company's m a h  l i n e s  of a c t i v? ty ,  ob j ec t i ve s  of t h e  R&D and t h e  normal 
working r u l e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t ime-tables and so  on c l e a r .  The t h i r d  important 
a c t f v i t y  i s  taking c a r e  of mot ivat ion.  This r e q u i r e s  a c t i v i t y  from t h e  
manager a t  a l l  t imes.  The f o u r t h  t a s k  i s  continuous t r a i n i n g .  The l i n e s  
of t h e  trai!n?ng program always r equ l r e  updat ing and e f f i c i ency  needs 
supervf s ing .  
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INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the. human f a c t o r  i n  t he  execut ion of d i f f e r e n t  t a s k s  
has  slowly become more apparent .  The i n f l uence  of  human e r r o r s  could be 
dramatic,  a s  i n  t h e  case  of t h e  Three Mile I s l and  i n c i d e n t ,  bu t  Humans could 
a l s o  grow i n  t h e i r  d u t i e s  and perform f a r  b e t t e r  than ever  expected.  
Understanding t h e  human a s  a  p a r t  of t h e  system i s  s t i l l  i n  i t s  in fancy ,  
a l though some means f o r  descr ib ing  and p r ed i c t i ng  human behavior a r e  emerging 
from sc iences  such a s  psychology and sociology. I n  s p i t e  of t h e  r e s u l t s  
a v a i l a b l e  i t  i s ,  however, d iscouraging t o  observe t h a t  very few of t h e  
r e s u l t s  have been app l ied  i n  p r a c t i c e  i n  o rgan iza t ions  dependent on t h e  
human f a c t o r .  
During r ecen t  yea r s  t h e r e  has  been a  growing i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  impl ica t tons  
of t h e  human f a c t o r  on t h e  s a f e t y  of nuc lea r  power. There ha s  a l s o  been a  
s t r i v e  f o r  inc lud ing  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  p r ed i c t i on  of human behavior i n  r i s k  
assessments.  A t  t h e  p r e sen t  l e v e l  of understanding t he  d e s c r i p t i o n  of human 
behavior i n  complicated dec i s i on  making s i t u a t i o n s  ha.s, however, t o  r e l y  on 
q u a l i t a t i v e  r a t h e r  than q u a n t i t a t i v e  methods. 
I n  consider ing case  h i s t o r i e s  where t h e  human f a c t o r  has  played a  p a r t  
i n  an acc iden t  o r  nea r  a cc i den t ,  one of  t h e  con t r i bu t i ng  f a c t o r s  t h a t  could 
be seen i s  d i f f e r e n t  o r gan i za t i ona l  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  wi th  t h e  impl ica t ion  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  do n o t  have t he  proper support  i n  t h e i r  dec i s ion  making s i tua t ions . .  
Th is  observa t ion  l e d  t o  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of a  subpro jec t  a s  a  p a r t  of t h e  Nordic 
cooperat ion on "Human R e l i a b i l i t y  i n  Complicated Energy Systems" (Wahlstr8pl 
and Rasmussen 1983). The s u b j p r a j e c t  "Safety Oriented Organizat ions  and 
Human R e l i a b i l i t y "  (WahlstrBm 1983) considered t h e  s a f e t y  imp l i ca t i ons  of 
o r g a n i z a t i ona l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  and has  been divided i n t o  t he  fol lowing main 
phases : 
- establ ishment  of a  t h e o r e t i c a l  model of t h e  o rgan iza t ion ;  
- c o l l e c t i o n  of case  h i s t o r i e s ;  
- ca t ego r i za t i on  of o rgan i za t i ona l  d e f i c i e n c i e s ;  
- establ ishment  of a  normative model f o r  a  s a f e t y  o r i en t ed  
organ iza t ion ;  
- development of c h e c k l i s t s  and o the r  measuring methods. 
The purpose of t h i s  paper  is  t o  g ive  a  b r i e f  account of t h e  most 
important concepts i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t he  Nordic cooperat ion p r o j e c t  and t o  
extend t h e  d i scuss ion  a l s o  t o  o rgan iza t ions  wi th  o the r  types of goa l s .  
The d i scuss ion  i s  then amended by some observat ions  made from development 
p r o j e c t s  i n  which t h e  au thor  has pa r t i c i pa t ed .  A s  a  conclusion some 
requirements on t h e  o rgan i za t i on  of a  company, which i s  dependent on i t s  
innova t ive  capac i t y ,  a r e  s t a t e d .  
THE ORGANIZATION 
A c o l l e c t i o n  of i nd iv idua l s  working toge ther  f o r  some common goal 
according t o  a  s e t  of accepted r u l e s  could be c a l l e d  an o rgan iza t ion .  The 
organ iza t ion  of t he  work gives  a  ga in  due t o  t he  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  by t he  
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  between the  d i f f e r e n t  i nd iv idua l s  i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  The 
fol lowing func t ions  could be found i n  each organ iza t ion :  
- l eadersh ip  func t ion ;  
- production func t ion ;  
- d i f f e r e n t  support  f  unctkons, 
The l e ade r sh ip  functkon i s  executed by one i nd iv idua l  o r  a  group of i nd iv idua l s ,  
which have been ass igned t h e  t a s k  of l ead tng  t h e  o rgan i za t i on ,  The product ion 
func t ion  i s  a s soc i a t ed  with  t heexecu t i on  of t he  main goal of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  
and c o n s i s t s  of t he  l a r g e s t    or ti on of i dd iv idua l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  two 
main func t ions  of t he  o rgan i za t i on ,  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  support  func t ions  
such a s  research  and development, marketing, accounting,  e t c ,  
An organ iza t ion  i s  cha rac t e r i z ed  by t h e  ex i s t ence  of both sub-organizations 
and super-organizations.  A company could f o r  i n s t ance  be subdivided i n t o  
departments and could a l s o  be p a r t  of a  l a r g e r  concern. Organizat ions  could 
then be seen a s  a  h ie ra rchy  of  o rgan iza t ions  where t h e  i nd iv idua l  r ep r e sen t s  
t h e  lowest l e v e l .  The concept of an  o rgan i za t i ona l  u n i t  could t h e r e f o r e  be 
used a s  a  model of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  a t  an a r b i t r a r y  l e v e l .  The o rgan i za t i ona l  
u n i t  con ta ins  i ts  own l eade r sh ip ,  product ion and support ing func t ions  and i s  
respons ib le  f o r  i t s  own resources .  The o rgan i za t i ona l  u n i t  could a l s o  be 
seen a s  an independent dec i s ion  making u n i t  c o l l e c t i n g  i t s  own informat ion 
and making con t ro l  dec i s i ons  on t h e  b a s i s  of t he  co l l e c t ed  informat ion,  The 
coordinat ion of t h e  o rgan i za t i ona l  u n i t s  i n  a  l a r g e r  o rgan iza t ion  i s  then 
exerc i sed  from above, wi th  t h e  o rgan i za t i ona l  u n i t s  a l s o  supplying information 
t o  t h e  h igher  l e v e l s  ( see  Figure  1 ) .  
The resources  of an o rgan iza t ion  a r e  i t s  i nd iv idua l s  and t h e  r u l e s  by 
which t h e  o rgan iza t ion  i s  def ined .  The r u l e s  of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  could be 
subdivided i n t o  t h e  fol lowing resources  : 
I n f o r -  
Con t ro l  mat ion 
- - 
Contro l  ma t ion  
F i g u r e  1 .  The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  u n i t .  
- value system; 
- d e c i s i o n  making and execu t ive  system; 
- informat ion system. 
The value  system i s  determined by t h e  primary and secondary organ2zat ion 
g o a l s ,  and i s  used t o  d e f i n e  va lues  and deduced o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
t a s k s  performed. The d e c i s i o n  making and execu t ive  system i s  used by t h e  
l e a d e r s h i p  func t ion  a s  a  means of c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  achieve 
t h e  goa l s  def ined.  The informat ion system i s  used t o  c o l l e c t ,  judge, s t o r e  
and r e t r i e v e  informat ion t o  support  d e c i s i o n  making i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
A t y p i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  a l s o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of 
formal and informal  o rgan iza t ions .  The formal o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  
t h e  r e s u l t  of a  conscious  des ign p rocess  which is documented i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
c h a r t s  and has de f ined  t a s k s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  The informal  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i s  again  t h e  r e s u l t  of a  more random development, where informal  v a l u e  
systems, d e c i s i o n  making and execu t ive  systems and informat ion systems a r e  
b u i l t  up. The informat ion o r g a n i z a t i o n  has  both  p r o s  and cons,  e ,g , ,  when 
patches  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  developing t o  c o r r e c t  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  
formal o rgan iza t ion ,  and, e ,g . ,  when d i f f e r e n t  shadow va lues  could be  more 
important than t h e  goa l s  of t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  
THE HUMAN FACTOR 
Any o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i l l ,  however, r e l y  on i t s  t n d i v i d u a l s  and i t  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  important  t h a t  i t  i s  a b l e  both  t o  develop and u t i l i z e  i t s  human 
resources .  I n  t h i s  connection t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  could be seen a s  a  complicated i n t e r p l a y  between t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r u l e s  and t h e  resources  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s .  14 t h i s  
connection t h e  r e s o u r c e s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  could b e  divided i n t o  t h e  
fol lowing systems: 
- mot iva t iona l  system; 
- d e c i s i o n  making system; 
- a c q u i r e d  a t t i t u d e s ,  s k i l l s ,  e x p e r i e n c e  and knowledge, 
The d i f f e r e n t  sys t ems  a r e  t h u s  v e r y  similar t o  t h e  sys tems d e f i n e d  f o r  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  and have  been d i s c u s s e d  u s i n g  similar d e f i n i t i o n s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
o f  psychology and management s c i e n c e .  
Dec i s ion  making i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  always performed by humans who, 
however, cou ld  be  u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  computerized d e c i s i o n  making s u p p o r t  
systems.  Dec i s ion  making cou ld  be  d iv ided  i n t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  phases :  
- i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  need f o r  a d e c i s i o n ;  
- o b t a i n i n g  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n ;  
- g e n e r a t i n g  and a s s e s s i n g  d e c i s i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  
- s e l e c t i n g  and implementing t h e  d e c i s i o n ;  
- o b t a i n i n g  feedback from t h e  d e c i s i o n .  
The d e c i s i o n  making phases  could  a l s o  b e  s e e n  a s  d a t a  p r o c e s s i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  
which a r e  s e p a r a t e d  by s t a t e s  o f  knowledge o f  t h e  human d e c i s i o n  maker 
(Rasmussen 1976) .  The d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s  i s  a l s o  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  two t y p e s  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  one s low and d e d u c t i v e  t h a t  cou ld  
b e  c a l l e d  knowledge-based, and one f a s t  and i n d u c t i v e  which c o u l d  be c a l l e d  
ru le-based  (Rasmussen 1981) .  
The performance o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  now dependent  on t h e  performance 
of  a l l  i t s  s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  makers,  and i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  impor t an t  t o  c o n s i d e r  
e r r o r s  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s .  Cons ide r ing ,  t h e  human a s  a r a t i o n a l  
be ing ,  t h e  blame f o r  e r r o r s  shou ld  n o t  be  p u t  on t h e  pe r son  b u t  r a t h e r  on 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  n o t  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n s .  
A model o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p rocedure  can  now b e  used  t o  s u g g e s t  a  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  e r r o r s  and t h e i r  u n d e r l y i n g  c a u s e s  (Rasmussen 
e t  a 1  1981) .  One such  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  form of a  so -ca l l ed  Murphy 
d iagram (Pew, Miller, and F e h r e r  1981) is  shown i n  F i g u r e  2 .  
The human e r r o r s  cou ld  then  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  deficiencies i n  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  fo l lowing  broad  c a t e g o r i e s ;  
- g o a l  c o n f l i c t s ;  
- l a c k  o f  d e c i s i o n  c a p a c i t y ;  
- d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  system; 
- l a c k  of  t r a i n i n g .  
Any g o a l  c o n f l i c t ,  e . g . ,  between i n d i v i d u a l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  g o a l s ,  
o r  between formal  and i n f o r m a l  g o a l s ,  shou ld  b e  sought  and r e s o l v e d  a s  a  
p a r t  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  a c t i v i e s  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
o v e r l o a d i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  making is  l a r g e  e s p e c i a l l y  
f o r  key pe r sons  i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  and t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  shou ld  t h u s  
p r o v i d e  n e c e s s a r y  mechanisms f o r  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  of  d e c i s i o n s .  D e f i c i e n c i e s  

i n  i n f o r m a t i ~ n  a r e  t h e  l a r g e s t  cause f o r  human e r r o r s ,  and t h i s  category 
could be divided i n t o  s eve r a l  subcategories .  The need f o r  t r a i n i n g  should 
a l s o  be i d e n t i f i e d  cont inuously  and add i t i ona l  t r a i n i n g  should be given, 
when necessary.  
THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
The word innovat ion is  usua l l y  ass igned a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  meaning 
than t h e  word inven t ion ,  The term innovation i s  used then more t o  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  a new cornbinationofknown f a c t s  than something r e a l l y  new. 
Innovation i s  a l s o  t y p i c a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  i n  a cooperat ion between d i f f e r e n t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who have t h e i r  own s pec i a l i z a t i on .  Innovation i s  us ua l l y  
t r i g g e r e d  e i t h e r  by a perceived need f o r  development o r  by a p o s s i b i l i t y  
t o  useaknown method i n  a new way. Innovation u sua l l y  goes through 
s e v e r a l  s t age s  of refinement before  i t s  f i n a l  implementation, 
The capac i ty  f o r  innovat ions  i s  an important a s s e t  i n  any company, 
and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r s  underlying t he  innovat ive  process  have t he r e fo r e  
been s tud ied .  D i f f e r en t  courses  aiming a t  t he  improvement of i nd iv idua l  
c r e a t i v i t y  and thereby i nc r ea s ing  t h e  innovat ive  capac i ty  of t h e  company 
h a l e a l s o b e e n  developed. I n  i d e n t i f y i n g  f a c t o r s  underlying c r e a t i v i t y  t h e  
following d i v i s i o n  could be made: 
- persona l i ty -assoc ia ted  f a c t o r s ;  
- a t t i t u d e s ,  s k i l l ,  exper ience and knowledge; 
- situation-dependent f a c t o r s .  
The p e r s ona l i t y  f a c t o r s  a r e ,  f o r  example, i n t e r e s t  i n  o t h e r  people and 
w i l l i n g n es s  t o  t ake  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Education and acquired exper ience 
w i l l  a l s o  have in f luence  on t h e  a b i l i t y  of a person t o  come up with  usable  
innovat ions .  The s i tuat ion-dependent  f a c t o r s  a r e  then,  f o r  example, t h e  
o rgan iza t iona l  atmosphere and oppo r tun i t i e s  t o  work i n  a c r e a t i v e  group. 
Innovations can occur spontaneously o r  be consciously  i n i t i a t e d  a s  a 
means f o r  t he  improvement of  a company. I n  t h e  case  of a conscious e f f o r t ,  
t h e  innovat ive  process  could i d e a l l y  be divided i n t o  t he  fol lowing non- 
over lapping phases:  
- c o l l e c t i o n  of background mate r ia l ;  
- d e f i n i t i o n  of t he  problem; 
- generat ion of ideas ;  
- design of a so l u t i on ;  
- informat ion and marketing of t h e  s o l u t i ~ n . .  
The d i f f e r e n t  phases a l s o  suggest  reasons f o r  i dea s  no t  t o  succeed i n  working 
themselves through t o  a success fu l  app l i c a t i on .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  def ic ienckes  
i n  t h e  background m a t e r i a l  c o l l e c t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a g rea t  r i s k  t h a t  good t dea s  
w i l l  be  generated f o r  t h e  wrong problem. I n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  problem 
i t  i s  important t o  both de f i ne  t he  goa l s  f o r  t h e  so lu t i on  and t o  de f i ne  
the  p o s s i b l e  r e s t r i c t i ~ n s  i n  t h e  implementation i n  as concre te  terms a s  
poss ib le .  I f  a  s o l u t i o n  is  n o t  even considered,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  w i l l  
n o t  be implemented. The design of t h e  s o l u t i o n  con ta ins  both  the  f u r t h e r  
ref inement  o f  t h e  i d e a s  generated and the  f i n a l  e v a l u a t i o n  of d i f f e r e n t  
s o l u t i o n s  p o s s i b l e .  The d e s c r i p t i o n  and markettng of t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  a l s o  
an important phase i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t f o n  of an i d e a ,  and could,  i f  n o t  
a p p r o p r i a t e l y  managed, even in t roduce  conscious sabotage from t h e  members 
of t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  
The i n i t i a l  e v a l u a t i o n  of an i d e a  i s  a very s e n s i b l e  s t a g e  i n  t h e  
innovat ion p rocess  because i t  w i l l  determine i f  t h e  i d e a  g e t s  a  chance. 
I n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  one could o f t e n  see  a  nega t ive  a t t i t u d e  t o  new i d e a s ,  
which could be  i l l u s t r a t e d  wi th  some common excuses gtven f o r  n o t  t ak ing  
up an idea ,  Figure  3 .  The under lying causes  could ,  however, o f t e n  be found 
among t h e  fol lowing:  
-, l a z i n e s s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
o  making e x t r a  e f f o r t s  
o  t ak ing  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  
- being a f r a i d  of 
o  r i s k - t a k i n g  
o  s t epp ing  on someone's t o e s  
o  r i d i c u l e ;  
- l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  knowledge and exper ience 
0 i d e a  n o t  understood 
o  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  n o t  seen 
o  ip lp l i ca t ions  ngt  judged.. 
The o l d  way i s  working f i n e .  
It w i l l  never  work. 
It has  n o t  been t r i e d  before .  
It has  been t r i e d  before .  
There i s  n o t  enough time. 
This  i s  n o t  t h e  c o r r e c t  time. 
It w i l l  be too expensive.  
T t  i s  not  my job.  
People w i l l  never  accep t  i t ,  
It i s  not  w i t h t n  our  bus iness  t d e a ,  
F igure  10. Ten Common Excuses f o r  Not Taking Up a n  Idea  f o r  Development. 
MANAGING INNOVATIONS 
A company i n t e r e s t e d  i n  enhancing i t s  innovat ive  c a p a c i t y  could t r y  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  under lying f a c t o r s .  The p e r s o n a l i t y  f a c t o r s  of t h e  
people working i n  a n  o r g a n t z a t i o n  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n f l u e n c e  d i r e c t l y ,  bu t  
could be  inf luenced i n d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  h t r i n g  p o l i c y  of t h e  company. The 
a t t i t u d e s ,  s k i l l s ,  exper ience  and knowledge eould be fnkluenced by d i f f e r e n t  
t r a i n i n g  courses .  The most important in f luene ing  f a c t o r s  a r e ,  however, t h e  
s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s ,  because t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  w i l l  show t h e  
s h o r t e s t  time c o n s t a n t s ,  The c o n t r o l  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  w i l l  
n a t u r a l l y  a l s o  invo lve  t r a i n i n g ,  b u t  t h e  t r a i n i n g  w i l l  be  d i r e c t e d  towards 
t h e  key persons  which have a  l a r g e  in f luence  on t h e  innova t ive  p rocess .  
Considering t h e  flow of  i d e a s  through an  o rgan iza t fon ,  t h e  fol lowing 
p recondi t ions  have t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  t r i g g e r  t h e  innova t ive  
process  : 
- t h e  i d e a  should be  good; 
- t h e  idea  should be. accepted f o r  r e a l f z a t l o n .  
For t h e  idea  t o  be  good f t  has  t o  be r e a l i z a b l e  i n  t h e  r i g h t  c o n t e x t ,  have 
t h e  markets,  e t c .  I n  o rder  t o  be  accepted f o r  r e a l i z a t i o n  i t  has  t o  be 
presented i n  t h e  r i g h t  way f o r  t h e  r i g h t  person and funding should be  
a v a i l a b l e .  These p recondi t ions  imply t h a t  only a  few ideas  of a l l  generated 
i d e a s  a r e  good, and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  always t h e  r i s k  t h a t  a  good idea  i s  n o t  
i d e n t i f i e d .  The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of good i d e a s  i s  very  fmportant f o r  t h e  
innovat ion p rocess ,  and i t  i s  a l s o  very l i k e l y  t h a t  good i d e a s  a r e  screened 
o u t  i f  t h e  i d e a s  have t o  go through very many d e c i s i o n  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  h i e r a r c h y  b e f o r e  they can g e t  t h e  necessary  acceptance f o r  
r e a l i z a t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  i s  necessary  t h a t  bad i d e a s  a r e  screened 
o u t  a s  soon a s  p o s s i b l e  and do n o t  use t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  of t h e  
o rgan iza t ion .  
I n  t r y i n g  t o  look f o r  o b s t a c l e s  t o  t h e  innovat ion process  t h e  fol lowing 
two a r e  t h e  most important:  
- a n  i d e a  i s  n o t  p resen ted  f o r  judgment; 
- an  i d e a  i s  judged i n c o r r e c t l y ,  
The p r e s e n t a t i o n  of i d e a s  f o r  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  is  very important and 
r e q u i r e s  a  favorab le  mot iva t iona l  c l imate .  The c l i m a t e  could b e  inf luenced 
by showing, i n  words and deeds ,  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of i d e a s  i s  apprec ia ted .  
The persons  judging t h e  i d e a s  have a l s o  a  s t r o n g  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  mot iva t iona l  
c l i m a t e  i n  g iv ing  feedback t o  t h e  person p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  idea .  The judges of 
t h e  i d e a s  could perhaps b e  given t r a i n i n g  i n  s o c i a l  s k i l l s  and c r e a t f v i t y  i n  
o rder  t o  improve t h e i r  performance i n  g iv ing  t h e  feedback and i n  see ing  o t h e r  
p o s s i b l e  a p p l i c a t t o n s  o f  t h e  i d e a ,  bu t  it seems c l e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  performance 
t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  is  dependent on p e r s o n a l i t y  f a c t o r s .  
The development of an o r i g i n a l  idea  i n t o  u s e f u l  innovat ion has  t o  go 
through s e v e r a l  phases.  The a p p l i c a t i o n  f i e l d  perhaps has t o  be  changed, 
t h e  f i n a l  r e a l i z a t i o n  should be given t o  ano ther  department,  o r  t h e  
product ion p rocess  w i l l  be i n  need of ref inement .  During t h a t  development 
i t  i s  important t h a t  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  in f luences  from markets,  product ion 
processes ,  l abor  resources ,  e t c . ,  a r e  considered and reso lved  i n  an 
optimal way. I n  t h e  adap t ion  of t h e  i d e a  t o  i t s  f i n a l  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h e  use 
o f  c r e a t i v e  disagreement could  b e  seen a s  an important  f a c t o r ;  t h e r e  a r e  
e x p e r t s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  t r y i n g  t o  f i n d  and r e s o l v e  d i f f e r e n t  o b s t a c l e s  
which h inder  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of an  idea .  I n  t h i s  phase i t  is  
e s p e c i a l l y  important  t h a t  a l l  t h e  t a c i t  arguments a g a i n s t  t h e  i d e a  a r e  
brought i n t o  t h e  open and a r e  discussed i n  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  way. The 
d i scuss ion  should thus  be  cons ider ing  t e c h n i c a l  and q u a n t i f i a b l e  m a t t e r s  
where t h e  assumptions a r e  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The human f a c t o r  i n  innovat ion management is very important.  The human 
f a c t o r  i n f l u e n c e s  both  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l  and through i t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
I n  o rder  t o  achieve t h e  g o a l s  def ined f o r  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i t  i s  a l s o  necessary  
t o  r e f l e c t  them i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  Using a model of both  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  we could  c o n s t r u c t  some requirements  which should be  imposed 
on t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  The requirements  could a l s o  s e r v e  a s  a c h e c k l i s t  t o  
be used i n  improving t h e  performance of t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  
Although i t  i s  comparatively s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  t o  compile some of t h e  
requirements  i t  is  r a t h e r  a s t o n i s h i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  they have 
no t  been considered.  The e x i s t e n c e  of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i s  one 
of t h e  major o b s t a c l e s  t o  many o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t  t o  a t t a i n  t h e i r  
primary and secondary goals .  With r e s p e c t  t o  innovat ion management i t  i s  
i n  some cases  r a t h e r  a s t o n i s h i n g  t h a t  any i d e a  g e t s  through i n  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  systems used. 
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MOBILIZING THE WORKING TEAMS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INNOVATIONS 
AT THE STATE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION ELPROM 
Ivan Bachvarov, Vesselin Vassev, ~assil Vassilev 
State Economic Association ELPROM, Sofia, Bulgaria 
The role of the human factor in the implementation of innovations in the 
electrical industry, and possibly other industries too, has two divergent 
apsects: 
o On the one hand, it can be conservative, with workers unwilling 
to 'introduce any changes into well-established production routines 
characterized by good technological and economic indicators; this 
unwillingness may well be justified and objective from a very short- 
term perspect. 
o On the other hand, when those participating in the innovation pro- 
cess at all levels are convinced that innovation is needed, they 
find ways to overcome any negative aspects of the implementation 
process or the period immediately thereafter; in such circumstances 
the human factor plays a very positive and in many cases decisive 
role in the rapid and widespread implementation of the innovation 
concerned. 
Of course, these are two very extreme situations: in practice, we en- 
counter many intermediate variants where one or the other factor predominates 
to a greater or less extent. If we consider the development of the innovation 
process over time, the conservative aspect usually prevails at the beginning, 
after which the constructive implementation attitude gradually asserts itself. 
Of course, waiting for the natural development of the process very often con- 
fronts us with the bitter truth that the innovation is already too late (in 
particular, when new products are to be introduced); favorable market and 
other conditions may have ceased to exist, and the overall level of efficiency 
that might have been reached with earlier implementation is now unattainable, 
resulting in losses in the shape of increased costs for finished development 
activity and in losses of lower sales. 
For this reason, it is very natural that each firm should attempt to 
speed up the process of "ripening" of the human factor until a sufficient 
level of understanding is reached about the need to promptly implement a given 
innovation. As a rule, the need for basic innovations, which will determine 
the firm's development and very existence, is assessed and decided by the re- 
sponsible management of the firm. However, in many cases and particularly 
under the conditions ofaplanned economy, some innovation implementation tasks 
are assigned by the corresponding higher-level authorities, which are mainly 
guided by the interests of the national economy. On the other hand, individ- 
ual innovations are frequently initiated on the shop floor and in particular, 
by the research and development divisions of the firm. 
All these features may be observed in the activities of the State Econ- 
omic Association "Elprom" in the area of innovation implementation. As a 
first step in overcoming the inertia of employees involved in implementation, 
optimum and real plans both for the current year and for a longer period of 
time (five or more than five years ahead), are prepared and approved. By ex- 
amining tasks proposed by individual divisions and discussing these tasks 
beforehand, the Association management takes a decisive step toward their 
eventual successful fulfillment. 
The approval of a real and resource-supported plan that has been the sub- 
ject of preliminary discussion and development by corresponding sections of 
the Association and devisional managements does not mean, however, that all 
-
divisional or Association resources have been taken into account. One of the 
most important "resources" in this sense is the maximum mobilization of those 
employees who participate directly in the development and production processes. 
The criticial period during which to achieve this mobilization is that 
corresponding to the development of the so-called counter plan, a device that 
we have utilized for over ten years. Under this system the approved plan for 
the forthcoming calendar period (one year, for example) for each division is 
sent to those who directly participate in the production process. The members 
of every first-level production team are assigned direct responsibilities, as 
specified in the divisional plan. Within the production enterprises these 
teams consider, first of all, ways of fulfilling the production tasks assigned. 
During the discussions, individual members of the team and the first-level 
team as a whole make counter-proposals on how best to fulfill both the plan 
itself and additional tasks, according to the specific situation, which in- 
crease the possibility of wage increases and improvementsinsocial and every- 
day living conditions. Among the proposals from the first-level teams are 
suggestions connected with innovations, though mainly directed at the improve- 
ment of the production process, related to working practices. Proposals con- 
concerning the adoption of new products, with improved technological and econ- 
omic specifications, are comparatively rate at this level. 
Discussion of the counter plan continues at a higher level in each of the 
divisions of the Association (in individual shops, for instance). Evaluations 
are made at this level as to which of the proposals of the first-level teams 
can be dealt with within the framework of the structural unit concerned and 
which of them must be handed over to the next higher level. 
Thus, step-by-step, the discussion moves up to enterprise management 
level, where it includes not only the direct administrative management that 
took part in the compilation of the approved plan, but all the managements of 
the various social organizations involved, the economic council of the enter- 
prise, and the delegates meeting. At this level it is finally decided which 
of the proposals made during all the stages of the discussion will be accepted, 
and which cannot be implemented within the division and must therefore be dis- 
cussed when coordinating the counter plan of the Association as a whole. The 
latter group generally covers the adoption of new products and the implemen- 
tation of new technological and organizational assignments for particular 
divisions. 
One of the main reasons for the counter planning procedure is to en- 
courage the disclosure of additional, inner reserves within the planned 
financial and labor resources. Only when highly efficient proposals are made 
to serve the needs of the Association, are possibilities considered for the 
additional provision of the necessary resources from available reserves, and 
sometimes from a redistribution of resources between divisions. 
The divisional counter plans, after discussion with Association manage- 
ment, provide a basis for the Association itself to work out its own counter 
plan, based on the changes made by the divisions, reflecting changes in indi- 
vidual specifications, and underlining the most important tasks to be solved 
at the level of the Association. The counter plan of the Association is ap- 
proved by its higher collective management body, the economic council. 
In contrast to the shop floor production divisions, the institutes and 
other research and development units in the State Economic Association Elprom 
develop their own counter plans, where tasks connected with the development 
of new products and technological processes (including equipment for their 
implementation) predominate. To coordinate these development and implementa- 
tion activities, the representatives of the institutes and other engineering 
organizations of the Association directly participate in the preparation of 
counterplans for the production units. On the one hand this approach makes 
it possible to keep development units informed of the needs of the production 
units for new products, technological tasks and equipment, as well as the 
organizational problems faced by the productions units; on the other hand it 
ensures that new projects from the engineering departments are implemented in 
the production process at the appropriate time. 
The fact that the development of the counter plan begins with the first- 
level teams within the divisions, and that division and Association employees 
at all levels take part in the discussion of the plan means that each person 
has the opportunity to voice his or her personal opinion and to assume fur- 
ther responsibility; in turn, upon successful fulifllment of the counter plan, 
this may lead to extra payments, improvement of working conditions, better 
social and living conditions, etc. From what has been said, it can be seen 
that the constructive involvement of the human factor in tasks connected with 
the implementation of innovations essentially involves speeding-up the imple- 
mentation itself and overcoming the innate human conservatism regarding new 
techniques or practices. 
Unfortunately, in practice the making and approving of counter plans (in- 
cluding those parts that cover the innovation process) frequently does not 
exactly follow the idealized scheme described above. Organizational short- 
comings due to a variety of factors, distort the way in which the counter plan 
process operates; this is sometimes manifested either in superficial discus- 
sion of the tasks of the approved plan in the first-level working team or in 
this stage being completely ignored and replaced by discussion of the problems 
at divisional management level. It is clear that isolating a large and even 
predominant part of the divisional team in this way from creative discussion 
of the counter plan destroys the opportunity to use the capacities of the work- 
ing teams for speeding up the implementation of innovations throughout the 
Association. 
Measures taken to avoid a purely formal attitude to the development of 
counter plans fall into two groups: administrative and social. The first of 
these concerns the Association management whose representatives directly par- 
ticipate in the making of counter plans in the divisions. The second group 
covers the social and political organizations involved, including the working 
teams of the divisions. The interests of the trade union organizations are 
directed toward the improvement of the standard of living of its members, to 
increasing their social incentives within the division, to improving working 
conditions, etc. Since the active and creative discussion of both the ap- 
proved plan and the "bottom-up" counter plan at all divisional levels results 
in the more complete satisfaction of these interests, these organizations also 
exert pressure on the administrative management of the division to prevent an 
excessively formal attitude to the making of the counter plan. 
Motivating those who participate directly in the production process 
through the construction of counter plans is one of the ways for overcoming 
human conservatism utilized in the State Economic Association Elprom, although 
as we have seen, the counter plan is also directed toward the improvement of 
production and overall economic activity. 
Another approach, specifically aimed at the accelerated implementation 
of innovations in the production divisions and the activation of the "human 
factor" is related to the working contacts between the Association's develop- 
ment centers-the two research institutes and the "Balkan" scientific and 
production enterprise* on the one hand, and the production divisions serviced 
by them, on the other. This type of activity is characterized by the conclu- 
sion of bilateral (usually one- or two-year) contracts between the develop- 
ment organization and the production unit it services. In practice these 
contracts are drawn up between the working teams of the two divisions taking 
part in the fulfillment of the common taks, with their directors (or deputies) 
and the leaders of the social. and political organizations as their represen- 
tatives. The contracts are based upon cooperation in the fulfillment of their. 
mutually planned tasks, i.e., those tasks that are developed in the project 
development unit for subsequent implementation in production units. The 
state and indepartmental norms specify to a great extent the relations between 
designer and implementor, particularly concerning the volume of work as well 
as the completion and documentation of various stages of the project up to 
the handover of results by the implementating enterprise. Unfortunately, 
strict observation of all the prescriptions of these norms is very time- 
consuming and slows down the research/implementation cycle; in practice this 
leads to delays in the arrival of new products in the marketplace or in the 
adoption of a new technological process. It is not difficult to see that all 
of these delays mean losses for the enterprise and the Association as a whole, 
and a decrease in the effectiveness of development activity. 
The objective of these contracts, which mainly cover important projects 
from the strategic viewpoint of the Association's future development, is that 
teams of specialists and workers from each organization identify productive 
and organizational possibilities in order to carry out in parallel some pro- 
portion of the otherwise consecutive operations at each individual stage. 
Mainly this involves the launching of new products, starting equipment design 
and devising the necessary tools even before work on final tests, and the 
*I. Bachvarov, V. Vassev, V. Vassilev, "Management Structures of Innova- 
tion Systems in the State Economic Association Elprom". Proceedings of the 
IIASA'Task Force Meeting on Organizational Structures in Innovation Management 
Prague 30 May-4 June, 1984. IIASA, Laxenburg: CP-83-50. 
modification and documentation of experimental product samples. Certainly, 
there is some (perhaps considerable) risk if changes need to be made in the 
already designed and manufactured tools, and this not only makes the project 
more costly but can also delay implementation. To decrease this risk, the 
two parties assume responsibilities within the contract for close cooperation 
during the process of product design and the development of the required tools 
for regular production. In practice, this cooperat ion means additional in- 
volvement of team members and stimulates them to speed up implementation of 
the new product. 
A specific example of cooperation involving this type of contract is 
given by the cooperation between the "Nikola Belopitov" Institute of Electric 
Industry in Sofia and two plants producing complex electric drives for metal- 
cutting machines in the towns of Sliven and Troyan, with regard to their in- 
troduction of a range of DC servo drives in 1980-1981. At the beginning of 
1980, the customers for Elprom three-pulse DC servo drives required improve- 
ments in some of their technical specifications. This could have been 
achieved quickly through the improvement of individual units of the drives 
but within the existing three-pulse concept. At the same time, this course 
of action would have delayed the development of a new range of DC servo drives 
based on the six-pulse concept, which potentially allows considerable improve- 
ment in all the main technical economic specifications of the drives to cater 
for a wider range of consumers. Through discussions of the most appropriate 
method to attain the technical levels requested by customers, the Association 
management, the managements and ~orking teams of the "Nikola Belopitov" 
institute, and the implementingplantsdecided to speed up the development of 
the new range of six-pulse drives by applying the form of cooperation already 
established through contracts between the institute and the plants. The 
correctness of this decision was confirmed in practice by the appearance and 
acceptance after less than a year of the first version of the six-pulse DC 
servo drives, followed by the introduction of practically all the remaining 
model sizes (with a few specific exceptions) in the subsequent year. During 
the period that would have been required to introduce the necessary changes 
in the existing drives, corresponding models from the new long-term series 
were adopted, quickly followed by model sizes produced for the first time. 
Meanwhile, on the basis of these decisions, improvements were made in the 
manufactured three-pulse drives, thus more fully satisfying the specific needs 
of consumers. These positive results were achieved thanks to the maximum mo- 
bilization of the specialists and workers who implemented and realized the 
project, and their initiative and creativity which were reflected in the 
award of the Dimitrov prize in 1982 to the leading specialists and authors of 
the project. 
Naturally, the results of institute-plant contracts can be unsatisfactory 
if an excessively formal or nonspecific approach is followed when the mutual 
obligations of both parties are determined. In such situations, the Associ- 
ation management, the administrative management, the social organizations, and 
the managements of the agreeing parties must work particularlyhardto control 
and improve the cooperation, to mobilize the human factor in order to speed 
up the implementation of innovations, and to prevent a formal, superf icial 
attitude that can have negative effects instead of stimulating the initiative 
and creativity of workers and specialists. 
Other methods are also utilized within Elprom to encourage initiative and 
creativity in the implmentation of innovations, but we shall not discuss these 
here. 
In conclusion, we would like to point out once again that one of the 
ways to activate the "human factor" in the process of innovation implementa- 
tion according to our experience with the State Economic Association Elprom, 
is to put into effect administrative forms and methods of management that 
involve the participation of teams of specialists and workers, represented 
either by themselves, by their direct managers, or by the social and political 
organizations. 
HOW TO CONTROL THE INNOVATIVENESS OF AN ORGANIZATION 
Lasse J. Kivikko 
Innovation In s t i t u t e  Otukon, 
Espoo, Finland 
We need creativity if we are in search of innovations. 
Creativity is not a blind power that is in a bottle, and the only 
question to solve is not: Where is the corkscrew? 
Therefore, the right question is not: How to stimulate creativity in 
one's organization? This way of putting the question is not specific enough. 
Systematic research and empirical work in numerous Scandinavian 
industrial and service organizations gives support to much more sophisticated 
starting-points in creativity and innovation management. It can be said that 
one has to control the innovativeness of one's organization. 
We therefore have to ask our questions like this: 
1. What kind of creativity is needed? 
(Profile?) 
2 .  What kind of creativity is not needed? 
(Frustrations !) 
3 .  To what kind of problems do we focus the creative power of 
our organization? 
(Priorities!) 
4. Which are the main obstacles to the needed creativity? 
(At organizational level.) 
5. What kind of creative capacity do we have in our organization? 
(Strengths and weaknesses at individual level.) 
In, a 
or gani za t i 
are given 
systematic evaluation that was carried out in 25 Finnish industrial 
.ons (with 1,000 to 5,000 employees) emphasis on (actual) difficulties 
in the following way: 
- Ability to find new problems and challenges. 20 - 26% 
- Ability to reformulate and to restructurize 
open-ended problems. 
- The knowledge-factor. 
- Ability to produce ideas (variations). 
- Ability to make use of problem-solving methods. 14 - 22% 
- Evaluation of ideas produced. 5 - 15% 
- Implementation of selected ideas. 
- "Listening . " 
TOTAL 100% 
In one Scandinavian company (heavy industry) a lot of time and money 
was invested in creativity training, to restructuring the organization, etc., 
without any results. The real problem was (and still is!) that the upper 
management are afraid of the company executive officer (CEO). They would 
not take any risks and would not do any experiments. 
In another Scandinavian company (process industry) the main problem was 
in focusing the creativity. They obtained some help when they began to apply 
MBO . 
It seems there is not much worth in investing too much in increasing 
activity at the individual level if other factors are too far behind. 
There must be a kind of balance among all relevant factors and we must 
go step by step along a positive spiral: 
There are two b0ok.s which show many practical paths to innovative and 
creative organizatiop: 
- The Art of Japanese Management (R.T. Pascale and A.G. Athos); and 
- In Search of Excellence; lessons from America's best-run companies 
(T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman); 
that bring forward the same conditions for innovation which apparently form 
the base of innovativeness in many Scandinavian organizations. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVITY I N  MANAGERS, TECHNOLOGISTS AND 
MARKETERS ENGAGED I N  PRODUCT INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
Vilkko Virkkala 
KONE Corporation, Helsinki, FinZand 
BACKGROUND 
The following exper iences  and impressions a r ebas ed  mainly onobserva t ions  
gathered from two t r a i n i n g  programs developed and used i n  Finland.  The Cre- 
a t i v i t y  DeveZoprnent (CD)  Course was o r i g i n a l l y  developed a t  KONE Corporation 
i n  1974. The course  m a t e r i a l  was a l s o  given t o  INSKO, t he  Engineering Organ- 
i z a t i o n s '  Training Center and has  undergone s eve ra l  refinement cyc les  s i nce  
i t s  in t roduc t ion .  The s tudy group under INSKO, which only s t a r t e d  i n  t h e  
Spring of 1983, number 400. A s  one study group c o n s i s t s  t y p i c a l l y  of between 
seven and n ine  people,  and a s  t h e  program has  been i n  continuous use a t  i t s  
o r i g i n a t o r  corpora t ion ,  some 3,000 t o  4,000 people have by now worked through 
the  course,  o r  have a t  l e a s t  s t a r t e d  it. Some 50 t o  60 percent  of t h e  par- 
t i c i p a n t s  have been product development engineers ,  t h e r e s t  c o n s i s t i n g o f o t h e r  
engineers  o r  t echn ic ians  but  a l s o  non-technical people.  
The Management Creativity Development (MCD) Bogram was a l s o  developed 
i n  cooperat ion between KONE Corporation and INSKO. This  program i s  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  t he  CD course  but  con ta ins  more ma te r i a l  needed by managers. I n  
a way, t h e  MCD program i s  intended t o  be a combination of an Organizat ion 
Development (OD) program and t h e  CD course.  The MCD program i s  only about 
two years  o l d  and so  f a r  only s i x  groups have completed it. 
Both t he se  courses  a r e  based on t h e  group sel f -s tudy p r i n c i p l e .  A group 
of s i x  t o  n ine  people work through ma te r i a l  s e n t  i n  s u i t a b l e  i n s t a l lmen t s  by 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  organ iza t ion .  The core  of both programs c o n s i s t s  of exe r c i s e s  
on r e a l  problems s e l ec t ed  from t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t ' s  work, home o r  hobby environ- 
ments. There i s  no teacher  ( p a r t l y  because good t e ache r s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  hard ly  
e x i s t )  but a "Godfather" ( f o r ge t  t h e  movie), namely, a person who has  a l ready  
worked through t he  course  and has  received some add i t i ona l  t r a i n i n g ,  and who 
v i s i t s  t h e  group two o r  t h r ee  t imes t o  provide help .  The CD course  r e q u i r e s  
between 100 t o  150 hours of work dur ing about one year ,  t h e  MCD program some- 
what more. A cons iderab le  p a r t  of t h e  work (perhaps up t o  60 percent)  can be 
d i r e c t l y  product ive  i f  t h e  exe r c i s e s  a r e  s u i t a b l y  se lec ted  from problems t h a t  
ought t o  be solved anyway. 
EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS FROM THE ABOVE DESCRIBED ACTIVITIES 
What Type of C r e a t i v i t y  Should be Developed? 
C r e a t i v i t y  i s  now a very  popular sub j ec t ,  but d i f f e r e n t  people use t he  
word t o  mean very d i f f e r e n t  th ings .  The fol lowing t h r e e  meanings, a t  l e a s t ,  
seem t o  e x i s t :  
o A r t i s t i c  c r e a t i v i t y ;  p ro t agon i s t s  of t h i s  group would t y p i c a l l y  
l i k e  t o  r e s e rve  t h e  word " c r ea t i v i t y "  f o r  themselves and would 
p r e f e r  t h a t  some o the r  word be used i n  p r a c t i c a l  l i f e .  
o P r a c t i c a l  c r e a t i v i t y ;  cons i s t i ng  j u s t  of t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  genera te  
unusual i dea s .  
o P r a c t i c a l  c r e a t i v i t y ;  seen a s  a complete process  beginning wi th  
t he  i n i t i a l  vague f e e l i n g  t h a t  an  oppor tun i ty  f o r  improvement 
might e x i s t  and ending when a new idea  i s  i n  ful ly-accepted use  
by t h e  app rop r i a t e  people.  
My opinion i s  t h a t  t h e  l a s t  one i s  by f a r  t h e  most f r u i t f u l  approach. The 
wel l  known c r e a t i v i t y  r e s ea r ch  p ioneers  a t  t h e  New York S t a t e  Univers i ty  
College a t  Buffalo d i v i d e  t h i s  process  i n t o  t h e  fol lowing f i v e  phases:  
o Fac t  f i nd ing  
o Problem f i nd ing  
o Idea f i nd ing  
o So lu t ion  f i nd ing  
o Acceptance f i nd ing  
This f i v e  phase formula i s  used i n  two ways: a s  a rough guide on how t o  pro- 
ceed when so lv ing  a problem and a s  a code on how t o  s o r t  ou t  t h e  problem- 
so lv ing  methods and o the r  informat ion concerning t h e  process .  Both uses  of 
t he  f i v e  phase process  a r e  very  u se fu l .  Bas ica l ly  t h e  same process ,  wi th  a 
s l i g h t  modi f ica t ion ,  i s  used i n  t h e  F inn ish  t r a i n i n g  programs a s  a genera l  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  hold t h e  m a t e r i a l  toge ther .  
How Much.Training i s  a S u i t a b l e  Amount? 
Qui te  a l o t ,  bu t  a c t u a l l y  very  l i t t l e .  One needs a long a c t i v i t y  in- 
volvement i n  t h e  c r e a t i v e  problem-solving a r ea  t o  f u l l y  understand how t e r -  
r i b l y  bad t he  behavioral  models we have been taught--most ly  ind i rec t ly - in  
school a r e ,  and which a r e  s t i l l  being taught  con t i nua l l y  by, e .g . ,  TV p lays .  
Here a r e  j u s t  a few examples: 
o That it i s  important t o  immediately know t h e  r i g h t  answer. 
o That t h e  r i g h t  answer i s  f a u l t l e s s .  
o That more educated people-pupils i n  a h igher  class-know 
everything b e t t e r .  
o That t he  hero always knows what t o  do and does no t  have t o  
search o r  a s k f o r i d e a s .  
o That it  i s  f i n e  t o  g ive  snappy, quick-witted answers. 
o That i f  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  opinions  then n a t u r a l l y  a qua r r e l  
begins and t h e  hero wins. 
Now, most people a r e  q u i t e  i n t e r e s t ed  i n  c r e a t i v e  problem-solving and 
would l i k e  t o  l e a r n  how t o  do it. However, t h e  s tudying h a b i t s  of t y p i c a l  
a d u l t s  a r e  such t h a t  they cons ider  anything above a one week seminar t o  be 
almost unthinkable .  The F inn ish  CD course  r equ i r e s  about t h r e e  t imes t h a t  
amount of s tudying time dur ing one year ,  and many people have remarked t h a t  
only towards t h e  end of t he  year  do they begin t o  understand what i t  was a l l  
about.  S t i l l ,  120 hours r ep r e sen t s  only about 0.4 percent  of t h e  time they 
spent  i n  r egu l a r  schools ,  homework included. Trying t o  n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  ill- 
e f f e c t s  of s tandard school ing,  TV, e t c . ,  wi th  t h i s  small  amount of a n t i d o t e  
i s  a l ready  q u i t e  a brave e f f o r t .  I would no t  l i k e  t o  reco~mnend a smal ler  
dose.  The Engl ish  consu l t an t  Vincent Nolan speaks about a "vaccinat ion 
phenomenon": a smal l  dose of b a c t e r i a  o r  c r e a t i v i t y  development r e s u l t s  i n  
no i n f e c t i o n b u t  immunity aga i n s t  l a r g e r  doses.  People who r ece ive  such doses  
of c r e a t i v i t y  t r a i n i n g  a r e  happy t o  be l ieve  t h a t  now they know most about it. 
I posed t h e  fol lowing ques t ion  t o  about 20 managers whohad ju s t  f i n i shed  
t h e  MCD program: I f  you had t o  develop an i d e a l  educat ion program f o r  f u t u r e  
managers, beginning from e a r l i e s t  grade school,  what percent  of t h e  time 
would be devoted t o  t h e  types  of ques t ions  and methods included i n  t h e  MCD 
program? The answers spread from between one t o  65 percen t ,  an  average of 
18 percen t .  This 18 percent  would mean some 5,000 t o  6,000 hours.  
Wouldn't This Belong t o  Elementary, Basic Education? 
Yes, but can you wai t  f o r  some 100 yea r s ?  
People t y p i c a l l y  s t a r t  our type of c r e a t i v i t y  t r a i n i n g  by thinking t h a t  
c r e a t i v i t y  i s  something q u i t e  f i n e ,  belonging only t o  some elat.ed s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  d i s t ingu ished  profess ions .  During t h e  year  they f i n d  t h a t  what they l e a r n  
i s  a s t o n i sh i ng l y  u se f u l  i n  everyday l i f e .  Afterwards,  one o f t e n  hears  t h a t  
t h i s  should be taught  i n  elementary school t o  everybody. I q u i t e  agree ,  but 
i f  we had t h i s  f i n e ,  creat ivi ty-promoting elementary school system ready t h i s  
year ,  i t  would take  nea r l y  60 years  f o r  a l l  people i n  working l i f e  t o  be 
graduates  from t h e  new school.  It w i l l  a l s o  probably be q u i t e  a time before  
we could have t h i s  school wi th  t eachers  who can do t h e  job.  
What E f f e c t s  Does This Type of Training Have? 
One would perhaps expect success  s t o r i e s  about f i n e  t e chn i ca l  invent ions .  
To a c e r t a i n  degree such s t o r i e s  a r e  being t o l d ,  but  more o f t e n  what people 
r e l a t e  a r e  genera l  improvements i n  t h e  working atmosphere. These a r e ,  of 
course ,  more no t i c eab l e  i n  o rgan iza t ions  where a high percentage of employees 
have p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t he se  courses .  They a r e  even more no t i c eab l e  i f  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  atmosphere of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  was t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n .  One 
o f t e n  hears  remarks t h a t  t h e  atmosphere a f t e r  t h e  CD courses  i s  much more 
open and p o s i t i v e  than before ,  and t h a t  a l l  k inds  of ideas  can be presented 
and discussed f r e e l y .  There seems t o  be a genera l  be l i e f  t h a t  many of t h e  
hundreds and thousands of l i t t l e  d a i l y  problems f i n d  b e t t e r  so lu t i ons ,  a l -  
though success s t o r i e s  of s i n g l e ,  ve ry  va luab le  i dea s  a r e  not so common. I 
remember, however, t h e  case  of one f a i r l y  l a r g e  company where t h e  people 
claimed t h a t  one of t h e  very  f i r s t  exe r c i s e s  produced such a va luab l e  idea  
t h a t  i t  c e r t a i n l y p a i d f o r  t h e  whole program i n  t h e  company. 
I n  t h i s  con tex t ,  i t  might be u se fu l  t o  remark t h a t  when I t r i e d  t o  ana- 
l y s e  some unsuccessful  des igns  made i n  my corpora t ion  i t  was t y p i c a l  t h a t  t h e  
b a s i c  idea of t h e  des igns  was no t  wrong. The designs  f a i l e d  because of a 
l a r g e  number of d e t a i l  problems: t h e  genera l  competence of t h e  group was 
j u s t  not  s u f f i c i e n t  enough t o  handle t he  l a rge  mass of d e t a i l s  we l l  enough. 
Some f a i r l y  t y p i c a l  comments heard from p a r t i c i p a n t s  of t h e  CD course  
a r e :  
o  "The g r e a t e s t  d i f f e r e n c e  I see  i n  our  working s t y l e  i s  t h a t  i n  
s i t u a t i o n s  which p r e v i o u s l y  would have led  t o  a  p r e s t i g e  c o n f l i c t ,  
people  now a s k  'How do we handle  t h i s  type  of problem?' .  Then 
they  t a k e  a  formal  problem-solving method and by u s i n g  i t  they 
proceed i n  a  c o n s t r u c t i v e  way." 
o  "The b e s t  p a r t  of t h e  CD course  i s  t h e  s e c t i o n  devoted t o  
l i s t e n i n g  s k i l l s . "  
o  " F i r s t  we t r i e d  t o  r u n  through t h e  course  i n  ha l f  t h e  recommended 
one yea r .  Then we found t h a t  i t  was no t  a  good i d e a .  There i s  
enough s t u f f  t o  d i g e s t  f o r  a  year."  
o  "My most s u c c e s s f u l  e x e r c i s e  was on a  q u i t e  d e l i c a t e  non-technical  
problem. I do n o t  l i k e  t o  t e l l  what i t  was." 
o  "One of t h e  most v a l u a b l e  t h i n g s  learned was t h a t  i f  I do n o t  
succeed t h e  f i r s t  t ime,  I know how t o  t r y  aga in .  Thus I now of t e n  
succeed i n  c a s e s  t h a t  I would have abandoned wi th  my prev ious  
s t y l e . "  
I n  d i s c u s s i o n s  one o f t e n  g a t h e r s  t h e  impress ion t h a t  t h e  course  has been a  
q u i t e  profound l e a r n i n g  exper ience  t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t .  The b e n e f i t s  a r e  n o t  
a t  a l l  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  working environment, and s t o r i e s  about cons ide rab ly  
improved fami ly  l i f e  a r e  a l s o  f a i r l y  common. 
CONTENTS OF THE COURSE PACKAGE 
The main c o n t e n t s  of bo th  t h e  packages, a s  f a r  a s  t h e  c r e a t i v e  problem- 
so lv ing  p rocess  i s  concerned,  c o n s i s t s  of t h e  fo l lowing  t h r e e  p a r t s .  
1. The five-phase p rocess .  
Described above. 
2. A c o l l e c t i o n  of problem-solving methods. 
These could be understood t o  be t o o l s ,  so r t ed  i n t o  a  toolbox w i t h  f i v e  
compartments formed by t h e  phases  of t h e  p rocess .  I n  t h e  idea - f ind ing  com- 
partment t h e r e  a r e  ha l f  a  dozen i d e a  f i n d i n g  methods. I n  t h e  s o l u t i o n -  
f i n d i n g  compartment t h e r e  a r e  t o o l s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  and r e f i n i n g  i d e a s .  The 
s e l e c t e d  e v a l u a t i n g  methods could be c a l l e d  personazized decision anuZysis 
~ O O Z S  (Ulvila-Brown 1982).  Mechanis t ic  methods t h a t  t r y  d i r e c t l y  t o  p o i n t  
t o  t h e  optimum s o l u t i o n  a r e  n o t  recommended. 
It seems t h a t  heavy, mathematics-intensive d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  methods 
have l i t t l e  use  i n  everyday i n d u s t r i a l  l i f e ,  product development included.  
They may even be harmful a s  compared w i t h  simple methods complemented wi th  
human i n t u i t i o n  and judgment. R e a l - l i f e  d e c i s i o n  making s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  norm- 
a l l y  v e r y  complicated and f u l l  of u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  and it i s  a b s o l u t e l y  impos- 
s i b l e  t o  inc lude  a l l  important  f a c t o r s  i n  a  mathematical  model. I f  t h e  model 
i s  s imple ,  i t  i s  easy t o  remember t h a t  t h e  model must be used only  a s  a  ve ry  
rough guide .  I f ,  however, t h e  des igner  o r  o t h e r  person made a  g r e a t  e f f o r t  
t o  bu i ld  a  comprehensive model, he  o r  she may be tempted t o  be l i eve  too much 
i n  t h e  model and neg lec t  an important f a c t o r  t h a t  was no t  included.  
The main method presented i n  t h e  acceptance-finding p a r t  i s  pa r t i c i pa -  
t i o n  i n  t he  process  a s  e a r l y  a s  pos s ib l e ,  but a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  eva lua t i on  
phase. 
3. A t t i t udes ,  s k i l l s  and h a b i t s .  
A s  t o  t he se ,  t h e  above mentioned problem-solving methods a r e  a l s o  used 
a s  a kind of mental gymnastics: t h e i r  use i s  understood t o  develop "crea- 
t i v e  f i t n e s s ' '  t h a t  c o n s i s t s  of a t t i t u d e s ,  s k i l l s  and h a b i t s ,  such a s :  
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  vary  one ' s  way of th ink ing  between widely imagina- 
t i v e  and p r a c t i c a l .  
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  prolong t he  idea-finding phase beyond f i nd ing  t h e  
f i r s t  f e a s i b l e  idea .  
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  l i s t e n  t o  o the r s  i n  a  p o s i t i v e ,  cons t ruc t i ve  way. 
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  s e e  s o l u t i o n  ideas  from many viewpoints i n  a  
balanced way. 
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  s ee  a  d i f f e r e n c e  of opinions  a s  a  s i t u a t i o n  requ i r -  
i ng  cons t r uc t i ve  problem-solving, not  arguing.  
o  The a b i l i t y  t o  see  oppo r tun i t i e s ,  an a t t i t u d e  of cons t ruc t i ve  
d i s con t en t .  
o  The b e l i e f  t h a t  i dea s  can be generated a s  needed. 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
The CD course  was n o t  s t a r t e d  i n  i t s  p re sen t  group se l f - s tudy  form. The 
f i r s t  a t tempt  was ind iv idua l  se l f -s tudy because i n  t h e  o r i g i n a t o r  company 
people t r a v e l  a  l o t .  It was thought t h a t  i nd iv idua l  se l f - s tudy  of fe red  t h e  
b e s t  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  pace t o  t r a v e l  and o t h e r  busy per iods .  The 
very beginning looked good: when we wanted t o  f i n d  about 30 people t o  t r y  
out  t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  of t h e  m a t e r i a l  package, 70 appeared.  Af t e r  a  couple 
of months, however, almost everyone had stopped progress ing.  The f a i r l y  de- 
manding e xe r c i s e s  were j u s t  being postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y .  I f  we had no t  re-  
organized t h e  course  i n t o  t h e  group sel f -s tudy form probably only two or  
t h r e e  percent  of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  would have f i n i s h e d .  Now i n  courses  
s t a r t e d  v i a  INSKO about 90 percen t  of s t a r t e r s  f i n i s h  t h e  course .  I n  t h e  
o r i g i n a t o r  company t h e  corresponding f i g u r e  i s  only about 60 percen t .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  course  i s  f r e e  t h e r e  may have something t o  do with  t h i s .  
Because t h e  courses  a r e  f a i r l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  they a r e  vo lun ta ry  i n  a l l  or-  
gan iza t ions .  The spread of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  an o rgan iza t ion  i s  q u i t e  i n t e r -  
e s t i n g .  I f  t h e  managing d i r e c t o r  o r  top management i n  genera l  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  
and p a r t i c i p a t e ,  f u l l y  o r  even p a r t l y ,  q u i t e  a  high percentage of employees 
may p a r t i c i p a t e .  The h ighes t  f i g u r e ,  about 80 percent  of t h e  s a l a r i e d  s t a f f  
and a  remarkable percentage of workers too,  has  been achieved i n  one such 
company (Vaisala  Oy), t h a t  manufactures advanced meteorological  ins t ruments .  
If the use of these courses starts at lower levels it does not, in general, 
spread to the higher levels and, typically, not very widely horizontally 
either. In quite a number of discussions I have tried to find cases where 
participation in the CD course has spread one step directly upwards in an 
orgagization: i.e., where thebossstarted it after one of his subordinates. 
So far I have found only one such case. 
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Human Fac to rs  i n  Innova t ion  Management 
He1 s i n k i  , 9-14 October, 1983 
Many t h e o r i s t s  and p r a c t i o n e r s  o f  i n n o v a t i o n  management a r e  r e a l i z i n g  
t h a t  s t r a t e g i e s  i n v o l v i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  f i n a n c i a l ,  o r  t e c h n i c a l  measures 
t o  promote i n n o v a t i o n  cannot be f u l l y  e f f e c t i v e  w i t h o u t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
spec ia l  c r e a t i v e  and p r o d u c t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  t h e  human behav io r  i n v o l v e d .  
Human behav io r  i s  indeed a  commonali ty o f  i n n o v a t i o n  problems and oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  around t h e  wor ld ,  molded by  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  d i v e r s i t y  o f  c u l t u r a l  
and h i s t o r i c a l  backgrounds. Thus,comparative a n a l y s i s  o f  ideas and exper- 
i e n c e  i n  addressing t h e  human f a c t o r  i n  i n n o v a t i o n  w i l l  be an impor tan t  
aspect  o f  t h e  o v e r - a l l  IIASA s tudy  o f  I n n o v a t i o n  Management i n  E l e c t r o -  
techno1 ogy . 
The Task Force Meet ing w i l l  be organ ized around t h e  f o l l o w i n g  major  
i ssues: 
1 .  T r a i n i n g  and Development of  Human Resources. 
2 .  St reng then ing  Worker ~ o t i v a t i o n  f o r  I n n o v a t i o n  and Qua1 i ty. 
3. I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  I n n o v a t i o n  Leadership and Management. 
4. Easing t h e  T ransac t ion  of I n n o v a t i o n  Change. 
Four major  sessions on these t o p i c s  w i l l  be he1 d, a long  w i t h  a  general 
sess ion f o r  p resen ta t ions  by i n d u s t r i a l  managers w i t h  exper ience i n  a1 1  
aspects .  A syn thes is  sess ion w i l l  p resent  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  common 
themes and concl  us ions  f rom t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e s e n t a t i o n s .  A d e t a i l e d  o u t -  
l i n e  o f  i ssues  under each of  t h e  fou r  ma jo r  c a t e g o r i e s  i s  a t tached.  
FORMAT AND PROCEDURE 
The meet ing w i l l  be focused on t h e  unique s t r e n g t h  of  an IIASA-convened 
group: t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  l e a r n  by drawing on t h e  comparat ive exper ience and 
t h e o r y  o f  t h e  v a r y i n g  s o c i a l  and economic systems represented.  To accom- 
p l i s h  t h i s  we w i l l :  
1  ) Take spec ia l  s teps t o  promote r e a l  d i scuss ion ,  p rob ing  quest ions,  
and idea exchange among p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
2 )  encourage p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  s t ress  r e a l  exper ience w i t h  ideas i n  
ac tua l  appl i c a t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  const ruct i .ve d iscuss ion  o f  prob- 
lems encountered and f a i l e d  ideas as we1 1 as successful  ones. 
Learn ing from f a i l u r e  w i l l  be emphasized as an impor tant  p a r t  
o f  t h e  general l e a r n i n g  process. 
3)  encourage p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  b r i n g  t o  t h e  meeting t he  broadest 
poss ib le  v iew o f  t h e i r  coun t r i es '  i nnova t ion  experiences, 
theor ies ,  and cu r ren t  debates on t he  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of human 
f a c t o r s  i n  innova t ion .  
S p e c i f i c  steps t o  meet these goals w i l l  i n c l ude  a schedule f o r  r e c e i p t  
o f  speakers' papers which w i l l  a l l ow  them t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  i n  ad- 
vance. Speakers w i l l  be asked t o  o r a l l y  sumnarize o n l y  t he  h i g h l i g h t s  o f  
t h e i r  papers, t o  maximize t h e  t ime a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d iscuss ion.  I n  add i t i on ,  
d iscussants w i l l  be designated f o r  each paper. They w i l l  have a spec ia l  
formal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  s tudy s p e c i f i c  papers, and lend  d iscuss ion o f  
them. Speakers w i l l  a l s o  be asked t o  pu t  toge ther  packets o f  recen t  i m -  
po r tan t  1  i t e r a t u r e  from t h e i r  coun t r i es  o r  f i rms  on innova t ion  management. 
These w i l l  be dupl i c a t e d  and d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a1 1 p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  t o  p rov ide  
un ique ly  broad i n s i g h t s  on comparative g lobal  i nnova t ion  t h i n k i n g  . 
P a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  be drawn from coun t r ies  represented a t  IIASA and a 
few others .  A c t i v e  execut ives and managers from e l  ec t ro technology and 
o t h e r  f i r m s  w i l l  be invo lved,  a long w i t h  exper ts  f rom research i n s t i t u t e s  
and u n i v e r s i t i e s .  Heavy emphasis w i l l  be placed on r e l a t i n g  management 
theory  c l o s e l y  t o  ac tua l  management p r a c t i c e  and needs. A d e t a i l e d  o u t l i n e  
o f  issues t o  be covered under t he  major headings f o l l ows .  
-242- 
Major  Issues f o r  t h e  Task Force Meet ing Agenda 
Human Factors  i n  Innova t ion  Management 
I. TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF HllMAN RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION 
A. New s k i l l s  needed f o r  promot ing i n n o v a t i o n  among va r ious  groups o f  
employees: s c i e n t i f i c ,  engineer ing,  manageri a1 , and p roduc t ion  
personnel .  
1. T r a i n i n g  f o r  v e r s a t i l i t y  and a d a p t a b i l i t y  t o  change i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  
2 .  T r a i n i n g  f o r  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  i n t e g r a t e  ideas and s c i e n t i f i c ,  
engineer ing,  and design c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
3. T r a i n i n g  f o r  i n n o v a t i v e  problem s o l v i n g .  
B .  New approaches and methods of t r a i n i n g  o f  impor tan t  groups o f  
employees: s c i e n t i f i c ,  engineer ing,  manageri a1 and p roduc t ion  
personnel. 
1. Workshops and seminars on innova t ion  and i n n o v a t i o n  management. 
2 .  E x p e r i e n t i a l  t r a i n i n g  f o r  personal development, c r e a t i v i t y ,  
and comnunication s k i l l s .  
3. T r a i n i n g  f o r  teamwork and group c r e a t i v i t y .  
C .  Issues and approaches t o  m i  d-career t r a i n i n g  and r e - t r a i  n i  ng. 
1 .  Es t ima t ing  va lue and a l l o c a t i o n  o f  resources t o  mid-career 
t r a i n i n g  . 
2 .  Methods o f  mi d-career t r a i  n i  ng and r e - t r a i  n i  ng . 
D. Issues faced i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t r a i n i n g  and human resource development 
as a s o c i e t a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
1 .  A n t i c i p a t i n g  s k i l l  needs; keeping t r a i n i n g  programs i n  l i n e  
w i t h  workplace needs and techno log ica l  change. 
2 .  Financ ing f o r  t r a i n i n g  investment, f rom government and employer 
sources. 
3. I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  employer and i n d i v i d u a l  investment i n  human 
resource devel opment . 
11. STRENGHTENING WORKER MOTIVATION FOR INNOVATION AND QUALITY 
A. P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  goal s e t t i n g ,  system p lann ing,  and design.  
B. I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  i n n o v a t i o n  and c r e a t i v i t y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups. 
C .  Removing b a r r i e r s ,  systems f laws, o r  c o n f l  i c t s  t h a t  i n h i b i t  i nnova- 
t i o n  and c r e a t i v i t y .  
D. Encouraging new and unconvent ional  approaches t o  irnprovement o f  
products  and p roduc t ion .  
E. B u i l d i q g  worker  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  goals:  
1 . Worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  s e t t i n g  1 ong-term goa ls  and s h a r i n g  
long- term b e n e f i t s .  
2. Using p l a n n i n g  systems as communication dev ices t o  b u i l d  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  understanding,  and suppor t  o f  1 ong-term 
goal s. 
I I I. INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
A. B u i l d i n g  i n c e n t i v e s ,  removing d i s i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  long-range t h i n k i n g .  
B. Encouraging c r e a t i v e  r i s k - t a k i n g .  
1 .  B lend ing t r a d i t i o n a l  f i s c a l  p lann ing  w i t h  i n t e l l i g e n t  
gambl i ng. 
C. B u i l d i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  n u r t u r e  and u t i l i z e  t h e  s t r e n g t h s  o f  
unconvent ional  b u t  c r e a t i v e  i n v e n t o r s ,  entrepreneurs,  and groups. 
D. B u i l d i n g  teamwork and h a b i t s  o f  coopera t ion  f o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and 
i n n o v a t i o n  ; reduc ing i n d i v i d u a l  and group c o n f l  i c t .  
E. P r o v i d i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  a1 1 ow o v e r a l l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  goal s t o  
dominate " t e r r i t o r i a l "  subgroup goa ls .  
F. C r e a t i n g  i n n o v a t i v e  group norms and personal  a t t i t u d e s .  
G. B u i l d i n g  subgroup s e l f  re1  iance,  r e s p o n s i b i l  i ty, and c r e a t i v i t y ,  
w h i l e  a l s o  encouraging communication and coopera t ion  among subun i t s .  
H. Recogniz ing s p e c i a l  management needs a t  t h e  v a r y i n g  stages of t h e  
i n n o v a t i  on process.  
I V .  EASING THE TRANSITIONS OF INNOVATIVE CHANGE 
A. Resol u t i o n  o f  group and i n d i v i d u a l  c o n f l  i c t s  a r i s i n g  f rom i n n o v a t i o n  
i n t r o d u c t i o n .  
B. B u i l d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t r a d i t i o n s  t o  p r o v i d e  c r e a t i v e  new pathways 
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  and groups d i sp laced  by  i n n o v a t i v e  change. 
C. R e t r a i n i n g  systems f o r  d i s p l a c e d  managerial o r  p roduc t ion  personnel .  
D.  I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  new techno logy and processes i n t o  e x i s t i n g  p roduc t ion  
and market ing systems. 
E .  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m i c r o e l e c t r o n i c s  on management and product ion,  e.g., 
r o b o t i c s ,  computer ized management and communication systems. 
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AGENDA 
MCNDAY 10 OCTOBER 
11:30 Registration (VTT Conference Hall) 
12:OO Lunch (VTT) 
14:OO-17:30 WELCOME ADDRESS 
P. Jauho (Finland) 
INTRODUCTORY SESSION 
Chairman: V. Goncharov ( IIASA) 
OPENING ADDRESS 
B. Segerstahl (Finland) 
H. Andersin (Finland) 
IIASA Plans of Electrotechnology Case Study Development 
and Main Goals of the Helsinki Task Force Meeting 
V. Goncharov (IIASA) 
PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: B. Segerstahl (Finland) 
Human Factors in Innovation Management-Themes, Contra- 
dictions, and Questions for Our Meeting T. Moss (USA) 
Some ~ethodological Approaches to Analyzing Human Factors 
in Innovation Management G. Wolf (Austria) 
Coffee 
DISCUSSANTS 
L. Hanes (USA) 
M .  Karttunen  inland) 
L. Zacher (Poland) 
Sauna and reception hosted by the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis at Keilaniemi (a short walk 
from the hotel). 
TUESDAY 11 OCTOBER 
9:OO-12: 30 PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: E. Razvigorova (Bulgaria) 
Co-chairman: B. WahZstrom (Finland) 
Social Invention and Innovation S. Lundstedt (USA) 
Innovation Management: Some Socio-Psychological and Legal 
Aspects in Socialist Countries M. Benjamin (IRIMS) 
Stressing Human Factors in Innovation Management-Will it 
Work? T. Moss (USA) 
DISCUSSANTS 
0. cervenka (CSSR) 
G.  Wolf (Austria) 
Coffee 
Innovation Management and Quality of Working Life 
L. Zacher (Poland) 
Innovation-The Human Side G. Wolf (Austria) 
DISCUSSANTS 
M. Benjamin (IRIMS) 
S. Lundstedt (USA) 
Lunch 
PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: 9. Moss (USA) 
Co-chairman: J .  Honko (Finland) 
Requirements for the Performance of Managers in the 1980s 
and Possibilities for the Development of Effective 
Management J. Smbka (CSSR) 
Human Factors in Innovation: Employee Involvement 
L. Hanes (USA) 
DISCUSSANTS 
V. Ryssina (USSR) 
B. WahZstrom (Finland) 
Coffee 
External Consultants for Fundamental Process Innovation 
F. Prakke (The Netherlands) 
The Role and Position of a Public Research Institution 
in Innovation Management E. OrmaZa (Finland) 
DISCUSSANTS 
V. VirkkaZa (Finland) 
P. Naert (EIASM) 
Bus departs for reception hosted by Valmet and Stromberg 
at Kaivohuone restaurant in Helsinki. The bus will return 
to the hotel at 10: 30. 
WEDNESDAY 12 OCTOBER 
9:OO-12:30 PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: 0. fervenka (CSSR) 
Co-chairman: H .  Andersin (Finland) 
Strategic Management Implications of New High Technologies 
A. Patz (USA) 
The Future Generation-A Generation of Innovations E. 
Razvigorova (Bulgaria) 
DISCUSSANTS 
F. B a k k e  (The Netherlands) 
J .  SmrEka (CSSR) 
Coffee 
Role Structures and Creative Potential of Working Teams 
V. Ryssina (USSR) 
Innovation Management and the Role of Creativity 
J. Langrish (UK) 
Managerial Effectiveness: Implementation of a Seminar for 
the Upper Management of Siemens AG D. HempeZ (FRG) 
DISCUSSANTS 
T .  Moss (USA) 
A. Patz (3SA) 
Lunch 
PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: G. Wolf (Austria) 
Co-chairman V. VirkkaZa (Finland) 
Motivational Factors in a Product Development Project 
H .  Andersin (Finland) 
Training Human Resources for Innovation 0. E e r v e n k ~  
(CSSR) 
Implementation of Decision Support Systems P. Naert 
(EIASM) 
DISCUSSANTS: 
D. HempeZ (FRG) 
L. Kivikko (Finland) 
Coffee 
Practical Aspects of Human Factors in Product Development 
M. Karttunen (Finland) 
WEDNESDAY 12 OaOBER CONT. 
The Human Factors in Organizations: Some Implications 
on Innovation Management B. WahZstrtlm (Finland) 
DISCUSSANTS 
J .  Langrish (UK) 
E. Rzzvigomva (~ulgaria) . 
Bus departs for reception hosted by Nokia. The bus 
will return to the hotel at 10:30. 
THURSDAY 13 OCTOBER 
9:OO-12:30 PLENARY SESSION 
Chairman: M. Karttunen  inland) 
Co-chairman: J .  Smrcka (CSSR) 
Features of Mobilization of the Working Treams for 
Innovations Implementation in the State Economic 
Association ' 9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M "  V. Vassev (Bulgaria) 
How to Control the Innovativeness of an Organization 
L. Kivikko (Finland) 
Development of Creativity in Managers, Technologists 
and Marketers Engaged in Product Innovation Activities 
V.  VirkkaZa (Finland) 
10: 30-11:OO Coffee 
Discussion on the program of the forthcoming IIASA Task 
Force Meeting to be held in Albena (Bulgaria) 7-11 May 
1984. T. Moss (USA) 
Discussion on the program of the forthcoming IIASA 
Conference on "Innovation, Flexibility and Productivity 
Improvement" to be held in Vienna, 17-21 September, 1984 
G. Wolf (Austria) 
Discussion on Contents of the IIASA Monograph on Inno- 
vation Management J. Smrcka (CSSR) 
General Discussion 
12:30-13:30 Lunch 
Afternoon free for informal discussion or sightseeing. 
FRIDAY 14 OCTOBER 
8: 30 
12: 30 
13:30 
BUS departs for technical visits to Nokia and Strumberg 
Lunch hosted by StrHmberg 
Bus returns to hotel 
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